Fixing the Shadows – Access to Art and the Legal Concept of the Cultural Commons by Bruncevic, Merima
FIXING THE SHADOWS 
ACCESS TO ART AND THE LEGAL CONCEPT 
OF CULTURAL COMMONS 
 
 
 
 
MERIMA BRUNCEVIC !!
  
 2 
Juridiska institutionens skriftserie 
Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs universitet 
 
Skrift 016 
2014 
 
Fixing the shadows: Access to art and the legal concept of cultural commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Merima Bruncevic, Göteborg 2014  
ISBN 978-91-87869-01-3 
 
Grafisk design: Jeffrey Johns 
Tryck: Kompendiet 
 
  
 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I want thank my supervisor, Professor Håkan Gustafsson (University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden). His guidance, encouragement, wit, inspiration, trust, pa-
tience, endurance and friendship enabled me to write this thesis. He introduced 
me to the wonderful world of legal philosophy and jurisprudence already when 
I was a law student. For all of this and for his steady support, I will be forever 
grateful! A special thank you to my co-supervisor, Professor Ulf Petrusson 
(University of Gothenburg, Sweden), for his advice, frankness, valuable com-
ments, joy and discussions.  
My good friends and colleagues doctor Leila Brännström (Lund University, 
Sweden) and Associate Professor Filippo Valguarnera (University of Gothen-
burg, Sweden) for reading, discussing and commenting on the first draft of this 
thesis, and challenging me at my final seminar. Leila and Filippo, thank you for 
your diligent work, and for your valuable comments when I needed them the 
most. I also want to take this opportunity to thank Professor Juha Karhu (Uni-
versity of Lapland, Finland) who has provided me with many insightful tips and 
comments throughout my doctoral studies. I am particularly grateful for his 
reading and comments on a very early draft of this thesis, as well as for all his 
spellbinding accounts of Northern Finland and Ethiopia that always stir my im-
agination. 
A thank you is due to the Dean of the School of Business, Economics and 
Law, Professor Per Cramér and the Head of the Department of Law, Associate 
Professor Thomas Erhag for making our workplace a wonderful academic and 
creative environment. Thank you both for granting me the privilege to work in 
an environment that promotes free thinking, dialogue, equality and excellence. 
To my colleague Erik Björling, with whom I have not only shared a supervi-
sor, but also teaching commitments, as well as the love of legal theory, a big 
thank you, Erik, for your friendship, support, wonderful comments throughout 
these years, for sharing some of my burdens, and for your intriguingly steady 
and constantly happy demeanour. A special thank you also to Professor Eva-
Maria Svensson (University of Gothenburg, Sweden), Associate Professor Sara 
Stendahl, (University of Gothenburg, Sweden) and doctor Wanna Svedberg 
(University of Gothenburg, Sweden), three very inspirational colleagues, who 
have always supported me. To my colleagues Associate Professor Filip Bladini, 
doctor Joachim Åman, doctor Andreas Moberg, my fellow doctoral candidates 
Philip Linné, Annkatrin Mayerson, Jannice Käll, among others, and everybody 
else at the Department of Law, who have supported me, my work, and with 
whom I have shared discussions, laughs, sometimes even tears, frustration, but 
mostly joy; dear friends, you are all wonderful! A warm thank you to Jeffrey 
Johns, who helped me with the layout of this book. And finally, to all our stu-
 4 
dents who always require of us to be the best that we can be, you have been an 
unceasing source of inspiration and joy. 
Another person who is due the warmest of thank yous is Mr. Benjamin 
Geissler. With his help and kind assistance I have been given a remarkable op-
portunity in terms of access to documents and information, which enabled me 
to conduct the study on the Bruno Schulz mural. The fate of this artwork reso-
nates throughout this thesis. Thank you, Benjamin. 
Had it not been for the very generous financial support of Göteborgs Han-
delskompani, this research would not have been possible. The board of trustees 
of Göteborgs Handelskompani are patrons of science in the truest of all senses 
and they deserve all the acknowledgements and recognition for their support of 
academic endeavours and young researchers. Thank you! Financial support has 
also been provided by: Gad Rausings Stiftelse, Stiftelsen Lars Hiertas Minne, 
Anders Karitz Stiftelse, Wilhelm & Martina Lundgrens Stiftelse, Iris Stiftelsen, 
Emil Heijnes Stiftelse. The possibility to spend some time in Paris and to study 
Gilles Deleuze in detail was enabled by the fact that the Swedish Institute invit-
ed me to stay in one of their guest apartments. All this together, enabled me to 
conduct this study. My gratitude is endless. 
Finally, to my mother Ajsela and my father Resad, thank you for instilling 
the urge in me to think independently and critically. And to my sister Mersiha, 
my partner in crime, and brother Isak, the joy of my world, there are no words 
to describe my gratitude to you both. Thank you, family, for your unwavering 
love, support and for putting up with all of my, and I know they are many, idio-
syncrasies and whims. Without you, this thesis would not have been written. 
For that, and everything else, you have all my love. 
 
 
Merima Bruncevic 
Götaplatsen, Gothenburg, Sweden. 
April 2014 
 
 
 
  
 5 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................... 3!
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... 5!
ENTER .............................................................................................................................. 11!
VOLUME I: BEYOND THE ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION 
 
Part 1: The Law 
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 21!
1.1! ACCESS AND NOT OWNERSHIP .................................................................... 28!
1.2! THE DARK SIDE .............................................................................................. 35!
1.3! PROBLEM AND PURPOSE .............................................................................. 36!
1.4! DELIMITATIONS ............................................................................................. 41!
1.5! INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONCEPT OF THE 
CULTURAL COMMONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ................................................ 43!
1.6! CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL COMMONS .................................. 48!
1.7! METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................... 51!
1.7.1! THE DELEUZIAN ENCOUNTER ............................................................ 55!
1.8! SITUATING THE THESIS WITHIN ITS CANONICAL HEIMAT(S) ................ 59!
1.9! STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS: A RHIZOMATIC JOURNEY ........................... 62!
1.9.1! SUMMARY OF THE EIGHT CHAPTERS .................................................. 63!
1.9.2! HOW THE CHAPTERS MIRROR EACH OTHER AND THE PURPOSE OF 
THE VOLUMES ...................................................................................................... 65!
1.9.3! THE NOMADIC STRUCTURE AND ITS METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS .. 65!
2! A RHIZOMATIC JURISPRUDENCE ................................................. 71!
2.1! INTRODUCTION TO DELEUZE .................................................................... 71!
2.1.1! DELEUZE AND GUATTARI .................................................................... 72!
2.1.2! DELEUZE, DELEUZE/GUATTARI AND POSTMODERNISM ............. 75!
2.1.3! DELEUZE AND LAW .............................................................................. 77!
2.2! DETERRITORIALISING JURISPRUDENCE .................................................... 79!
2.3! RHIZOMATIC NOMOS .................................................................................... 84!
2.3.1! THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “ASSEMBLAGES” AND “BODIES WITHOUT 
ORGANS” FOR THE RHIZOME ............................................................................ 89!
2.4! THE LEGAL THEORY OF THE RHIZOME: DELEUZE IN LAW ................... 91!
2.4.1! THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF THE RHIZOME .............................................. 93!
 6 
2.5! NOMADIC NOMOS ........................................................................................ 101!
2.5.1! LUFTMENSCH: ON THE LEGAL PERSON AND THE LEGAL SUBJECT
 101!
2.5.2! LEGAL GROUNDLESSNESS: SANS FOND ............................................ 105 
 
Part 2: The artwork 
3! THE RHIZOMATIC ARTWORK ..................................................... 111!
3.1! THE ORIGINAL FISSURE? HOW ART ALWAYS REACHED BEYOND THE 
“WHAT IS” QUESTION ........................................................................................... 113!
3.2! RHIZOME 1: INDUSTRIALISM – THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL ................... 118!
3.2.1! PLATEAU 1: THE CULTURE INDUSTRY ............................................... 120!
3.2.2! PLATEAU 2: THE DICHOTOMY BASED LOGIC, AND BEYOND ........ 121!
3.3! RHIZOME 2: POST INDUSTRIALISM – ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL CAPITAL ............................................................................................... 124!
3.3.1! PLATEAU 3: THE FORMS OF CAPITAL ................................................. 126!
3.4! RHIZOME 3: KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY – RHETORIC BASED AND 
SEMIOTIC/NETWORK BASED ART ....................................................................... 127!
3.4.1! PLATEAU 4: RHETORIC-BASED ART .................................................... 128!
3.4.2! PLATEAU 5: SEMIOTIC/NETWORK-BASED ART ................................ 130!
3.4.3! PLATEAU 6: A MIXTURE OF THEM ALL… .......................................... 131!
3.5! RHIZOME 4: THE ASSUMPTIONS ENTRENCHED IN LAW ........................ 132!
3.5.1! PLATEAU: DELEUZE AND ART ........................................................... 139!
3.5.2! PLATEAU: ACCESS 2.0 ........................................................................... 145!
3.5.3! PLATEAU: ORIGINALITY AND FIXATION ......................................... 146!
3.5.4! PLATEAU: ART AS BEING .................................................................... 148!
4! CASE STUDIES (PART 1): ENCOUNTERS AND LINES OF FLIGHT157!
4.1! ENCOUNTER 1: THE LOST MURAL OF BRUNO SCHULZ ......................... 157!
4.1.1! LINE OF FLIGHT: IDENTITY ................................................................ 162!
4.1.2! LINE OF FLIGHT: FRAGMENTED AND AURA OF THE WORK .......... 167!
4.1.3! LINE OF FLIGHT: (COLLECTIVE?) MORAL RIGHTS .......................... 169!
4.1.4! LINE OF FLIGHT: DIGITAL REPRODUCTION OF THE WORK, A 
MOVABLE PIECE, NOT MERELY CHATTEL ...................................................... 173!
4.1.5! LINE OF FLIGHT: THROUGH TIME AND SPACE, JOURNEYS TO THE 
UNKNOWN .......................................................................................................... 175!
4.2! ENCOUNTER 2: DARFURNICA .................................................................... 177!
4.2.1! LINE OF FLIGHT: DERIVATIVE WORKS ............................................. 179!
4.2.2! LINE OF FLIGHT: POSSESSION AND EXPRESSION ............................ 182!
4.3! ENCOUNTER 3: DEAD POETS ..................................................................... 186!
 7 
4.3.1! AWAY-FROM-HERE .............................................................................. 187!
4.3.1.1! THE KAFKA CASE ......................................................................... 189!
4.3.1.2! THE JOYCE CASE ........................................................................... 191!
4.3.2! LINE OF FLIGHT: DEAD AUTHORS AND ART 27 UDHR ................ 193!
4.3.3! LINE OF FLIGHT: DEBRIS .................................................................... 197!
4.3.4! LINE OF FLIGHT: RECLUSES AND PRIVACY ...................................... 198!
4.3.5! LINE OF FLIGHT: MEMORY-MAKING AND PRODUCTION OF 
HISTORY .............................................................................................................. 200!
4.3.6! LINE OF FLIGHT: BEYOND THE CLASHES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
IP RIGHTS ........................................................................................................... 201!
4.4! ENCOUNTER 4: ORPHAN WORKS .............................................................. 203!
4.4.1! ORPHAN WORKS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE .................................... 204!
4.4.2! THE RAISON D´ÊTRE OF THE CONCEPT ORPHAN WORKS ............. 206!
4.4.3! LINE OF FLIGHT: ORPHANED? THE PLAY WITH METAPHORS ...... 208!
4.4.4! LINE OF FLIGHT: GOOGLE BOOKS AND HATHITRUST ................. 210!
4.4.5! LINE OF FLIGHT: THE LOST MURAL OF BANKSY ............................ 212!
4.4.6! LINE OF FLIGHT: ORPHANED ANTIQUITIES .................................... 214!
 
--- INTERMEZZO ...................................................................................................... 217!
 
VOLUME II: THE PERFORMATIVITY OF THE COMMONS 
 
Part 3: The Common 
5! PROPERTY, SPACE AND COMMONS: FROM ROMAN LAW TO 
THE BEING-IN-COMMON .................................................................. 227!
5.1! PROPERTY AND COMMONS ........................................................................ 229!
5.1.1! IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AND LAND LAW .......................................... 231!
5.1.1.1! RIGHT OF WAY AND RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS ....................... 234!
5.1.2! MOVABLE PROPERTY AND PROPERTY LAW ..................................... 235!
5.1.3! IMMATERIAL PROPERTY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW .... 238!
5.2! SPACE ............................................................................................................. 240!
5.2.1! PUBLIC SPHERES: HABERMAS ............................................................. 240!
5.3! THE COMMONS ............................................................................................ 245!
5.3.1! THE NATURAL COMMONS ................................................................... 251!
5.3.2! THE ARTIFICIAL COMMONS ................................................................ 254!
5.4! COMMON NOT PUBLIC ................................................................................. 257!
5.5! THE BEING-IN-COMMON(S) NOT COMMUNITY ....................................... 260!
6! COMMONS V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ....................... 267!
 8 
6.1! STINTED COPYRIGHT V. DETERRITORIALISING CAPITALISM .............. 270!
6.2! THE BALANCING ACT: LEARNING V. OWNING ....................................... 277!
6.3! THE TYPE OF OWNERSHIP: PRIVILEGE V. RIGHT ................................. 284!
6.3.1! PRIVILEGE .............................................................................................. 285!
6.3.2! RIGHT ..................................................................................................... 288!
6.3.3! RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE ........................................................................ 290!
6.4! CONTENT V. CARRIER ................................................................................. 291!
6.4.1! DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT ........................................................ 292 
 
Part 4: Commons and communication – Fixing the shadows 
7! COMMONS IN THE DIGITAL ERA (CASE STUDY PART 2) ......... 301!
7.1! THE COMMONS INSIDE THE DELEUZIAN FORMS OF POSSESSION ....... 303!
7.1.1! THE SEDENTARY AND NOMADIC FORMS OF POSSESSION ............. 306!
7.2! THE RES ISSUE .............................................................................................. 308!
7.3! COMMONS (1): INITIATIVE BASED CREATIVE COMMONS .................... 312!
7.3.1! CREATIVE COMMONS .......................................................................... 312!
7.3.2! THE PROBLEM WITH THE CREATIVE COMMONS ............................ 315!
7.4! COMMONS (2): CONTRACT BASED CULTURAL COMMONS – GOING 
BACK TO THE CASES .............................................................................................. 318!
7.4.1! SCHULZ – THE LONG TERM AGREEMENT ......................................... 318!
7.4.2! THE YAD VASHEM AGREEMENT – A SEDENTARY MODEL OF 
POSSESSION? ....................................................................................................... 321!
7.4.3! KAFKA – THE WILL VS. THE JUDICIAL DECISION ........................... 323!
7.4.4! GALUT – THE KAFKA DECISION AND THE NOMADIC FORMS OF 
POSSESSION ......................................................................................................... 326!
7.4.5! SHLOSS – THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ....................................... 329!
7.4.6! CONTRACT BASED ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE – SEDENTARY AND 
NOMADIC MODELS PUT TOGETHER ............................................................... 331!
7.5! THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONTRACT BASED SOLUTIONS ..................... 333!
7.5.1! PRIVATE ORDERING – ENCLOSURE 2.0 ............................................. 333!
7.5.2! BARGAINING POWER (INCLUDING FINANCIAL POWER) ............... 335!
7.5.3! LAW AND POLITICS .............................................................................. 336!
7.6! COMMONS (3): THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF CULTURAL COMMONS ....... 339!
7.6.1! NOMADOLOGY: SMOOTH AND STRIATED SPACES AND THE LEGAL 
CONCEPT OF THE CULTURAL COMMONS ....................................................... 339!
7.6.2! THE NO-LACK ...................................................................................... 342!
8! CONCLUSION – FIXING THE CONCEPT OF THE CULTURAL 
COMMONS IN LAW ............................................................................. 349!
 9 
8.1! SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................... 350!
8.1.1! SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: VOLUME I ........................................ 350!
8.1.2! SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: VOLUME II ...................................... 351!
8.1.3! OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 353!
8.1.4! THE CASES-SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS ................................................. 355!
8.1.5! THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................ 359!
8.1.5.1! THE DELEUZE/HABERMAS – AXIS ........................................... 359!
8.1.5.2! THE DELEUZE/LUHMANN – AXIS ............................................ 363!
8.2! THE FUTURE OF RHIZOMATIC JURISPRUDENCE ..................................... 367!
8.2.1! DELEUZE AND DELEUZE/GUATTARI BY WAY OF LAW ................ 369!
 
EXIT. ............................................................................................................................. 373!
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 378!
 
 
 10 
  
 11 
ENTER 
 
 
 
 
 
Izmedju Vrta is the name of a narrow but busy and densely populated cobbled 
street hidden behind the grand Hilton Hotel in the Pile district of Dubrovnik, 
Croatia. Walking up and down the hill towards the Old Town locals as well as 
tourists pass through it daily. During the hot summer days and nights the street 
is awash with the characteristic Adriatic scents of salty sea, pine trees, freshly 
cooked food and magnolias.  
It was the summer of 2010, I had once again returned to Dubrovnik. I was 
there for a conference. Izmedju vrta, at first glance, means “Between the Gar-
den”, a weird and beautiful name, I thought to myself, with connotations noth-
ing short of Alice in Wonderland. This name, or even little phrase gave rise to 
countless images in my mind. But, I wondered, what does it mean? Where in a 
garden is between supposed to be? Again, I thought of Alice and the hole down 
which she falls into Wonderland. The fact that one of the front doors towards 
the end of the street proudly announces that Mr. Zec (Mr. Rabbit in Croatian) 
lives there did not make this fantasy any less compelling. What could between be 
referring to? Between the garden, and what? Spatially and linguistically speaking, 
it is an impossibility, one cannot be between the garden.  
The impossibility of the street name made my thoughts wander and for 
some reason I thought of Kafka’s protagonist who spends his entire life stand-
ing before a door made only for him but one that he will never pass through, a 
door where the guard never reveals what lies hidden beyond it. Thinking further 
about Kafka’s story, had the protagonist been allowed to pass through the door, 
what might he have found on the other side, might it have been a place that is 
as strange and as improbable as the between the garden? The spatial impossibility 
of the name and its linguistic improbability made me think of the people who 
had built this city. The Old Town in Dubrovnik, a medieval city, one of the first 
important Mediterranean maritime powers, can today be found on the 
UNESCO’s world heritage list. I found it symbolic that this strangely named 
street, the ‘Pearl of Adriatic’ as Dubrovnik is also known, leads down to a port 
that has historically fought off both pirate ships and Venetian armies. It seemed 
to me that Dubrovnik itself was as ephemeral as the notion of between the gar-
den, a door that connects the past and the present, the here and the beyond. I 
had numerous other ideas and variations, and the name became a constant 
source of wonderment for me. It did not leave my thoughts and it stayed with 
me until the next summer, when I returned to Dubrovnik. 
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Then, the following summer in 2011, suddenly it came to me! I realised the 
mistake I had made in translating the phrase, and it was wholly due to my lin-
guistic shortcomings. What I had assumed to be the singular object case form 
of the noun ‘vrt’ pronounced [vrta] was in fact the plural pronounced [vrtà]. 
While it is spelled the same in both instances, the street name obviously refers 
to the second option, [vrtà], simply meaning between the gardens.  
The solution to the riddle that had plagued me for over a year, turned out to 
be far less romantic than I had imagined. No Alice, no Kafka, nothing. In reality 
it was not even a riddle at all, it was just a simple language trick that I had 
played on myself. However, it did not make it any less interesting or less com-
pelling. Once I understood the meaning of the name I did not stop playing the 
language game and thinking about these gardens, in between which a Dubrov-
nik architect or city planner had once squeezed in a narrow street. Why was 
there a need for a street between the gardens, I asked myself? I searched for 
clues. Today, on the one side of the street there is mainly the imposing Hilton 
Hotel that is hidden behind a wall, but the grounds of which are nonetheless 
visible from the outside. People standing on the street are fully able to get a 
good glimpse of the beautiful 19th century building, with its characteristic emer-
ald green shutters, a building that looks out on Dubrovnik’s Old Town and the 
harbour.  
The other side of the street is, astonishingly, also lined with an even taller 
wall than the one that fences off the Hilton, a wall that is adorned by small 
front doors like the one that announces the residence of a man with the last 
name Zec. If you are standing on the street the wall on the opposite side from 
the Hilton is impossible to see behind. It goes all the way from one end through 
to the other end of the street. On that side of the wall there are mainly private 
residences. In 2010 I rented one of these houses, and have since visited several 
other in the neighbourhood and I have realised, to my amazement, that these 
front doors in the wall can often directly open up to steep steps leading up and 
down, labyrinthine walkways and even roofless tunnels, that always in the end 
lead to a beautiful garden and the family home. The private sphere of Dubrov-
nik is truly a complex network of streets, tunnels, staircases and gardens. 
In the summer of 2012 I was back in Dubrovnik once again. Being one of 
the organisers of the Critical Legal Conference that was held in Stockholm in 
September 2012, my work for the summer also involved some preparation for 
the conference. The theme that we had given the conference was Gardens of Jus-
tice. I was thus once again, both physically as well as mentally, back on the sub-
ject of the Dubrovnik street whose name had occupied my thoughts for years. 
The street that separates the large international hotel from the small private res-
idencies, the street that wriggles between the two walls on its either sides, a 
street that marks the border between the two Dubrovniks, the one that accom-
modates for the foreign, temporary, movable, public and the other that guards 
the local, eternal, immovable, private. I spent the summer once again playing 
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with words and while this time the English translation did not fail me, I became 
aware that the correct translation of the street name could still be manipulated. I 
played with it and came up with: Between the Guardens [sic!]. There is no guard 
component to the word garden etymologically (which stems from the root 
yard), but one can still be imagined or artificially construed. 
I elaborated on theses ideas in the following manner: behind the walls there 
is a garden, and in the garden there is something one might want to guard and 
protect, the family home and everything that belongs to that most private 
sphere, thus we enclose it, we raise fences around it and we keep it behind a 
wall. 
The ideas of gardens, walls, boundaries between the family home and the 
public life, and everything else that wriggles in-between, the connections 
throughout time and space that people make in order to communicate, sums up 
my work here. This research project has been marked with riddles, either erro-
neously constructed by me like the one surrounding the name of the Dubrovnik 
street, or riddles that others have bestowed upon scholars like myself navigating 
through this particular field. I have gone through doors that have lead me to 
places I may have imagined, or through other doors that have lead me some-
where I never imagined even in my wildest dreams.  
This work has been marked by travel and journeys, sometimes road travel, 
sometimes rail travel, sometimes air travel, and other times by slower journeys, 
by walking like Walter Benjamin and Guy Dabord preferred to do it. Writing 
mainly in Gothenburg on the shore of the North Sea, but also in London by the 
Themes or in Paris by the Seine, this work came to life in environments very 
closely connected to water, canals, seas, rivers, harbours. This will be evident 
throughout the thesis, the fact that I have made a scholarly journey in search for 
a connection between law, that usually connotes boundaries and walls, and art 
that challenges them. Water transcends all boundaries and therefore it gave me 
the inspiration needed to go on with this work that at times challenges every-
thing. 
This research project is difficult to describe, it can only be explained as an 
attempt to fix a fleeting shadow on water. Because any attempt to fix a shadow 
will often turn out to be impossible. It is impossible to capture a moving shad-
ow, to close it in, let alone to then place it under a microscope, or a telescope 
for that matter, and seek to study it. The realms of law and art are just like the 
realms of shadows, waters, waves, shores, and canals. Once inside these spheres 
we can never talk about walls, gardens, guards, boundaries or enclosures, at least 
not as we are used to talking about them. The object of this study that you are 
about to read can only be described as a hunt for a shadow on a watery surface, 
unlike Wendy in Peter Pan, my work is never able to capture it. Whenever I at-
tempt to trace it, my own shadow overlaps it, if I take too long tracing it, the 
light source disappears, alters or moves and everything changes completely. 
Nevertheless, I carry on.  
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Researching within this field means trying to constantly look for the connec-
tions between art and law, to make them communicate and understand each 
other, to see how they float into one another, attempting to fix that fleeing 
shadow, in search of the spaces in which shadows might dwell, dealing with and 
exploring the links, contexts and connotations between the two different fields, 
hoping to find an elusive understanding of it all that might be lingering in (be-
tween) the shadows.  
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“I renounce the fundamental contradiction.” 
 
- Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy in Roll Over Beethoven 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In November 2013 a cache containing more than 1500 paintings came to public 
attention. It had been found by chance in 2011 when Cornelius Gurlitt, the son 
of an art dealer, was being investigated for tax evasion and the authorities had 
obtained a warrant to search his home. Stored in his private Munich residency, 
the trove found by the German authorities is believed to have included looted 
art from World War II that had been referred to by Hitler as generate art [Der 
Gerettete Schatz]1. Most of the artworks held by Gurlitt might possibly be art-
works that had been pulled off the walls of German museums in 1937 and 
1938. The find may also include artworks acquired for Hitler in France for the 
aim of creating the “greatest museum in the world on the banks of the river 
Danube in Linz, the so called Führer Museum”.2 The cache, the contents of 
which are not know by the public, seems contain artworks (some hitherto com-
pletely unknown) by artist such as Picasso, Matisse, Chagall, Courbet, Degas, 
among others. According to the Focus magazine the worth of the trove may be 
more than one billion Euros.3 
It is believed that the descendants to families whose art had been seized by 
the Nazis will claim ownership to many of these artworks. 4  
 
* 
 
On the 15th of April 2013 the US Supreme Court opened the oral hearing for 
the case that has been making its way through the American courts since 2009. 
The case, Myriad Genetics,5 calls into question whether human DNA can be 
claimed as intellectual property. This case treats the question where, in legal 
terms, products of nature (which cannot be patented) end and human-made in-
ventions that are the results of human ingenuity and invention (that can be pa-
                                                
1 The saved art, as opposed to degenerate art that was deemed un-German. 
2 Art historian Godfrey Barker in an interview for BBC (3rd November 2013). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24794970. Last accessed 15th March 2014. 
3 Markus Krischer and Thomas Röll, ‘Der gerettete Schatz’ in Focus Magazine, (13th November 
2013). Available at: 
http://www.focus.de/kultur/kunst/tid-34646/titel-der-gerettete-schatz_aid_1146923.html. 
Last accessed 15th March 2014. 
4 In fact, many of the artworks have been published at the site lostart.de in order to facilitate 
the owners to locate and claim artworks. Available at: 
 http://www.lostart.de/Webs/EN/Datenbank/KunstfundMuenchen.html. Last accessed 15th 
March 2014. 
5 Latest decision: Association for Molecular Pathology, et al., Petitioners v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, No. 12-398, (16th April 2012). 
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tented) begin. Is merely isolating, even if the act of isolation requires human ex-
pertise and knowledge, a human gene enough to grant a patent? If so, what re-
percussions can such a legal decision have?   
 
“The patent law is filled with uneasy compromises,’’ commented Supreme Court Justice Ste-
phen G. Breyer.6 
 
“Why would a company undertake massive investment if it cannot patent?’’ asked Supreme 
Justice Antonin Scalia. 7 
 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor suggested that an isolated gene is “just nature sitting 
there.” 8 
 
* 
 
On March 15th 2013 the French newspaper Le Monde published an open letter, 
signed by sixty professionals belonging to the community of higher education 
and research: university presidents, directors of several Maisons des Sciences de 
l’Homme, publishers, representatives of journals, representatives of university li-
braries, professors and researchers.9 The letter was entitled « Qui a peur de 
l’open access ? » / “Who is afraid of open access?”. Commenting on the Euro-
pean Commission’s recommendation on Open Access,10 some French editors 
of journals in the Humanities and Social Sciences had expressed their concern 
with regards to this recommendation, which they saw as a threat to an already 
vulnerable business model.11 The signatories of the open letter address the con-
cern by writing: 
 
                                                
6 Adam Liptak, ‘Justices wary of bold action on gene patenting’ in Boston Globe Online, (16th 
April 2013). Available at: 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/04/15/justices-seem-wary-bold-action-
gene-patenting-case/yREhWeoaTBjToiKvKkboMP/story.html. Last accessed 5th September 
2013 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Quotes taken from the English translation provided from the website iloveopenaccess.com 
where the petition is open for further signatures http://iloveopenaccess.org/arguments-for-
open-access/. Last accessed 15th March 2014. 
11 Commission Européenne, Communication De La Commission Au Parlement Européen, Au Conseil, 
Au Comité Économique Et Social Européen Et Au Comité Des Régions, Pour un meilleur accès aux infor-
mations scientifiques: dynamiser les avantages des investissements publics dans le domaine de la recherché, 
Bruxelles, le 17.7.2012 COM(2012) 401 final. 
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“To be afraid of Open Access is, in our eyes, to commit oneself to a narrow – and in fact er-
roneous – vision of the future.” 
 
“According to us, this is not only an economic and commercial problem. […] Knowledge can-
not be treated as a commodity and its dissemination is more than ever a vital concern in our 
societies: we can work towards a revolutionary democratisation of access to research results.” 
 
“We are not afraid of Open Access. To take knowledge out of silos and beyond the bounda-
ries of academic campuses is to open knowledge to everyone, acknowledge that it has a pivotal 
role to play in our societies and open up perspectives for collective growth.”12 
 
* 
 
This dissertation is about access to art as knowledge, and the role law plays in fa-
cilitating access. As such it touches upon all of these examples above from the 
point of view of artworks. It analyses cultural property and cultural heritage as-
pects and its enforcement difficulties. It studies intellectual property law and its 
uneasy compromises, incentives as well as at instances where “nature is just sit-
ting there” as US Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor expressed it in Myriad Ge-
netics, i.e. the instances of knowledge transmission that concern the question of 
enclosure of something that exists out in the open and in the public domain for 
everybody to access. It also studies open access and the discussions and projects 
connected to the open access initiatives in order to situate the access to 
knowledge issues13 within a broader framework.  
This project discusses how to advance and strengthen access to art and cre-
ate legal pathways that facilitate the communication of art, the access and shar-
ing of it. This project introduces the legal concept of the cultural commons and how 
such a concept could be given a platform in law. In order to introduce the con-
cept, it needs to be conceived of in jurisprudence. The project therefore also dis-
cusses the traditional dogmatic legal reasoning and the impediments it faces in 
order to arrive at a conception of the cultural commons. 
The study has been divided into two volumes. The first one is called Beyond 
the ontological question and studies obstacles to access created by certain types of 
traditional legal reasoning and dogmatic law. Through a theoretical exercise that 
opens up the possibility of a commons conception, Volume I aims to get at the 
                                                
12 Quotes taken from the English translation provided from the website iloveopenaccess.com 
where the petition is open for further signatures. Available at: 
http://iloveopenaccess.org/arguments-for-open-access/. Last accessed 15th March 2014.  
13 This research does not have the ambition or intention to address artworks ontologically and 
get engrossed in the questions of what art is. In order to focus on access to art, a rhizomatic 
approach to the artworks has been applied. As such, artworks are approached as knowledge 
sources within this research. For further detail in this question see chapter 3 below. 
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potential of law. The second volume analyses the concept of the commons and 
is called The performativity of the Commons – it aims to analyse the potential of a 
cultural commons concept when applied to current law. The overall aim is to 
develop an alternative approach to law and how it deals with access to art.  
Often, studies discussing access to art from a legal perspective tend to be 
written either from a cultural heritage point of view e.g. discussing return, restitu-
tion or repatriation of artworks that have been stolen, looted or otherwise ac-
quired,14 where culture functions as an identity or an ideology. Or, as they have 
been more recently considered, i.e. from a new media, internet, information and 
knowledge society perspective,15 where culture is often presented as a property, in-
formation, or a power in a class dependent structure. Law regulates both of the-
se areas. My research project, it could be argued, is about both. And neither. 
Cultural heritage studies, in a broad sense, often study the value of ancient 
artworks, their provenance and the manner in which they were imported, ex-
ported16 or generally acquired, as well as where these artefacts might belong, to 
                                                
14 It is impossible to even account for a fracture of those works, but see e.g. James Cuno (ed.), 
Whose Culture? The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities, Princeton University Press, 
(2009), (ed.) Kate Fitz Gibbon, Who Owns the Past?: Cultural Policy, Cultural Property, and the Law, 
Rutgers University Press, (2005), John Carman, Against Cultural Property: Archaeology, Heritage and 
Ownership, Duckworth, (2005), (ed.) Barbara T Hoffman, Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy 
and Practice, Cambridge University Press, (2006), (ed.) John Henry Merryman, Imperialism, Art 
and Restitution, Cambridge University Press, (2006), Etienne Michon, Venus de Milo: Son arrivee et 
son exposition au Louvre, Paris: Revue des Etudes Grecques (1900), Colin, Loot: Legitimacy and 
Ownership, Duckworth, (2006), (eds.)Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Melanie G. 
Wiber, Changing Properties of Property, Berghahn Books, (2006), etc! 
15 It is equally impossible to account for this other strand also, but do see e.g. James Boyle, 
Shamans, software and spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, (1996), Gillespie Tarleton, Wired Shut?: Copyright and the Shape of Digi-
tal Culture, MIT Press (2007), Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to 
Gates, Chicago University Press, (2010), Lawrence Lessig, Code and other laws of cyberspace, New 
York: Basic books (1999), Lessig, Lawrence Code version 2.0, New York: Basic books cop, 
(2006), Lawrence Lessig, Free culture: how big media uses technology and the law to lock down culture and 
control creativity, New York: Penguin Books, (2004), Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and 
Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, New York: Penguin Press (2008), Lawrence Lessig, The 
Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons in a Connected World, New York: Vintage Books, (2002), 
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, Prometheus Books, (2001), (ed.) Pelle Snickars, Efter Pirate Bay, 
Mediehistoriskt arkiv, Kungliga biblioteket, Stockholm (2010), Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights 
and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity, New York: New 
York University Press, cop, (2001), etc! 
16 All governed by various international conventions, see e.g. Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Heritage during Armed Conflicts, 1954 (Hague Convention), International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966, Rapport du secrétariat, Report from the 15th Session of the UNESCO Intergov-
ernmental, Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of 
Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, Paris, 11-13 May 2009, UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Trans-
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whom they belong etc. The questions within the cultural heritage paradigm re-
volve around the rights of the people in the source countries, i.e. the countries 
in which the artworks were found, vis-à-vis the rights of large, influential muse-
ums or cultural institutions, in the keeper countries, such as the so called “ency-
clopaedic museums” with collections that span over a broad range of times, 
places, and cultures,17 e.g. the Louvre in Paris, the British Museum in London, 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, etc. places in which the art-
works often are kept and exhibited today. These discussions often revolve 
around the ownership issue and the legal ownership of the artefact.  
The first type of discussion usually concerns the ownership of artefacts which is closely con-
nected to the “identity issue,” and in these instances cultural heritage represents, constitutes and 
re-constitutes identity and heritage (national, local or that of the human kind as a whole).18 
Within the cultural heritage paradigm, the questions often make up a discussion 
whether it is truly, morally, as well as legally, always right to claim that the find-
er19 per default always should be the keeper? And so it seems to go round and 
round in what appears to be an endless debate that seems to be leading no-
where. The source countries demand their cultural heritage back, while the 
keeper countries as often as they possibly can politely decline these requests for 
return citing that the works are either too fragile to travel,20 that the source 
country does not have the proper means and knowledge to tend to the works’ 
                                                                                                                                   
fer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970 UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage Conven-
tion, 2003 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural 
Property of Nov. 26, 1976 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 1975 UNIDROIT Con-
vention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 1995 United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 
September 2007 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948… 
17 Holly Flora, ‘The Quest for the Masterpiece’, in (eds.) Francesco Francioni and James 
Gordley, Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law Oxford Scholarship Online (2013), p. 228. 
18 See e.g. UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natu-
ral Heritage (1972) (World Heritage Convention) 
19 The fact that the finders are often former colonial powers needs not be stressed any further. 
20 In her very interesting book Loot: Tomb Robbers, Treasure and the Great Museum Debate, Old 
Street Publishing, London, (2010), Sharon Waxman discusses in particular the Zodiac Ceiling 
that was taken from Denderah in Egypt and is now in the Louvre Paris. All Egyptian requests 
for its return have according to Waxman been denied on the account that the piece is too frag-
ile to travel, pp. 62-107. She presents a number of similar types of argumentation concerning 
also the so called Nefertiti Bust being stored in the Egyptian Museum in Berlin, taken from 
Tell el-Amara in Egypt, see Waxman pp. 55aa. Another, much less known Swedish example, is 
the case of the Peruvian Paraccas textiles being stored at the Museum of World Culture in 
Gothenburg, Sweden. At the time of writing a decision by Gothenburg Municipality Council 
acknowledges that the ownership of the textiles befalls the state of Peru and that the textiles 
ought to be returned to Peru (Göteborgs Stad, Kommunfullmäktige, Handling 2013 nr 148). 
However, the cost for transport and the return process are still being debated. Out of 89 
Paraccas textiles, so far only two have been returned due to the high costs connected to the 
return.  
 26 
safekeeping, or that the artefacts, after all, rightfully belong where they are now, 
as some works have indeed been exported in due legal procedures. For instance, 
the encyclopaedic museums and other cultural institutions, claim in a rather util-
itarian way that the artworks in their possession have been acquired legally, and 
where provenance is not straightforward they claim that the objects neverthe-
less belong with them, as they are there for the enjoyment of all, that they con-
stitute heritage of the entire human kind, and should therefore be exhibited 
where the greatest majority of people (regardless of national belonging) can ac-
cess them – e.g. Paris, the number one tourist destination in the world, and not 
some remote town, in a conflict torn country.21 This is the “benefit for the en-
tire human kind” argument that is often brought forward as an alternative to 
the national or local identity. 
The second type of discussion concerns access to art that mainly stems from a new media, 
internet, knowledge society perspective. This discussion runs almost in the opposite di-
rection to the one of cultural heritage. The issue of where a work ought to be 
kept is virtually non-existent in this discussion. All digital or digitised works can 
theoretically be available to anybody regardless of their physical location. How-
ever, due to for instance intellectual property laws, in day-to-day practice, it is 
not possible for everybody to have access to everything. Far from it, in fact. 
The studies from this second perspective tend to constitute a discussion con-
cerning the balance of interests between closed and open access, pros and cons 
of platforms for accessing content, balance of interest between rights owners 
and consumers, between the public and the private. Such discussions often end 
up in some type of democracy or power discourse: who can access information, 
on what terms and to whom, be it an individual or a community, such infor-
mation and knowledge belongs?  
 
So my research is about “both” of these discussions in that it does analyse cases 
concerning artefacts of cultural heritage that were found somewhere, and taken 
elsewhere, and then a legal dispute might have ensued concerning: ownership, 
which identity it can be ascribed to, or where it ought to be kept. In other plac-
es my study discusses the perils and possibilities of the digital spheres, of the art 
that exists digitally and/or online, and what law in the digital era does, does not, 
and could do, when it comes to access to art.  
My research is also about the “neither” as it does not seek to provide any 
answers to any of these questions, and certainly not the ownership question, since 
the study focuses on articulating and posing the problem differently than what 
has been done in other recent similar studies.22 Dividing the field in this way, as 
                                                
21 See e.g. Waxman, Loot. 
22 See e.g. Francoise Benhamou, Who Owns Cultural Goods?: The Case of Built Heritage, Emerald 
Books Business, Management and Economics, (2004), (ed.) Barbara T. Hoffman, Art and Cul-
tural Heritage, (eds.) Kenji Yoshida & John Mack, Preserving the Cultural Heritage of Africa: Crisis or 
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has been done so far, in either cultural heritage or digital production, by present-
ing the issue as two-fold, by creating dichotomy pairs and binary opposites, 
makes the issue appear as though there is no alternative entrance into the field 
of access to art.23 
The research focuses on questions such as what does law do, what could law 
do, what functions it performs, other than to settle conflicts and answer the 
questions who the legal owner is. Is it at all possible for law to do something 
other than that? Can law be a productive, creative force? Is law supposed to do, 
and can we as lawyers make such claims, or is law only meant to be?  
The project utilises the theories and methods of the French philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and the French psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (1930-
1992) in dealing with jurisprudence and law. Its aim is to develop a critique of 
dogmatic legal thinking and study particular obstacles to access to art created by 
certain traditional approaches to jurisprudence. This project aims to challenge 
such reasoning by using the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (henceforward 
“Deleuzian”) in a legal theoretical setting as well as the theories which Deleuze 
developed together with Félix Guattari (henceforward “Deleuzeoguattarian”), 
and finally, the research project arrives at a discussion concerning access to art 
through a legal concept of cultural commons. This is done by way of a rhizoma-
tic legal reasoning that can conceive of a conception of a cultural commons by 
means of avoiding, for instance, the usual legal dichotomies and, hopefully, 
overcoming them. Therein lie the theoretical and methodological approaches of 
this project. 
For a reader of Deleuze these types of questions are obvious when using a 
Deleuzian theory and method. Addressing a similar issue Deleuze once wrote in 
a letter: 
 
You either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what 
it signifies, and then if you’re even more perverse and depraved you set off 
after signifiers. And you treat the next law as a box contained in the first or 
containing it. And you annotate and interpret and question and write a 
book about the law, and so on and on. Or there’s another way: you see the 
law as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is ‘Does it 
work, and how does it work?’ How does it work for you?... This second way 
of reading’s intensive: something comes through or it doesn’t. There is 
nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It’s like 
                                                                                                                                   
Renaissance?, Suffolk ; Rochester, NY : James Currey ; [Pretoria] : Unisa Press, (2008), John 
Carman, Against Cultural Property, (ed.) Kate Fitz Gibbon, Who Owns the Past, etc. 
23 I shall return to this in more detail in chapter 2 below. 
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plugging into an electric circuit... It relates a law directly to what is Out-
side...24  
In that vein, this research seeks not to see law as a ‘box’ but instead it attempts 
to get beyond this proverbial box that seems to regard law either as a cognitive 
creation or as an ontological metaphor. For this research, it does not help to 
approach law as a set of boxes placed inside one another. It only leads to a 
dead-end. The theoretical approach (Deleuze/Guattari) shall be developed in 
chapter 2 below, but I will already in this chapter step-by-step introduce some 
concepts and basic Deleuzeoguattarian ideas. 
 
1.1 ACCESS AND NOT OWNERSHIP 
In the book Chasing Venus: The Race to Measure the Heavens25 the author Andrea 
Wulf describes how during two days in the years 1761 and 1769 astronomers 
from across the world set out on dangerous journeys to various corners of the 
world, from as far away as Siberia, St Helena, to India and Indonesia, in order 
to observe the so called Venus transit, that is, when the planet Venus passes the 
Sun and when this occurrence is fully visible from Earth. Measuring this pas-
sage from various places around the world meant that certain previously un-
measured distances on Earth and in the Universe could for the first time be cal-
culated (more) accurately. One single astronomer could not possibly conduct 
such an endeavour alone, nor could one single country send people to all these 
places, due to practical and political restrictions as many of the colonial empires 
such as England and France were at war at the time. The only way to carry out 
the measurements was for the astronomers to exercise diplomacy, to collabo-
rate, access and to share each other’s data and findings. Wulf writes how this 
was achieved, despite wars, savage weather and personal rivalries. Various coun-
tries26 decided to contribute with funds, astronomers, and access to their colo-
nies and territories as well as their own scientific findings in order to be able to 
conduct this project, to measure and observe the Venus passage. Each country 
had its own reason for doing so, not only the prestige of conducting such ad-
vanced studies during the Enlightenment era, but also because they knew that 
participating in this project would mean an increased and more accurate 
knowledge that could help navigation, increase trade, and perhaps, paradoxical-
                                                
24 [my emphasis, quote modified], The words in italics have been changed from the word 
‘book’ in the original quote, to the word ‘law’ in order to fit in my text here. Quote taken from 
Judith L. Poxon and Charles J. Stivale, “Sense, series” in (ed.) Charles Stivale, Gilles Deleuze, Key 
Concepts, Acumen, (2005), p. 73. 
25 Andrea Wulf, Chasing Venus: The Race to Measure the Heavens, William Heinemann: London, 
(2012). 
26 The transit of 1761: Britain, France, Sweden, Russia, America (not yet United States of 
America). The transit of 1769: Britain, France, Sweden, Russia, America (not yet United States 
of America), Denmark. 
 29 
ly, even lead to new colonies. Whatever the reason, the goal to measure the Ve-
nus passage could only be achieved by cooperating with others, by communi-
cating and by sharing and accessing each other’s territories and data.  
Likewise, when discussing the notion of cultural commons, or cultural com-
monwealth as the literary theory and political philosopher Michael Hardt and the 
political philosopher Antonio Negri refer to it, requires finding ways in which 
jurisprudence, law and the legal method can allow for, and perhaps even en-
courage, these types of endeavours: cooperation, sharing, communication, etc. 
And for such purposes law becomes something that acts, does, creates, fosters, pro-
duces rather than something that forbids, restricts, encloses and raises fences. 
This very production that law can give rise to becomes interesting from this re-
search perspective, particularly, as we shall see further down, when it comes to 
the production of public space, production of the commons and later on, production of 
knowledge and ultimately production of law. There is a lot to be said, theoretically, as 
well as legally and practically, about the production(s) of issues. Hardt and Negri 
arrive at the creative force of productivity and commons via Foucault’s History 
of Madness,27 his critique of the “false universals”, and Spinoza’s concept “com-
mon notion” when they discuss the production and the productivity of the 
commons.28 I shall develop their approach to the commons below in chapter 5. 
For now, suffice it to say that we are searching for the productive potential of juris-
prudence and law and with that a conception of commons in legal thinking and a 
legal concept of the cultural commons in law. 
So how does the cultural commons fit inside the legal sphere? The phenomenon of the 
commons usually refers to resources that are held and managed in common. 
The concept of commons is typically divided into two parts – the natural com-
mons that consists of goods in nature such as land, water, air, and the human 
commons that is occasionally also referred to as artificial or cultural commons. 
This second type of commons refers to the man-made, intellectual, tangible and 
intangible resources and comprises broadly of language, knowledge, ideas, im-
ages, rites, styles, beliefs, etc.29 The intellectual resources that form the intellec-
tual commons are idiosyncratic in their nature.30 Because of the vastness of the 
concept, this research will focus particularly on artistic works and the aspect of the 
                                                
27 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, (trans.) Jonathan Murphy, Rutledge; 1 edition (2006, 
[originally published in 1961]). 
28 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, (2009), p. 120-121. 
29 For a closer analysis of the two commons types see chapter 5 below. See also Michael 
Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’, in Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & 
Society, 22:3, 346-356. See also (eds.) Enrico Bertacchini, Giangiacomo Bravo, Massimo Marrel-
li and Walter Santagata, Cultural Commons: New perspectives on the Production and Evolution of Culture, 
Edward Elgar, (2012). 
30 See Enrico Bertacchini, Giangiacomo Bravo, Massimo Marrelli, ‘Defining Cultural Com-
mons’ in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli, Santagata, Cultural Commons, p. 3. 
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intellectual commons that is connected to the artistic expression in particular. Most of the 
significant research in terms of commons-based resources has so far been con-
ducted within the area of the natural commons, confining the cultural commons 
often to the margins of the commons studies. The legal framework that con-
cerns the natural commons is furthermore also marginalised in these types of 
studies. As an economic concept, often presented as an aspect of the prisoners’ 
dilemma, the concept of the commons in general, and the cultural commons in 
particular, often marginalises and ostracises theoretical legal exercises, and as 
such, the concept has only been topographically (at least in terms of theoretical 
approaches) treated from the legal point of view. That is not to say that promi-
nent scholars have not commented on and treated the subject. The American 
professor of law James Boyle has addressed the commons within the so called 
“second enclosure movement”31  – i.e. within the framework of what he refers 
to as expansion of intellectual property rights and the private paradigm that has 
taken over resources previously held in common. Law professor and the creator 
of the Creative Commons initiative Lawrence Lessig has addressed the legal re-
strictions on culture and ideas, often discussing the benefits of a commons con-
struction as an alternative.32 Outside the legal sphere Michael Hardt and Anto-
nio Negri have made a significant contribution in terms of the theoretical 
framework surrounding the (natural as well as artificial) commons of which the 
artistic and cultural content is naturally part of. Carol M. Rose,33 law professor, 
has also conducted some significant studies in terms of law and the theoretical 
aspects of the commons as a legal concept particularly with regards to infor-
mation and intellectual property law. One of the most recent studies, at the time 
of writing, called Protecting Future Generations Through Commons34 edited by Saki 
Bailey, Gilda Farrell and Ugo Mattei adds some further interesting aspects to 
the commons, particularly discussing the Italian Rodotà Commission that inter-
estingly introduced the category of “common goods” into the Italian Rodotà 
                                                
31 The second enclosure of the commons is one of the defining tropes within the A2K 
movement. James Boyle has coined the phrase. He refers to the first enclosure of the com-
mons, which took place in England between the fifteenth and ninetieth century, encompassing 
a long historical “process of fencing off common land and turning it into private property”. 
With the advent of global intellectual property rights “once again things that were formally 
thought of as either common property or uncommodifiable are being covered with new, or 
newly extended, property rights.” James Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of The Public Domain’ in Law and Contemporary Problems, 66, nos 1/2 (Win-
ter/Spring 2003), pp. 33-34 (first quote) p. 37 (second quote). 
32 See e.g. James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, (2008). Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas, see also (eds.) Ber-
tacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and Santagata, Cultural Commons, p. 3. 
33 Carol, M. Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public Property In 
The Information Age’ in 6 Law & Contemporary Problems 89 (2003). 
34 (eds.) Saki Bailey, Gilda Farrell and Ugo Mattei, Protecting Future Generations Through Commons, 
Trends in Social Cohesion, No. 26, Council of Europe Publishing, (2013). 
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Commission that introduced the category of “common goods” into the Italian 
Civil Code and property law. I shall be returning to these commons studies be-
low, particularly in Volume II.  
The discussion surrounding the commons thus concerns a very much still-
in-progress paradigm shift. In fact, it could be claimed that it is a three-tiered 
paradigm shift, or three types of paradigm shifts, occurring simultaneously. The 
first concerns the commons as a construction in law, the second concerns the intellec-
tual property paradigm and its existence and function in the access-and-sharing-
based digital knowledge society, and the third is an international paradigm that 
generally concerns the global access to resources, the level of openness, plat-
forms and laws that can regulate openness and access to various types of re-
sources.  
In terms of commons as a construction in law, this paradigm has to do with 
the type of logic(s) that already exist in the legal sphere. Issues such as: “Can ac-
cess to the commons be formulated as a right?”, “Or, as a new type of right?”, 
“Or, an obligation?”, “Or, a property?”, or “A heresy?”,35 “Is it contract-based 
or statutory?” – these questions are continually discussed within this paradigm.  
The second paradigm that this research touches upon is the future of intel-
lectual property and the paradigm shift from industrial to digital economy socie-
ty. There are certain assumptions that are very much industrial and based within 
the industrial society, entrenched within intellectual property law, such as that a 
work of art is presumed to be fixed and tangible, a commodity, that expression 
has to have an object-centric side to it in order to achieve the status of intellec-
tual property, that the author is always a definable individual, that creation most 
often happens ex nihilo, etc. Still, it can be questioned whether the intellectual 
property law as a paradigm in its own right, is at all mature, or ready, to even 
conceive of the cultural commons as a concept as it challenges fundamental 
grounds of IP law, and if so, to which degree of openness can it be introduced 
into IP law without destroying or seriously denting the underlying property 
right? 
The third paradigm that will be addressed within the setting of this research 
is connected to a more general international paradigm and the on-going discus-
sion in terms of how access to resources has to be regulated and governed with-
in the knowledge economy as well as the still very much present global econom-
ic crisis.  In the first sentence of their book Commonwealth,36 Hardt and Negri 
claim already in the preface that crisis such as war, suffering, misery and exploi-
tation, increasingly characterise our globalising world.37 Hardt and Negri’s writ-
                                                
35 Filippo Valguarnera, ‘Commons: framtid eller rättsligt kätteri?’ in Miljörättsliga Perspektiv och 
Tankevändor: Vänbok till Jan Darpö och Gabriel Michanek, (eds.) Lena Gipperth and Charlotta Zet-
terberg, (2013).  
36 Hardt/Negri, Commonwealth. 
37 Ibid. p. vii. 
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ings will be read with reference to the global Access to Knowledge movement 
(A2K) throughout this research. And, as Andrea Wulf manages to show beauti-
fully, when it comes to the sharing of intellectual achievements on a global level, 
wars and crisis are certainly not a new phenomenon. However, this particular 
crisis has brought on a paradigm shift of its own, where it is a question of ac-
cessing both natural and intellectual resources. In this crisis, there seems to be a 
shortage of both. 
This research project has in fact been written in a time of crisis: financial cri-
sis, environmental crisis, employment crisis, technological crisis, legal crisis, intel-
lectual property crisis… The crisis has particularly hit the global cultural industries. 
It has certainly also affected law. First it appeared as though we were entering 
the end of times.38 Then it appeared as if the only way to exit the crisis was to 
reclaim what had been lost, the causes39, the struggles, the influences, the territo-
ries, the streets, the spaces, the squares, the realms of power… To do that, law 
on a global level had to be approached differently. So law slowly, and perhaps 
unbeknownst to many of us, became something else, it became a territory, a 
machine. This project has indubitably been written with this crisis as backdrop. 
As such it tries to re-imagine jurisprudence and law in order to pose questions 
concerning the role of law in the discussion concerning access to art and the legal 
concept of the cultural commons. 
To conduct a study of law in this setting certain conceptions have had to be 
(re)visited. Introducing or reintroducing the legal concept of the cultural commons 
means that the ideological concept and the conception of ownership of cultural 
works and scientific findings slightly fall outside the scope of this research. The 
research focuses instead on access.  
My research has been conducted by studying cases that have then been 
translated into the Deleuzian theoretical matrix of concepts such as “encoun-
ters” [recontres]. This has been done in order to show current obstacles to access 
to cultural and intellectual creations such as for instance rights that restrict ac-
cess e.g. on on-line distribution and sharing, reticent rights-owners that do not 
wish to make their artworks available to the public, institutions that limit access 
to artworks, digital rights management schemes that restrict digital use, etc. 
Here, the focus is thus particularly placed on artworks as a form of intellectual 
creation and knowledge. These “obstacles” to access will be presented through 
four case studies with the aim to closer analyse the following issues: 
1) Access to the physical artworks 
2) Access to inspiration  
3) Access to artworks post mortem auctoris 
4) Access through libraries and digitisation.  
                                                
38 Slavoj Zizek, Living In The End Of Times, Verso (2011). 
39 Slavoj Zizek, In Defence Of Lost Causes, Verso (2009). 
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In access to physical artworks I look at a case where a mural painted for a child’s 
nursery during World War II was divided into pieces and the subsequent dis-
pute that ensued between various parties claiming that the pieces of the mural 
rightfully belong to them. Stressing both the physical fragmentation of the work 
as well as the fragmentised nature of the identity of its creator, the obstacle de-
scribes how a shattered identity or a shattered artwork become difficult to grasp 
and conceive of legally. Therefore, access to such works can become stifled 
and/or restricted.  
In access to inspiration I study derivative works. I look particularly at a case 
where a trademark had been incorporated in a painting for the purposes of so-
cial commentary. Discussing the branded information society and the creative 
expressions that exist everywhere today, the case studies how already existing 
original works can inspire derivative ones, and the borderlands between posses-
sion of intellectual property and the privilege of freedom of expression in a 
global branded society. Access to inspiration means being inspired by other cre-
ative expressions that exit at the time as the derivative work is being created. 
In access to works post mortem auctoris the focus is on works that have been left 
behind by, in this case, prominent authors. Discussing the role played by the 
heirs and estates that control works left behind by deceased authors, this case 
attempts to reveal ‘gatekeepers’ that exist after the original creator has passed 
away, both under the duration of copyright, as well as when the copyright term 
has expired. This particular case attempts to show that heirs and estates can 
sometimes have more control over works that are left behind than might have 
been legally intended, and the balance between the public interest in works left 
behind and the rights of family/heirs/estates is analysed in detail.  
Access through libraries and digitisation studies the legal concept of orphan works 
and how access to these works can be enabled through libraries and/or digitisa-
tion. Orphan works are works that are still within the term of copyright but 
where the creator is unidentified or unknown. The lack of rightsholders means 
that many of these works remain locked up in e.g. libraries but no one can ac-
cess them, as there is no one available to grant clearances and/or licences. Dis-
cussing the concept of orphan works in particular this case analyses which 
works fall within the definition and the possibilities in terms of access this con-
cept potentially enables.  
The four access issues have been, as already mentioned, analysed as encounters 
in the Deleuzian sense of the word i.e. something that forces law to think. What 
does that mean? Gilles Deleuze defined the concept of encounter in the follow-
ing manner: 
 
Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it 
thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that 
which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an 
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act of thought or a passion to think. The conditions of a true critique and a 
true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which 
presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. 
[…] Something in the world forces us to think. This object is not of recog-
nition but of an encounter. […] In whichever tone, its primary characteristic 
is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition.40  
 
An encounter is something that the law meets but does not recognise a priori.  
In legal research we have become quite accustomed to H.L.A. Hart’s rule of 
recognition.41 In The Concept of Law, Hart argues that the legal system comprises of 
rules and is founded on rules. The rule of recognition is thus the meta-rule, (the 
Grundnorm in Kelsen42) which recognises the foundation of law. Now, it may seem 
that the word ‘recognition’ here has two different meanings. Deleuze seems to 
be applying it in the sense of recollection, an object that we have met before, and 
we can recollect when we encounter it a second time and place it in the network 
of everything else we know. Hart on the other hand seems to be using the word 
in the sense of authority or justification, something that gives something else its va-
lidity. However, this very multi-meaning of the word is what provides us with 
the first connection between Deleuze and jurisprudence. What both Deleuze 
and Hart are implying is that recognition appears to be some kind of reaching of a 
limit. In Hart’s case it is the limit of positive law, in Deleuze’s case it is the limit 
of a recollection. In that sense the two are commensurable. A Hartian reading 
of recognition in law entails finding the limit of the legal system, and finding the 
rule that recognises and justifies its authority and existence. A Deleuzian reading 
of (non)recognition in law means finding an encounter that is unrecognisable 
within the dogmatic legal framework as outlined above and as such problematic. 
With an encounter we also find a legal problem. An encounter thus “forces 
[law] to pose a problem: as though the object of the encounter, the sign, were a 
bearer of the problem – as though it were a problem.”43 
The encounter is thus read both as a problem and a productive force. Deleuze 
explains an “encounter” as a glimmer of light, as an event, a speed, a becoming. 
It forces law to think and recollect its own validity. With the encounter some-
thing is transformed, it becomes something else – therein is the productivity: 
production of the public sphere, production of knowledge, production of law, 
etc.  
                                                
40 [original emphasis], Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, (trans.) Paul Patton, Continuum, 
(2004 [originally published in 1968]) p. 139.  
41 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon, (1961). 
42 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (trans.) Max Knight, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. (2009 
[originally published in 1934]). 
43 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 140. 
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This concept will be developed further below in section 1.7.1, but it can 
briefly be stated here that a Deleuzian encounter is a productive force, an en-
counter with something entirely new, previously unencountered, which forces 
the scholar to go “beyond philosophy through philosophy”44 or more exactly in 
terms of what this research aims to achieve to go beyond law through law as an 
epistemological endeavour. Thus, it will not indulge in the ontological question 
of what law is45but rather focus on law as a productive force as well as the pro-
duction of knowledge and legal possibilities.  
Charles Stivale describes the Deleuzian encounters as “becoming un-
hinged”.46 Focusing on access to art instead of ownership of art this research is an 
attempt to challenge law as it has been known, or as it has been assumed to be, 
to become unhinged when faced with cases that can be described as Deleuzian 
encounters. And from there on, it goes on to discuss how the concept of the 
cultural commons can be conceived of in jurisprudence and law. 
That widened possibilities in terms of access to art can and do affect owner-
ship of the underlying resource seems to be a foregone conclusion. However, 
this research attempts to show how there is a possibility to form a conception 
of a legal cultural commons that does not necessarily have to affect the underly-
ing ownership structure as well as the ownership paradigm (radically). That is 
not to say that current ownership paradigm and property based rights will not 
be criticised. But placing the critique within the theoretical framework of this 
project also means finding the possibility within jurisprudence and current law. 
Reading law in the proposed way, a concept of the commons does not have to 
(fundamentally) negate the underlying property structure.  
 
1.2 THE DARK SIDE 
Lately, the art world and the cultural industries as content creators and owners 
have seen a rapid development and unprecedented possibilities in terms of cre-
ating an ever-wider access to works through a fast dissemination of content 
through various digital platforms and alternatives. As is now widely known, the 
digital alternatives also came with a dark side that generated uncontrolled 
amounts and rapid soars in illegal downloading, piracy and counterfeiting. From 
a legal perspective, such development has been met with a defensive response, 
by creating incentives for an increasingly narrow, property-based regulation, 
with strict enforcement rights, longer durations of term of the exclusive right, 
and so forth. Enclose, and enclose quickly, seems to have been the buzzword 
                                                
44 Charles Stivale, ‘Introduction: Gilles Deleuze, a life in friendship’ in (ed.) Stivale, Gilles 
Deleuze, Key Concepts, p. 2. 
45 The ontological question is further discussed in chapter 2 below.  
46 Stivale, ‘Introduction: Gilles Deleuze, a life in friendship’ in (ed.) Stivale, Gilles Deleuze, Key 
Concepts, p. 6. 
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for the legislator. This in turn has had a negative impact on the public interest 
and the fair use principles in copyright law and other intellectual property legis-
lations. The notion of the open public domain and other collective and net-
work-based aspects of access to art had to be scaled down, not to say fully dis-
regarded, for the benefit of enforcement rights in order to actively counteract 
the on-going illegal downloading issues.  
Contrary to the development of knowledge society and the digital spheres 
themselves, which mostly revolve around a network-based sharing of 
knowledge and content, law developed in the completely opposite direction, fo-
cusing on strategies that provide stricter fences, and additional individually con-
trolled enclosures. This is a dichotomy among a multitude of dichotomies that 
we shall meet throughout this research, namely the closed, individual enforce-
ment right in copyright law vis-à-vis the open, network-based, multiple spheres 
of the digital alternatives. 
The strengthening of the enforcement rights has not gone by unnoticed. In-
dignant voices of concern have been raised around the world, claiming, (shout-
ing, tweeting, demanding, even occupying), that culture is little by little being 
colonised by the growing private domain,47 that freedom of speech is diminish-
ing for the benefit of commercial interests and the realm of creativity and 
knowledge is gradually being transformed into private property.48 These 
tendencies of progressively emphasising the commercial and private in art-
works, of strengthening the enclosed property right, this second enclosure movement 
to reiterate Boyle’s terminology, will potentially result in future cultural losses, it 
has, perhaps rightly so, been pointed out.49 
 
1.3 PROBLEM AND PURPOSE 
The problem of this research is the burning question that generates issues on a 
daily basis, namely, how to consolidate ownership and access to intellectual 
property based commodities, without losing the one (e.g. ownership) for the 
benefit of the other (e.g. access). This project focuses particularly on access to 
artworks and the creative expression as knowledge. Seen in that way, the project 
studies whether access to art can be enabled and whether a conception of 
commons can be conceived of in legal thinking when the concept of cultural 
commons is (re)introduced in law.  
Intellectual property law can be in conflict with various rules and not just the 
principle of open access. For instance, it can be in conflict with article 27 Uni-
                                                
47 Which includes, but is not limited to, the commercial and market aspects. 
48 See e.g. Lessig, Free Culture, and Fiona MacMillan, ‘Commodification and Cultural Owner-
ship’, in (eds.) J Griffiths and Uma Suthersanen Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and Interna-
tional Analyses, Oxford University Press (2005). 
49 Ibid.  
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versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) – the right to freely participate in 
the cultural community, or constitutional laws such as freedom of speech, free-
dom of expression, etc. While intellectual property law encloses the creative ex-
pression, the other two (UDHR and constitutional rights) regulate the principle 
of public interest and democracy when it comes to the acts of access and com-
munication in a free society or engagement in communication and cultural ex-
change. To put it differently, the rights of a private owner can be in a perpetual 
conflict with the interest of the public when it comes to cultural expressions.  
This is the unending hurdle in dogmatic legal reasoning that appears insur-
mountable, namely that the one always has to benefit at the expense of the oth-
er, in a legal order where we assume50 a hierarchical order according to a pre-
sumed binary logic this is the only logical way to approach conflicts of laws, 
principles or interests. In the “Deleuzeoguattarian rhizome-based logic” that I 
shall be introducing here we shall see how this particular approach allows for a 
study of law as an assemblage, legal reasoning as a map with multiple entryways.  
The “rhizome” and the rhizomatic nature of jurisprudence are concepts that 
I shall be developing throughout this study, particularly in chapter 2. The rhi-
zome is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari developed in their book A Thou-
sand Plateaus51 and as a philosophical concept it denotes something that is con-
nectable, i.e. a philosophical concept that instead of hierarchies and systematic 
organisation advocates connectabilty. This very notion of connectability shall be 
particularly explored here.  
Deleuze/Guattari borrow the term rhizome from botany, used to indicate 
multi-centred plants, with horizontal roots with offshoots that form other indi-
vidual organisms. It thus denotes a number of underground organisms that cre-
ate a network of horizontally spreading roots. In order to create a reasoning that 
is similar to such an idea, i.e. that correlates to a network based, multiple, 
spreading biological rhizome, the philosophical concept of the rhizome was de-
veloped for the sake of creating connectivity and fluidity between various, often 
                                                
50 Håkan Gustafsson points out (my translation): “A critical legal epistemology exposes, with 
all necessity, that legal concepts and boundaries are instable and contingent – namely constantly 
exposed to discursive negotiations and power displacements – and can also actively contribute 
to a destabilisation by enhancing the ‘anomalies’ of knowledge, which signify the otherness of 
law.” [original emphasis], Håkan Gustafsson, Dissens: Om Det Rättsliga Vetandet, Juridiska Insti-
tutionens Skriftserie, Skrift 9, Göteborgs Universitet, (2011), p. 33. By using the word “as-
sume” here I am aware that I am inadvertently causing certain destabilisation, to follow Gus-
tafsson’s train of thought. This temporary act of destabilisation will hopefully contribute to the 
discussion in which the anomalies and otherness of law are approached as encounters that re-
veal the potential of jurisprudence and law. 
51 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (trans. 
and foreword) Brian Massumi, London: Athlone, (edition from 2011 [originally published in 
1988]). 
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dispersed, philosophical concepts. Here they shall also be connected to juris-
prudence and legal concepts.52  
Using the concept of the rhizome as the main theoretical tool, the connec-
tion between ownership and access in law will not have to pose any problems. 
Allowing various interests and rights to be inter-connected at various levels, to 
form more or less temporary constellations, is one of the Deleuzeoguattarian 
rhizome theory’s strongest benefits. On some levels there might be a conflict of 
interests, while on others what appeared as a conflict can form a productive alli-
ance. What will be argued throughout this study is that in copyright law the pri-
vate and the public have to compete, in a commons based setting they can work 
together to form the specific rhizomatic relationship that makes up the cultural 
commons. 
The rationale behind a commons based concept in law, as I hope shall grad-
ually become apparent, is to facilitate a wider access to artworks, to enable 
communication and flows of ideas and knowledge, and to ultimately avoid ob-
structions or bottlenecks created by law. Addressing issues such as the balance 
between the public and the private, between open and closed access, between 
rights and privileges, between invention and information, the project analyses 
how jurisprudence so far has conceived of commons as a concept as well as 
how the legal concept of cultural commons can be a potential interesting path 
or a hub that could soothe the most burning problems that these issues pose to 
jurisprudence and positive law. Thus, the research question is: 
 
In order to advance and strengthen access to art and create legal pathways which facilitate that 
art can be communicated, accessed and shared, could legal thinking formulate a conception of 
the commons and could the concept of the cultural commons be introduced, applied and given a 
platform in law?  
 
So as to conduct the study, and finally address the overall research question in 
the end, the research question has been broken down into three sub-questions: 
1) How can the underlying binary reasoning in law that creates the 
opposite pairs such as e.g. private/public, open/closed, etc., 
which are hindering and/or complicating access to art as well as 
the creation of a legal conception of the cultural commons, be 
overcome?  
For this question to be addressed the Deleuzeoguattarian concept of the rhizome 
will be applied. The concept of the cultural commons requires that we reimag-
ine certain characteristics that have been taken for granted in order to conceive 
of the cultural commons. Some of those characteristics such as the binary op-
                                                
52 For a detailed discussion concerning the rhizome concept please refer to section 2.3. below. 
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posites as inside-outside, private-public, open-closed, have to be reassessed and 
formulated differently. It will be argued that the binary thinking that underpins 
dogmatic legal reasoning, particularly within the field of intellectual property 
law, creates obstacles to access of its own. Which brings us to the second sub-
question, namely: 
2) Is a dependence of a legal system, of a legal inside and a legal out-
side, a norm hierarchy, the only possible approach to law, and 
how does such a notion create obstacles to access? 
The legal system creates other types of obstacles to access too, not only the di-
chotomy-based pairings. This research project also aims to explore those. To 
answer this sub-question a constructive exercise will be conducted in order to 
show how other cognitive constructions than a hierarchical legal system can be 
beneficial to legal reasoning. Law will be approached not as a system but as a 
Deleuzian “Body Without Organs” or more accurately “Law Without Organs”. The 
law without organs concept refers to, not the body of law, but the organisation of 
law. Various ‘realities’ that exist inside and outside law, but that are not neces-
sarily always acknowledged, or that are sometimes excluded, within the dogmat-
ic legal reasoning can be incorporated into a Law Without Organs in a new way. 
Instead of presenting traditional legal fields as ‘boxes’ such as e.g. intellectual 
property law or constitutional law or human rights law that are organised and 
placed in a hierarchical order, the project aims to answer this sub-question by 
assuming a linkage based reasoning, that is when the legal concepts are enabled 
to be interlinked, rather than to compete. And finally: 
3) Can the concept of the cultural commons be divorced from prop-
erty-based reasoning? 
Ultimately, in order to formulate the concept of cultural commons the project 
poses this final sub-question that examines the incentives for development and 
rewards that intellectual property provides vis-à-vis access that open access pro-
jects promote and how the two can be interlinked and reconciled in a concept 
that focuses on communication and access instead of ownership. The project will 
answer this sub-question by demonstrating how law can enable communication 
within the cultural commons, without for that reason undermining certain un-
derlying ownership structures. 
Through Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory, this project attempts to 
introduce a conception of the cultural commons in jurisprudence and the legal 
concept of the cultural commons in law, using the three sub-questions at hand 
as a guiding light throughout the analysis. This theory is necessary mainly be-
cause it reveals the particular binary reasoning and opposite based couplings 
that have stifled further constructive attempts concerning the cultural commons 
particularly within the legal setting. The overall research question will be an-
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swered by committing to the three sub-questions above, underpinned by 
Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory and method, namely, whether it is 
possible to conceive of commons in jurisprudence and how of the concept of 
the cultural commons could be given a genuine legal platform.  
The ambition of this project is to broaden the theoretical understanding as 
to how a cultural commons may be introduced as a concept in law and how 
such a concept may function and be beneficial. Another ambition is to further 
discuss Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory and keep bringing it within le-
gal theory and jurisprudence. On a theoretical level, the rhizomatic jurispru-
dence and a wider conception of the cultural commons as a legal concept will 
open up (perhaps unexpected) theoretical alliances such as the one that Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has been exploring between Niklas Luhmnann 
and Deleuze as well as a connection between Deleuze and Jürgen Habermas 
that still remains comparatively unexplored. I shall return to these theoretical 
discussions in the eighth and final chapter of this study.  
What ties the entire research together is the search for the legal concept of the cultural com-
mons, and in order to do that, we have to revisit certain conceptions of jurisprudence, law, art 
and obstacles to access from a rhizomatic point of view, we have to also theoretically approach 
the concept of the commons and place it within the rhizomatic study of jurisprudence.  
That means that this research attempts to present certain concepts in a nu-
anced light, increasingly problematised, adding layers to them and connecting 
them to each other and other (philosophical) concepts and connections that are 
not necessarily always made or allowed for in dogmatic research. Admittedly, 
some of the connections may seem provocative, but that is done so as to reveal 
the potential of law and the benefits of a concept of cultural commons in law. 
The study has been divided in two volumes. Volume I aims to explore the 
possibilities of law in terms of the access to art. The purpose of volume one is not 
to merely present a critique of the shortcomings of law and obstacles that law 
poses to access to art, but to also through a theoretical exercise emphasise how 
the commons can be conceived of in jurisprudence, while doing that the possi-
bilities of law will be revealed when a problem or obstacle is encountered. Vol-
ume II aims to place that entire discussion inside a cultural commons paradigm and 
how it may be introduced in law. The purpose of Volume II is to theoretically con-
struct a legal concept of the cultural commons. For that to be done, various 
previous readings of the commons are presented from different points of view, 
economic, social, cultural as well as legal. Volume II culminates in a connection 
between the theoretical analysis conducted in Volume I and the readings of the 
commons conducted in Volume II, introducing a legal concept of the cultural 
commons within the rhizomatic jurisprudence. 
The research argues throughout Volume I and Volume II that the time is 
ripe to seriously discuss an introduction of a legal concept of the cultural com-
mons particularly in a time of crisis that has spurred on various paradigm shifts. 
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New life conditions require new laws and legal concepts. That means that juris-
prudence, law and existing legal concepts need to be inventoried and some con-
cepts that we have become accustomed to, may in that vein have to be changed, 
some introduced, and other reintroduced.   
 
1.4 DELIMITATIONS 
The A2K movement is challenging the coherence of this account by formulat-
ing a series of critical concepts, metaphors and imaginaries of its own – con-
cepts such as ‘public domain’ and the ‘commons’ and ideals such as ‘sharing’, 
‘openness’ and ‘access’.53 
 
So far, this research has been introduced as a study that concerns access to art. 
This research can further generally be placed within the Access to Knowledge para-
digm (A2K)54. The A2K movement is described in two ways:  
1) As a reaction to structural trends in technologies of information 
processing and in law, and 
2) As an emerging conceptual critique of the narrative that legitimis-
es the dramatic expansion of intellectual property rights that has 
been occurring lately.55 
It has been argued that these two occurrences taken together have lead to an in-
creasingly marginalised access to knowledge. The A2K movement concerns all 
areas covered by intellectual property rights including (but not limited to) pa-
tents, software, agriculture, medicine, entertainment, etc. The first delimitation 
of this project is that it shall particularly study access to artworks as knowledge 
sources and in that vein focus on primarily copyright law.  
Intellectual property rights are thus understood as a set of conceptual tools 
provided by the legislator that allow ownership and control of intellectual works 
and information. As such, it is through intellectual property people own and 
control knowledge. This management of knowledge has implication on for in-
stance the economic growth, but also on human experiences, health, and ulti-
mately, democracy. 
Often the A2K movement is presented as an activist movement, a counter 
reaction to the neoliberal movement of the 1970s. My research acknowledges 
                                                
53 Amy Kapczynski, ‘Access to Knowledge: A conceptual genealogy’ in (eds.) Gaëlle Krikorian 
and Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property, Zone Books (2010), p. 
18. 
54 See generally (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Prop-
erty. 
55 Ibid. p. 17. 
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the importance of this activist movement, particularly for the significant role it 
has played in the development of the research concerning the commons. How-
ever, the project equally attempts to reach beyond to activist aspect of the 
movement when discussing these concepts within jurisprudence and law.  
Stated in reverse then, my project does not study: 
a) The ownership issue and the property rights connected to it. As I 
have already indicated above, that intellectual works are owned and 
governed by the instruments of property rights will be addressed, but 
the ownership structures will not be studied in detail. In order to 
reach the concept of the commons, some ownership issues will have 
to be addressed. This will be done particularly in chapter 5. However, 
this is done only in order to arrive at the concept of the commons 
that shall be applied from Volume II and onwards. A study of the le-
gal concept of property rights will thus not be conducted.  
 
b) The non-aesthetic56 works in which copyright or other intellectual 
property rights can subsist such as e.g. patents, software, medicine, 
agriculture, data bases, maps and various other assemblages and 
compilations of information, intellectual property that is created 
without an a priori aesthetic rationale. While the A2K movement was 
born from the access-to-medicine movement,57 and much of the re-
search that is conducted within the field has to do with access to pa-
tent-based commodities, this research project will not study those 
types of works and inventions. The A2K discourse guide the study, 
but the particular focus is on the access to the aesthetic work. 
 
c) Mere technological inventions, digital solutions or platforms (e.g. bit 
torrents, Spotify, The Cloud, etc.) will not be studied, even if these 
inventions and platforms do generate intellectual property, enable ac-
cess, and can have certain creative functions. These technological so-
lutions are instrumental in the process of dissemination of creativity 
and knowledge, but this research focuses on the creative content that is 
being disseminated rather than the technology, i.e. content carriers that 
enable such dissemination.58 However, this statement will be slightly 
                                                
56 Or at least where aesthetic is not one of the main purposes of the work. 
57 See generally (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Prop-
erty. 
58 Lewis Hyde writes rather polemically: “Record companies don’t sell music; they sell the 
container, and thinking that the container is the music is like thinking that a shopping cart is 
food or that the wine bottle is the wine. Substituting the one for the other – the container for 
the contained – is an old trick of language; rhetoricians call it metonymy. […] When concrete 
objects deliver abstract objects, a skin of scarce and exclusive property settles over the abun-
dant and nonexclusive, stands in its stead, and makes it easy to manage rights-holders’ privi-
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modified and nuanced in chapter 6 where it will be shown that a clear 
line between content and content carrier, or form and expression, is 
difficult to draw both theoretically and practically in the digital 
knowledge sphere. 
The reason why particular focus is centred on the access issue and not owner-
ship is precisely because of the A2K movement. The conception of access tends 
to be minimised in ownership discussions, even the ones that are critical of cur-
rent intellectual property law, but are not within the A2K paradigm. However, 
within the A2K discussions there tends to be an overemphasis on patents, par-
ticularly medical, agricultural and technological inventions and the benefits and 
knowledge connected to those. Here, I am exploring how artworks as 
knowledge can further be connected to the aspects of access to knowledge. The 
cultural works are still rather unexplored or at least under-explored within the 
A2K discourse. 
The term ‘access’ in A2K was first associated with access-to-medicine cam-
paigns, but was then broadened.59 Legally speaking both access to AIDS medi-
cine, as well as access to the latest The Lumineers track are governed within the 
same legal field – namely, intellectual property law. Whether this is an apt or an 
uncomfortable categorisation, to bundle such disparate intellectual products to-
gether, may not be an irrelevant question, but one that will only obliquely be 
addressed here. Instead it is used as an argument to show how already today, in 
law, artworks as well as medicine seem to be considered as life-saving.  
Seen in this way the discourse for art as well as for medication, is framed 
within the discourse of human rights, the right to life – the right to a good life. 
 
1.5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONCEPT OF THE 
CULTURAL COMMONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Unlike prior international intellectual property agreements negotiated under 
the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
TRIPs has teeth.60 
 
Aside from national legislation, the field of intellectual property is also governed 
by international agreements such as TRIPS,61 a number of treaties governed by 
                                                                                                                                   
leges”, Lewis Hyde, Common as Air: Revolution, Art and Ownership, Union Books, (2012), p. 63-
64. I shall return to the content/carrier distinction in chapter 6 below.  
59 Kapczynski, ‘Access to Knowledge: A conceptual genealogy’ in (eds.) Krikorian and 
Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property, p. 37. 
60 L. R. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, in 29 Yale Journal of International Law (2004) p. 1. 
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WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation),62 regional agreements such 
as various EU directives,63 bilateral conventions64 and agreements that are es-
tablished outside the WIPO such as ACTA65. There are also certain national 
proposals from e.g. the US that, even though they are national legislation pro-
                                                                                                                                   
61 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS 
Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
62 e.g. WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, WIPO Copyright Treaty 2002. 
63 e.g. The Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC 22 May 2001) – also known as the 
“EU Copyright Directive” (EUCD). 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights (Criminal) (proposed) 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights (Civil) (2004/48/EC 29 April 2004). 
Harmonising the term of copyright protection (Copyright Term Directive) (93/98/EEC 29 
October 1993) 
Legal protection of designs (98/71/EC) 
Database Directive (11 March 1996) 
Patentability of biotechnological inventions (98/44/EC 6 July 1998) 
Patentability of computer-implemented inventions (proposed, then rejected) 
Rental and lending rights (92/100/EEC) 
Directive on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor products (87/54/EEC 16 
December 1986) 
Trademark Directive (89/104/EEC 21 December 1988) 
Directive on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copy-
right applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (93/83/EEC 27 September 
1993) 
Directive on the re-use of public sector information (2003/98/EC 17 November 2003) 
Certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market directive (2000/31/EC “Directive on electronic commerce”, 8 June 2000 on 
EUR-Lex) 
Coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors directive (2004/17/EC 31 March 2004 on EUR-Lex) 
Coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts directive (2004/18/EC 31 March 2004 on EUR-Lex) 
Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community directive (2007/2/EC IN-
SPIRE directive 14 March 2007 on EUR-Lex) 
Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology COM (88) 172 and its follow up 
document: 5.12.1990, COM (90) 84  
EC Treaty art. 30 
Television Without Frontiers Directive (Council Directive 97/36/EC) 
64 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broad-
casting Organisation, 1961 
The Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Du-
plication of Their Phonograms, Genève 1971 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 
65 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), that has been signed by among others 
the USA, EU, Australia, Japan. 
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posals, have garnered a lot of international attention (and concern) such as PI-
PA66 and SOPA67.  
The general tendency that can immediately be shown is that the legislative 
acts have rapidly increased during the last couple of decades. Ever since 1880s 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property and The Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works there have been international con-
ventions regulating this area of law on an international level. These two conven-
tions, Paris and Berne, where placed under WIPO (which is a United Nations 
agency) in 1967. In the UN capacity WIPO does not have a mechanism for en-
forcement of the two conventions or intellectual property rights on a global lev-
el. With the TRIPS agreement this traditionally week enforcement possibility 
changed as it was brought under the umbrella of WTO (World Trade Organisa-
tion).  
TRIPS now implements a division of labour between WTO and WIPO: 
 
To facilitate the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, the Council for 
TRIPS concluded with WIPO an agreement on cooperation between 
WIPO and the WTO, which came into force on 1 January 1996. As explic-
itly set out in the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO desires a 
mutually supportive relationship with WIPO. The Agreement provides co-
operation in three main areas, namely notification of, access to and transla-
tion of national laws and regulations, implementation of procedures for the 
protection of national emblems, and technical cooperation.68 
 
Apart from a couple of countries in the Middle East and Africa, the rest of the 
countries in the world have all signed the TRIPs agreement, including Russia 
and China that were never likely to sign the previous conventions. Another in-
teresting aspect is that all developing countries are also signatories of the 
agreement.  
One of the most frequent critiques of this agreement is the very fact that the 
developing countries are placed under same burdens as the developed countries. 
Also, since the developed countries are usually the owners of intellectual prop-
erty and the developing countries are often users, there is a North-South divide 
that is created and perpetuated:   
 
                                                
66 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property 
Act, (PIPA). 
67 Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). 
68 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel3_e.htm. Last accessed 15th March 
2014. 
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To a large extent, the ‘NorthSouth’ divide has merely become a leitmotif 
for a new transnational IP discourse framed more broadly as access to 
knowledge, or ‘A2K.’ This discourse, among other things, offers a counter
narrative that has systematically challenged the established IP orthodoxy, 
which has represented ever-stronger IP rights as a source of inescapable vir-
tues for economic growth. Today, global public concerns about matters as 
varied as labor standards, environmental protection, gender equity, biodi-
versity and food security, set against a backdrop of vast social networks, all 
canvass around the A2K rubric, combining the claims of ordinary citizens 
worldwide with the longstanding demands of less industrialized countries 
for a global IP system that promotes technological, social and cultural pro-
gress. These are some of the critical issues at the frontier of future global IP 
normsetting.69 
 
It is this tendency towards an increasingly monolithic legal framework that al-
lows projects like this to address intellectual property law without necessarily hav-
ing to specify which intellectual property law is being referred to – the harmoni-
zation that happened with TRIPS puts in place a global regime with a basic IP 
regulation that is the same all over the world. This may seem like a controversial 
statement, but in my view it is not controversial, even if it can be criticised. 
There are of course national divergences and there are IP principles that dif-
fer depending on jurisdictions. However, with the TRIPS agreement, especially 
from a theoretical and A2K point of view, the differences are marginal. I shall, 
therefore, not dwell on either the history of intellectual property rights (IPRs) or 
on the differences between various IP laws and regulations in different coun-
tries. For the sake of clarity when intellectual property law (IP law) is being ad-
dressed throughout this project what is being referred to will be the harmonised 
IP law that is the result of the TRIPS agreement. This can be done because the 
TRIPS agreement represents a radical shift in at least three ways according to 
Amy Kapczynski.  
a) Although treaties on intellectual property are not new (and indeed are 
remarkably old), before TRIPS, such treaties were generally overseen 
by WIPO. WIPO had no enforcement capability and countries could 
choose to join treaties in a ‘à la carte’ fashion. 
 
b) As TRIPS is part of the WTO, a country is not able to join the WTO 
unless it adheres to the TRIPS agreement. WTO has a dispute resolu-
tion system and any violations of the TRIPS are punishable, and 
 
                                                
69 Ruth Okediji, ‘WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual Property 
Norms’, in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 39, 2008, p. 4.  
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c) Intellectual property standards incorporated in the TRIPS are far 
more expansive than many of those that were in force in certain 
countries before the TRIPS, particularly in the developing countries. TRIPS 
requires for instance the member state to impose criminal penalties 
for pirated copyright goods.70 
It has further been claimed that the strong TRIPS agreement, with unprece-
dented enforcement possibilities, or with teeth, as Laurence Helfer referred to it, 
promotes an intellectual property right concept that is increasingly privatised, 
and where individual rights are premiered over ‘public interest’, ‘faire use’ etc. 
This is where the TRIPS agreement will be linked to the concept of commons 
in this research project. So far, the most serious type of critique that has been 
delivered against TRIPS’ encroachment on other values that are not neo-liberal 
in nature have been for instance the Public Health71 types of critiques concern-
ing access to medication, particularly in the developing countries.  
Currently there appears to be a tug of war between the private commercial 
IPRs and the public, open access to the goods produced by IPRs. Theoretically, 
this very tension where the public and the private, and the open and the closed 
are pitted against one another is the very interest of this research project. Must 
they be each other’s opposites? Must the one benefit at the expense of the oth-
er? 
As it will soon become apparent, this research argues that the questions are 
not posed correctly. By posing the questions in such a way where one is ulti-
mately forced to choose between commercial and non-commercial, between the 
free market and governed market, the question becomes politicised to such an 
extent that the legal options get locked in. Here, I will explore how we can pose 
the question differently, particularly from a legal point of view where law’s pos-
sibilities can be revealed. By utilising the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian 
theory, it becomes possible to envision another type of legal approach to these 
matters. It does not necessarily have to do with inventing new solutions; rather, it 
has to do with visualising the possibilities, which may be already there.  
 
                                                
70 Kapczynski, ‘Access to Knowledge: A conceptual genealogy’ in (eds.) Krikorian and 
Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property, p. 25 
71 see e.g. Ellen ’t Hoen, ‘The Revised Drug Strategy: Access to Essential Medicines, Intellec-
tual Property, and the World Health Organization’, Sangeeta Shashikant, ‘The Doha Declara-
tion on TRIPS and Public Health: An Impetus for Access to Medicines’, Spring Gombe and 
James Love, ‘New Medicines and Vaccines: Access, Incentives to Investment, and Freedom to 
Innovate’, Eloan dos Santos Pinheiro, ‘The Future of Intellectual Property and Access to 
Medicine’, all in (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Prop-
erty, see also the report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights The Impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Report of the High 
Commissioner, U.N. ESCOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001).  
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1.6 CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL COMMONS 
In the year of 1972 the UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage was approved, and it came into force in 
1976. Its ambit was to protect valuable world heritage from threats and deterio-
ration – or even modernisation.72 Since then the UNESCO World Heritage 
community has been growing, progressively shifting from Western and Euro-
centric conceptions of cultural heritage to increasingly broader approaches and 
definitions.73 Interestingly, cultural and natural heritage have been placed in one 
and the same convention, something that I shall have the reason to be returning 
to throughout the course of this project – namely that both natural heritage74 as 
well as cultural heritage75 are protected and acknowledged within one and the 
same legal document – in this case an international convention. This conven-
tion has given rise to the so-called World Heritage List, which at the time of 
writing (April 2014) consists of 981 sites, of which 29 are transboundary, 44 
that are in danger, 759 that are cultural, 193 natural and 29 mixed. There are 160 
State Parties76 and 190 States of the convention. In order to make the World 
                                                
72 Aldo Buzio and Alessio Re, ‘Cultural commons and new concepts behind the recognition 
and management of UNESCO World Heritage Sites’ in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and 
Santagata, Cultural Commons, p. 178. 
73 Ibid. 
74 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Herit-
age (1972) (World Heritage Convention): 
Article 2 
For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “natural heritage”: 
natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, 
which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; 
geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the 
habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the 
point of view of science or conservation; 
natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point 
of view of science, conservation or natural beauty. 
75 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972): 
Article 1: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “cultural heritage”: 
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or 
structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of fea-
tures, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or sci-
ence; 
groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their archi-
tecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value 
from the point of view of history, art or science; 
sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeo-
logical sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological 
or anthropological point of view. 
76 “States Parties” are countries which have adhered to the World Heritage Convention. They 
thereby agree to identify and nominate properties on their national territory to be considered 
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Heritage List, sites have to be of outstanding universal value for “all the people 
of the world” and “be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a 
whole”77. The initial definition of cultural heritage focused on the uniqueness of 
the monuments and the sites, regardless of them being cultural or natural, and 
they had to have a tangible component that was unique in a manner that it could 
acquire a universal value in order to be deemed as heritage. Some of the first 
sites ever to be selected for the World Heritage List were for instance the Palace 
of Versailles and the sanctuary of Machu Picchu78 - clearly unique and physical 
sites. Since the 1970s the conceptions of heritage, also in terms of UNESCO 
heritage conventions, have changed considerably and “move[d] in the direction 
of de-materialization of the conception of heritage [that had been] initially 
adopted by UNESCO”.79 One of the first departures from the original concep-
tions of heritage was, according to Buzio and Re80, the notion of landscape as 
heritage, “in order to reveal and sustain the great diversity in the interaction be-
tween humans and their environment and to protect living traditional cul-
tures”.81 This was the first time when UNESCO introduced non-tangible ele-
ments into the notion of heritage, and after 1992 even some cultural routes 
where added onto the heritage list such as the “Main Andean Road”, the “Silk 
Road”, the “Venetian trade route”, etc.82 Buzio and Re write: 
 
Cultural routes and serial sites are geographical representations of a cultural 
heritage that crosses national boarders but still defines or used to define a specific 
national community.  They are based on population movement, encounters and dialogue, 
cultural exchanges and cross-fertilization, taking place in both space and time.83 
 
Lately it has become increasingly significant to adapt the notions of cultural her-
itage to more dynamic notions of culture, which was exemplified by the intro-
                                                                                                                                   
for inscription on the World Heritage List. When a State Party nominates a property, it gives 
details of how a property is protected and provides a management plan for its upkeep. States 
Parties are also expected to protect the World Heritage values of the properties inscribed and 
are encouraged to report periodically on their condition.  
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/. Last accessed 15th March 2014.   
77 Preamble, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Herit-
age (1972). 
78 Aldo Buzio and Alessio Re, ‘Cultural commons and new concepts behind the recognition 
and management of UNESCO World Heritage Sites’ in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and 
Santagata, Cultural Commons, pp. 180-181. 
79 Ibid. p. 181. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 [my emphasis throughout], Ibid. 
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duction of “cultural landscapes” and “cultural routes”84 into the World Heritage 
List – which meant that aspects such as living heritage (as opposed to dead 
monuments) garnered more attention. Consequently, the intangible aspects of 
heritage eventually resulted in a new convention in the year 2003, namely the 
Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, in which five 
broad domains of intangible cultural heritage85 were mentioned: oral traditions 
and expressions, preforming arts, social practices, knowledge and practices con-
cerning nature and universe and traditional craftsmanship. The convention par-
ticularly mentions the transmission of culture from generation to generation 
(Art. 2) as one of the core aspects of intangible heritage.  
In this research it is particularly interesting to analyse artworks as culture – 
culture in the manner of it being both tangible and intangible, both material and 
immaterial. It is also significant that UNESCO has expressly mentioned the as-
pects of knowledge and transmission of knowledge that is embedded in culture. 
While I shall be presenting a more nuanced approach to certain UNESCO cri-
teria such as community, identity and continuity the research nevertheless 
adopts a very similar notion of art as culture as the one presented in the 
UNESCO conventions. The specific connection between knowledge, practice 
and skills that is stressed in the UNESCO conventions are important for this 
research as they provide a counter-narrative to the intellectual property and the 
object-based, commodified notion of culture that is presented within that par-
ticular paradigm. In fact, commodification is one of the many factors that with-
in the paradigm of cultural heritage is seen as threatening86 to the authenticity 
and sustainability of cultural heritage and that leads to overexposure as well as 
creation of social dilemmas in terms of the safeguarding and management of 
                                                
84 Buzio and Re, ‘Cultural commons and new concepts behind the recognition and manage-
ment of UNESCO World Heritage Sites’. in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and Santagata, 
p. 182. 
85 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage,  
“Article 2: The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated 
therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is 
constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their inter-
action with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, 
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this 
Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compat-
ible with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of 
mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development.” 
86 “Authentic and genuine values of the heritage may in fact be compromised in the process of 
making it more attractive to the tastes of consumers. […] Heritage (tangible and intangible) 
may get standardized and homogenized in the local community’s concerted effort to present 
the heritage in a more understandable manner to tourists”, Buzio and Re, ‘Cultural commons 
and new concepts behind the recognition and management of UNESCO World Heritage 
Sites’, in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and Santagata, Cultural Commons, p. 184. 
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the heritage.87 Heritage that is somehow threatened by overexposure or in risk 
of being destroyed can be placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger as a 
counter-measure that can provide certain urgent tools in order to safeguard the 
heritage in question.88 
That cultural heritage has an economic, social and cultural significance for 
the territories in which it exists is doubtless. Buzio and Re stress for instance 
this particular significance for the developing countries89 - but I shall be lifting 
this on to a global level. Placing this claim within the theory of the French phi-
losopher Pierre Bourdieu and his concepts of economic, social and cultural cap-
ital will add on to these types of discussions. That will be done in chapter 3 be-
low.  In chapter 4 I shall present a number of cases that challenge certain under-
lying assumptions of the cultural heritage paradigm, namely that an artwork can 
always be attributed to a clearly definable cultural heritage of a named commu-
nity and is valuable (economically, socially and culturally) for their identity. The 
notion of community and community identity will further be opened up 
through the writings of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy and his con-
cept of being-in-common, in chapter 5. All this will then be placed within the dis-
cussion concerning the concept of cultural commons in law that will be pre-
sented in the end of this study in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
In order to conduct the study, in order to fuse the paradigms of intellectual 
property and cultural heritage and for the two to be interconnected and linked 
to the legal concept of cultural commons, and in order to answer the research 
questions and refrain from a restraining binary legal reasoning, an encounter-
based approach to this study shall be adopted. 
 
                                                
87 Buzio and Re, ‘Cultural commons and new concepts behind the recognition and manage-
ment of UNESCO World Heritage Sites’, in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and Santagata, 
Cultural Commons, p. 184. See also 2004 Yamato Declaration on Integrated Approaches for 
Safeguarding Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as Convention on the Protec-
tion and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005.  
88 The old City of Dubrovnik was for instance placed on this list in November and December 
1991, when it was seriously damaged by artillery fire in the armed conflict during the Yugosla-
vian war. Since then, the Croatian government has restored the facades of the Franciscan and 
Dominican cloisters, repaired roofs and rebuilt palaces with, notably, a contribution of 
US$300 000 from UNESCO. Subsequently, the Old City was removed from the List of Herit-
age in Danger in 1998. It remains on the World Heritage List and is listed as a cultural site. 
Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/147. Last accessed 15th March 2014.  
89 Buzio and Re, ‘Cultural commons and new concepts behind the recognition and manage-
ment of UNESCO World Heritage Sites’, in (eds.) Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli and Santagata, 
Cultural Commons, p. 187.  
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Deleuze himself, and other scholars reading Deleuze have positioned his meth-
od as an opposition to the Kantian method. Kant presumed an “ability to think 
the particular as contained under the universal”,90 where the notion of the uni-
versal was a given. Deleuze’s method focuses on the particular, on the real experi-
ence. In that way it is empirical.91 His method can initially be summarised in a 
somewhat abridged manner, but which will be developed further down. 
Deleuze opposes that what he considered to be the Kantian approach, namely 
the assumption of the particular, something that can always be presupposed, or 
subsumed under a finite, closed, universal system. Alexandre Lefebvre cites Cri-
tique of Judgment92, whose organising problem, he claims, was (human) experience 
that “must constitute a system of possible empirical conditions, and do so in 
terms of   both universal [transcendental] and particular [empirical] laws”.93  
This particular assertion, especially from a legal point of view, in assuming 
that law (as an instrument), or judgement (as a human experience), must consti-
tute a system of both universal and particular laws, is very interesting. The 
Deleuzian method will provide us with the tools to challenge such an assertion. 
Can this dependence on a supposed unity in law be subverted, without under-
mining the seminal principals such as the rule of law and the ideas of predicta-
bility and foreseeability in jurisprudence? Would such an attempt only open up 
a possibility for arbitrary decision-making, discretion, and as such perform a 
thorough exorcism on any and all legitimacy that law has, rendering law, for the 
lack of a better word, useless? 
The Kantian unity94 (as well as the Dworkian unity for that matter, the one 
in which it is possible to subsume all cases, and the one that in theory can al-
ways be grasped by the omnipotent Hercules judge), is I shall be claiming fur-
ther, following Deleuze, assumed,95 theoretical, rather than a de facto, unity that we 
“must presuppose […] in order to judge”.96 This seems to be an empirical ne-
cessity that also Hans Kelsen adopted when labouring with his Grundnorm, how 
                                                
90 Alexandre Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza, Stanford University Press, 
(2008), p. 22. 
91 The critique of Kant here is not mine but I follow Deleuze and Guattari. 
92 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, (trans. and intro by) J. H. Bernard, Hafner Publishing 
Company, New York, (1951 [originally published in 1790]). 
93 [original emphasis], Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 29. Here Lefebvre is citing Critique of 
Judgement, First Introductions, 397, §4. 
94 Lefebvre writes: “Kant proposes a unique and necessary presupposition of our faculty of 
judgement: Empirical nature, together with diverse laws, must be judged as if it were a coherent 
unity.” [my emphasis], The Image of Law, p. 22. This precise presupposition that Kant proposes 
that we make, and that we act as if it were empirical, is what I, following Deleuze, am attempt-
ing to get at. Kant’s unity is assumed, but we have to presuppose it. 
95 For more on the metaphysical aspect of legal unity, see e.g. Costas Douzinas and Ronnie 
Warrington, Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text and the Text of Law, Rutledge, (1991). 
96 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 33. 
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to justify the assumption of an hierarchical unity, with a foundational origin that 
can be traced all the way back to a Grundnorm: in order to create a system, that 
is logical, predictable, scientific, there must be, one must assume, a primal norm 
that ties it all together, that makes all the other norms fit within a perfect sys-
tem, creating a unity.97 The system is envision to be like a vertical tree with the 
Grundnorm as the root that grows upwards, creating a trunk that the tree 
stands on, on which it develops branches, shoots, and leaves. 
Continuing the system-dependent thinking after Kelsen, Niklas Luhmann 
created a theory that incorporated subsystems (or hyper cycles in his disciple’s 
Günther Teubner’s terminology98) that are able to communicate inter se, at-
tempting to acknowledge the multiple levels of law and its various interactions 
with the “outside” society.99 Or to be more accurate, this is how Luhmann him-
self described it: 
 
But we do not use ‘system’ like some lawyers who mean by it a context of 
coordinated rules. We mean by ‘system’ a context of factually enacted oper-
ations, which have to be communicated because they are social operations, 
whatever defines them – and in addition to that – have to be communicated 
as legal communication. This means, however, that the basic distinction is 
not found in a typology of norms or of values but in a distinction between 
system and environment.100 
 
I shall return to the distinction between systems and environments and how 
they connect to the study of access to artworks and the legal concept of the cul-
tural commons in chapter 8, but for now suffice it say that Luhmann in his the-
ory envisions a closed system with subsystems within a clearly definable unit. 
How this can be fused with the Deleuzian theory will also be discussed in that 
chapter, the only reason that Luhmann is addressed already here is to indicate 
the differences between a system-dependent thinking, and the more open-ended 
Deleuzian rhizome-based, encounter-focused, thinking that shall be adopted in 
this study. In the final chapter these two will be fused.  
The reason why the project attempts to break free from the system-based 
thinking using Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari is to attempt to get beyond the 
distinction between a legal inside and outside in order to answer the above 
listed research question, and its subquestions, in order to discuss the conception 
                                                
97 See Håkan Gustafsson, ‘Fiction of Law’, in Rechtstheorie 3, (2010), s. 319-363. 
98 (ed.) Günther Teubner, Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, Berlin : Gruyter, 
(1988). 
99 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, (trans.) K. Ziegert, eds. F. Kastner, R. Nobles, D. 
Schiff and R. Ziegert, Oxford University Press, (2004). 
100 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, p. 78.  
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of commons in jurisprudence and the cultural commons as a concept in law. 
Commons, as a concept, in fact requires a theory that is able to for instance fuse 
intellectual property and cultural heritage, rights and access, open networks and 
closed systems, etc. It also requires that the dynamics that happen ‘outside’ law 
can always be incorporated into the commons as a legal concept. Whenever a 
system is envisioned, even a very advanced and multi-layered one as in Luh-
mann, one that is always able to incorporate the outside as well as communicate 
with that which is outside, we are, in Deleuzian terms within an “arborescent” 
type of thinking, i.e. we imagine the system as a tree. This type of reasoning is 
closed, hierarchy-dependent, binary and as such cannot imagine anything new. 
It will be argued that the theoretical conception of the commons as well as the 
legal concept of the commons is, in a manner of speaking, something new, even 
if there are a number of legal concepts that are similar to it in nature. 
The one (the idea of a coherent system) does not necessarily cancel out the 
other (the critique of certain assumptions concerning systems, coherence and 
unity) in the Deleuzian theoretical approach. The two can both be upheld and 
connected to one another. I hope to be able to show how this does not have to 
be a contradiction. To be able to present that type of theory we need to delve 
deeper into the Deleuzian thinking and the concept of the rhizome and encoun-
ter that challenge such notion of systems and universals.101  
By challenging certain underlying assumptions produced by traditional legal 
reasoning it shall be argued that jurisprudence can indeed conceive of commons 
and the legal concept of cultural commons can be introduced in law. Or to put 
it more directly, the particular encounter focused method applied here aims to 
accomplish the following:  
1) Expose the inadequacies of traditional legal reasoning and its reli-
ance on conventional dichotomies and hierarchy based binary 
thinking;  
2) Study the possibilities of introducing the legal theoretical concep-
tion of cultural commons into jurisprudence; 
3) Demonstrate how and why a concept of cultural common in a con-
crete way, by legislation or the conceptualisation of legal rules and 
principles, can free the potentialities in existing legislation; and ul-
timately  
                                                
101 While it may not be an express aim of this study to fuse Deleuze, and Deleuze/Guattari, 
and Luhmann theoretically, it certainly emerges as a by-product when trying to approach the 
cultural commons theoretically. This by-product is interesting from a legal philosophical point 
of view, and one which may provide us with a possibility to get beyond the ontological ques-
tions and system-based reasoning. Therefore, this project has to discuss law as something oth-
er than a system, instead approaching it as a rhizomatic assemblage, a Law Without Organs. 
See section 8.1.5.2. below. 
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4) Hopefully also, unleash the legal reasoning itself to serve as a cri-
tique the entire edifice of the discourses based on the fissure be-
tween private/public, and by doing so, find a new way of under-
standing commons in legal theory. 
 
1.7.1 THE DELEUZIAN ENCOUNTER 
When engaging in a critique of dogmatic thought Deleuze developed the idea of 
the encounter102 and used it as a device to question the idea that everything can be 
subsumed within a perfectly constructed, universal system, such as (an assumed, 
closed) legal system. The concept of the encounter is also used to analyse that 
which is perceived to be a ‘problem’. Instead of approaching a problem like an 
obstacle (like would have been the case in this project to approach obstacles to 
access as problems) Deleuze is instead approaching problems as encounters, 
projections, that carry with them a potentiality. This is very significant for this 
study.  
Deleuze’s main argument when discussing the concept of the “encounter” is 
that it is an occurrence that can challenge and break the dogmatic thought – it is 
not a problem. It is when faced with the encounter, with something previously 
unknown, that the notion of the universal can be truly challenged, Deleuze 
claims. For the purposes of this research four occurrences have been chosen, 
four instances of obstacles to access to art, and I will argue that instead of approach-
ing them as problems or obstacles, by adopting the encounter concept, we will 
come closer to the legal concept of the cultural commons. The encounters are 
links between the rhizomatic jurisprudence that is able to conceive of the theo-
retical conception of the commons and the practical legal concept of cultural 
commons in law and legislation.  
Within the four encounters there are 6 “cases” or “case studies”. However, 
some of them have been grouped together. So for instance in encounter one, 
Bruno Schulz and the lost mural, only that case that is analysed as one encoun-
ter. In encounter three, on the other hand, Dead Poets, there are two cases, the 
case of James Joyce and his personal diaries and the case of Franz Kafka and his 
                                                
102 Naturally following Spinoza who conceived of nature as composed through encounters 
among elementary particles, see Hardt/Negri, Commonwealth, p. 43, Gilles Deleuze, Public Lec-
ture, On Spinoza, Cours Vincennes from 24 January 1978, Benedictus Spinoza, Ethics, (ed. and 
trans.) G.H.R. Parkinson, Oxford : Oxford University Press, (2000, [originally written in 1632-
1677]). That many of these ideas, not to say most of them, presented here stem from a Spino-
zian paradigm is obvious. However, in my use they have been filtered through Deleuze. So 
here for instance, when I am using the term “encounter” it is used as Deleuze, relying on Spi-
noza, used it. That is to say insofar I am using the word encounter it does not refer to the Spi-
nozian “occursus”. Same goes for e.g. “affect” which is used below as Hardt/Negri employ it, 
even though their use arguably stems from the Spinozian affectus (n.b., not affectio). 
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manuscripts. The two are treated as one encounter because of the common de-
nominators in the two cases. The same can be said of encounter four, Orphan 
Works, where two cases, HathiTrust and Banksy’s mural, are treated as one en-
counter within the orphan works framework. The selection of the cases and en-
counters has been done in order to construct an encounter-based analysis. The 
encounters have not been selected on a quantitative basis, instead they have 
been selected in order to demonstrate instances where a problem can both 
serve as an obstacle as well as an encounter in the Deleuzian sense, i.e. carrying 
a potential.  
Encountering something that is unrecognised and something that challenges 
the given fixed structures serves as Deleuze’s core argument in his critique of 
dogmatism. I will therefore present cases that are analysed as encounters, name-
ly, occurrences that appear as obstacles, problematic for law, that law initially 
does not seem to be able recognise, but that at the same time reveal the potenti-
ality of law, beyond legal dogmatic thinking. The cases first appear to be ques-
tioning some of the fundamental dogmatic legal tenets, such as the legal subject, 
the concept of rights, legal coherence and hierarchy, etc., but read through the 
encounter concept they also reveal the legal potential. The cases have been se-
lected keeping precisely this in mind, an occurrence, which challenges some of 
the fundamental assumptions in traditional, dogmatic legal reasoning. 
Approaching the cases in this way, as encounters in the Deleuzian sense, is 
different from claiming that the selected cases are empirically representative. My 
view is that they are, however, it should be stressed that the selection of the 
ones that feature here is based on their very difference, on the fact that they have 
the ability to rupture the dogmatic legal thinking and to act as encounters.  
That means, as we shall for instance see in the case of Bruno Schulz, that no 
traditional legal concept, neither in copyright law nor cultural heritage law, 
could in that particular case fully be applicable. This very instance, namely that 
which Lefebvre refers to as “running out of rules”, formed the basis for the se-
lection of the cases, i.e. a case was selected if it, or certain aspects of it, appeared 
to incorporate something that clearly demonstrated certain fundamental inade-
quacies or non-recognitions in law. Cases have also been selected on the basis 
where both decision makers such as courts, legislators, as well as parties, negoti-
ators, attorneys, academics, have had to go outside law in order to find ‘solu-
tions’, or where certain legal binary opposites locked the legal reasoning into 
paradoxes. It is this instance, when law appears to run out of rules, that I am wish 
to highlight and study, and that I analyse using the concept of the Deleuzian en-
counter, namely something different, something new, something that challenges law but at 
the same time reveals law’s potential.103  
                                                
103 These encounters differ from one another, some have occurred due to certain paradigm 
shifts, such as increased globalisation and migration, or technological progress, others have 
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Adopting the encounter-based approach means that the legal problems can 
at the same time be turned around, inverted, and as such not only act as prob-
lems but also have a positive, creative, function. Instead of a dogmatic approach 
that often just reiterates that which already is, without the ability or the will to 
imagine or create that which is new, the problem is not treated as an anomaly 
that ought to be extinguished, but rather as a possibility of law that ought to be 
explored further.  
Lefebvre’s comment on how Deleuze conceived of dogmatism is very con-
cise and succinct and can be mentioned here: 
 
The dogmatic image of thought is a key concept in Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition. In that text, it signifies a set of implicit presuppositions operative 
throughout the history of philosophy about what it means to think and that 
comprise the true exercise of thought. Deleuze calls these presuppositions 
an image of thought because they are concepts and have not been discursive-
ly secured: instead, they are opinions about what it means to think […]104  
 
Thus, when Deleuze comments on dogmatic reasoning, he refers to the image of 
what we assume it is to think and how we assume the thought progress func-
tions. These assumptions naturally also exist in legal reasoning. One of the key 
characteristics of such dogmatic reasoning, as well as dogmatic legal reasoning, 
is that it relies on recognition of legal norms and criteria for legal validity as the 
vocation of thought.105 This characteristic is key also for this study as it is im-
perative to reveal it in dogmatic legal reasoning. Lefebvre writes: 
 
With recognition as its aim, thought is reduced to a task of identification. 
And, as a consequence of its drive to recognize, dogmatic thought threatens 
to assimilate all its potential encounters (with things, others, texts, etc.) into the 
concept and categories used to recognize them.106  
 
This study will show, particularly through the encounter-focused case studies in 
chapter 4, how the reliance on recognition in legal reasoning excludes and/or 
attempts to assimilate the potential encounters. Such activity, it will be argued, 
reduces and hides the potentialities that exist in law. The interesting aspect that 
will be studied is how legal reasoning ‘reacts’ when it cannot a priori recognise 
certain occurrences. 
                                                                                                                                   
been brought forward because of pluralistic types of laws, e.g. they happen in between the lay-
ers of national, EU and international legislative acts. 
104 [original emphasis] Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 2.  
105 Ibid, p. 3. 
106 [my emphasis], Ibid. 
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The fact that that which is encountered cannot easily be put in one particular 
box in traditional legal reasoning, the fact that it cannot be clothed in pre-
tailored clothes107 so to speak, is exactly what makes it so interesting for juris-
prudence. Lefebvre describes that which is unrecognised in an encounter as 
something that does not come predetermined by an inevitable law. He gives an 
example of a case where the court is caught unprepared in the sense that it can-
not cancel out “the encounter with a ready-made rule up its sleeve”.108 An ex-
ample of such an occurrence is the Bruno Schulz case, where the facts of the 
case challenged most (not to say all) existing (national and international) legal 
rules. This occurrence forced settlements and solutions to happen outside of the 
legal sphere, i.e. through political agreements. Lefebvre writes further that the 
encounter in Deleuze is connected with an interruption – an encounter “inter-
rupts recognition by suspending the spontaneous linkages between perceptions 
and recollections.”109 The encounter is, simply put, the occurrence that not only 
challenges, but also interrupts and undermines, the rule and the system on 
which it rests. Lefebvre writes: 
 
[W]e can enumerate the characteristics of the encounter: It is unrecognized; it 
is singular; it is forceful; it forces thought to think; it is the transcendental condi-
tion for thought, that which breaks thought away from routine recognition. 
In sum, we might say that the encounter is an interruption.110  
 
In the case study chapter, I aim to use the cases as encounters, and to argue that 
these are instances where a real case111 encounters and challenges the assumed 
underlying foundation of the legal system. It could be said that this is what 
makes the project not problem oriented, but instead by selecting and stressing cer-
tain encounters, it is encounter-focused. 
In his reading of Deleuzian encounters, Lefebvre distinguishes two types of 
encounters: the easy legal case and the problematic legal case. It is in the “prob-
lematic case”, he argues, that we experience encounters. While I do think that 
such a distinction could be helpful, I will not argue here that the cases chosen 
for this analysis are necessarily “problematic” (as opposed to “easy”) in perhaps 
a Dworkian sense; instead I will stress certain traits that make them an encoun-
ter, i.e. something that is unrecognised, forceful, and something that interrupts 
dogmatic legal reasoning. Even if they sometimes are not a difficult or prob-
                                                
107 See e.g. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, (trans.) Arthur Mitchell, New York: Dover, 
(1998, [originally published in 1907]) p. 48. See also, Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 59-60. 
108 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 174. 
109 Ibid. p. 117. 
110 [original emphasis], Ibid. pp. 174-175. 
111 NB. not hypothetical case to tie it together with Kant’s Critique of Judgement. 
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lematic legal case per se in a formal or dogmatic sense, such as the Darfurnica 
case (encounter number two), there might be aspects to the case that makes it an 
encounter nonetheless. Encounters in this study focus on the act of interrup-
tion, and not whether the case is easy or problematic within a dogmatic legal 
reasoning. This may be in line with what Lefebvre proposes, the point I want to 
reiterate here is that in this research, even the “easy case” may have encounter 
potential if there are instances. While the distinction between hard and easy cas-
es is closely linked to legal dogmatic reasoning, the encounter-focused approach 
escapes this particular division as it part of the completely different rhizomatic le-
gal reasoning. Instances of this will also be explored in my last case study that 
concerns orphan works, where I look at a mere legal concept as an encounter, 
before it has even lead to a conflict, and/or become a case in court. 
It is this very approach to law that manages to introduce an inventive aspect 
to law and jurisprudence. Because “[i]n a way, law exists only through the case 
alone”.112 For the purposes of this project, ‘cases’ are thus a much wider con-
cept than mere ‘conflicts’ or ‘problems’ that end up in the courts of law or lead 
to a dispute. 
 
1.8 SITUATING THE THESIS WITHIN ITS CANONICAL HEIMAT(S) 
This is a theoretical research project. In order to place the concept of the cul-
tural commons within this framework, the project therefore adopts a meta 
stance, examining jurisprudence, intellectual property law as well as the concept 
of the commons, from a theoretical perspective.113 Most studies devoted to the 
cultural commons are usually not placed within a larger theoretical matrix; the 
concept is often approached and defined as a form of communitarian owner-
ship where certain access to the underlying property is granted to the public or 
where some type of co-ownership is created. This definition shall be ques-
tioned, and the concept of the commons will be studied and constructed theo-
retically and then placed within the setting of this project. 
Using Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari in order to conduct a study of this 
type and to analyse law must still be seen as a rather rare endeavour. I am not 
the first one to attempt to do it, by no means, but there are still very few mono-
graphs written that deal with Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory and law, 
and in jurisprudence and law. This research will very much attempt to carry on 
with the already existing discussions that have been conducted in the last couple 
of years. I have already mentioned Alexandre Lefebvre and his study, and later 
on I will also introduce the writings of Edward Mussawir and the studies that he 
has conducted concerning Deleuze and jurisdiction(s).  
                                                
112 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 13. 
113 Whether that particular point of view takes place from above, below or from the side I 
shall leave as unaddressed. 
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On a broader level, the project was born from my theoretical interest in Crit-
ical Legal Studies (CLS), but then it developed through the influence of the re-
searchers and the work from the field of Law and Humanities, and various other 
research projects that attempt to develop an alternative jurisprudence. These three 
strands have all in their unique way opened up different possibilities for this 
project. The Critical Legal Studies movement, the American as well as the Brit-
ish, opened up the possibility to develop a succinct and scientific critique of tra-
ditional dogmatic legal theories. The Law and Humanities movement influenced 
and opened up ways to introduce other theoretical fields into the study of law, 
and gave me tools to utilise the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory to the 
extent to which I have done. And finally, the alternative approach to jurispru-
dence and legal science freed the research project from certain constraining 
methods, definitions and structures both in terms of legal research in particular 
as well as scientific social and cultural research in general.   
That means that there are certain themes that these three movements carry 
intrinsically that have in one way or another made their way into this research 
endeavour. The themes concern for instance the discussions regarding the unity 
and coherence of law, justice and welfare, the legal inside and the legal outside, 
and so on. The research thus adopts a critical approach and can in many ways 
be positioned within the tradition of Critical Legal Studies.114 Even though CLS 
initially was a largely American movement it has since its inception spread to 
Europe through its British branch sometimes referred to as “Brit Crit”, or Criti-
cal Legal Conference (CLC). CLC is in reality a conference held yearly, but it 
has also come to be used as an umbrella term for the European arm of the CLS. 
Even though it is called British, it consists of members from all over the world. 
CLC developed the European critical legal theory. It was firstly heavily influ-
enced by Marxism, but later branched out (and moved away from Marxism) to 
also include areas such as race, gender, queer, post colonial studies, etc.115 The 
many approaches of the CLC have lately extended to other territories outside 
USA and Europe such as Australia, India, South Africa and various other coun-
tries across the world. Scandinavian researchers and academics have steadily 
been part of both the American and British driven critical traditions. Costas 
Douzinas and Adam Gearey articulated the main difference between the CLS 
and the CLC in Critical Jurisprudence:  
 
CLS was a political movement with little politics. Its main intellectual activi-
ty was the critique of judicial institutions and reasoning, while the politics of 
the movement were largely exhausted in the intrigue of the academy and 
                                                
114 See e.g. Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Jus-
tice. Oxford: Hart Publishing. (2005) and James Boyle (ed.) Critical Legal Studies, New York 
University Press, (1992).  
115 Douzinas/Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence, pp. 237 – 258. 
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the endless search for media exposure. European scholars found the pre-
occupation of leading members of the American CLS with the internal 
(in)coherence of judicial reasoning a little bizarre. CLC on the other hand, is 
an intellectual movement with lots of politics. The annual CLC started in 
1984 and has taken place without interruption since. In all these years of 
operation no officers or posts, chairmen or secretaries, committees or dele-
gates were created. The conference was and remains just that: a conference 
and an umbrella name. CLC is a ‘community always to come.’116 
 
According to Peter Goodrich, contrary to e.g. feminist legal studies and critical 
race theory, Critical Legal Studies do not have a “demographic” or an “affilia-
tion”,117 which makes it particularly interesting and useful in the field of art and 
culture. Art as knowledge and how a democratic access to it can be facilitated 
through law fits right in in this type of framework. The field of Law and Hu-
manities can be seen as a branch of CLS and CLC. It is historically tied with the 
rights movements as well as with discourses concerning fundamental rights. 
Whether and how access to art can be seen as a fundamental right, shall be dis-
cussed throughout this research. The use of Deleuze and Guattari in these set-
tings is certainly nothing unusual. 
As a consequence and by employing all of the above, this research studies 
the artwork as a knowledge source, and what role the law plays therein when it 
comes to creating and enabling access to the artworks within the cultural com-
mons. This research deals with a number of political matters, but the research is 
not in itself a political project. In fact, I have tried to avoid the political argu-
ments, and even though the theories that I use are loaded with politics I have 
tried to extract their operational value as tools.  
This approach has enabled me to tackle the hotly debated legal issue, namely 
how do we act within the information society paradigm in terms of creating ac-
cess to knowledge, which has given rise to the A2K movement. Various legal 
cases concerning e.g. downloading and the implications of new media and new 
technology utilised in accessing artworks (legally and illegally) testify to this. 
Sweden has seen the major Pirate Bay118 case – concerning illegal downloading 
by way of, at the time at least, the most sophisticated bit torrent technology and 
the implications it had on access as well as on the enforcement of copyrights.119 
We are, on a daily basis, faced with a battle between individual own-
ers/rightsholders and the public’s and consumers’ interests and demands. 
                                                
116 Douzinas/Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence, p. 240. 
117 Peter Goodrich, ‘The Critic’s Love Of The Law: Intimate Observations On An Insular Ju-
risdiction’, in Law and Critique, 10: 343–360, 1999, p. 345. 
118 Jens Andreasson and Kristoffer Schollin ‘Goda och onda medhjälpare – Är du socialt ad-
ekvat, lille vän? Om Pirate Bay målets betydelse’, in Svensk Juristtidning, SvJT 2011 sid. 534. 
119 Kristoffer Schollin, Digital Rights Management: The New Copyright, Jure (2008). 
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Prompting the ever-returning question concerning what role copyright law plays 
in the 21st century and how to generate wider access to knowledge, access to art, 
without infringing upon or compromising underlying ownership structures. 
The position of this research is thus obviously within a critical tradition, but 
when Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s ambiguities are added on to it, then 
even the critique will have to be criticised. From a legal theory and legal philos-
ophy point of view, this is done in order to get to the potentiality of law, and not 
get locked in within any one tradition, not even the critical one. The Deleuzian 
and Deleuzeoguattarian theory open up law and legal theory through a number 
of concepts such as the rhizome, plateau and encounter in order to visualise what 
traditional legal theories are not able to see.  
In that vein, and in true nomadic and rhizomatic manner, there is not one 
but several (more or less temporary) Heimats where this research project can be 
placed. What they all have in common is that they are attempting to open up 
and challenge certain legal conceptions as well as concepts that have been taken 
for granted, which in turn have created gridlocks in terms of seeing the potenti-
ality of law.  
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS: A RHIZOMATIC JOURNEY 
The two volumes have been divided into four subparts: Law, Artwork, Com-
mons and Commons & Communication. The first subpart maps out the LAW, 
the legal problem and the theory that underpins the project. The second focuses 
on the ARTWORK with an approach that centres on placing the conception of 
artwork within the context of this project. The third opens Volume II and de-
velops the concept of the COMMONS by applying the theories that have been 
presented in the subparts LAW and ARTWORK and adds on commons related 
theories. The forth and final subpart fuses all three previous subparts, all the 
theoretical approaches and the presented case studies, in order to discuss the le-
gal future of for instance rhizomatic jurisprudence in COMMONS & COM-
MUNICATION.  
The research consists of a number of theoretical exercises, in order to firstly 
achieve a contextualisation as well as a critique of current law and to then pre-
sent the access issue in more detail, followed by a closer look at the commons 
and thereafter to conduct a constructive exercise in the end when addressing 
the commons and law together.  
The project has been divided in eight chapters. Chapter 1 and 8 provide the 
entrance to and the exit from the study respectively. The remaining chapters 
form a serpentine journey that has been undertaken and the reader is invited to 
follow along in order to travel between chapters 1 to 8. Each of the chapters in 
the middle (namely chapters 2 through 7) have a mirroring chapter, so for in-
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stance chapter 2 and chapter 5 mirror each other, as do chapters 3 and 6, and 4 
and 7. 
Therefore, the structure is as follows: 
 
VOLUME I:  
Part 1: LAW 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: A Rhizomatic Jurisprudence 
 
Part 2: ARTWORK 
Chapter 3: The Rhizomatic Artwork 
Chapter 4: Case Studies 
 
VOLUME II:  
Part 3: COMMONS 
Chapter 5: Property, Space and Commons 
Chapter 6: Commons v. Intellectual Property Law 
 
Part 4: COMMONS AND COMMUNICATION  
Chapter 7: Commons In The Digital Era: Contract Based 
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Fixing The Commons In Law 
 
1.9.1 SUMMARY OF THE EIGHT CHAPTERS 
ENTER. 
 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Provides the entrance to the study through an introduction, description of the 
problem and purpose, method and the delimitations of the study. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: A Rhizomatic Jurisprudence 
Introduces the main Deleuzian concepts such as rhizome, line of flight, plat-
eaus, (re/de)territorialisation. It is presented with reference to the critique of 
dogmatic jurisprudence. The chapter is structured as a critical exercise analysing 
certain jurisprudential conceptions such as the unity of law, foundations of law, 
coherence, structure, etc. particularly in terms of how these are presented and 
envisioned within dogmatic jurisprudence. The critique is conducted by and 
through Deleuze and Guattari’s theory. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Rhizomatic Artwork 
Develops the concept of the rhizome presented in chapter 2 and demonstrates 
the various plateaus of the artwork. Focuses mainly on three plateaus: 
Plateau 1: Industrialism and the industrial approach to the artwork – Authentic 
or Mass produced artwork, according the Frankfurt School of Thought. 
Plateau 2: Postindustrialism and the post-industrial approach to the artwork – 
Economic, Social and Cultural Capital, according to Pierre Bourdieu. 
Plateau 3: Knowledge Society and current approaches to the artwork – Rhetoric 
and Semiotic/network-based information, according to Jamie Stapleton. 
This chapter demonstrates that the various plateaus exist simultaneously and do 
not necessarily disappear at each paradigm shift. The chapter discusses how to 
deal with this phenomenon. 
 
CHAPTER 4: Case Studies (1): Encounters and Lines of Flight 
Each case study is presented as a Deleuzian ‘encounter’, namely something that 
the law encounters but does not recognise. Something that is entirely new. Lines 
of flight within the case studies are also presented, that is, parts of each case 
that “flee” the legal framework are demonstrated. 
Case 1: Bruno Schulz – the shattered artwork (access to the physical artworks) 
Case 2: Darfurnica – the derivative artwork (access to inspiration) 
Case 3: ‘Dead poets’ – the control of the death estate (access to artworks post 
mortem auctoris) 
Case 4: Orphan works – abandoned and forgotten artworks (access through li-
braries and digitisation?) 
 
CHAPTER 5: Property, Space and Commons 
Presents and defines the commons as a phenomenon. The chapter approaches 
the commons from two angles: 
Ownership: From immovable property thought to immaterial property 
(Hardt/Negri) 
Space: From “public space” to “being-in-common” (Jürgen Habermas, Jean-
Luc Nancy) 
 
CHAPTER 6: Commons v. Intellectual Property Law 
Confronts the concept of the commons with modern intellectual property law. 
Demonstrates the dichotomies of intellectual property law such as right-
privilege, content-carrier, invention-information… The chapter analyses the 
market and capitalism, approaching them as deterritorialising forces that can 
understand the lines of flight of the artwork, while law struggles to do the same. 
This chapter also problematises the underlying dichotomies of IP law particular-
ly in light of the fact that the artworks/the creative expressions are difficult to 
frame in a binary manner.  
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CHAPTER 7: Commons In The Digital Era: (Case Study part 2) 
Commons in the digital era. Various commons projects such as the Creative 
Commons initiative are presented, mainly focusing on the Creative Commons 
(contract based solutions/licences). Addresses the Creative Commons as well as 
other types of contracts, focuses particularly on settlement agreements that 
came out of the case studies presented in chapter 4. Presents the legal concept 
of the cultural commons. Begins to wrap up the study. 
 
CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
Concludes the study and opens up two new theoretical axes namely the Deleuze 
and Habermas axis, and, the Deleuze and Luhmann axis. 
 
EXIT. 
 
 
1.9.2 HOW THE CHAPTERS MIRROR EACH OTHER AND THE PURPOSE OF 
THE VOLUMES 
Chapters 2-5: Theory of Law – Theory of the Commons (Focus on theory in 
the two volumes) 
 
Chapters 3-6: The Plateaus of the Artwork – The Artwork in IP Law (Focus on 
the artwork in the two volumes) 
 
Chapters 4-7: Case study statutory law – Case study contracts (Focus on the case 
studies in the two volumes) 
 
The intention with Volume I and its subparts is to reveal and bring attention to 
certain underlying problems and consequences often stemming from law that 
stifle access to art but also to reveal the underlying potential of law. The inten-
tion with Volume II and the last two subparts are less descriptive and more 
constructive in terms of what the commons and law together not only could 
look like, but also how they could be approached in the future. 
 
1.9.3 THE NOMADIC STRUCTURE AND ITS METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS 
Volume I has been structured using some Deleuzian concepts such as rhizome, 
plateau, encounter, and line of flight. Volume II focuses on other Deleuzian con-
cepts, namely connectivity, de/re territorialisation, smooth and striated spaces. The pro-
ject attempts to have an overall nomadic approach. The nomadic approach comes 
with its own set of methodological tools. One of the more pertinent benefits of 
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such a method is that it provides rather open-ended theoretical concepts that 
can analyse the complex occurrences of the digital knowledge society in an ad-
vanced manner – where both the earlier paradigms as well as new paradigm 
shifts can be analysed simultaneously.  
The jurisprudence and the conception of the artwork will both be ap-
proached as a rhizome. This overall concept will be used in order to get beyond 
the ontological questions such as what law is, and what the artwork is. Instead the 
six principles of the rhizome, namely, connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity, asignifying 
rupture, cartography and decalcomania, have been used when addressing the two 
seminal concepts for this research, namely jurisprudence and artworks. Ap-
proaching the two in this rhizomatic way, as open-ended, unfinished, moving, 
constantly changing concepts, that can never really be caught fully or fixed, will 
be imperative for this project.  
Deleuze and Guattari developed the concept of the plateau. Writing in a 
non-linear fashion, they present various “plateaus” within their text, namely 
theoretical assemblages that make up the rhizome. Such clusters of themes form 
different aspects of the rhizome. That is why the concept of the plateau has 
been used particularly within chapter 3 that discusses the rhizomatic artwork, 
and various clusters of themes that exist simultaneously within the artwork. The 
plateaus that are explored are various types of artworks and how they have been 
approached in various eras, and the role they have played. All the different plat-
eaus do not disappear, they exist side by side simultaneously. This is not neces-
sarily always reflected in law, but ought to be.  
I have already introduced the concept of the encounter and how it will be 
used in order to analyse the cases. What remains to be addressed in this intro-
ductory section is the concept of the “line of flight”. Every encounter forces 
law to think. How this happens more concretely is that it shatters various con-
cepts that are taken for granted in dogmatic reasoning. The encounter forces 
certain aspects of the traditional concepts to break free, and to become con-
cepts of their own or in their own right. These are the lines of flight. Each en-
counter can give rise to a number of lines of flight. In my case study chapter I 
present the most pertinent ones in terms of law. 
All this taken together, makes up the methodological approach of this re-
search. This is part of that which Deleuze and Guattari call “nomadic thought”, 
which does not have the ambition to totalise the knowledge, but rather intro-
duces the fluidity and movement, and explores the potentiality such movements 
give rise to. In that way, science that applies a nomadic approach is never ho-
mogenised – instead it keeps moving through all the multiplicities that it con-
stantly encounters. Therein, it shall be argued, lies the potential of rhizomatic 
jurisprudence. The contribution to legal research and jurisprudence that I am 
attempting to make with this research project is to introduce cluster- or constel-
lation concepts - into legal reasoning, concepts that require a cross-field reason-
ing, that require that what has previously been seen as opposites (e.g. individual 
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rights and open access) to be fused together, an example of such concepts is in-
deed the cultural commons. While these types of concepts in many ways stem 
from and are symptoms or results of the idiosyncrasies of the digital knowledge 
society and the paradigm in which we are now, they are in no way new to legal 
reasoning, which is also another contribution I hope to make with this research. 
Alternating between paradigms within the overall digital knowledge paradigm 
namely the intellectual property, the cultural commons, and international alloca-
tion of resources also shows the benefits of plateau and rhizome-based think-
ing, as it is very much called for in terms of cluster concepts. Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s theory further lends itself well to these endeavours as well as the linkages 
between the legal sphere and the societal spheres such as e.g. the market econ-
omy. These linkages open up a possibility to explain as well as to integrate en-
counters into legal conceptions as well as concepts, and follow the natural lines 
of flight that are constantly being created to be fused with the legal sphere. The 
rhizomatic jurisprudence and the nomadic method that this project discusses 
acts as a critique of the dogmatic legal binary reasoning – which results in cer-
tain underlying assumptions in e.g. intellectual property law, which directly leads 
to obstacles to access. The digital knowledge society requires that we reason in 
new ways, in ways that are network-based, in ways where legal concepts can be 
cluster-concepts that are dynamic and open-ended. In order to conduct this 
type of study the following structure has been applied: 
 
 
ILLUSTRIATION OF THE STUDY 
 
1. Eight Chapters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Chapters
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Law
Chapter 3
Art
Chapter 4
Cases
Chapter 5
Commons
Chapter 6
Commons/IP
Chapter 7
Contracts
Chapter 8
Conclusion
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2. Mirroring Chapters 
 
 
 
3. Two Volumes 
 
 
 
4. Four Parts 
 
 
 
Mirroring Chapters
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Law
Chapter 3
Art
Chapter 4
Cases
Chapter 5
Commons
Chapter 6
Commons/IP
Chapter 7
Contracts
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Two Volumes
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Law
Chapter 3
Art
Chapter 4 
Cases
Chapter 5 
Commons
Chapter 6 
Commons/IP
Chapter 7
Contracts
Chapter 8
ConclusionVol. 1
Vol. 2
Four Parts
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Law
Chapter 3
Art
Chapter 4 
Cases
Chapter 5 
Commons
Chapter 6 
Commons/IP
Chapter 7
Contracts
Chapter 8
ConclusionVol. 1
Vol. 2
Part 1: Law Part 2: Artwork
Part 3: Commons Part 4: Commons & 
Communication
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2 A RHIZOMATIC JURISPRUDENCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO DELEUZE 
Virtually every book or article that deals with Deleuze and law, or Deleuze and 
the philosophy of law, begins by quoting the, by now legendary, utterance that 
Deleuze made in an interview with Claire Parnet: “Si je n’avais pas fait de phi-
losophie, j’aurais fait du droit”.120 Paradoxically, Deleuze never wrote a book on 
law and jurisprudence, and while it appears that law and jurisprudence are ever 
only marginally mentioned in his other works or en passant, there still appears to 
be a very strong connection that links Deleuze and law. But before we arrive at 
a closer study of Deleuze and Law, Deleuze in Law, and even further still, 
Deleuze by way of Law which shall be addressed in chapter 8; let me first take a 
few steps back and generally introduce this philosopher and place him in a con-
text. 
Gilles Deleuze, it is often claimed, is one of the twentieth century’s most 
important thinkers. Contemporary of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, he 
belongs to, that which is sometimes referred to as, post-structuralism or the 
French postmodern philosophical tradition. He was born in 1925 and chose to 
end his own life at the age of seventy in 1995, after enduring a long illness, by 
jumping from his balcony. He studied philosophy at the Sorbonne in the 1940s 
and finished his doctoral thesis in the, certainly for Paris, iconic year of 1968. It 
was in fact during the events of 1968 that Deleuze met his friend and lifetime 
collaborator, the psychoanalyst, Félix Guattari.121 The spirit of a revolutionary 
soixante-huitard was therefore always present in Deleuze’s thinking, even if some 
internauts on blogs and websites go so far as to warn about making such a con-
nection, writing: “Danger warning! Deleuzian ethics are unconventional in ways 
that tend to piss people off, especially Marxists!”122 That Deleuze is difficult to 
place in a philosophical tradition is undisputed. But it is precisely that which 
produces the potentiality in his philosophy. 
Deleuze became a professor at the University of Paris VIII Vincennes/St. 
Denis, an experimental institution that had been founded by, among others, 
                                                
120 [eng.] “If I hadn’t become a philosopher, I would have studied law”. Original French quote 
taken from Gilles Deleuze, L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet, Paris: DVD Editions 
Montparnasse (1994). The English translation taken from (eds.) Laurent de Sutter and Kyle 
McGee, ‘Introduction’, in Deleuze and Law, Edinburgh University Press (2012). 
121 See e.g. Mats Hjelm, ‘Kring, konst och intelligenta maskiner – Humanistisk kritik i infor-
mationssamhället’ in (ed.) Sven-Olov Wallenstein Nomadologin, Skriftserien Kairos, nummer 4, 
Kungliga Konsthögskolan, Raster Förlag, (1998), p. 33. 
122 See e.g. Ken Bauman, The Beginner’s Guide to Deleuze. Available at: 
http://htmlgiant.com/random/the-beginners-guide-to-deleuze/. Last accessed 15th March 
2014. 
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Michel Foucault. The Parisian and international activists, anarchists and other 
intellectuals frequently visited the Tuesday seminars held there during the 
1970s.123 This formed Deleuze’s philosophical trajectory and maturity. From 
his, albeit often peculiar and perhaps wayward, approach to the history of phi-
losophy,124 he developed firstly a critical approach that then morphed into a 
constructivist approach to philosophy. Later on in his career he wrote books on 
topics other than ‘pure’ philosophy such as: art,125 cinema,126 literature,127 etc.  
 
2.1.1 DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 
Félix Guattari was one of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s first stu-
dents. He was a practising psychoanalyst and an activist. His experimental ap-
proach as well as his critique of Lacan worked its way into the work he con-
ducted together with Deleuze. Guattari worked his entire life at the La Borde 
clinic that was run by another Lacanian student, Jean Oury. The work at the La 
Borde gave Guattari certain insights in terms of therapy, as well as theory. He 
was, for instance, always rather derisive of the term ‘postmodern’ and ‘post mo-
dernity’128 particularly when it came to his work, something that Deleuze cer-
tainly agreed with. However there were still aspects that tied their work to the 
postmodern project, especially their critique of e.g. the holistic, hierarchical rea-
soning, the unified self, as well as their focus on the inhuman or the dehuman-
ised processes that affect the subject. These were the influences from the post-
modern thinker Jean-Francois Lyotard that Deleuze and Guattari incorporated 
and developed. The same can be said about their placement in the psychoana-
lytical tradition. While neither Guattari alone, nor Deleuze and Guattari togeth-
er, ever fully distanced themselves from the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, 
their critical approach to both Lacan and Freud formed the backbone of their 
collaborative works. That they explored the realms and existed within the in-
                                                
123 See e.g. Mats Hjelm, ‘Kring, konst och intelligenta maskiner – Humanistisk kritik i infor-
mationssamhället’, in (ed.) Wallenstein Nomadologin p. 31. 
124 He wrote books on Hume, Kant, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Leibniz, Foucault. 
125 See e.g. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, (trans.) Daniel W. Smith, Con-
tinuum, (2003 [originally published in 1981]). 
126 See e.g. Gilles Deleuze. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, (trans.) Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, University of Minnesota Press, (2009 [originally published in 1983]) and Gilles 
Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, (trans.) Hugh Tomlison and Robert Galeta, Continuum, 
(2010, [originally published in 1985]). 
127 See e.g. Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs: The Complete Text, (trans. Richard Howard), The 
Athlone Press, (2000 [originally published in 1972]), essay on Sacher-Masoch in Gilles Deleuze 
Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, (trans.) Jean McNeil, Zone Books (1999 [originally published in 
1967]); See also Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, (trans.) 
Dana Polan, University of Minnesota Press, (1986 [originally published in 1975]). 
128 See e.g. Félix Guattari, Cartographies Schizoanalytiques, Paris: Galilée (1989).  
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betweens of science and philosophy gradually became apparent during the course 
of their collaboration. 
Guattari was born in 1930. He was a psychoanalyst, philosopher, political ac-
tivist, and some even give him the epithet, a militant. He edited the Trotsky-
ist newspaper La Voie Communiste (the Communist Way) and he was involved in 
various anti-government movements during the events of 1968. Some of Guat-
tari’s more influential works are Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (1992), 
Psychanalyse et transversalité (1972) and La révolution moléculaire (1977).  
He co-authored with Deleuze Anti-Oedipus (1972), Kafka: Towards a Mi-
nor Literature (1975), On The Line (1976), A Thousand Plateaus 
(1980), Nomadology: The War Machine (1986) and What Is Philosophy? (1991). 
He also co-authored with Suely Rolnik Molecular Revolution in Brazil (1986) 
and with Antonio Negri Communists Like Us (1985).  
He was particularly interested in the concepts of schizoanalysis and the con-
cepts of the molar/molecular. Both the concept of the schizophrenic as well as the 
molar/molecular were some of the driving forces behind Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, which is the focus of this study (see be-
low). While the meaning of schizophrenic in that context shall be developed 
further throughout this study, the concepts of molar and molecular have been 
largely omitted here and are discussed only obliquely. Guattari’s terms molar 
and molecular can only be briefly presented here. They were borrowed from 
chemistry where they are used to denote a (large) unit of molecules dissolved in 
a solution, which is called a  ‘mole’. For the intents and purposes of this project 
suffice it to say that this was how it is understood that Deleuze and Guattari 
applied these two concepts:  
  
For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ form a paired concept: 
not exactly opposites, connected yet distinct, whose use is ‘dependent on a 
system of reference’ (whether an object is seen from its ‘closed’ or ‘open’ 
side) and scale (the cell is molecular in relation to the organism, the organ-
ism is molecular in relation to the social group etc.). To the extent that it re-
fers to larger aggregates, the political meaning of molar tends to be associ-
ated with the level of governance, the state, political parties, but also social 
movements, policies, demands: what is extensive and can be measured. The 
molecular generally refers to the micro-political level, to processes which 
take place below the level of perception, in ‘affects’ (impersonal sensations 
which transform a body’s capacity to act and be acted upon). To think of 
politics as composed of both molar and molecular transformations, and of 
the two levels as distinguishable by right but not distinct or separate in fact, 
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provides a model for thinking the complexity of relations through which 
political movement and struggle takes place.129 
 
Deleuze and Guattari developed their joint thought experiment mostly in Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia, that consist of two volumes Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus. In this project they particularly expand on their critique of psychoanalysis in 
Anti-Oedipus (or as Foucault dubbed the book, “Introduction to the Non-Fascist 
Life”, in his introduction to the American edition) as well as their other tenets 
of nomadism and multiplicity in A Thousand Plateaus. In Anti-Oedipus and A Thou-
sand Plateaus Deleuze/Guattari develop concepts such as “rhizome”, “nomadol-
ogy”, “bodies without organs”, “territorialisation” (“de/re/territorialisation”), 
“plateaus”, “lines of flight”, “assemblages”, “machines”, “smooth and striated 
spaces”, etc. All these concepts have been instrumental for this project. Clearly, 
it is almost impossible to tell the two thinkers apart in their collaborative works, 
or to claim that the one contributed to this aspect while the other contributed 
to the other. Deleuze and Guattari contaminated, for the lack of a better word, 
each other’s thoughts, and this very contamination symbolised for instance their 
experimental style of writing, making it, as Paul Fry put it, “versatile” for the 
ones who like it, and “murky” for the ones who do not.130 This research project 
is without a doubt inclined towards the former, rather than the later. 
For some, to this author unexplained reasons, even the works that were 
written in collaboration with Guattari, are often referred to as Deleuzian. 
Throughout this research project I have tried, as far as that has been possible, 
to designate works and concepts as “Deleuzian” if they were created by Deleuze 
alone in his own writing (such as e.g. the “encounter” concept); “Deleuzeoguat-
tarian” if they were developed in their joint writing (even if initially the concept 
in question may have stemmed from the one or the other such as e.g. the “rhi-
zome”); “Deleuze/Guattari” where I refer to them as joint authors, and, finally 
I have used “Deleuze and Guattari” to designate where I generally refer to them 
as collaborators or when they jointly relate to issues outside their own philoso-
phy. 
What makes the Deleuzeoguattarian theory particularly versatile and intri-
guing is its unique way of relating to traditional philosophical concepts. As such, 
their philosophy is a constant event, a becoming, where philosophy and philosoph-
ical concepts are not created, but happen and affect one another, contaminate one 
                                                
129 Rodrigo Nunes and Ben Trott, in Turbulence, (2008/7), pp. 38-47. Available at: 
http://turbulence.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/07/guattari_rolnik_nunes_trott_low_res.pdf. Last accessed 17th March 
2014. 
130 Paul Fry in the lecture The Postmodern Psyche. Available at http://oyc.yale.edu/english/engl-
300/lecture-15. Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
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another, through the various meetings, clashes and interlinkages that constantly 
take place.  
 
2.1.2 DELEUZE, DELEUZE/GUATTARI AND POSTMODERNISM 
Another philosopher that is closely connected to Deleuze is Michel Foucault. 
They were friends and mutually appreciative of each other’s work. Deleuze 
wrote a book called Foucault. They also wrote together.131 Deleuze wrote a 
number of essays that in one way or another were directly influenced by or ad-
dressed Foucault, mainly the essay “Post-Scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle” 
where he addressed the Foucauldian disciplinary societies. He also wrote the in-
troduction to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. Foucault in return wrote the intro-
duction the American edition of Anti-Oedipus. In terms of production of 
knowledge, power, and the subject, Deleuze and Foucault often converged, 
even if, in Foucault, Deleuze engages in a reconstruction of Foucault’s ideas.  
It is in ‘Post-Scriptum’ where Deleuze engages with Foucault that he em-
ploys the term societies of control. Clearly, the two friends were interested in the in-
stitutions of discipline and control, be it the family, the university, the hospital, 
or prisons (physical as well as biopolitical). The interest in the enclosures and 
controls of the subject placed them within the tradition of the French revolu-
tionary thinkers. The processes of individuation, becomings, production of 
truth, tied them together. As with Guattari, Deleuze and Foucault contaminated 
each other’s philosophies. And while there is a lot of Foucault in Deleuze, there 
is a unique focus on certain Deleuzian concepts here that Foucault did not fur-
ther engage with such as e.g. the nomadic thinking, something that from time to 
time could perhaps be ascribed to some of Foucault’s discontinuous texts, but 
which was something that Deleuze developed on his own, and with Guattari. 
While so many studies on Foucault and law have been conducted, they are too 
numerous to even list here, it is the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian concepts 
that still remain rather unexplored, and so interesting for further research, espe-
cially from a legal point of view. 
Another French contemporary of Deleuze’s is Jacques Derrida. Deleuze and 
Derrida did not have the same intimate friendship as he shared with Foucault. 
They did not often refer to each other’s work, but there was an undisputed mu-
tual respect between the two.132 The conversation between Deleuze and Derri-
da, while it was perhaps always there, never really began until Deleuze’s death. 
                                                
131 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, ‘The Intellectuals and Power: A Discussion Between 
Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault’ in Telos 16 (1973), New York: Telos Press.  
132 Gordon C.F. Bearn, ‘Differentiating Derrida and Deleuze’, in Continental Philosophy Review 
33: 441–465, (2000). 
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In “I’m Going to Have To Wander Alone”,133 Derrida’s eulogy for Deleuze, he 
wrote that he felt closest to Deleuze of all his contemporaries and that their 
conversation was only just then truly beginning. This conversation no doubt in-
volved non-Hegelian philosophy of difference, inclination towards openness, 
diversity, heterogeneity, etc.134 
Gilles Deleuze was thus a French philosopher that existed in-between post-
modernism, post-structuralism, who was essentially a constructivist thinker, 
which had become most obvious in his collaborative work with Félix Guattari 
What is Philosophy? (1991).135 In it, they discuss concepts, formation of concepts 
and presuppositions in philosophy. This chapter presents Gilles Deleuze and 
the Deleuzian jurisprudence and takes a journey through Deleuze’s thinking and 
explores the theory developed by him in his individual works, as well as him 
and Guattari in their joint works.136 Gilles Deleuze has written around thirty 
books (some of them essay collections) all together. Four of them were written 
in collaboration with Guattari,137 one of them was written together with Michel 
Foucault.138 All of these projects have formed the Deleuzian thought and the 
Deleuzian theory. The four written with Guattari formed the Deleuzeoguattari-
an thought and the Deleuzeoguattarian theory. They all move in an out of each 
other and they deal with a number of different subject matters. In this research 
I have chosen to focus primarily on Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schiz-
ophrenia project.  
Other than the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia that form the 
theoretical backbone of this study, I have also utilised Deleuze’s major works 
Difference and Repetition (1968) and The Logic of Sense (1969). In those two books 
Deleuze developed, among others, the concept of the encounter that was intro-
duced in chapter 1, as well as the concepts of difference, repetition and ground-
                                                
133 Jacques Derrida, I’m going to have to wander all alone, (trans.) L. Lawlor, in Philosophy Today, 
42.1 (1998), p. 3. 
134 See e.g. (eds.) Paul Patton and John Protevi, Between Derrida and Deleuze, Continuum, (2003), 
p. 4. 
135 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, (trans.) Hugh Tomlinson and Gra-
ham Burchill, London : Verso, (1994). 
136 I focus mainly in the two-volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia, which comprises of Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (trans.) and Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. 
Lane, foreword by Michel Foucault, Continuum (2004 [originally published in 1972]) and A 
Thousand Plateaus, and Deleuze’s own The Logic of Sense (trans. and eds.) Mark Lester with 
Charles Stivale, Constantin V. Boundas, New York : Columbia University Press, (1990 [origi-
nally published in 1969]), and Difference and Repetition in order to develop a legal Deleuzian the-
ory. 
137 Deleuze/Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze/Guattari, 
What is Philosophy?, and Deleuze/Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. 
138 Deleuze and Foucault, ‘The Intellectuals and Power: A Discussion Between Gilles Deleuze 
and Michel Foucault’. 
 77 
lessness that shall also be used throughout the project, particularly in the Dar-
furnica case.   
Difference and Repetition was Deleuze’s doctoral thesis. It engages in a critique 
of representation. In its seven chapters, “Introduction: Repetition and Differ-
ence”, “Difference in Itself”, “Repetition for Itself”, “The Image of Thought”, 
“Ideal Synthesis of Difference”, “Asymmetrical Synthesis of Sensibility” and 
“Conclusion: Difference and Repetition”, Deleuze sets the stage for his future 
place in philosophy. There, he engages in a dialogue with philosophers before 
him and the history of philosophy. In the first part of the book he sets in mo-
tion a depersonalisation of philosophy (in chapters 1 and 2) and a prolegomena 
of philosophy in chapter 3. In the second part of the book he does philosophy 
“in his own name”, creating an internal repetition in the book. That he provides 
a repetition of the Introduction in the Conclusion, and how his chapter 1 and 4 
and 2 and 5 mirror each other have clearly inspired the structure of this book. 
As already mentioned, he discusses the concept of the “encounter” throughout, 
as well as “difference” and “repetition”, concepts that this research also engages 
with.  
The Logic of Sense (1969) is the other Deleuzian single work that has been sig-
nificant for this study. In it Deleuze developed the concept of “becoming”. 
Deleuze also explores “meaning” and “meaninglessness”, “common-sense” and 
“nonsense” – those concepts are not applied in this study, nor are his other tex-
tual analysis of among others Lewis Carroll, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Émile Zola and 
Sigmund Freud. 
 
2.1.3 DELEUZE AND LAW 
Let us go back to the Deleuzian claim that if he had not become a philosopher 
he would have studied jurisprudence. This chapter takes up Deleuze on that 
very utterance and places most of these abovementioned Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian concepts within a jurisprudential setting. Even though it still 
might be somewhat unusual to use this particular philosophy in conjunction 
with legal theory, it certainly is not the first time it has been attempted. On the 
contrary, many interesting works on Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari and juris-
prudence have been presented in the last couple of years. Several books and a 
couple of articles juxtaposing Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari place their philos-
ophy in the setting of jurisprudence. These shall be of particular interest here.139 
                                                
139 Some of the key works addressing the relation of jurisprudence in Deleuze’s work see, e.g. 
(eds.) Laurent de Sutter and McGee Kyle, Deleuze and Law, Edinburgh University Press, (2012), 
Edward Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze: The Expression and Representation of Law, Rutledge, 
(2011), Edward Mussawir. ‘The Activity of Judgment: Deleuze, Jurisdiction and the Procedural 
Genre of Jurisprudence’ in Law, Culture and the Humanities (2011) 7: 463, Alexandre Lefebvre, 
The Image of Law; Laurent de Sutter, Deleuze: La Pratique du Droit Paris: Michalon, (2009); (eds.) 
Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook and Patrick Hanafin, Deleuze and Law: Forensic Futures Basing-
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The vast body of secondary literature outside jurisprudence that comments on 
Deleuze, Guattari and Deleuze/Guattari, is too extensive to list here. Therefore, 
I will attempt to inscribe myself in the many discussions concerning these phi-
losophers and jurisprudence mainly, borrowing some concepts, commenting on 
others. Throughout the study I will attempt to develop my own reading and ap-
plication of the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian philosophy, as well as to dis-
cuss it under the headline of “rhizomatic jurisprudence”.  
In my view, the two most significant works in the field of jurisprudence are 
Alexandre Lefebvre’s The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza and Edward 
Mussawir’s Jurisdiction in Deleuze: The Expression and Representation of Law. Both of 
these books will help me fuse my own analysis with e.g. concepts of territorialisa-
tion and deterritorialisation, as well as smooth and striates spaces, (chapters 5-7) and 
nomadic and sedentary forms of possession (chapter 7). The other research that fuses 
Deleuze and law, has so far been presented mostly in articles or chapters in an-
thologies, and as such will not be addressed as actively, but that type of research 
has also been tremendously important for this project, even when used oblique-
ly or for the sake of clarity in certain instances. I will attempt to engage in a 
conversation mainly with the two monographs written by Lefebvre and 
Mussawir but also with some of the other recent works that connect Deleuze to 
law such as Deleuze: La Pratique du droit, written by Laurent de Sutter and the an-
thology Deleuze and Law that was edited by Laurent de Sutter and Kyle McGee.  
Duly in accordance with Alexandre Lefebvre and his preface to The Image of 
Law,140when using Deleuze and his concepts in jurisprudence and in legal re-
search, a study of Deleuze and jurisprudence does not so much have to do with 
“applying” the Deleuzian concepts, but rather using the thoughts and ideas “in 
coordination with law toward the creation of new problems and new con-
cepts.”141 The same is true of Deleuze and Guattari and the Deleuzeoguattarian 
concepts. One of the overall aims here is to argue that Deleuze, and 
Deleuze/Guattari, can indeed be very beneficial to jurisprudence and legal rea-
soning, as well as provide a new type of explanatory values, and add to the 
study of law and the philosophy of law.  Their philosophical concepts such as 
“territorialisation”, “deterritorialisation”, “reterritorialisation”, “rhizome”, “en-
counters”, “plateaus”, “lines of flight”, etc. shall be defined, applied and dis-
                                                                                                                                   
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, (2009); Alexandre Lefebvre, ‘Critique of Teleology in Kant and 
Dworkin: The Law Without Organs (LwO),’ in Philosophy Social Criticism (2007) 33: 179–201; 
Nathan Moore, ‘Icons of Control: Deleuze, Signs, Law,’ in International Journal for the Semiotics of 
Law (2007) 20: 33–54; Alexandre Lefebvre, ‘We Do Not Yet Know What the Law Can Do’ in 
Contemporary Political Theory (2006) 5: 52–67; Alexandre Lefebvre, ‘A New Image of Law: 
Deleuze and Jurisprudence,’ in Telos (2005) 130: 103–126; Nathan Moore, ‘So You Love Me’ 
in Law and Critique (2004) 15: 45–64; Nathan Moore, ‘A Distant Hand Fell From His Shoulder’ 
in Law and Critique (2000) 11: 185–200.  
140 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, preface. 
141 Ibid, p. xi. 
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cussed as well as placed inside a jurisprudential framework in order to demon-
strate how valuable such ideas can be in the sphere of law, and particularly in 
the field of law and art – and ultimately these instruments will be the very tools 
that shall be used in Volume II in arguing how a concept of the cultural com-
mons can be envisioned and introduced in law.  
2.2 DETERRITORIALISING JURISPRUDENCE 
A Thousand Plateaus may be one of the strangest philosophy books ever writ-
ten.142 Deleuze and Guattari guide the reader through a ‘thousand plateaus’ – 
where each chapter of the book forms a plateau. Each plateau is marked by a 
date that represents something in the chapter, for instance year 1914 for the 
chapter ‘1914: One or Several Wolves?’. This chapter addresses Freud’s ‘Wolf-
man’143 case. In the year 1914 the patient known as ‘Wolfman’ finished his ther-
apy with Freud. The year 1914 was the year when Freud wrote From the History 
of an Infantile Neurosis in which he described the treatment of this patient as well 
as, obviously, the year when the First World War began. Deleuze and Guattari 
were very critical of the conclusions that Freud reached in this case, no wonder 
then that they chose the date that marked the end of the therapy sessions, the 
year in which Freud wrote the thesis based on this patient with the backdrop of 
a changing world. Another example is the year 1227 – the year Genghis Khan 
died. This year marks one of the most read and mostly quoted chapters in A 
Thousand Plateaus namely ‘1227: Treatise on Nomadology’ where Deleuze and 
Guattari develop what will come to be one of their more significant concepts: 
“nomadology” and “nomadic space”. Lars Marcussen writes: 
 
In his account of the historical process, Deleuze introduces an agent called 
‘the nomad’, unknown to Marxism, who runs counter to ‘the State’ in the 
sense that the nomad is aggressively creative, while the State plays the more 
passive role of consolidator: the State thrives by capturing nomadic innova-
                                                
142 Wallenstein, ‘Kommentar till nomadologin’ in Nomadologin, (1998). 
143 According to Freud this was how Wolfman described his wolf dream: “I dreamt that it was 
night and that I was lying in bed. (My bed stood with its foot towards the window; in front of 
the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I know it was winter when I had the dream, 
and night-time.) Suddenly the window opened of its own accord, and I was terrified to see that 
some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six 
or seven of them. The wolves were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for 
they had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked like dogs when they pay attention 
to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I screamed and woke 
up. My nurse hurried to my bed, to see what had happened to me. It took quite a long while 
before I was convinced that it had only been a dream; I had had such a clear and life-like pic-
ture of the window opening and the wolves sitting on the tree. At last I grew quieter, felt as 
though I had escaped from some danger, and went to sleep again.” in From the History of an In-
fantile Neurosis, (1918). 
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tions and transforming them to fit its own needs, precisely in order to con-
solidate a certain state of affairs. On the other hand, every consolidated 
state induces renewed nomadic aggression and inventions that the State 
must absorb and adapt to its consolidating tissue, which, thus enriched, 
opens up paths for amplified nomadic action, and so on. 
 
In accordance with their philosophical style, Deleuze and Guattari do not come up 
with a definition of the nomad, but they put the word into play in different contexts, 
and as such it never acquires a definite meaning, but rather is intended to serve 
as a conceptual nomad: an agent in unfinished philosophical, political, artistic 
and other field.144  As a matter of fact, Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari almost 
never come up with any definitions or engage in defining their concepts. The 
very definition of concepts is in their understanding the grounding of a concept, 
a territorialisation of it, which strips it of its potential. Instead the concepts are 
used in various contexts, and as such they are always events, open-ended, unfin-
ished, continuous. This mode of writing is both very helpful and obstructive for 
a scholar that uses Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian concepts. On the one 
hand one is provided with a set of concepts that are open, imaginative, and lend 
themselves to a number of different uses. They are tools that allow the scholar 
to connect them to any discussion and context that they see fit. At the same 
time, they are difficult and obstructive in that that a scholar that attempts to use 
them is never given a definite definition of the concepts, never given any real 
leads as how to (and how not to) use them. Throughout this chapter I have as 
far as possible, without compromising the integrity of the concepts or Deleuze 
and Deleuze/Guattari, tried to be as transparent as possible as to (a) how I un-
derstand Deleuze and Guattari are using the concepts, and (b) how I propose 
they be used in jurisprudence. While this makes it difficult to provide a tradi-
tional definition of concepts and how they are used, it also opens up a new way 
of approaching jurisprudence that in turn opens it up to new possibilities. An-
other challenge is to decide where to begin or which concept ought to be pre-
sented first as they so often come in bundles and networks, and are so tightly 
connected to one another. Sven-Olov Wallenstein suggests that the Deleuzeo-
guattarian concepts ought to be understood as tools, local interventions in a 
given situation, they do not attempt to present a universal truth.145 I have at-
tempted to use them in that very manner, as tools or local interventions to be 
applied in jurisprudence in general, and various legal implications to access to 
art in particular. Therefore, instead of posing the “What is?” question the tradi-
tional scholarly approach to familiar legal and jurisprudential concepts such as 
                                                
144 [my emphasis] Lars Marcussen, Deleuze and Space: The smooth and the striated. Available at: 
http://www.architectureandspace.com/sider/deleuze-and-space-the-smooth-and-the-
striated_89.aspx. Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
145 Wallenstein, ‘Kommentar till nomadologin’, in Nomadologin, p. 182. 
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“right”, “property” or even “Grundnorm”, I instead pose the questions what do 
these concepts do, what do they perform? This is the Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian way to approach concepts, which may be new to jurispru-
dence, i.e. instead of seeking out static definitions to approach legal concepts as 
events, as conceptually open.  
So I begin with the nomad above, mainly because it is so unique for 
Deleuze/Guattari, and the first explanation of the concept that is provided here 
comes not from Deleuze/Guattari, but from the architect Lars Marcussen.  
The ‘thousand’ plateaus of the A Thousand Plateaus are divided in 15 chap-
ters, and the authors claim that they can be read in any order, which is what 
makes them nomadic. But the authors also suggest that the first and the last 
chapter ought to be read first and last respectively, as a type of entry and exit to 
the book. Each plateau treats and uses a number of different subjects and theo-
retical fields such as philosophy, psychoanalysis, biology, music, literature, 
economy, mathematics, and so on. This is probably why the book is considered 
both strange and fascinating at the same time, and why the authors write in their 
particular experimental manner, not necessarily to define what the concepts are 
in an ontological way but rather to guide the reader’s journey through the plat-
eaus.   
There is one principle that binds the plateaus together, and that is that in 
each chapter of the book the authors are composing a so-called plane of con-
sistency [plan de consistence] – i.e. a field where they create a resonance between 
various concepts. This is the philosophical matrix that they use, one that does 
not give rise to a closed circle, an “en-cyclopedia” (with an absolute centre 
point) but rather they work with these types of planes of consistency that re-
main open to all types of connections. This approach they refer to as experi-
mental constructivism.146 
Legal reasoning often begins with an encounter, with a border. Where do we 
draw the legal line in terms of legality, is often one of the key questions that 
colours legal discourses. Instead of borders, Deleuze and Guattari speak of terri-
tories. The concepts of territorialisation, deterritorialisation as well as reterritorialisation 
were developed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, firstly in Anti-Oedipus and then in 
A Thousand Plateaus. The concepts “provide an alternative to thinking of territo-
ries as bounded entities, and thus, to thinking of border as frontiers or as the 
boundaries of an entity.”147A territory for Deleuze and Guattari could be geo-
graphic, political, conceptual, or what ever else, and here I explore the legal. A 
territory is something that is constantly and continuously subject to change, 
                                                
146 See generally Wallenstein, ‘Kommentar till nomadologin’ in Nomadologin, p. 179. 
147 Antke Engel (Institute for Queer Theory, Berlin) Work Group 1: Borders Nicosia (Cyprus) 
14-15 April, 2009, Deterritorialization, Reterritorialization, and Lines of Flight. Available at: 
http://wiki.manchester.ac.uk/eastbordnet/index.php/Deterritorialization,_Reterritorialization
,_and_Lines_of_Flight. Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
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there are occurrences that flee the territory and the orders and structures of the 
territory. This is deterritorialisation, a concept that they began to explore in Anti-
Oedipus as a comment on (or an attack on) psychoanalysis.148 Deleuze and Guat-
tari manage to show how this approach constantly produces lines of flight, which 
deterritorialise the territory, forming new assemblages. A deterritorialisation is thus 
something that has broken with an established configuration and where that has 
happened through lines of flight. This movement gives rise to new assemblages, 
while it is at the same time subject to reterritorialisation that hegemonises the 
formally provocative and/or subversive assemblage. Reterritorialisation stabilis-
es, albeit provisionally, the new configuration.149 The configurations, or assem-
blages are created form constellations of singularities and traits deduced from 
flows that result from lines of flight and deterritorialisation. The singularities 
and traits are (temporarily) selected, organized and stratified – artificially or nat-
urally – to form a new constellation, an assemblage.150 Deleuze and Guattari 
write that assemblages can both be small and large and constitute “cultures” or 
“ages” or any other type of constellation. They write also that the territory is the 
first assemblage, the first thing to constitute an assemblage. Therefore the no-
tion of assemblage is fundamentally territorial,151 and spatial. 
Already at this point we see how there are a number of concepts that are 
connected to one another, and in order to explain one, others are put into play 
and these too have to be explained at the same time. Therefore, territory is 
something that is bordered off – it can be both a physical territory, e.g. a na-
tional territory, a jurisdiction, as well as a conceptual territory such as for in-
stance the (dogmatic) legal system, the field of intellectual property law, the field 
of public law, etc. Lines of flight that emerge form the territorialised and static 
order challenge the territories, for instance with the emergence of EU law or in-
ternational conventions that challenge the physical territoriality and jurisdiction, 
or with technological progress that challenges the intellectual property concepts. 
These lines of flight induce deterritorialisation, a nomadic movement that con-
fronts the given territory and its underlying systems and orders. The legal sys-
tem e.g. encounters the question: which is the superior norm, the one that 
stems from EU law or the one that stems from the national constitution? When 
the lines of flight that have left the territory and its order assemble under new 
and different forms, a new assemblage is formed – i.e. new forms of more or 
less temporary constellations appear, such as if we are following the above ex-
                                                
148 Deleuze and Guattari opposed the Lacanian understanding of desire in terms of negativity, 
lack and castration, and instead, by fusing Marx and Nietzsche, presented desire as production of 
new realities. When the concept of lack is abolished, they argue, a productive aspect is intro-
duced in its place.  
149 [my emphasis] Engel, Deterritorialization, Reterritorialization, and Lines of Flight. 
150 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 448. 
151 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 356. 
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amples, digital content directives like The Information Society Directive152 or the Cop-
yright Term Directive.153 Lines of flight are thus instances that flee the territoriality 
(physical or conceptual) of a given system. For instance, in chapter 4, it is pre-
sented how certain instances that the law encounters produce a number of lines 
of flight that flee the legal territory, again both physical and conceptual, and 
even create new constellations of their own. At the same time there are reterri-
torialising forces, such as the statutory law or the market forces, which we shall 
see in e.g. chapters 6 and 7, that move along with the lines of flight, follow them 
to the new assemblages, attempting to once again reincorporate that which has 
fled, once again within their own territorialising systems. This is the nomadic 
movement that is produced by lines of flight and new assemblages with con-
stant de/reterritorialisation.  
An assemblage happens when a line of flight breaks free from the territory. 
In ‘Treatise on Nomadology’ Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism is one 
of the more powerful deterritorialising forces that challenges previous territori-
asing notions of identity, traditions, symbolic orders, etc. but at the same time it 
gives rise to reterritorialising instruments that create new territories that are in-
stead there to hold together not the territory but the capitalist production.154 
Hence the schizophrenic nature of capitalism, it both produces lines of flight, 
deterritorialisation, as well as reterritorialisation, and hence the title of the two 
volumes, Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
All these concept that I have began to list in this chapter and that I am in-
troducing here will be used in order to analyse the territoriality of jurisprudence 
and law, and then follow the lines of flight that it gives rise to, and the assem-
blages that it produces. In Volume II I shall then be adding on the reterritorial-
ising aspects that arise from the market forces and law, and how they affect the 
legal reasoning in terms of access to art and the legal concept of cultural com-
mons.  
The Deleuzian concepts are thus used as tools in order to describe and ap-
proach jurisprudence and law, but then other concepts that I shall be discussing 
below such as the rhizome will be used in order to reach beyond traditional le-
gal reasoning and in order to get to the potentialities of law, one of them being 
the ability to imagine, conceive of and construct a concept of the cultural com-
mons.  
 
                                                
152 2001/29/EC 22 May 2001 – also known as the “EU Copyright Directive” (EUCD). 
153 93/98/EEC 29 October 1993. 
154 Wallenstein, ‘Kommentar till nomadologin’, in Nomadologin, p. 181. 
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2.3 RHIZOMATIC NOMOS 
This section begins with the concept of the rhizome that Deleuze/Guattari de-
veloped in Capitalism and Schizophrenia and then works its way back to Deleuze’s 
individual earlier works mainly Difference and Repetition155 and The Logic of Sense156. 
I shall start with the theory of the rhizome because the rhizome theory will span 
over the entire theoretical approach to law in this study, while the other parts of 
the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory will only serve specific purposes 
for specific parts of this project, for instance the Deleuzian concept of the “en-
counter” shall mainly be used to explain and analyse the case studies. A number 
of concepts have already been presented above since they are key in under-
standing the concept of the rhizome. Some other concepts such as difference and 
repetition I shall introduce later on and will use them specifically in the course of 
the analysis of one of the cases, namely the Darfurnica case.157 
The Deleuzeoguattarian “rhizome” in A Thousand Plateaus will thus be used 
in establishing my general understanding of the ever-so-disputed ontology of 
law.158 The concept of the rhizome will be used to approach jurisprudence and 
law in a different manner than what is common in the studies of jurisprudence. 
I shall develop some, or reintroduce other, legal and jurisprudential concepts, by 
reading traditional legal philosophy and jurisprudence through the Deleuzian or 
the Deleuzeoguattarian theoretical matrix when applying the rhizome theory to 
law.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s address the rhizome in A Thousand Plateaus as fol-
lows: “The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple.” they write 
in probably the most quoted passage of the book, which then goes on: 
 
It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five, etc. It 
is not a multiple derived the One, or which One is added (n+1). It is com-
posed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither 
beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which 
it overspills. [...] Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and 
positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relation-
ships between positions, the rhizome is made only of lines...159  
 
Deleuze and Guattari call into question the notion of so called “arborescent” 
knowledge, or the tree metaphor, which is often used in describing a body of 
                                                
155 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 
156 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense. 
157 See section 4.2. 
158 Even if my aim is to resist falling back in the “What is” question, certain ontological mat-
ters cannot be fully circumvented in a study like this one.  
159 [my emphases throughout], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 23. 
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knowledge: we conceive of knowledge as linear, rising from a clearly defined, 
singular origin, with a central trunk that then develops branches, leaves and 
shoots. Their theory of the rhizome is created to oppose such fictions of singu-
lar origins, often illustrated by a root, or a deep structure, where the body of 
knowledge stems from a certain point and then spreads upwards, chronological-
ly, and thereby the image of knowledge is presented as having merely one single 
constituting source.160 The tree metaphor creates a sense of unity and continui-
ty, homogeneity, a dependence on coherence in order to gain legitimacy and de-
scribe the development and production of knowledge. Such an understanding 
of knowledge calls for a systematic approach and the epistemology becomes 
systemised and exclusory. This is where Deleuze and Guattari propose another 
understanding of knowledge, and as such knowledge gains a new experimental, 
strange status in Deleuze and Guattari’s work: 
 
They do not seek an encyclopaedic knowledge of the processes present in 
all situations and events, from a universal, dispassionate perspective, ac-
cording to which one could take practical decisions leading to chosen ends. 
Nor do they seek a critical knowledge of social processes from a moral and 
superior perspective, so that a programme of transformation towards a bet-
ter society can be ventured. Knowledge is no longer a question of being 
able to repeat the main points of as many books as possible in a library, nor 
is it a question of being able to criticize their weaknesses and failings; 
knowledge is more like the capacity to direct oneself, through encounters with others, to-
wards the most interesting and profound books in that library. Only 
through this knowledge can one awaken desire.161  
 
The rhizome is complex to outline by its very nature. Deleuze and Guattari in-
troduce the concept in order to imagine knowledge differently, in a non-
arborescent, non-encyclopaedic, way. The arborescent way of understanding 
territorialises knowledge and grounds it, they claim. Such knowledge is depend-
ent on being fitted within the encyclopaedic structure that it can never imagine 
anything new, they claim further. Here, my aim is to approach jurisprudence, 
the same way as Deleuze and Guattari have approached knowledge and the im-
age of thought. What I shall be arguing is that we have been approaching juris-
prudence in an arborescent way – seeking to ground it, stratify it, systemise it, 
place it in a particular order. This approach oversees the potentiality of juris-
                                                
160 Ashton Dyrk, Using Deleuze: The Cinema Books, Film Studies and Effect, open access. Available 
at: 
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Ashton%20Dyrk.pdf?bgsu1151342833, pp. 58-59. Last 
accessed 14th July 2013.  
161 [my emphasis], Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, 
Sage Publications, (1996), pp: 4-5. 
 86 
prudence, and is not able to incorporate certain encounters that deterritorialise 
it, make it move, producing an unending and constantly unfinished project, a 
constant becoming.  
The term ‘rhizome’ itself as we already saw above in chapter 1 has been bor-
rowed from botany. Rhizomatic roots are able to give rise to new plants, even if 
a rhizome is broken or cut off from the rest of the root it can start up a new 
rhizome. When separated, fragmented or cut into pieces the rhizomes can thus 
give rise to new plants. Rhizomes are, so to speak, reproducible even when 
fragmentised, they can give birth to themselves. The Greek term rhizoma means 
root but it often refers to genealogy and/or race – to stem from someone, with-
in an infinite lineage, but such genealogical use of the term is something that 
Deleuze and Guattari were adverse to.  
The rhizome cannot be approached as a system or structure – the only way 
to begin somewhere is to state that the rhizome is connectable. As such, it imme-
diately challenges certain metaphors and images, often used and relied upon in 
jurisprudence and legal philosophy, for instance origin, unity, coherence and so 
on. Deleuze and Guattari argue, that the rhizome is a concept that does not 
stem from a root or a trunk, it can only be described as flows on deterritorialised 
plateaus that connect and link concepts together. We have above seen how 
Deleuze and Guattari approach deterritorialising movements, namely lines of 
flight that challenge territorial structures and make them evolve and move. 
Deleuze and Guattari based the entire A Thousand Plateaus on deterritorialised 
plateaus.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari use several very similar concepts as synonyms to 
“plateau”, namely ‘plane of consistency’, ‘level of intensity’ and ‘plane of in-
tensity’. For the purpose of this research they need not be separated, I read 
them as synonyms and the term I shall be using henceforward is plateau. 
Each plateau is thus something that subsists its own themes and concepts 
“which are interrelated with those other plateaus, but which finally are not 
reducible to any abstract system or ‘plateau of plateaus’”.162  
 
Plateaus, as clusters of themes and concepts, make up a rhizome. Deleuzeoguat-
tarian plateaus are thus clusters of inter-crossed themes and concepts, that span 
both over each other and various other disciplines. A plateau can include for in-
stance, as we saw above, philosophy, psychoanalysis, economics, literary theory, 
separately, and all together, and within the plateau all aspects of these themes 
resonate, i.e. form a cluster. A plateau is a plane of consistency but not one that 
is closed off in a circular manner, producing an encyclopaedic knowledge, but 
one that remains open and connectable to other possible connections and 
                                                
162 Roland Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, Rutledge, (1989), p. 125. 
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themes. One does not have to read A Thousand Plateaus in order to understand 
what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they refer to plateaus. Their own non-
linear writing exemplifies how plateaus can work within a text, and how various 
theoretical assemblages make up rhizomatic knowledge. The clusters of themes 
in the plateaus are different aspects that make up the rhizome. This research 
approaches both jurisprudence and the artwork as rhizomatic in this way, as 
made up of plateaus. In this chapter I discuss the rhizomatic jurisprudence. In 
chapter 3, I discuss the rhizomatic artwork. Getting to the various clusters of 
themes that exist simultaneously, within jurisprudence and the artworks alike, 
open up the potentialities that this project aims to demonstrate.  
Even though each plateau has its own theme, Deleuze and Guattari make a 
point of demonstrating that the plateaus interact and communicate inter se, but 
never establishing a vertical structure. Instead there is a horizontal connected-
ness. It means that there is “a multiplicity that cannot be understood in terms of 
the traditional of the One and the Many, of origins and genesis, or of deep 
structures in which any point can be connected with any other point, and any 
sequence of elements broken at any juncture.”163  
Proposing open trajectories, i.e. a rhizomatic understanding of jurisprudence 
that does not create closed boundaries like a systematic approach would have 
done, the theory is useful to apply e.g. when discussing the concept of the cul-
tural commons that requires an open-ended approach. Challenging for instance 
the Luhmannian and Kelsian notions of closed systems and hierarchies, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory and the way of thinking that they propose open 
up alternative paths to approaching jurisprudence and law. In other, perhaps 
more familiar academic words, it signifies a multi/pluri- and interdisciplinary 
approach to jurisprudence and law. 
Critical legal research has presented studies devoted to the plurality, multi-
plicity (and indeed pluricentricity164) of law challenging the notions of systems, 
unity and singular origins in law ontologically. Some have even tried to fuse 
those ideas with Luhmann’s systems theory.165 This research is very much part 
of such a “postmodern” or “alternative jurisprudence” tradition. Here I shall be 
stressing the significance, in line with the Deleuzian theory as I read it, of un-
derstanding law not as a static, vertical, hierarchical body of coherent regulation 
but rather as rhizomatic, fluent, horizontal, consisting of dynamic sets of plat-
eaus, each with its own concepts and themes that can be interlinked and inter-
dependent. For instance, instead of addressing how law is hierarchically or-
dered, in which fields and in which concepts, we focus on the connectedness 
                                                
163 Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 125. 
164 Håkan Gustafsson, Rättens Polyvalens: En Rättsvetenskaplig Studie av Sociala Rättigheter och 
Rättssäkerhet, Lunds Studies in Sociology of Law, (2002). 
165 See e.g. Andreas Philippopuolos-Mihalopoulos, Niklas Luhmann: Law, Justice, Society, Nomi-
koi, Critical Legal Thinkers, Rutledge, (2010). 
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between all of them. More exactly for this project, instead of e.g. approaching 
intellectual property law and certain constitutional laws, such as freedom of ex-
pression, as two different, often opposing legal fields, that have to be balanced 
against each other and that have two different hierarchal positions – I investi-
gate how they can be connected, particularly within the commons setting. Such 
an approach acknowledges the deterritorialising lines of flight that challenge the 
assumed territoriality of law and the legal concepts, it examines whether law and 
jurisprudence can be approached as a nomadic rhizome, unfinished, moving, 
connectable, as opposed to an assumed territorialised system. 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari apply this very manner of 
thinking and writing, they assemble, put together, juxtapose, in order to show as 
well as test the nature of the rhizome, but they do not rank, coordinate, impose 
structures nor, as it were, draw conclusions, they write:  
 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between 
things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alli-
ance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb ‘to be’, but the fabric of 
the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and... and... and...’166 
 
I shall be arguing that law has certain possibilities that are often overlooked in 
dogmatic research that approaches law as territorised and grounded. Deleuze 
and Guattari claim that the image of thought and knowledge must be seen as 
rhizomatic. I am exploring the realms away from the ontological aspects, trying 
to reach beyond them. I am proposing that we approach law not as a system, 
but acknowledge its rhizomatic qualities. I am exploring what it is law does, 
how it works, and how it could work – i.e. its potential. The traditional dogmatic 
legal reasoning forces us to ask the question “What is it” – what is law, what is 
jurisprudence, what is the artwork, what is a right, etc. Such an approach auto-
matically requires closed concepts, binary and dichotomy based reasoning (it is 
either this or that), and an approach that constantly reterritorialises the lines of 
flight that appear and challenge the territoriality of law.  
Therefore, if law and jurisprudence are seen for their rhizomatic qualities in 
this sense, and if approached in such a way, certain traditionally difficult con-
cepts, such as e.g. the cultural commons become a possibility that already exists 
within law and jurisprudence, and not just a collection of impossible, paradoxi-
cal, political and economical concepts that can only be formulated ‘outside’ law 
by e.g. contractual agreements. Relying on the rhizome theory, the legal concept 
of the cultural commons will in fact become the natural concept in law with 
which access to art can be formulated as a legal concept. I aim to show how this 
can be possible by applying this particular Deleuzeoguattarian theory in order 
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try to get beyond what appears to be the eternal paradoxes in law when it comes 
to access to art, e.g. the tug of war between ‘high-brow’ and ‘low-brow’ art, ‘in-
tellectual’ and ‘mass produced’ art, ‘private’ and ‘public’ art, ‘open’ and ‘closed’ 
access, and so on. All of these paradoxes or dichotomies force lawyers to argue 
for the destruction of the concept of capital and property when it comes to ac-
cess to art in order to create accessibility, to argue against individual rights and 
private ownership in art, against the closed system of intellectual property law, 
because a concept of the private, enclosed artwork is always detrimental to the 
public interest in a culture that is democratic, and open to all. Alternatively, the 
same paradoxes force the more traditional and dogmatic lawyer to argue for the 
opposite. 
The rhizome theory attracts legal attention as it disrupts the need for these 
kinds of opposites that often tie legal reasoning in knots and create mazes that 
are often impossible to logically exit from. Therefore, as some legal theories will 
have it, artworks can either be privately closed off, owned by one or more indi-
vidual or be completely open, un-owned or publically owned and accessible to 
all. We have to choose one – both cannot do!167 
The core idea of the rhizome theory in law may be that it appears to be able 
to transcend these dichotomies as it is stressing not the hostile opposites, but 
rather interlinkage, the eternal and... and... and...168 with an infinite number of 
potential formations inter se, alliance instead of opposition. Rhizomatic theory 
thus allows for all these various formations and perspectives to operate all at 
once – in a network – together.  
 
2.3.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “ASSEMBLAGES” AND “BODIES WITHOUT 
ORGANS” FOR THE RHIZOME 
In order to manage the concept of the rhizome and apply it in jurisprudence we 
must look more closely at “Assemblages”, “Machines”, and “Bodies Without 
Organs” (BwO).  
When explaining an assemblage Deleuze and Guattari use an example: litera-
ture. Literature, they write, is a form of assemblage, a literary machine as they also 
refer to it, something that can be plugged into and interlinked with or connect-
ed to other assemblages in order to function. An assemblage is created when 
deterritorialised lines of flight are clustered together in a new formation. As an 
assemblage it exists in connection with other “machines”. A simple example is 
that the reader brings his own machine into reading, and adds a dimension to 
the book that s/he reads and its subject matter that was not there before. 
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Deleuze and Guattari explain in the beginning of Anti-Oedipus what each per-
son’s machine refers to. They write: 
 
Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving 
other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the nec-
essary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an en-
ergy-source-machine: the one produces a flow the other interrupts. The 
breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth is a machine coupled 
to it. […] Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machine.169 
 
A reader’s machine is thus both his/her specific physical predispositions as well 
as his/her intellectual predispositions, as well as everything it is connected to, 
everything it becomes a hybrid of, based on e.g. upbringing, education, back-
ground, experiences etc. Deleuze and Guattari argue that such a literary ma-
chine can both appear as an organism and as a signifying totality (e.g. a novel), 
with a determination attributable to a subject (e.g. the reader), but it does not 
have to have a subject in order to exist (a book exists even if it is not read). It is 
at the same time subject to lines of flight that constantly challenge its totality. In 
that similar manner, I shall now approach law, legal subjects, and legal concepts, 
in this multiplying manner with constantly added dimensions. This is relevant, 
as it not only introduced multiplicity in terms of law and jurisprudence that is 
required for the conception of the commons in jurisprudence, it is also a cri-
tique of certain dogmatic endeavours that territorialise law and the legal con-
cepts.  
Deleuze coined another term that he continued to explore in his writings 
with Guattari, and that is the concept of Body Without Organs (BwO). BwO is 
something that is continually and constantly dismantling the totality, or the ap-
pearance of it. Such dismantling of the totality is continuous, relentless, perpetual, 
it goes on until it leaves nothing more than an empty name, Deleuze and Guat-
tari conclude: a BwO is both a state prior to or after existence. A book can thus 
simultaneously be an existing corporeal totality as well as it is nothing more 
than a Body Without Organs, a non-totality. Literary assemblages have not one 
but several BwOs that they can face and interact with; this is the process of the 
“quantifying of writing” – seen in this way a book is understood as an event, 
but also as something continuous, unfinished, always able to be connected to 
other BwOs and become something else. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari con-
tinue, the book, as a literary assemblage, has no object either.170 
The term BwO itself is borrowed from the French playwright Antonin Ar-
taud who in a radio play wrote that a person becomes truly free when he has 
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become a Body Without Organs, that is, when all automatic reactions and bodi-
ly apparitions have been stripped from him and when he can experience affect 
and reason freely. Deleuze and Guattari develop the concept further and in de-
tail171 in Anti-Oedipus.172 Bogue explains the concept of BwO that was intro-
duced in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense:  
 
[T]wo fundamental intuitions of the body: as a collection of dissociated 
body parts, dismembered, interpenetrating and mutually devouring; and as a 
miraculously solidified ‘body without organs’ […] catatonic body ‘without 
parts which does everything through insufflation, inspiration, evaporation, 
fluidic transmission.173 
 
A BwO is a constant becoming, continuous, without limit; 
 
We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite 
of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. 
The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs 
called the organism.174  
 
The concept BwO is thus a concept that aims to get beyond the systemic organ-
isation. 
Can we go even further and ask whether law can be imagined as a Law with-
out Organs?175 Law without Organs as a concept opens up for the constant be-
coming of law and allows for a rhizomatic jurisprudence with nomadic tenden-
cies that can refrain from territorialisation. It also acknowledges the dismantling 
forces that exist and constantly create lines of flight from the legal territory, 
forcing law to come face to face with its movement and non-totality.  
 
2.4 THE LEGAL THEORY OF THE RHIZOME: DELEUZE IN LAW  
The introductory chapter in A Thousand Plateaus is called “Introduction: Rhi-
zome”. There, Deleuze and Guattari propose that there are three types of liter-
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ary machines: the root book, the radicle system/fascicular root book, and finally 
the rhizome book.  
With reference to the first one, the root book, they use, as we already saw 
above, the metaphor of a tree to describe it. The root book is like a tree in that 
it has a root e.g. in the book’s language, tradition, geographical place, historical 
place, author and so on. It relies on an origin that acts as a root, a fixation, a 
substructure. The totality above the surface that we are able to see and examine 
is the book itself. In Freudian terms, the subconscious lies underneath the sur-
face, the conscious on the surface, but both are nevertheless present. The root 
book, they argue, signifies unity, coherence, organisation, territorialisation, and 
it always has a singular origin. It is based on dialectical opposites and dependent 
on a dialectical and binary logic.176 Deleuze and Guattari claim that traditional 
philosophical reflection is based on root book-type thinking. Root books instil 
discipline, unity, chronology, and coherence within a singular, and an organised 
body.  
The root book in itself is a process of perpetual deferral as one concept is 
defined by another in an infinite self-referential regress.177 A self-referential re-
gress in legal theory can for instance be found in Kelsen’s Grundnorm as well as 
in Hart’s rule of recognition. The root book, with its binary logic, dominates sci-
ence and scientific reason. Could it be argued that due to such an approach, the 
root book type of reasoning must be the prevailing one also in jurisprudence? 
In order to understand law and the legal system, we feel we must organise it, we 
presume a unity, coherence, opposites, and a hierarchical order.  
The second type of book, the radicle system/fascicular root book, emerged as an 
alternative to the root book during modernity. There, the root has been abort-
ed, and an infinite number and multiplicity of secondary roots developed in-
stead of the one root.178 This metaphor rests on the idea of fragmentation e.g. 
the cut-up techniques utilised in creative production or writing. Still, Deleuze 
and Guattari continue to argue, that even though multiplicity had been intro-
duced, and regardless of the infinite number of fragments that may have been 
created using modern methods, there still exists a secret, albeit not directly dis-
cernable, unity even in these assemblages. The mode of reasoning had merely 
moved from the binary, linear logic to a “circular or cyclic dimension”.179 As 
examples of such methods Deleuze and Guattari mention James Joyce’s writing 
or Nietzsche’s philosophy. Joyce shattered the linear unity of words and showed 
how words do not have one, but multiple roots, of which we shall see an exam-
ple and their legal ramifications, in chapter 4 below. Nietzsche, in his theoretical 
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constructions, even went one step further than Joyce and shattered the linear 
unity of knowledge itself. Even still, these kinds of fragmentations were not sat-
isfactory for Deleuze and Guattari. They maintained that such methods do not 
adequately break and do away with dualisms, opposites, binary logic, and after 
all, there still remains a notion of unity, albeit fragmentised and shattered. It is 
just a new type of unity, they write, a mystification of unity, and it makes the 
book “all the more total for being fragmented”.180 If we assume that this is what 
modern and post-modern jurisprudence has been doing, moving jurisprudence 
away from a root-cosmos towards a radicle-chaosmos, in the words of Deleuze 
and Guattari, then we must assume that even postmodern jurisprudence has not 
gone far enough. It has not managed to truly break with the concept of unity 
and coherence, invoking infinite numbers of plurality and multiplicity, but still 
helplessly presupposing a secret, opaque unity, a new type of mystified unity, 
but a unity nonetheless.181 Postmodernism can in such a view be seen as a mir-
ror image of modernism, reproducing the tenets of modernism, without ever 
breaking free from it, or getting beyond it. 
 
2.4.1 THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF THE RHIZOME 
Deleuze and Guattari propose the rhizomatic book as an alternative to the two 
previous ones (root and fascicle books). In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and 
Guattari define the rhizome by ascribing it six principles. 
 
Principles 1 and 2: Connection and heterogeneity 
The first principle refers to the fact that a rhizome can be connected to any-
thing, and in that sense it differs from a tree or a root that has a fixed point and 
a hierarchical order. They write: 
 
A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, or-
ganisations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and 
social struggles.182  
 
In that way the fictional situations of an ideal, e.g. an assumed ideal speaker and 
listener or signifier and signified, are circumvented. Binary reasoning that is 
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marked by homogeneity can be subverted and heterogeneity introduced with 
the rhizome as interlinkage can be achieved between various components that 
are connected to one another. A centre, a core, a single origin becomes futile as 
the connectivity manages to create new dimensions and connection – where the 
full potential of the assemblage can be actualised through linkage alone.  
The significant trait of the rhizome theory that may be interesting in juris-
prudence is that legal reasoning becomes connections: a jurisprudence where 
law is enabled to become a BwO, where law is not seen as a single, unified 
body183 but as an assemblage of inter-connectable norms, that are not depend-
ent of a binary logic. A plural law that enables alliances, not opposites. A rhi-
zomatic jurisprudence becomes a collection of potentialities. In that shape the 
Law without Organs can be connected to other (more or less organised or un-
organised) bodies such as the market, the society, art, etc. These types of con-
nections are referred to by Deleuze and Guattari as “becomings”, and it is 
through the becomings that the potentiality in a rhizome can be fully actualised. 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari for instance mention the becom-
ing-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-child, etc. in order to show the pro-
cess of multiplicity and what happens when two ‘bodies’ are (more or less tem-
porarily) interlinked.  
However, the Deleuzeoguattarian becoming is not juridification in e.g. a Ha-
bermasian sense – when a societal issue or conflict is transformed into law – 
“the tendency towards an increase in formal (or positive, written) law”,184 that 
which Habermas calls colonisation of the “lifeworld”.185 No. Becoming in the 
Deleuzeoguattarian sense is a much more radical concept than so. A becoming 
refers to becoming something else. The concept of becoming is a concept of 
creativity, i.e. of connections and alliances that cannot be imagined within dog-
matic reasoning. The Deleuzian becoming refers to production of something 
completely new, something that previously had been unimaginable. It is brought 
on by lines of flight and encounters.  
In order to understand what that means let us firstly look at how Deleuze 
and Guattari describe the concept. Deleuze and Guattari describe becoming in the 
following manner: 
 
A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. […] To become 
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is not to progress or regress along a series. […] Finally, becoming is not an 
evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and filiation. Becoming pro-
duces nothing by filiation; all filiation is imagination. Becoming is always of 
a different order than filiation. It concerns alliance.186  
 
This research project is particularly interested in the becoming of law, or the 
becoming of a rhizomatic jurisprudence, of a legal BwO. It is precisely the be-
coming of law that can conceive of a legal concept such as the cultural com-
mons. The legal concept of the cultural commons may be difficult to conceive 
of in traditional jurisprudence, because it is often presented as an economical 
concept (it is a social dilemma), a political concept (it is allocation of resources), 
it destroys individual rights, it takes away the principles of ownership, it pro-
motes public over private, etc… A becoming for Deleuze and Guattari has to 
do with achieving exactly these types of heterogeneity, where concepts such as 
law, economics, politics, etc. need not be each other’s opposites or exclusory.  
A concept of the commons in law, it will be argued here, manages to sustain 
fundamental individual interests as well as it manages to provide access to natu-
ral and cultural resources (as opposed to allocation of resources). As such it is 
not a question of pragmatism, it is a question of becoming.  
This project is in search of the becomings of law, through which law’s potentiality 
can be actualised, in order to discuss the possibility of introducing a concept of 
cultural commons in law. It is the very possibility of alliance, involution and 
connections of law that this research explores, rather than its “evolution” or 
“filiation”. What happens for instance when law creates an alliance with the 
artwork, with the market, with the digital sphere? In those very connections, is 
there a type of becoming-artwork or becoming-law that might be interesting to 
look at from a jurisprudential point of view? 
The concept of becoming is what allows heterogeneous connections, the 
first two principles of the rhizome theory.  
 
Principle 3: Multiplicities 
The third principle of the rhizome system is the principle of multiplicity, or ra-
ther multiplicities, a double plural.  
 
Multiplicities are rhizomatic and expose arborescent pseudo multiplicities 
for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to 
divide in the subject.187  
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This is a radical idea. Deleuze and Guattari exemplify it with a puppet on a 
string, the rhizomes and multiplicities are here the puppet connected to an artist 
or puppeteer, but also to the artist’s nerve fibres which form a dimension of its 
own, and then the artist’s physical body, then his mental abilities, then his geo-
graphical place, etc. which all form new dimensions that are connected to the 
first and the second, and so on. This is how an assemblage is created. Deleuze 
and Guattari explain, in the “increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that 
necessarily changes in nature as it expands connections. There are no points or 
positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree or root. There 
are only lines.”188  
It is this very multiplicity of dimensions that is particularly interesting for ju-
risprudence. But the increase in multiplicities does not require hierarchical 
structures according to Deleuze and Guattari, as: 
 
[a]ll multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their 
dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, 
even though the dimensions of this ‘plane’ increase with the number of 
connections that are made on it. Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by 
the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialisation according to which 
they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities.189  
 
In conjunction with law and jurisprudence, this is how Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos suggests that law becomes a multiple plane of immanence that 
reaches beyond traditional boundaries: 
 
The law becomes a plane of immanence, namely the term that Deleuze & 
Guattari reserve for the all-embracing sum of folds and falls and connec-
tions, where all causality is immanently contained within its boundaries. The 
plane of immanence is infinite. Its boundaries are virtually everywhere and 
actually including everything – not unlike a system whose boundaries are 
the world as the system knows it, potentially expanding to ingest more and 
more environment. The crucial point is that the law as a plane of imma-
nence contains all there is to be contained. Its exteriority is always internal-
ised but always powerfully appearing as a movement that pushes the 
boundaries ever further. This immanent exteriority is what Deleuze & 
Guattari call a line of flight, namely a line that traverses the plane and pushes 
the limits from within to further edges of creativity.190 
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Postmodern jurisprudence has challenged the inside and the outside of legal 
boundaries. By adopting Deleuze’s and Guattari’s reasoning and focusing on 
the immanent reflexivity which produces lines of flight, the problems with ex-
clusions from the legal realm could if not be overcome then at least minimised 
with this reasoning. The legal dimensions will always be connectable to another 
plateau for instance a new technological or digital development, new market ini-
tiatives and business models, globalisation – and as such the constantly moving 
reality (or rather realities) can be conceived of in jurisprudence and grasped by 
law and they can always be connected. This is what the rhizomatic jurispru-
dence opens up for. And whenever a line of flight occurs in society, we do not 
have to leave law, we just move to another plateau. 
 
Principle 4: Asignifying rupture 
Much like the concept of rhizome in botany, if a rhizome in Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s theory is broken or shattered it can start up again and give rise to a new 
“plant”. In the theory of Deleuze and Guattari, each time the rhizome is broken 
the fourth principle, asignifying rupture, takes place – the rhizome starts up anew 
on a new or on an old line of flight.191 The rhizome has a recuperative nature, 
and it allows movements and flows to be re-routed or to be diverted. Deleuze 
and Guattari do not use genes but rather viruses as an example of how rhi-
zomes are broken, spread, contaminate and are contaminated, and how they 
multiply, moving from body to body.192 The rhizome, they write, is antigenealo-
gy193. 
While a reasoning based on binary logic has to appear as mimicking the 
world, the rhizome does not have to mimic anything. Law has always been ob-
sessed with mimicry, of having to imitate reality, in order to bring the “real” in-
to the legal sphere(s). The rhizome theory, however, allows for the real instead 
to colour or contaminate law194, and vice versa, for them to be interlinked and 
communicate with one another, transforming hostile legal opposites (good-bad; 
true-false; legal-non legal, open-closed, private-public and so on) that have their 
origin in binary logic, into rhizomes that can be inter-connected to form more 
or less temporary alliances instead. Therefore, instead of seeing the legal concept 
of the cultural commons as either public or private, as either open or closed – 
we understand that it is an alliance between the public and the private, the 
                                                
191 For lines of flight see particularly chapter 4 below. 
192 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 11. 
193 Ibid. p. 12. 
194 “Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its colour, pink 
on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible 
itself, asignifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight, it follows its ‘aparallel evolution’ 
through to the end.” Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 12. 
 98 
opened and the closed, and whenever there is a break in a concept, an asignify-
ing rupture, it can start up a new, create new alliances, make new connections.  
 
Principles 5 and 6: Cartography and Decalcomania 
 
[A] rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a 
stranger to any idea of generic axis or deep structure.195  
 
What would happen if legal philosophy was to stray from the dependence on 
the (metaphor of) generic axis and deep structures in law? Deleuze and Guattari 
propose that such a structure-dependent reasoning can only achieve descrip-
tions of a de facto state of being, and can only maintain a balance in the inter-
subjective relations, it is a method that comes “ready-made”, they argue. “The 
tree articulates and hierarchizes tracings; tracings are like leaves of a tree.”196 
That means that jurisprudence and law can never really fully be in contact 
with the real when a structural approach and the method of tracing are applied 
because in that case the reality can only be understood if ‘translated’ into the le-
gal language that fits within the legal system. Through this act of translation, as-
pects of reality may be lost. Another aspect that gets lost is the potentiality of 
law. Instead, the rhizome theory invites us to make maps, as “[t]he map has to 
do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged ’compe-
tence’”.197 
There is then, a distinction between a map, cartography and a tracing. Tracing 
assumes a notion of a closed off, structuralised, organised, (legal) body where 
norms exist in a hierarchical, binary order. If this is presumed then we are only 
conducting a tracing per such logic in the world of Deleuze and Guattari. Trac-
ing means mimicking – but it is only partial mimicking as some aspects of reality 
always remain outside.  
The body of law is also (like the root book) often described by using the 
metaphor of a tree, it begins with a root below the surface (deep structure) and 
then grows upwards with a trunk (legal culture), and then it branches out and 
creates offshoots (the legal surface).198 Such reasoning calls for an assumption 
that something will always have to fall inside or be translated to otherwise fall 
inside the legal sphere (even if it is within the deep structure) and conversely 
that something else will fall outside (even outside the deep structure). This is the 
underlying binary logic that underpins traditional legal reasoning. Deleuze and 
Guattari write: 
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An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure 
nor superficial structure; it flattens all of its dimensions onto a single plane 
of consistency upon which reciprocal presuppositions and mutual insertions 
play themselves out.199 
 
We have to look closer at the contact with the “real” that a mapping calls for. 
Mapping according to Deleuze and Guattari means therefore that reasoning in 
general and here legal reasoning in particular always remain open and connecta-
ble to all other dimensions, like a map; such connectivity does not depend on an 
inside and an outside.  
Boaventura de Sousa Santos also addressed the concept of legal cartography 
in 1987 in the article ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Con-
ception of Law’. There he writes:  
 
[L]aw and society have been conceived in the conventional paradigm, as two 
separate and distinct realities or entities which are then juxtaposed in order to in-
vestigate the extent to which they correspond or do not correspond. The 
most important ‘exemplars’ of sociological research on law have been de-
veloped from this conception (the study of the relations between law in 
books and law in action and the study of the impact of society on law or, 
inversely, the study of the impact of law in society).200  
 
De Sousa Santos challenges this ‘conventional paradigm’, or what I here refer to 
as dogmatic legal reasoning. He argues instead for a legal cartography, where the 
concept of the map, even though it distorts ‘reality’, is still convenient to use.201  
 
In the modern era law has become the privileged way of imagining, repre-
senting, and distorting, that is to say, of mapping these social spaces and the 
capitals, the actions and symbolic universes that animate or activate them.202 
 
While de Sousa Santos does not use Deleuze and Guattari nor reference the 
Deleuzeoguattarian mapping method, his article provides a connection between 
the critique of the dogmatic legal reasoning where law and reality are ap-
proached as two separate or distinct entities and cartography. This can help us 
                                                
199 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 100. 
200 [my emphasis], Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading: Toward a Post-
modern Conception of Law’ in 14 Journal of Law & Society 279, 1987, p. 280. 
201 Ibid. p. 283. 
202 de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’, 
p. 286. 
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in further understanding the benefits of the Deleuzeoguattarian mapping meth-
od. 
Not only does the mapping method open up law to the changing reality, 
conceived to be ‘outside’ law in dogmatic legal reasoning, it also allows oppos-
ing legal fields to be inter-connected among each other, for instance private and 
public law, or civil and constitutional law, national and EU law. In law, the most 
difficult problems are often encountered when we are faced with a conflict of 
laws, principles203 or even interests. We have two valid norms, but they oppose 
(or cancel out) each other. One trusted legal method in such an instance has 
been to organise the norms hierarchically, in rank, in order to determine which 
one must prevail. For instance, constitutional laws trump ‘regular’ laws, statuto-
ry laws trump general legal principles and customs, specialised laws trump gen-
eral laws, and so on. This type of reasoning can be explained by Dworkin’s Riggs 
v. Palmer204 classic schoolbook example. In Taking Rights Seriously205 Dworkin 
shows that law is made up not only of rules but also of principles. While rules, 
in a system that is assumed to be coherent, can never contradict each other, 
principles can be contradictory inter se. So Dworkin designates Riggs v. Palmer to 
be a clash of principles, and not a clash between a rule and a principle. In this 
particular case the principle of “one cannot benefit from one’s own wrongdo-
ing” as argued by the majority prevailed over the principle “one should not be 
punished beyond the ways specified in the statute”. 
Explained in such a way within the context of what this research is studying 
one interesting issue deals with the clash between the principle of open access to 
art (knowledge) and the closed, individual-based intellectual property right. Seen as in 
Dworkin and how he analyses Riggs v. Palmer this conflict can and does create 
clogs in the legal machinery as per such reasoning it should be impossible for 
principles to contradict rules. Here I argue that instead of seeing it as a paradox, 
the mere fact that both operate simultaneously, might instead be used in a pro-
ductive manner as a force that exists, and flees and deterritorialises the law. 
What is then the difference between mapping and tracing? Does not map-
ping also include a tracing aspect? Deleuze and Guattari write: 
 
The tracing has already translated the map into an image; it has already 
transformed the rhizome into roots and radicles. It has organised, stabilised, 
neutralised the multiplicities according to the axes of significance and sub-
jectification belonging to it. It has generated, structuralised the rhizome, and 
                                                
203 Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 
cop. (1977). 
204 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). 
205 Roland Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. 
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when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing 
itself.206  
 
That is, the act of stabilising and neutralising decreases the potential alternatives 
of actions, which in turn creates impasses, “bottlenecks” and blockages in the 
system. It means that the binary logic will perpetually be locked-in in a “One-
Two” reasoning, a logic that can never be circumvented. The society of couples 
exists in a centre based system, whereas the rhizome is acentered (or multicen-
tred) and the “communication runs from any neighbour to any other, the stems 
or channels do no preexist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only 
by their state at a given moment – such that the local operations are coordinated 
and the final, global result synchronized without a central agency.”207  
The rhizome theory is at once a critique and a re-evaluation of the dogmatic 
legal reasoning that rests and depends on the idea of a root-foundation, of a 
Grund208. In such classic dogmatic reasoning knowledge and science are under-
stood as arborescent, as we have seen, the tree is the image of the world.  
 
2.5 NOMADIC NOMOS 
2.5.1 LUFTMENSCH209: ON THE LEGAL PERSON AND THE LEGAL SUBJECT 
As it has been noted above Deleuze and Guattari criticise the notion of the uni-
versals, and I have developed this chapter in attempting to show how the con-
cept of universals is equally problematic for law. When we move on to the 
smaller subparts or fractions of law as for instance the various legal fields, or 
even smaller still, we eventually encounter the legal subject – the individual. In a 
similar manner as they critique the universals (and here the universal legal sys-
tem), Deleuze and Guattari also present a critique of the concept of in-dividual. 
In order to incorporate the multiplicity and develop a critique of the notion of 
the undividable individual, the undividable legal subject, we must understand 
their idea of the individual as an ‘infinite multiplicity’.210 
                                                
206 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 15. 
207 [original emphasis], Ibid. p. 19. 
208 Cf. Kelsen’s Grundnorm even if Gustafsson does not interpret it that way, see e.g. see 
Gustafsson, ‘Fiction of Law’. 
209 Luftmensch, Yiddish = Rootless person. Interestingly, the word is also used to designate a 
person who is primarily concerned with intellectual pursuits rather than practical matters.  
210 “Thus each individual is an infinite multiplicity, and the whole of Nature is a multiplicity of 
perfectly individuated multiplicities […] its pieces are the various assemblages and individuals, 
each of which groups together an infinity of particles entering into an infinity of more or less 
interconnected relations”, Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. p. 280. 
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Deleuze and Guattari are attempting to show how the subject too is con-
stantly in a state of becoming, and as such s/he remains unfinalised, but also 
multiple, iterant, continuous. Approaching the legal subject in this way reveals a 
certain potential and acknowledges the possibility for constant movement and 
development of the subject.   
In What is Philosophy Deleuze and Guattari begin to develop the idea of the 
subject that they refer to as “conceptual personae”211. Already in naming the 
concept personae i.e. the plural of persona, they hint at the multiplicity in the 
concept of the person. Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari it is always a question of 
individuation – a constant multiplication, becoming, rather than a fixed subject. 
There are always other sides of the self that may be lost when the concept of 
the legal subject is applied in a dogmatic manner. In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
sense, on the other hand, the subject always remains continuous and unfinal-
ised. 
Edward Mussawir finds an interesting potential in the concept of legal per-
son. Mussawir explains this particular potentiality. He cites Deleuze that claims 
that while philosophy could afford to do without the concept of “the subject” – 
it could look at law and jurisprudence “as an example of a discipline accus-
tomed to dealing in cases and singularities”.212 Mussawir then claims that: 
 
The jurisprudential creativity involved in fashioning a ‘legal person’ or a ‘ju-
ristic person’, however, is something not commonly acknowledged in mod-
ern accounts of jurisdiction. […] Legal persons, as the formalized roles in 
the technology of civil governance in other words, are related to rights in a 
very different way than the ‘legal subject’ is. As an element in analytical legal 
philosophy, the legal subject is able to be related to rights in a universalized 
and abstract way. It is capable of simply ‘bearing’ rights – or indeed capable 
of bearing any imaginable right – and thus retains only the potential of acting. 
The legal person, on the other hand, has a determinate relation to a set of 
rights and capacities which it performs. If we are able of considering the ju-
ridical technology of legal personality independently of the deployment of 
the concept of a ‘subject of rights’, we notice that the legal person contin-
ues to be constructed precisely through crafting a non-universalized set of 
rights linked definitely to a particular office. The person in this sense re-
mains a device invented in law to make a certain set of rights livable in and 
through a definite role, but – since the role does not exist outside the right 
that it is designed to institute – it is without any abstract, transcendental or 
confessional relation to moral responsibility.213  
                                                
211 Ibid. p. 61-83. 
212 Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 23. 
213 [original emphasis], Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 24-25. 
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Mussawir acknowledges that the concept of the universal legal subject and par-
ticular legal person do not cancel each other out. I shall return to this discussion 
in more detail in chapters 5 and 8 where I discuss how an approach to a legal 
subject in this way fits within the commons (chapter 5) as well as how concept 
of the commons does not cancel out the concept of copyright or author (chap-
ter 8). On a theoretical level what can be addressed already here, is that 
Mussawir’s differentiation between the legal person and the legal subject is very 
interesting. In his reading of Deleuze Mussawir manages to show that there is 
an existing potential in law, that is always already there, but that we may not al-
ways acknowledge. In this particular instance he presents the concept of the le-
gal person as a potentially much more ‘multiple’ concept than the static legal 
subject. Mussawir points out, for instance, how also corporations can indeed be 
legal persons even though they are non-human. This particular reading both of-
fers a critique of subjectivity and the subject of rights according to Mussawir, 
but it is also constructive in its reading of the legal possibility.  
 
The modern ‘Law of Persons’ typically does not divide persons into ‘unfree’ 
and ‘free’ [as had been done in Roman law], but rather into ‘natural persons’ 
and ‘corporations’. This shift in perspective was accompanied also by a re-
newal in the theoretical approaches to legal personality as well as with a 
metaphysical emphasis on two categories: the human and the subject.214  
 
Further on in this study, particularly in the cases of Bruno Schulz and Franz 
Kafka that will be presented in chapter 4, I shall be looking at fragmented iden-
tities and how they influence firstly the construction of the artist as a legal per-
son, and secondly how that particular construction affects access to art. On a 
more general level it has to do with how to deal with the ‘individual’ that re-
quires a case-by-case approach and totality that is ‘reality’ or ‘human experience’ 
or ‘law’ that require universal principles applicable to everyone equally.  
Here the noun ‘individual’ is transformed into the verb ‘individuate’215 – par-
ticularly used by Gilbert Simondon, who has influenced Deleuze’ writing great-
ly. It was Simondon’s “more-than…” philosophical concepts that laid the 
ground of that which later became Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s unfi-
nalised, multiple identity. In terms of the individual Simondon maintained that 
the individual was never completely determined and was always more-than-identity 
                                                
214 Ibid. p. 31. 
215 Gilbert Simondon, L’Individuation Psychique et Collective : A la Lumière des Notions de Forme, In-
formation, Potentiel et Métastabilité, Editions Aubier (2007 [originally published in 1964]). See also 
Andrew Iliadis, ‘A New Individuation: Deleuze’s Simondon Connection’ in MediaTropes, 
eJournal Vol IV, No 1 (2013): 83–100. 
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and more-than-unity216. This leads into Simondon’s other concept that also influ-
enced Deleuze namely “transindividuality”. Rather than relying on a collective 
subject, Simodon devised transindividual sharing, that could be more or less 
temporary, and that also contributed to the constant individuation and the con-
stant development of the person. It takes place in the interaction with other in-
dividuals.217  
These concepts thus lay the ground for Deleuze and Guattari’s and became 
general conditions for the concept of unfinished becoming, rather than the stat-
ic being. What this particular approach reveals, and something that I shall be 
exploring further, particularly in the Schulz and Kafka cases, is the need for law 
to also acknowledge the legal subject as open-ended, multiple and constantly in 
the process of transformation. Using Deleuze’ and Guattari’s approach, what 
this project attempts to show is how the human complexity can be incorporated 
within legal concepts. Acknowledging interaction, the complexity of humans 
and the human experience, the unfinished, multiple, becoming subject can be 
used – it can become the nomadic subject and serve as the base from which one 
reads the legal subject.  
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari go one step even further than 
the nomadic subject and develop further upon the medieval concept of haecceity, 
namely the concept of particularity or ‘thisness’ describing the subject as a de-
gree or as an intensity, that enters into composition with other degrees, other 
intensities, to form another individual.218 This is in line with what we have al-
ready seen as the constant transindividuality, individuation – the constantly 
changing subject. Deleuze and Guattari comment further on it, writing: 
 
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, sub-
ject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a 
winter, a summer an hour, a date have a perfect individuality, lacking noth-
ing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a sub-
ject. They are haecceities in the same sense that they consist entirely of rela-
tions of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to af-
fect and be affected.219 
 
                                                
216 See generally Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, (trans.) 
Thomas LaMarre, MIT Press, (2012). 
217 Riccardo Baldissone Conference paper. Dostoyevsky as a Legal Theorist? On the Role of Litera-
ture in the Reconsideration of the Human Subject of Rights, Aidel International Conference 2012 Liter-
ature and Human Rights Verona, (15-17 November 2012) 
218 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus., p. 279. 
219 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus., pp. 287-288. 
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It is this very notion that shall be explored throughout this analysis is when per-
sons cease to be subjects and become events220 – and instead of identity we 
shall be looking at individuation and haecceity. Seen that way, the person be-
comes a rhizome in his/her own right. To conclude in the words of Deleuze 
and Guattari, a “haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; 
it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhi-
zome.”221  
 
2.5.2 LEGAL GROUNDLESSNESS: SANS FOND  
Gustafsson writes in Dissens that the “fact that a perceptible ground is missing, 
does not detract from law’s legitimacy: law’s being groundless does not mean 
that it is meaningless.”222 Before ending this chapter I shall here look at the last 
significant concept and how the Deleuzian theory can assist us in the analysis of 
it, namely the absence of origin, ground and the foundation (or lack thereof) of 
law. For Deleuze, jurisprudence means something different than, and also far 
more important than, only legal theory or the philosophy of law. Jurisprudence 
is more like the active and immanent plane on which law navigates its groundless-
ness.223  
The concept of groundlessness and ungrounding (sans-fond) Deleuze devel-
ops mainly in Difference and Repetition.  
 
By ‘ungrounding’ we should understand the freedom of the non-mediated 
ground, the discovery of a ground behind every other ground, the relation 
between the groundless and the ungrounded, the immediate reflection of 
the formless and the superior which constitutes the eternal return. Every 
thing, animal or being assumes the status of simulacrum […]224  
 
The point here is not to dwell on Deleuze’s understanding and use of the Nie-
tzschean eternal return, but rather to show how he reads the ungrounding. To 
paraphrase McMahon reading Deleuze, law is thus always shadowed by the un-
thinkable as both its raison d´être and its impossibility, its ground (fond) and its 
“ungrounding” (éffondement)225. It is this particular occurrence that I refer to as 
                                                
220 Ibid. p. 289. 
221 Ibid. p. 290. 
222 [original emphasis, my translation], “Det faktum att det saknas ett förnimbart ursprung, 
förtar ingalunda rättens berättigande: att rätten är grundlös betyder inte att den är meningslös.” 
Gustafsson, Dissens, p. 110  
223 [my emphasis], Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 23. 
224 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 67. 
225 [quote modified]. Melissa McMahon “Difference and Repetition” in (ed.) Stivale, Gilles 
Deleuze, Key Concepts, p. 48. Her use of thought has here been replaced by law. 
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Ungrund here that may challenge Kelsen’s notion of Grund but it is not, as 
would have been the case per binary reasoning, that the act of ungrounding is 
the Grund’s opposite. On the contrary, it is its raison d´être. 
The Deleuzian groundlessness is in line with the rhizomatic, nomadic 
thought, as opposed to the arborescent, grounded, dogmatic thought. The idea of 
groundlessness is also connected to the Deleuzian concept of difference. Differ-
ence in Deleuze challenges universal concepts and unified ideas. The ground-
lessness thus refers both the entire system, e.g. the entire legal system, as well as 
the smallest components that make up the system, e.g. the individual or the le-
gal subject. Deleuze writes in The Logic of Sense: 
 
No, singularities are not imprisoned within individuals and persons; and 
one does not fall into an undifferentiated ground, into groundless depth, 
when one undoes the individual and the person.  The impersonal and pre-
individual are the free nomadic singularities….226 
 
Through the notion of difference as opposed to universality it is possible to get 
beyond the “What is?” question. This will be exemplified in chapter 4 where the 
legal concepts of intellectual property and freedom of speech are analysed with 
the help of the notion of Deleuzian difference. What the Deleuzian theory ar-
rives at, is that even though the nomadic and territorialising nature of law can 
be shown, as well as its groundlessness, it does not mean that all legal acts are 
discretionary, or that anything goes. On the contrary, the principle of ground-
lessness connects law to the exteriority, and makes it more able to conceive of 
the multidimensional ‘reality’ or be connected to it without for that sake having 
to translate it into its own system.  
All this taken together, nomads, territorialisation, de/reterritorialisation, 
bodies without organs, haecceities, sans-fond, etc. will make up the rhizomatic 
jurisprudence that shall be introduced henceforward and developed throughout 
this entire research project. 
  
                                                
226 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 106. 
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PART 2 
 
 
THE ARTWORK 
 
“No wind is the king’s wind 
Let every cow keep her calf.” 
 
- Ezra Pound, Canto IV.16 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE RHIZOMATIC ARTWORK  
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3 THE RHIZOMATIC ARTWORK 
 
As is widely known, the concepts of “art” or “artwork” have had a number of 
various meanings and definitions historically and have come to designate differ-
ent creative activities in different times. It can for instance be noted that even 
within the field of art history any given established definition of art differs from 
any other, e.g. definitions adopted when defining what constituted art in ancient 
Greece is not the same as in ancient Rome, in Renaissance Italy or in modern 
times. To then attempt to define art within a legal doctoral thesis might seem 
presumptuous,227 as law and jurisprudence neither have the knowledge nor the 
tools to define art in that way, but there has to be at least some indication as to 
how the concept is used within this project. The concept of “art” has evolved 
and changed through time. Because it is a concept that is constantly in trans-
formation and in process the question “what is art” has often lead researchers 
and artists alike down the wrong path – a dead-end. So as to avoid dead-end 
reasoning, and as this research project is aiming to get beyond the ontological 
question, the same approach is applied to the artwork. The “What is” question 
becomes less central and secondary, while the more pertinent “What does it 
perform?” creates a dialogue and fuels the access discussion. For the purposes 
of this project then, the main goal is to look at the knowledge potential in artworks, 
regardless of what the definition of the artwork might have been at the time of 
its creation or how we may define those creative endeavours today. Therefore, 
for this project it does not matter how a work of art is defined, what matters is 
how it functions, what it does. Later, in chapter 6 I will explore how law can com-
prehend and handle the various concepts of art and its functions without sim-
plifying it or acting as an obstacle to access.  
Deleuze’s and Deleuze/Guattari’s approach to art was very similar to the 
one they adopted to philosophy and science, namely that all three (science, phi-
losophy, and art) participate in the production of knowledge. They write: 
 
[A]rt, science, and philosophy […] cast planes over the chaos. These three 
disciplines are not like religions that invoke dynasties of gods, or the epiph-
any of a single god, in order to paint a firmament on the umbrella, like the 
figures of an Urdoxa from which opinions stem. Philosophy, science, and 
art want us to tear open the firmament and plunge into the chaos.228  
   
                                                
227 Ever since Marcel Duchamp and the type of artworks that he made, the question has even 
gone one step further and the “What happened to the definition of art after Duchamp?” 
seems to often be the starting point in these types of discussions. Definitions, for better or for 
worse, appear to be if not difficult and constraining, certainly obsolete. 
228 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, What is philosophy?,  p. 202. 
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In that vein, as with science and philosophy, art is approached as something 
that creates while it is at the same time seen as a practice. With art, as with ju-
risprudence and legal science, ontological questions such as “is it true?” or 
“what is it?” are equally uninteresting here, claim Deleuze and Guattari. Instead 
they propose a more functional approach to art, – “what does it perform”. Seen 
in that way art becomes connected to knowledge.229 
In this chapter I explore the performance of art, i.e. what it does and how 
does it functions in various guises, various rhizomes and plateaus, as we move 
from the critical perspective of the Frankfurt School to the knowledge based 
perspective of Jamie Stapleton.230  For the sake of clarity, however, it is im-
portant to begin somewhere. And here I have chosen to begin with one of the 
most basic approaches to art, the one presented by the German sociologist, phi-
losopher and musicologist Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and his colleague phi-
losopher and sociologist Max Horkheimer (1895-1973).  
Adorno and Horkheimer’s approach is very much based on a binary logic 
and on one particularly imposing dichotomy. For Adorno/Horkheimer, the 
significance of art is presented as twofold. On the one hand, they claim, art per-
forms a ritual, a magical231 social function that which they refer to as an authentic 
or intellectual232 social function. Secondly, the other function of the artwork is 
presented as being monetary or commercial. In its second guise, the artwork is a to-
ken or a generator of wealth and social status.233 These are works that are  
“packaged” and adapted for some kind of exploitation (in the market place). 
Commodified and often object-centric, this second performance of the artwork 
is connected to wealth, of course wealth in its broadest sense, but wealth never-
theless, rather than participation, communication, action and reflection. This se-
cond type of artwork can comfortably be placed within the property paradigm – 
the artwork is seen as capital, or more accurately perhaps as a resource234 or an as-
                                                
229 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, (trans.) Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, cop. (1995), p. 60.  
230 Jamie Stapleton, Art, Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Economy, Doctoral Thesis, Gold-
smiths College, University of London, (2002). Available at: 
http://www.jaimestapleton.net/about.html. Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
231 See e.g. Walter Benjamin, “Work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction”, in Illumina-
tions: Essays and reflections, (ed. and intro.) Hanna Arendt, (trans.) Harcourt, Brace, Jovanivich, 
Inc., NY: Schocken Books (2007 [originally published in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, in 
1935]). 
232 See e.g. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (Theory and History of Literature), (trans.) Robert 
Hullot-Kantor, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1998 [posthumously published in 
1970, written between 1961 and 1969]). 
233 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, (trans.) Thomas Burger with the assistance of Fredrick Lawrence, Cambridge, 
MA: Polity, MIT Press, (1992 [originally published in 1962]), p. 8. 
234 See e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on art and literature, (ed. and 
intro.) Randal Johnson (various translators), Cambridge: Polity, (1993). See also Jens Andreas-
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set. The significance of the artwork in its second shape is a private one and in 
order to fully exploit its potential value it needs to be packaged and commodi-
fied for exploitation. The information society, as will become apparent, does 
not allow for this type of division between social and commercial to be made as 
clearly as Adorno/Horkheimer proposed, as in the knowledge economy, the 
two functions are practically inseparable. In order to get from Ador-
no/Horkheimer to the knowledge society I shall be adopting a rhizomatic rea-
soning here. Firstly, let us look more closely at Adorno/Horkheimer division 
and the implications it has for the approach to the conception of art. 
 
3.1 THE ORIGINAL FISSURE? HOW ART ALWAYS REACHED BEYOND 
THE “WHAT IS” QUESTION  
Historically, the urban planning of the polis contained a centrally placed agora. 
The Greek city-state always had a natural focal point, a public space, where 
works of art could be placed as well as accessed, discussed, communicated and 
shared. The Parthenon for instance was not solely designated for worship or for 
ritual. It was built, on the one hand, to enshrine statutes in honour of Pallas 
Athena and to demonstrate the piety of the people, but on the other hand it was 
also a sign of wealth and power of the Athenian city-state235. The function an 
artwork performed inside the temple was consequently both a ritual and a reli-
gious one, serving as a place for meeting, discussion and communication as 
most parts of the temple were open to the public.  
Other spaces that had a function similar to a public space where artworks 
could be accessed were burial grounds, war memorials and open-air theatres. 
Equally, stadiums in ancient Rome (e.g. the Colosseum) were built to showcase 
(communicate) the power of the empire. But, as it ought not to be forgotten, 
these were public spaces where entertainment could be provided in the guise of 
for instance games and plays.236 As so often is the case, so too in ancient times, 
entertainment and education of the people went hand in hand. Art entertains. 
Art educates. 
Due to the fact that ancient art was positioned and kept mostly in the public 
sphere it meant that both entertainment and education could take place at the 
same time, as access to art during the Antiquity was one of the more open ones 
                                                                                                                                   
son who discusses the intellectual resource as credit safety in Intellektuella Resurser som Kred-
itsäkerhet: En Förmögenhetsrättslig Undersökning, Juridiska institutionens skriftserie, Gothenburg 
University, (2010).  
235 Most of the Parthenon statutes, as is well known, are currently held in the British Museum 
in London taken there by Earl Elgin and are more widely known as Elgin Marbles. About art-
works as cultural heritage with impact on identity and belonging, see chapter 3 below.  
236 Hugh Honour and John Fleming, A World History of Art, Seventh Edition, Laurence King 
Publishing, (2005), pp. 165-207. 
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historically. But, artworks were connected to their geographical places of origin. 
Even if some art was created for the private spheres such as decorative arts and 
luxury items for the home, the clear tendency was that the artworks were made 
to be open to the public and placed in the public sphere.  
The artworks often also cultivated a divine-like public status by its very 
placement within or adjacent to temples and burial grounds. Such artworks will 
have been equally created for the eyes of Gods as for the eyes of Man.237 That 
means, in terms of their function, the ancient artworks were often created in 
order to communicate with others, but not necessarily with other people, it could 
equally be a matter of a communication with deities. The act of lexis (the mental 
faculty or power of vocal communication) is therefore most interesting, when it 
comes to art during Antiquity in that it can be read as fragments of discussions 
suspended in mid air, embodied in the artworks. It was sometimes a question of 
vertical one-sided communication between Man and Deity and sometimes a dia-
logue between Man and Man and thus the antique artwork performed an addi-
tional function through its communicative potential. Art entertains, educates, 
and it can also even perform a religious function. 
That all these communicative functions embedded in the artwork were 
equally significant is obvious. Artworks were used in order to convey certain 
messages or spread the ideals that were significant for the city-states. For in-
stance, statues were made using the ideal of naturalism, that is, to as far as possi-
ble stay true to every part of the human body when representing it artistically. 
That being said, this ideal was not always followed through fully, as the statutes 
were at the same time built in order to transcend simple everyday appearances, 
thus certain features had to be vastly ‘improved’ and the artist often erased indi-
vidual flaws that the models may have had in order to portray ‘pure’ beauty. 
There is a well-known myth that tells the story of five girls each known for their 
beauty who sat as models for a particular statute of Helen of Troy because, it 
was claimed, that merely one of their individual beauties was not enough to de-
pict the splendour of Helen. Naturalism was therefore not a simple ideal; it was 
used both in order to create likeness as well as to create appearance. Art enter-
tains, educates, it can perform a religious function, as well as an aesthetic func-
tion.  
One could certainly entertain the thought that such thinking may have in-
spired Plato to develop his theory of Ideas, namely, that all perceptible objects 
that we encounter, were only mere imperfect copies of the ultimate Idea of the 
said objects and however close to depicting them we ever came, objects were 
nonetheless still only template-based shadows of their eternal idea. This would 
seem to be in line with Plato’s mistrust of the art of appearance-making, as it 
incorporated a level of manipulation. In Book III of The Republic, for instance, 
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he placed poetry not in the hands of poets but in the hands rulers, and within 
the ambit of the ruler’s power. That had to be done, he argued, for the public 
good.238 Plato in a way was the first one to go against the open-access approach 
to art of his time and on the contrary propagate the idea of fencing off the art-
work, controlling it, placing it within the powers granted to the ruler. By placing 
poetry in the hands of the ruler as opposed to the bard, or the people, the result 
becomes an administrated form of poetry and art, and thus, by the same token 
all lexis that art might be able to generate is placed under control of the ruler. 
Plato therefore argued that poetry, as an art form, ought only to be used to 
describe likeness particularly focusing on the ideal virtues that were seen as sig-
nificant for the city-state, e.g. loyalty and bravery. His distrust of art and its po-
tency can thus be studied as an attempt to narrow the access to knowledge or 
the potential of art by controlling an otherwise very open public sphere as well 
as the lexis inside it. Art entertains, educates, it can perform a religious function, 
an aesthetic function, as well as a political and ideological function.  
Creation of appearances was, however, seen by Plato to be entirely legiti-
mate if done by the ruler or the ruling class for instance in order to boost mo-
rale. Later on in Antiquity Alexander the Great was often portrayed as a God in 
statues in order to represent (and arguably embellish) his and the Hellenic pow-
er.239 Ever since Plato, we can clearly see that a discussion concerning access to 
art has existed, particularly concerning who can have access to art, when and on 
what/whose terms.  For that do be answered, the question “What does it do” 
must be posed. What does art do and how it functions is evidently in no way a 
modern question.   
The artworks in the Antiquity (image-based as well as written) were thus di-
verse and had multiple functions, but they did not only have a social and a polit-
ical significance. Artworks had an equally remarkable commercial value. The 
Parthenon, for instance is an architectural construction that was built in order 
to convey ideas of virtue, piety and wealth by means of the various artworks in-
side it. But, it also served as a treasury where the gold reserve was kept. Gold 
reserves were stored inside some of its rooms. Today such an act would be con-
sidered progressive indeed, imagine housing some of the reserves of the Bank 
of England in the British Museum! Art entertains, educates, it can perform a re-
ligious function, an aesthetic function, a political and ideological function as 
well as a commercial function.   
Other examples of art’s commercial potential are various metal and pottery 
works that were exceptionally popular Athenian exports, being sold to Egypt, 
Assyria and Persia.240 The high-end and sought after Greek craftsmanship was 
renowned for its luxury items such as jewellery and vases. The Greek term techne 
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240 Ibid. 
 116 
was used to designate this type of craftsmanship that had gone into the creation 
of the artworks. This term is still used in contrast to episteme implying that crafts-
manship based art (techne) is related to but nonetheless separated from knowledge 
based art241 (episteme). That means that we can already here discern two types of 
art, the one deemed to have some kind of knowledge function or potential (the 
one that could be found in the agora, poetry which was feared by Plato, etc.) 
and one without knowledge potential but with a commercial value (luxury 
items, etc.). This fundamentally binary schism seems to have haunted our per-
ceptions and approach to art ever since.  
All this can theoretically be condensed into the dichotomy we began with, 
namely authentic/mass produced art in the manner of Horkheimer and Ador-
no.242 According to Adorno and Horkheimer’s approach to art, artworks could 
either be authentic/intellectual, and as such have a function as for instance 
knowledge (with a connected magical/religious/aesthetic function), or be mass-
produced, and as such be commodified, packaged, simplified with no, or next to 
no, knowledge function (but on the other hand this type of art is commercial, it 
can also serve an ideological function in the hands of the state).  
This authentic/mass-produced dichotomy and Adorno/Horkheimer’s writ-
ings on the culture industry are central to this initial part of the study. Stripped 
from everything else, these writings clarify the involuntary, inherent paradox of 
this entire research project, namely, if we were to create a concept which opens 
up access to artworks, what might we gain (e.g. a more democratic access to 
knowledge) and what do we stand to lose (e.g. the commercial potential of art)?    
In this chapter I am attempting to present three rhizomes that will assist me 
in addressing this paradox. This requires an approach that acknowledges and in-
corporates the numerous multiplicities of the artwork. Rootlessness, movement, 
dimensions and variation define multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari address it in 
the following manner: 
 
A multiplicity is not defined by its elements, nor by a centre of unification 
or comprehension. It is defined by a number of dimensions it has: it is not 
divisible, it cannot loose or gain a dimension without changing its nature. Since 
its variations and dimensions are immanent to it, it amounts to the same thing to 
say that each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms of symbiosis, and 
                                                
241 See e.g. Rudolf Löbl, Techne: Untersuchungen zur Bedeutung dieses Wörtes in der Zeit nach Aristo-
teles Band III - Die Zeit des Hellenismus, Königshausen & Neumann (2008/2009).  
242 This dichotomy is admittedly forced for a number of reasons, one being that it is not the 
only dichotomy available (e.g. private/public, which is another one) and because it is virtually 
impossible to place an artwork on a scale as either being social or commercial, or to argue that a 
particular artwork belongs on the one or the other end of such a spectra. 
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that a multiplicity is continually transforming into a string of multiplicities according to 
its thresholds and doors.”243  
 
I will attempt to show this change in nature that happens as artworks enter into 
new paradigms, and how these multiplicities are continuously challenging and 
transforming the notion of the artwork, and the functions it performs. Multi-
plicity is one of the six founding principles of the rhizome.  
Each of the rhizomes presented in this chapter consists of plateaus. All rhi-
zomes, it will be argued, exist simultaneously and can be interconnected. I will 
begin with the Frankfurt School rhizome, that represents the industrial context 
and approach to artworks, and the culture industry in which the artworks ex-
ist(ed). In the industrial paradigm, the artwork is understood either as 
knowledge (authentic artwork) or commodity/capital (mass produced artwork). 
There are a number of plateaus that make up the industrial rhizome that will be 
examined in order to arrive at the next rhizome in which we encounter the art-
work, namely the post-industrial context. Within the post-industrial framework, 
the concepts of commodity and capital have become diversified. I shall be using 
the theory of Pierre Bourdieu to present a broader, more diversified, notion of 
capital. Capital is presented as economic, social and cultural. The artwork is 
embodied in all three forms of capital and it has economic, social and cultural 
values simultaneously. Within such a post-industrial approach, all three types of 
capital are shown to also have knowledge potential. The post-industrial para-
digm has its own plateaus that make up the post-industrial rhizome. Finally, the 
last rhizome that we will enter into is the knowledge society rhizome, and the 
dematerialised artwork that exists there. Within the digital knowledge society, 
the artwork has been dematerialised, freed from its material form. The last rhi-
zome is discussed using the theory of Jamie Stapleton where he presents rheto-
ric-based and semiotic/network-based artworks. This approach is particularly 
fitting for the knowledge economy as Stapleton shows.  
This chapter aims to demonstrate the complexity in art and the difficulty in 
defining art when it comes to discussing access to it. The mirroring chapter, 
chapter 6, will then continue to further explore the artwork and intellectual 
property law together. My intention here is to present the artwork as Deleuzian 
rhizomes, and to introduce the artwork’s rhizomatic qualities and its various 
plateaus, into the study and to simply present art within the broad Deleuzian 
network of contexts. Thereafter, in chapter 6, the aspects of art presented here-
in will then be interconnected with the law and the market, focusing particularly 
on the functional approach, namely what do the law and the market do to the 
artwork, what do they perform, how do they function. 
 
                                                
243 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 275. 
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3.2 RHIZOME 1: INDUSTRIALISM – THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL  
Works of art are ascetic and unashamed; the culture industry is porno-
graphic and prudish – Theodor Adorno and Marx Horkheimer244 
 
One of the broad rationales behind this project is to examine the production of 
knowledge and the role artworks play in the general production and dissemina-
tion of knowledge. The Frankfurt School’s division between intellectual and 
mass-produced art is therefore used in order to illuminate and illustrate one of 
the intrinsic and basic contradictions that are easily detectable when discussing 
this. Such, as one might call it, founding dichotomy, ought to be acknowledged be-
fore it can be criticised, and before access to art can be studied further.  
The Frankfurt School, it should generally be kept in mind when reading this 
study, opened up the path for critical legal studies through critical theory and as 
such there is a wider connection between it and jurisprudence.245 The reason for 
using only some of the Frankfurt School’s fundamental ideas, very narrowly, 
that deal with culture and the culture industry, is to illustrate basic difficulties 
and needs when conceiving of cultural commons in jurisprudence and develop-
ing the concept of the cultural commons constituted in law, and when discuss-
ing access to art and the protection of both the commercial and knowledge as-
pects of it.  
Writing in the beginning of the twentieth century the Frankfurt School theo-
ry focused on industrial capitalism, and thus in Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s 
works we find the approach to artwork very much within an industrial setting. 
Before we look more closely at their approach to art, let us firstly be reminded 
how Deleuze and Guattari presented the concept of rhizome in order to pre-
sent this first, industrial, rhizome. We saw in chapter 2 how this concept is 
something that challenges the hierarchical, and binary images of reason and 
knowledge. Deleuze/Guattari present it as an alternative to system-based, or-
ganisational and structural thinking that is not able to imagine anything truly 
new. Here, we begin with the rhizome that marks the industrialism and the ide-
as of Adorno and Horkheimer with regards to culture and the culture industry. 
Industrial production of art, they wrote, resulted in commodification of art, re-
pressed and reduced the intellectual, knowledge aspects of art, and increased the 
number of passive, reified, commodified, mass-produced artworks.246  
The Frankfurt School scholars developed a critique of consumer society. In 
it, the culture industry acts as a generator of cultural losses because it reduces 
the number of autonomous, intellectual artworks. Such critique is indispensable 
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245 See generally, Douzinas/Gearey, Critical jurisprudence. 
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and still to this day a very astute observation specifically when discussing the 
processes that take place when artworks are commodified e.g. the tendency to 
standardise works when they are placed inside the property paradigm and when 
works are made to fit the structures and frameworks of e.g. the entertainment 
industry. This type of standardisation or “pseudo-individuation” as Adorno et 
al. also referred to it was explained in the following manner: 
 
By pseudo-individuation we mean endowing cultural mass production with 
the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself. 
Standardization of song hits keeps the customers in line doing their think-
ing for them, as it were. Pseudo-individuation, for its part, keeps them in 
line by making them forget that what they listen to is wholly intended for 
them or predigested.247 
 
The Frankfurt School claimed that modern society is becoming a “machinery of 
bureaucratic administration” where the human soul is often lost in the throes of 
the industrialised world; people have a poor quality of life, in a standardised, 
mechanical society.248  Adorno, however, did not see the possibility of liberating 
the individual from domination neither in the rise of new oppositional groups, 
nor in sexual liberation, but rather in the work of the “authentic” artist, who 
confronts the given reality with imaginations of what it could be. Authentic art 
has therefore a subversive potential, and Adorno contrasts it, as a superior form 
of cognition – a future-oriented pursuit of truth – with science, which only re-
flects the existing reality.249 The Frankfurt School thus criticises individualist 
capitalist society that by commodification, reduces many genuine (knowledge-
based) artistic works to merely a fraction of their potential. Through this, a pat-
tern can be discovered where repetition and standardisation become part of the 
mass culture being produced and thus, through industrialisation and mass pro-
duction, any aspects of diversity in cultural works of art are in fact lost.  
Stressing the dialectical nature of art as mass-produced and as such “passive 
and undialectic” on the one hand and on the other as that which is authentic 
and “expresses alienation”250 allows us to distil and expose the knowledge po-
tential in artworks, even if it initially creates (an uncomfortable) binary pairing.  
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that if we are looking for knowledge in art-
works then we really only ought to be looking at the intellectual/authentic 
                                                
247 Theodor Adorno, ‘On Popular Music’, in Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences (1941), Vol. 
IX, No. 1, pp. 17-18. 
248 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 83. 
249 Tom Bottomore, The Frankfurt School, Tavistock Publications, London/NY, (1984), pp. 41-
42. 
250 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On The Social Situation of Music’, in Telos 35 (1978 [originally pub-
lished in 1932]). 
 120 
works. The mass-produced works, they claim, were at best to be considered as 
diversion or simple entertainment. Therefore, all artworks that were the prod-
ucts of the entertainment and culture industry could easily be disregarded, at 
least when it comes to knowledge potential. What benefits are there to lifting 
and placing this type of reasoning within the information and knowledge socie-
ty? Can such reasoning that is very much based on the industrial paradigm be 
beneficial within the realms of e.g. the digital sphere, where art has become de-
materialised, abstract and network-based? In order to answer that, we must look 
a little closer at the Frankfurt School concept of “culture industry”. 
  
3.2.1 PLATEAU 1: THE CULTURE INDUSTRY 
“The culture industry” is a complex term in the writings of the Frankfurt 
School. It is described as a wide phenomenon with various significances and 
roles. The definition of culture industry that Horkheimer and Adorno coined in 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment can nonetheless be a useful one.  There, the concept 
“culture industry” portrays the industrial setting, based on the common traits of 
the capitalist industry, in which mass culture, mass-utilisation and mass-
exploitation of art251 occurs. The term is used in order to theoretically manage 
and understand the phenomenon of the culture industry during the industrial 
era as well as to place access to art in that particular context. It was not used to 
refer to production per se but rather to standardisation or “pseudo-
individualisation”252 of cultural products.253 Here, it is argued that it is worth re-
visiting, and even revaluating these, perhaps slightly out-dated, concepts and 
their functions and roles in the digital era in order to show how even though 
both production and consumption of artworks has changed, some industrial 
characteristics still linger both within the entertainment industry as well as in 
law that can be connected to other newer phenomena. It will assist in discover-
ing the layers of norms that interact within the legal sphere.  
The Frankfurt School criticised the industrialist capitalist society, which 
through commodification reduced genuine and socially significant artistic 
works, with an important knowledge potential, to a fraction of their true apti-
tude.254 The market not only standardised complex artworks so that they could 
be packaged and sold, it also generated gatekeepers that managed to keep certain 
works outside the market place and effectively bar them from dissemination be-
cause gatekeepers prevented or posed obstacles to works being circulated and 
accessed, as no genuine access possibilities exist outside the market place and 
the property paradigm. These commercial processes and business models often 
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affect, Adorno and Horkheimer claim, the authentic artwork negatively, in that 
that the authentic artwork does not lend itself to commodification, and there-
fore, it has less potential of entering the property paradigm. It is constantly held 
outside, barred from distribution.  
The nature of the authentic work is that it is not always (only) entertainment, 
it is often more complex than that. Consequently, few such works are produced 
inside the culture industry in comparison to the more easily manageable mass-
produced products of entertainment. This second type of works, mass-
produced, has less, to no, knowledge potential, according to Adorno/Hork-
heimer, it is simply made to provide entertainment for the masses and as some 
argue govern the masses.255 This is a line of reasoning that goes back all the way 
to Plato as we saw above and this is roughly how Adorno/Horkheimer framed 
their aesthetic theory. If we make industry out of art, we will only ever get fewer 
authentic works, with less complexity, the works will be very similar to each 
other as that is the only way that they can be adapted for the consumer demand 
and the industry. In such a society, there will always be a deficiency of 
knowledge. 
Through this critique of the culture industry a pattern was established 
demonstrating that repetition and standardisation as a process in packaging art-
works for the market gradually becomes an integral part of the culture industry 
itself. As in any other industry, and accordingly, through industrialisation and 
mass-production, a number of significant traits such as e.g. diversity in art-
works, politically uncomfortable subject matters, and so forth, are gradually ex-
cluded and eventually lost. At the same time, it means that less knowledge is 
disseminated. 
That means, therefore, if the Frankfurt School theory is followed to its natu-
ral conclusion, that only a standardised type of knowledge will be available to 
people. Consequently, the commodification of art has a wider implication than 
just access to a variety of artworks.  
 
3.2.2 PLATEAU 2: THE DICHOTOMY BASED LOGIC, AND BEYOND 
When Adorno/Horkheimer drew up this division between the intellectual art-
work and the mass-produced artwork they did so as a step towards exposing the 
relation between the existing cultural works and power structures in society. 
The mass-produced artwork was held up as the product of the culture industry 
and as such was meant to generate profit, and not knowledge.  
In the essay “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” this 
type of argumentation was developed. It is often claimed that Adorno and 
Horkheimer appeared to have had a clear highbrow/lowbrow approach to art 
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when they discussed the culture industry as the only disseminator of culture. In 
order for the product to have an as wide appeal as possible and in order to ena-
ble large sales and to fully exploit the work financially, they argued, the work 
had to be stripped down and simplified. Thus they wrote: 
 
When jazzing up Mozart he changes him not only when he is too serious or 
too difficult but when he harmonizes the melody in a different way, per-
haps more simply, than is customary now. No medieval builder can have 
scrutinized the subjects for church windows and sculptures more suspi-
ciously than the studio hierarchy scrutinizes a work by Balzac or Hugo be-
fore finally approving it. No medieval theologian could have determined the 
degree of the torment to be suffered by the damned in accordance with the 
ordo of divine love more meticulously than the producers of shoddy epics 
calculate the torture to be undergone by the hero or the exact point to 
which the leading lady’s hemline will be raised.256 
 
Studying this short passage can be quite revealing both in terms of the reason 
for which their writings can be useful and instrumental, as well as why Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s theory at the same time can be treacherous when it comes to 
understanding the function of art today. Their writings on the culture industry 
are useful in one way and that is that they manage to demonstrate that some-
thing happens to artworks when they have to be packaged, closed off, com-
modified for the exploitation on the market. When artworks are moulded to 
serve as entertainment, passed off as commodities and when they have to be 
adopted to fit the tastes of an as large number of potential customers as possi-
ble, there is an aspect to art that will always have to be lost.257  
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The above quoted passage from Adorno and Horkheimer also raises other 
issues, for instance the question of preservation of cultural heritage as e.g. Mo-
zart’s music. Enabling creative incorporation of works into derivate ones is im-
portant, but it is equally important to safeguard access to the original, the fully 
unaltered, unedited, work. This will be discussed further in chapter 4 below. 
Adorno and Horkheimer studied the artworks that were being disseminated 
through the culture industry and also examined the disseminated ideology 
stemming therefrom. The intellectual work was held as something that did not 
lend itself for ideological purposes, it could not be governed and that it on the 
contrary served as a critic and challenger of power structures. These issues, al-
beit relevant in many parts of this research, are not directly studied, or applica-
ble, here. Such an analysis can be difficult to conduct in a digital society, as most 
“commercial” mass-produced artworks can be at the same time equally valuable 
as knowledge bearers as well as generators of profit, because of the distribution 
and dissemination possibilities that exist today. It can also be argued that the 
mass-mediated culture does not even exist any more, that it has been replaced 
by the network-based information society hybrid, virtual artwork.258 The dis-
semination of art is simply not as dependent on the culture industry today as it 
was then. We see for instance numerous alternative distribution possibilities 
outside the traditional culture industry channels (e.g. user generated content on 
YouTube). We already have functioning business models where artworks fully 
manage to generate profit and be distributed outside the industry through vari-
ous self-administrated (e.g. online) distribution possibilities. The industrial fac-
tory-type company e.g. a record label does not play the same role in the dissem-
ination of culture any more.259 
What is instead interesting to study in the information society is that, despite 
the digital possibilities, it can still be difficult to gain access to certain works, 
due to various new types of acts of exclusion and new types of gatekeepers that 
generate and create obstacles to access. Because of the obstacles to access, cer-
tain knowledge potential remains unattainable even though a number of new 
channels that allow for more flexible dissemination of art than before have 
come into fruition.  
When describing the intellectual authentic artwork Adorno/Horkheimer al-
so implied that the work created by a great artist was always more valuable (as 
knowledge) than the works that had been mass-produced or produced by non-
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258 See e.g. Yochai Benkler, ‘The Idea of Access to Knowledge and the Information Com-
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259 See chapter 6. 
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established, lesser renowned, artists.260 More than anything else, when Adorno 
addresses the intellectual work he conjures up a work of art that not only has 
knowledge potential but also a work that in itself is able to create, as well as be-
come, a world of its own: 
 
Authentic artworks, which hold fast to the idea of reconciliation with nature 
by making themselves completely a second nature, have constantly felt the 
urge, as if in need of a breath of fresh air, to step outside themselves.261  
 
This potential of stepping outside itself that the intellectual artworks have ac-
cording to Adorno, namely to create new worlds and to imagine new realities, is 
particularly interesting from a commons and access to art perspective. It means 
that the work performs more than one or two functions; it can also create and 
imagine something new, it produces knowledge. It can be part of a democratic, 
on-going, discussion – therefore it has to be communicated.  
A juxtaposition of the art that exists today, in the information society, with 
the mass-produced art studied by Adorno/Horkheimer, reveals the difficulty in 
attempting to define artworks through various opposites-based pairs (authen-
tic/mass, intellectual/proprietary and so on). This goes against the rhizomatic 
logic, it is an arborescent type of reasoning. It is simply not possible to create 
such dichotomies in an adequate manner and that is why more flexible ap-
proaches are required for the purpose of catering to this complexity. By begin-
ning with the Frankfurt School analysis of art in the industrial society and the 
notions they developed that still to this day linger in terms of classification of 
and approach to the artwork concept, by looking closer at the dichotomy au-
thentic/mass, there is a potential that is discovered that the rhizomatic theory 
can add on to, namely connecting those particular notions to other cognitive 
constellations in terms of the artwork. 
 
3.3 RHIZOME 2: POST INDUSTRIALISM – ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL CAPITAL  
It is what makes the games of society – not least the economic game – 
something other than simple games of chance offering at every moment 
the possibility of a miracle.262 – Pierre Bourdieu  
                                                
260 Again, even if this too is problematic here, the mere problem serves as a springboard. 
When conducting this research the aspects of small-scale creation, collective creation, and the 
importance of inspiration that stems from other artworks that exist around the artist, as well as 
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261 [my emphasis], Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 63. 
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Within the Frankfurt School theory the culture industry was criticised for treat-
ing artworks as capital, something commodified, bought and sold. It is certainly 
not as simple today to claim that the mass-produced, commodified artwork will 
always have less value, or have less knowledge potential, than the so-called intel-
lectual artwork. Following that particular train of thought, we then move into 
this section where the artwork as capital is presented.  
One way of doing so is to begin where the Frankfurt School left off, namely 
in the dichotomy that art can function as knowledge or capital. We need to take 
a closer look at the notion of capital, that in itself also needs to be diversified. 
Once again not asking what capital is, but what it does. 
We turn to the French sociologists and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu (1930-
2002), and particularly his use of the notion of capital as a far wider phenome-
non than traditionally assumed. Bourdieu defines capital very broadly and ap-
proaches it in “all its forms and not solely in the one form recognised by eco-
nomic theory”.263 
Bourdieu listed three forms of capital: economic capital, social capital and cultural 
capital. Capital in his writings264 is thus not reducible to economic capital only265 
it can also be:  
 
• Cultural, which includes academic capital (stemming from formal edu-
cation). In the essay Language and Symbolic Power266 Bourdieu also 
stresses the linguistic capital as a part of the cultural capital concept, 
or 
• Social Capital, which is for Bourdieu based on creating values that stem 
from people’s networks and connections, acquaintances, recognitions, 
memberships and so on. 
 
All these capital forms generate value, he argues, adding a more complex notion 
of capital than previously allowed for by e.g. the Frankfurt School approach. 
This is the post-industrial critique of the industrial thought, and a new rhizome 
that generates plateaus of its own. 
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3.3.1 PLATEAU 3: THE FORMS OF CAPITAL 
Economic capital, according to Bourdieu, in itself does not need much further 
explanation – its significance remains as a monetary or proprietary capital form 
that can be managed by property rights.267 Bourdieu argues that the two other 
capital forms can both perform similar, as well as additional, functions than the 
economic capital. Like economic, the other forms of capital can also be une-
qually distributed among e.g. social classes (however classes are defined). Bour-
dieu is indeed duly in line with traditional Marxist theory when he analyses capi-
tal in this way. However, the social and cultural capital forms are acquired com-
pletely differently than the economic capital, and the other two forms cannot be 
transferred or exploited in the same manner as the economic capital. It is very 
important to introduce the Bourdieuian forms of capital; as such an approach 
challenges the notion of the “altogether bad” or “altogether good” notion of 
capital. This schizophrenic nature of capital is of course in line with 
Deleuze/Guattari and their ideas on capitalism. 
Arguably, for the Frankfurt School, both authentic and mass-produced art 
exist within the property paradigm, and therefore fall within the narrow defini-
tion of economic capital. Bourdieu describes268 cultural capital as a form of 
knowledge that we can internalise, and that with time can even have a pure eco-
nomical significance.  
Bourdieu’s study of capital began as a theoretical hypothesis during one of 
his studies, attempting to explain “the unequal scholastic achievement of chil-
dren originating from the different social classes”.269 Given that the scholastic 
and educational investment, much like any other monetary investment, could 
indirectly be converted into economic capital, Bourdieu argues that the underly-
ing social and cultural capital that the bourgeois children have, always gives 
them an advantage in schooling circumstances. This he calls the “domestic 
transmission of cultural capital”270 and Randal Johnson describes it as “an in-
ternalised code or a cognitive acquisition which equips the social agent with 
empathy towards, appreciation for or competence in deciphering cultural rela-
tions or cultural artefacts.”271 
Studying cultural capital as a phenomenon more closely Bourdieu divided it 
into three states, the embodied state, the objectified state, and the institutional-
ised state. The embodied state is where the accumulation of cultural capital 
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takes place internally through cultivation, Bildung. This is a process of embodi-
ment or incorporation of knowledge – which requires labour, costs in terms of 
both money and time and as such it is something that needs to be invested in. 
This is self-improvement [on paie de sa personne]. Such embodied cultural capital, 
Bourdieu continues “cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, 
property rights [...]) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange.”272 
What signifies the embodied state is that the notion of time passing is re-
quired for the acquisition of cultural capital to take place and be transformed in-
to (internal) knowledge. The cultural capital is subsequently materialised into 
objects and media such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments etc. in 
order to be able to be transmitted materially. Bourdieu acknowledges his own 
understanding of the dual nature in artworks writing, “[t]hus cultural goods can 
be appropriated both materially – which presupposes economic capital – and 
symbolically – which presupposes cultural capital”273. 
A painting can be bought with economic capital, but a painting can only be 
fully appreciated and appropriated with cultural capital. This materi-
al/symbolical division is both a new dichotomy, as well as a new dimension that 
adds on and can be connected to the Frankfurt School theory. It does not negate 
the Frankfurt School theory. 
Finally, the institutionalised state is where the cultural capital acquires the 
form of academic qualification. This concerns mostly academic capital, as men-
tioned above, but can be equally applicable to a more narrow sense such as aca-
demic education in art theory in particular. The academic capital therefore gives 
an official recognition of cultural capital as knowledge, as a qualification ac-
quired on educational merits and as such it can be measured, compared, valued 
and so forth.  
Bourdieu’s capital categories are helpful here, because they reveal knowledge 
potential in more areas than just the “intellectual” artwork. Bourdieu raises 
many, often overlooked points, such as the passing of time in acquiring cultural 
capital as well as that it is directly tied to future profit-making potential of the 
individual and his place in society. These are the various dimensions that I want 
to collect, in order to show the evident flaws and inadequacies of the binary 
structures and arborescent reasoning. 
 
3.4 RHIZOME 3: KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY – RHETORIC BASED AND SE-
MIOTIC/NETWORK BASED ART  
The definitions and approaches to art submitted here follow the plateau think-
ing and the rhizomatic logic, and we can see how all the various rhizomes have 
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their own plateaus, that is, their own spheres and themes and how they can be 
interconnected with one another. What we have defined as a Frankfurt School 
industrial approach to artworks by dividing art into authentic and mass-
produced was then problematised by the use of Bourdieu’s post-industrial capi-
tal forms, challenging the property paradigm in which both authentic and mass-
produced works are placed, and challenging the notion of capital by introducing 
a knowledge value even in capital. Bourdieu’s theory is used to show, that even 
when it comes to mass-produced works, very much within the property para-
digm, it is not as simple as straight away disregarding them, as they too contain 
knowledge value. When studying capital value, knowledge potential also in “en-
tertainment” is revealed. The last dimension that I shall add here is to place all 
of this into the information and knowledge society rhizome.   
In this context I shall turn to, in part, an analysis conducted by Jamie Staple-
ton in Art, Intellectual Property & The Knowledge Economy.274 Stapleton conducted a 
study of artworks in conjunction with intellectual property and the knowledge 
economy by creating a distinction between what he referrers to as the “rhetoric 
based” and “semiotic/network based” artworks.  
The rhetoric-based artwork, to Stapleton, is founded upon the idea of a (rights) 
creating individual and of an artistic work that is produced by his hand. Most 
“traditional” art can be placed within such a concept, he claims. The notions of 
rhetoric-based art were fully challenged with the advent of modernism, Staple-
ton writes further. The semiotic/network based artwork followed from modernism 
and onwards. The semiotic/network-based works differ from the former be-
cause they are dematerialised/object-less works of art. They are also de-
subjectivised, art that is no longer necessarily created by only one individual art-
ist, or even by a human being’s hand. Instead, the artist has to be positioned in-
side a context in which he practises and creates. The ontology of art is subvert-
ed once again, focusing instead on the function of the artwork that is located in 
the network of the existing technology and other works, and on the communica-
tion that happen inside and outside the (creative) community.  
In subsequently reflecting upon his thesis, the writing of which commenced 
in 1997, Stapleton writes that the idea of the commons remained unaddressed in 
his research, which was due to a number of reasons.275 What I aim to do is to 
add a commons-based dimension and discuss further some of his concepts in 
such a setting.  
 
3.4.1 PLATEAU 4: RHETORIC-BASED ART 
Stapleton traces rhetoric based art and its existence with reference to intellectual 
property law all the way back to the “state privileges that regulated the printing 
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industry of 15th century Venice”.276 Rhetoric based art in his study is closely 
linked to the legal concept of the intellectual property rights, which in turn is 
based on the notion of “invention” and “originality”. Cognate of the ancient art 
of rhetoric277, the rhetoric based artworks exists from the 15th century and on-
wards. Stapleton adds to it further by discussing the idea of the “genius” creator 
who is seen as the inventor a work, a work is assumed to have been created ex 
nihilo. This formed the basis for the future intellectual property law, that at that 
point was yet to come.   
This model is based in the art of rhetoric in that a work of art is seen to be 
addressing the viewers, speaking to them as if attempting to describe or represent 
(a? the?) reality. This act of “speech” or of “speaking”, rhetoric, can be followed 
all the way from Antiquity through to the present day. What is interesting with 
the rhetoric-based work of art is that it speaks in a structured, rhetorical, man-
ner. Furthermore, the act of speech is embodied in and closely connected to the 
object or the tangible, material artwork that has been created by the genius artist. 
Individuality and invention are therefore traits that signify these artworks. The 
works are movable as they are in fact material objects.278  
This type of art is highly dependent on the individual creative labour and the 
work is based on “traditional” composition. The raison d’être of this type of art is 
to tell stories – rhetoric-based art is founded on the notions of (linear) narrative. 
These concepts, Stapleton argues, affected the early intellectual property laws 
and as such placed the discourse of rhetoric in the artworks and made them fit 
inside the property paradigm. The rhetoric based artwork is the artwork that 
can easily be connected to an individual artist, his/her labour, and that generates 
individual rights. Stapleton writes that “[a]s a practical theory, the rhetorical 
conceptualisation of creativity centred on the labouring capacity of individu-
als.”279  
As such the concept lends itself to codification in private law as it trans-
formed creativity into individual fruits of labour – and then, profit. 
The conception of creativity as rhetoric-based is founded on the original-
invention-composition model and it has remained relevant to this day when dealing 
with art and how art is approached in law. An example of a rhetoric based work 
is for instance a Turner painting, it is fairly easy to identify an individual author, 
the originality in his creation made by his hand, invented by him, and the rights 
generated in such a creation. 
These artworks can quite easily be studied within the framework of the 
Frankfurt School writings. Crudely, it could be stated that rhetoric based works 
                                                
276 Stapleton, Art, Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Economy, p. 32. 
277 Ibid. p. 28. 
278 Ibid. p. 12, movable at least theoretically, e.g. buildings are not necessarily easy to move 
from one place to another, but can in theory be taken down and reassembled elsewhere.  
279 Ibid. p. 83. 
 130 
connect to some extent to authentic art as these are unique, intellectual works 
that tell stories and transmit knowledge. That the semiotic/network-based art-
works have some traits in common with mass-produced art, however, is a com-
parison that can be problematic and cannot be made sweepingly. I shall explain 
in the next section.  
 
3.4.2 PLATEAU 5: SEMIOTIC/NETWORK-BASED ART 
Semiotic/Network-based artworks cannot be as comfortably compared to 
“mass-produced art” as the Frankfurt School definition would have it. What 
they have in common is that both the semiotic/network based works and mass 
produced works are the results of attempting to understand artworks that came 
with the new technology of industrialisation and modernism, that were subject 
to faster dissemination and the blurring of the line between the copy and the 
original that came with the mechanical (re)production of art.280 When describ-
ing the semiotic/network based works Stapleton writes that while the rhetoric 
based artworks had “stressed the training of individuals for particular creative 
tasks, the new model approached the view that creativity occurred not within 
individuals, but in the relational spaces between human (and non-human) ‘ac-
tors’.” 281  
Thus, as with the mass produced work, the new modes of creating art 
moved away from the importance that had been placed on the “unique”, mate-
rial, singular artwork and focused instead on work that was created when hu-
man and non-human (machines!) actors were combined. This particular phe-
nomenon is a particularly interesting find as the previously prevailing notions of 
“author/creator” within the old ideology of creativity were here being ques-
tioned. An example of semiotic/network based artwork could for instance be 
John Cage’s “music” or rather “audio” piece 4:33 that consists of 4 minutes and 
33 seconds of silence. It could perhaps also be user generated content created 
online where the consumers at the same time become co-creators, or a 
prosumer282 (producer and consumer in one). Commons-based peer production 
may also fall within this category. 
The new ways of producing art brought about by modernism, and with it 
new ways of producing and accessing knowledge, can both be seen as indicators 
of the revolution that happened when society transformed from having been 
industry-based, then post-industrial, and then graduated towards becoming digi-
tal and knowledge-based. Therefore when studying the semiotic/network based 
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artworks a heavy focus is placed on the processes of dematerialisation and de-
materialisation functions within a legal context. The legal definitions of art (and 
artist) have largely been founded upon the rhetoric based art and the “genius 
inventor”, and statutory law is still not fully equipped to deal with semiot-
ic/network-based works. This will be discussed further in chapter 6 but it can 
already here be stated that this means that in law, artistic creation is always as-
sumed to take place ex nihilo or as James Boyle puts it: “Copyright is about sus-
taining the conditions of creativity that enable an individual to craft out of thin air 
an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen Kane.”283  
This can be seen as the traditional ontological approach to the artwork in in-
tellectual property law and the ground on which it ultimately rests. It seems that 
legally, in order to apply copyrights and other intellectual property rights on 
works, we must assume, that they have been ‘invented’ out of thin air.  
 
3.4.3 PLATEAU 6: A MIXTURE OF THEM ALL… 
When studying both rhetoric-based and semiotic/network-based concepts of 
art and when adopting Stapleton’s way of categorising and defining art, we soon 
realise that it is not as straightforward as claiming that the former is art created 
before modernism and the latter is mass-produced modern and post-modern 
art. It can quite clearly be shown that today both types of works exist side by 
side, simultaneously, and at times they might have different functions but at 
other times they can be quite similar. One such example is the work of Jackson 
Pollock. Stapleton places Pollock’s work in the semiotic/network based catego-
ry.284 My view is that this is a slightly heavy handed categorisation for many rea-
sons, one of them being that Pollock worked on canvas and also his “name” 
and his “hand” played a significant part in valuing his works, both socially and 
commercially. That is, some rhetoric-based concepts still played a role in his crea-
tion process such as e.g. individuality, originality and invention. None of those 
rhetoric-based traits were completely absent in his work even if his mode of 
painting was new and innovative, and arguably not based on traditional notions 
of rhetoric and linearity. Pollock had, after all, invented, the unique drip tech-
nique in painting as well as the process of painting from above while the canvas 
lay on the floor, that had thither not been the norm. His paintings are also ab-
stract and not dependent on a classic narrative, but still he is hardly the sole 
modern painter to diverge from classic, linear narrative. Therefore, while it is 
true that Pollock’s style of painting radically challenged the notions of for in-
stance composition, subject matter, narrative and so forth his works still argua-
bly comprised of a number of rhetoric-based attributes (unique, original, mate-
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rial, artist-genius and so on). For me, it seems that his work is more appropri-
ately defined as a mixture of the rhetoric-based and semiotic/network based 
categories. 
Moving from (and connecting) the seemingly different Frankfurt School 
theory, to Bourdieu’s theory, through to a knowledge-based theory that Staple-
ton has presented has opened up the rhizomatic approach to the artwork. Uti-
lising this way of tackling something that is as abstract as art and still attempting 
to somehow manage it scientifically, indicates just three of the many rhizomes 
that law has to be prepared and able to handle.  
In combining Frankfurt School, Bourdieu and Stapleton this research thus 
studies artworks that can be approached as: 
a) Rhetoric based artworks that “speak” – monologue, AND  
b) Semiotic/network based artworks that “interact” – dialogue, 
AND,  
c) A mixture of 1 and 2, AND 
d) ETC (i.e. any other new rhizomes that may come up in the future) 
Once again then, for this study it does not matter how a work of art is defined, 
what matters is how it functions, what it does and how law can comprehend and 
handle it without simplifying it or acting as an obstacle to access. 
 
3.5 RHIZOME 4: THE ASSUMPTIONS ENTRENCHED IN LAW 
What happens when, for instance, works enter digital spheres where e.g. con-
vergences of various media are commonplace and when works stop being sepa-
rate, individual “works” and instead become coproduced by users, when there is 
no separation between a work and a public space for creation that encapsulate 
knowledge?  The digital knowledge society naturally produces and turns spaces 
where works are accessed into cultural commons, something that exists slightly 
outside the public-private dichotomy, and as we shall see, outside the property 
paradigm.   
What role, if any, does the conception of art have and how does it affect the 
role law plays in the constitution of the cultural commons where access to art is 
taking place? Particular focus must be given to the dematerialised, digital and 
virtual realms that constantly enable access to intellectual, aesthetic works that 
function as knowledge. These are the modern day equivalents of “salons” and “coffee 
houses” where unfettered critical exchanges of ideas and social participations take 
place. This is a key argument, particularly when examining that which can 
broadly be referred to as the cultural industry and cultural economy285 and the 
sphere(s) of cultural production.  
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We have seen above how the capital value that is generated in the cultural 
economy can be differentiated. In discussing the various forms of capital it was 
presented how Bourdieu argued that capital is a far wider phenomenon than tra-
ditionally assumed. Such a wide understanding of capital is applied here, that is, 
“all its forms and not solely [...] the one form recognised by economical theo-
ry”.286 All Bourdieu’s capital forms produced different values, and taken togeth-
er they form the cultural economy.  
In the information society aesthetic intellectual works are produced, pack-
aged and marketed within the paradigm of private property and cultural econ-
omy, which is driven by economic capital. What counts as public space, some-
where where non-commercial values can be created and where artworks as 
knowledge can be accessed, communicated and shared, can directly be linked to 
the pure financial values of those works and their exploitation potential on the 
market. However, it can also have implications on the broader values of the 
works for instance the social and cultural functions that they may have, such as 
knowledge potential.   
In law, exclusive rights, and the enabling of packaging and enclosure of 
products have been necessary processes for the (industrial) economy and the 
commercial exploitation of products. Such processes for exploitation have been 
the same for both tangible and intangible works. In the digital era on the other 
hand, and particularly when it comes to dematerialised artworks, these process-
es are no longer necessarily valuable, nor are they easily either described, 
grasped or applied. Therefore, as it will be apparent, it can be complicated to 
discuss what constitutes public and what constitutes private in the virtual, ab-
stract realms of the digitised spheres.  
Before we arrive at the public spaces and the cultural commons of the 21st 
century and the information society, and before the digital realm was even cre-
ated, other inventions that had similar effect on the cultural industry emerged, 
such as lithography and photography, with their inherent mass production po-
tential and reproduction possibilities. Photography and lithography enabled, 
what looked like at the time, an unhindered mass production and dissemination 
of artworks. With the introduction of the industrial machine and the possibility 
to produce artworks, and here particularly images en masse, previous notions that 
had dominated art theory and law such as “original work” created by an “artist 
genius”, the work’s “uniqueness” as the chief artistic merit, etc. were thus chal-
lenged. When those mass-produced images, not long thereafter, started moving, 
first silently and subsequently accompanied by sound and colour, the awareness 
of images and their potency also came under scrutiny. Editing techniques grant-
ed the possibility to control and manipulate images in new ways as well as the 
narratives and the perceptions of images.  
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Cinema and modern art are discussed here as semiotic/network based works 
and film is also seen as a “dematerialised work”. Dematerialised works, are seen, 
following Lippard, as works where “the idea is paramount and material form 
secondary, lightweight, ephemeral, cheap, unpretentious and/or ‘dematerial-
ized’”287. This is done in order to crystallise the knowledge value contained in 
the images. With dematerialised artworks the notion such as “object” or “origi-
nal” directly becomes less significant. Material uniqueness more often than not 
serves a secondary (or no) purpose in terms of value of for instance the camera 
based image. The metaphysical film, the “idea”, the story, the narrative is the 
focus there rather than the tangible “copy”, or carrier, onto which the work is 
shown or projected, in terms of film e.g. a print, a tape, a DVD or indeed any 
(digital) platform.  
When it comes to dematerialised artworks the carrier and the content have 
to be separated, as shall be discussed further in chapter 6 below. The same can-
not always be said of object based, material, works such as for instance paint-
ings or sculptures that are inherently interlinked with the object/carrier by ne-
cessity (even if they are not necessarily always one and the same thing). Jamie 
Stapleton addressed the intangible, non-material works: “In other words” he 
writes “dematerialization still presented objects to the viewer, but objects that 
were stripped of the ‘ideology of materiality’ and ‘objecthood’”288. The demate-
rialised artwork in this context is exactly such a work, a work that will have been 
stripped of the ideology of materiality and objecthood, but one that nonetheless 
has knowledge potential and broader values outside the commercial ones.  
The impossibilities of enclosure of such dematerialised works is key to dis-
cuss and it is particularly relevant for modern artworks and the image based 
works because these works themselves are overwhelmingly object-less and thus, 
potentially, un-enclosable. The mechanical reproduction necessary for the im-
age, as Walter Benjamin noted, separated the artwork from its basis in cult and 
therefore it shook the creation of images to its core. Benjamin notes:  
 
When the age of mechanical reproduction separated art from its basis in 
cult, the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever. The resulting 
change in the function of art transcended the perspective of the century; for 
a long time it even escaped that of the twentieth century, which experienced 
the development of the film.289  
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The metaphysical aspects of “uniqueness” and “cult” became seemingly irrele-
vant.  
From modernism and onwards the previous terms for production, dissemi-
nation and access to art changed drastically because of the growing presence of 
the dematerialised work. In a setting where the mass-produced work was preva-
lent and the works of art were more and more dematerialised as well as desub-
jectivised,290 art and spaces where works could be accessed needed to be re-
viewed and reconsidered. The new types of works and production of works, re-
ferred to by Jamie Stapleton as semiotic/network based, required new theoreti-
cal approaches in order to both understand and analyse the settings in which 
they existed.    
Jamie Stapleton differentiates between rhetoric based and semiotic/network 
based artworks, as was shown above. The rhetoric based artwork according to 
him is traditionally founded on the idea of a (rights) creating individual and the 
material and tangible artwork produced by his hand: most ‘traditional’ art can in 
that vein be placed within the rhetoric based concept. What is interesting with 
the rhetoric based work of art is thus that it speaks in a structured, rhetorical, 
manner. Furthermore, the act of speech is seen as embodied in and closely con-
nected to the notion of the object or the tangible, material work that has been 
created by the genius artist. Individuality is therefore a trait that signifies these 
artworks.  
As we already saw above, Stapleton traced rhetoric based art and its exist-
ence vis-à-vis intellectual property law back to the “state privileges that regulat-
ed the printing industry of 15th century Venice” that is, rhetoric based art in his 
study was closely connected to concepts of “inventions” and “originality”. In 
Renaissance Italy for instance, where a system was in place with artist guilds and 
artist’ bottegas, the creative labour took place in reality within a network, but fo-
cus was nevertheless placed on the master and his labour. It was in this setting 
that the first rights creations in the form of privileges started emerging.  
Rhetoric based art is therefore highly dependent on the individual creative 
labour and labourer. The focus on individual labour, Stapleton argues, was em-
bedded in the early intellectual property laws, and was compatible with the 
property paradigm. Stapleton writes notes further that “[a]s a practical theory, 
the rhetorical conceptualisation of creativity centred on the labouring capacity 
of individuals”291 and as such it lent itself to codification in private law as it 
transformed it into individual fruits of labour – and profit. The semiot-
ic/network based works thus vastly differed from the former as they were de-
materialised, object-less pieces of art created within a network where the audi-
ence was much more active in participating and creating the significances and 
values of the artwork.  
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It could be argued that traditional ‘classical music’ or in fact any musical 
composition for that matter, anything from a Beethoven composition to a Ri-
hanna song, could be seen as equally “dematerialised” as John Cage’s silence 
piece. However, the difference between the two kinds of music, albeit a theoret-
ical one, is that the first two can be “preformed” or transmitted via a carrier 
such as e.g. a CD, while it is not equally possible for the second. The score is in 
the first sense independent of the audience as well as of the composer. With 
Cages piece on the other hand, the silence is filled by the audience itself adding 
to the performance, the score can never be an independent composition as such 
nor is it ever one and the same, changing as the audience changes. The sur-
rounding sounds of whoever chooses to listen to the work, or happens to be 
there, will always have to be taken into account. In that way, the audience is an 
integral part of the work, and can never be separated from the work in-itself. In 
Six Years of Dematerialisation Lippard quotes Robert Berry in claiming that “[f]or 
years people have been concerned with what goes on inside the frame. Maybe 
there’s something going on outside the frame that could be considered an artistic 
idea.” 292  
By that account the dematerialised art is art that takes into account also that 
which happens to take place outside the framework and outside the traditional, 
enclosed, concept of the artwork as we are used to understanding it. Naturally, 
as Stapleton shows, this has to challenge the traditional notions of art as they 
may still be understood in law. 
Semiotic/network based artworks are furthermore desubjectivised, not nec-
essarily linked to merely the singular artist, not always created by one identifia-
ble person, or even by a human being’s hand. Instead, the artist and the work 
are seen to exist inside a context of the art community in which art is practised 
and created. The ontology of art is always located in the network of people, the 
existing technology, other works, and on the communications that happened 
within the (creative) community. Stapleton claims: 
 
Dematerialisation can be presented in a number of ways: as a shift from ob-
ject to idea, inspired by Duchamp’s readymades of the early teens of the 
20th century; as a defiance of the commodity status of the art object; as an 
attack upon the notion of the masterpiece and its allied notion of genius; as 
a rejection of ‘Bernsonite’ connoisseurship and the Romantic fetish made 
of the artist’s hand.293 
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Stapleton did not expressly mention cinema when he addressed the dematerial-
ised semiotic/network based artwork, but arguably, following Lippard,294 in his 
definition of semiotic/network based art focusing on the (collective) labour, ideas 
being disseminated and that the rejection of the artist’s hand renders it also applica-
ble on e.g. film, especially when discussing film as a knowledge source that can 
be communicated within a commons. Stapleton’s writings can furthermore be 
placed within the context of Deleuze’s cinema writings in order to discuss the 
values of film and other dematerialised works. 
Cinema embodies certain new tendencies in art such as dematerialisation of 
the previously tangible works as well as it serves as an example of the mass pro-
duced and mass disseminated works that were no longer produced by the hand 
of one individual artist but rather by a network of people and machines. Initially 
it was fiercely debated whether camera based images (the still as well as the 
moving) could or ought to at all be considered as artwork due to their primary 
documentary nature. Film was seen as captured moments of reality that we 
could go back to and re-watch. There was no ‘invention’ as such, it was merely a 
question of reproduction or reality. However, the various opinions around this 
issue were in themselves representative of the evolution that was taking place in 
art and art theory. Early photographers such as Robert Frank, Edward Weston, 
Tina Modotti, as well their later peers such as Diane Arbus, were pioneers in 
utilising the camera-based image within a truly artistic context. Nonetheless, 
their work was not always seen as art, at least not initially.  
The idea of documentation and the depiction or reproduction of reality ra-
ther than artistic expression was the prevalent critique expressed by the oppo-
nents who saw the camera image as something documentary rather than artistic. 
The counter argument by the proponents was that the narrative composed by 
the camera image and the notion of what counted as fact and what counted as 
fiction in the image could be controlled and manipulated. It was argued that the 
fact that aesthetic consideration lay behind the camera images illustrated the ar-
tistic basis onto which photography stood. All that taken together with the fact 
that a photograph could be staged, edited, cropped, and otherwise directed in 
order to tell a story and manipulate ‘reality’ testified that it was a matter of art 
rather than documentation (even if the one did not necessarily preclude the 
other, of course).  
What counts and does not count as art is precisely the interesting detour that 
this research project is attempting to avoid in discussing access to art. The still 
lingering definitions of art can be quite telling in that regard, as the mere defini-
tion marks what can be accessed and what cannot be accessed. Various defini-
                                                
294 In Six Years of Dematerialization Lippard names a number of films as examples of demateri-
alised works, such as various moving image works by Ed Ruscha, p. 12, Christine Kozlov’s 
films, p. 31, Michael Snow’s films, p. 34 and so on. All these works can be seen as experiments 
in dematerialising the moving image and challenging the concepts of film itself.    
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tions of art can be detected when studying art inside the legal sphere and how it 
is approached within a legal setting. The camera image and other visual media in 
particular are specifically not altogether uncontroversial and easily handled in 
law. One interesting recent case, in which this issue was apparent, was when re-
sponding to a VAT question the European Commission reversed a decision 
made in a UK tax tribunal (No. C00266), and refused to classify installations by 
prominent video and light artists Dan Flavin and Bill Viola as “art” instead odd-
ly branding the works as “lighting fittings”. Did that mean that these works fell 
outside e.g. intellectual property law, did copyright not subsist in those works as 
light fittings can by no means be deemed to be artistic in any way? The fact that 
the Tax tribunals and the European Commission ultimately have to make such 
calls is illustrative, showing that the legal framework cannot even envision cer-
tain, perhaps semiotic/network based, types of artworks. 
In Swedish legislation also, the issue and uncertainty as to whether e.g. cam-
era based images can fully be deemed as artworks that can subsist copyright 
protection is also traceable. Indeed, for a long time camera based images were 
completely exempt from the Swedish Copyright Law Statute (Upphovsrättslala-
gen, URL),295 regulated instead in the so called Photograph Statute,296 where 
works were granted a shorter duration of term, namely 25 years post creation to 
be exact, under a “copyright-light” protection. The Photograph Statute regulat-
ed all camera works, regardless of their artistic merit. Nowadays, photographs in 
Swedish law are treated either as falling under copyright law if they are deemed 
to be “photographic works” (1 chapter 1§ point 5 URL) and as such enjoy full 
copyright protection (namely, 70 years post mortem auctoris, etc.). However, if 
deemed to be “photographic images” instead, they fall under the neighbouring 
producer rights (5 chapter 49a§ URL)297 with a mere duration of 50 years post 
creation.298 Even though the general requirements for copyright to subsist fully 
in works are generally very low for all other artistic creations, the division into 
photographic works and photographic images testifies to the existence of certain dated 
attitudes towards art still linger in (Swedish as well as in other) intellectual prop-
erty laws where a type of quality merit is still being upheld in the case of the 
artworks that are not rhetoric-based, produced by a machine, network based 
etc. By that reasoning, how come a pen scribble on paper is seen as a worthy ar-
tistic creation that could be given full copyright protection, while an amateurish 
snapshot of a tree is not? That is of course a contrived, rhetorical question, but 
                                                
295 Swedish Copyright Law, full citation: Lag (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga 
verk, hereafter “URL”.  
296 [my translation], full citation: Lag (1960:730) om rätt till fotografisk bild.  
297 Malin Bonthron and Peter Danowsky, Comments to Swedish Copyright Law, p. 112. Swedish 
citation: Lagbokskommentaren, Norstedts Juridik, Göteborg, (2001).  
298 Cf art. 7.4 in the Berne Convention that allows the Member States to grant shorter protec-
tion times for photographs, however, not lower than 25 years. Henry Olsson, Copyright: Svensk 
och Internationell Upphovsrätt, 7th ed. Norstedts Juridik, (2006) p. 377.  
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one that illustrates the difficulties encountered in copyright law when art has to 
be defined. Evidently, it affects the way various works are categorised, which in 
turn can affect access to these works, as certain works are given more protec-
tion than others.  
Such blurring of the line or the disappearance of a clear division between 
what is seen or not seen as art came with the advent of modern art and camera 
image. The industrial transformations changed how art was produced and the 
impact the mechanical (re)production could have on the creative production 
was re-evaluated, but that transformation was not altogether mirrored in law. It 
also testifies that law to this day struggles with modern and postmodern art, 
particularly camera based and digital artworks,299 and that it did not know from 
the start (and is still not quite sure) how to treat such works. Uncertainty can 
have implications on both protection of and access to works. These older atti-
tudes towards art mean that legislation is always lagging when compared to the 
development taking place outside its boundaries and therefore it cannot be ap-
plied equally to all artworks.  
 
3.5.1 PLATEAU: DELEUZE AND ART 
When we look more closely at Deleuze’s writings on cinema, as we shall do be-
low, we will see that the semiotic/network based artworks such as cinematic 
works have certain values that exemplify that which positive law is still not able 
to address. Deleuze addresses e.g. time, space and memory depicted and pre-
sented in cinema, and as such these notions can be equally valuable as any other 
commercial or other values of cinema. By using Deleuzian theory the cracks in 
the positive law will start to appear and we can study what it is in law that leads 
to commodification and as such results in enclosures, obstacles and restricted 
access to other values that are not per se commercial in nature or generally that 
still cannot be conceived of legally. 
In the Cinema books Deleuze addresses cinema both in the context of it be-
ing a cognitive medium as well as a phenomenon, which has social and histori-
cal implications. Generally, Deleuze distinguishes the pre- from the post world 
war images by dividing them into two groups that he referred to as movement-
images and time-images. The two were separated then roughly by WWII as well as 
by the birth of neo-realism as a movement in art theory. Such a division is vastly 
interesting as Deleuze dealt with, on a philosophical level, how the rapidly 
transforming outside world and the fast paced changes in production modes 
could influence the social, cultural and commercial significances and values of 
art. That could also have implications on access to art, as we soon shall see. 
                                                
299 As well as other art forms that are not mentioned here such as e.g. dance, conceptual art or 
performance. 
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Cinema was understood by Deleuze as the ultimate mass-producing art 
form, both due to the fact that it comprised of a multitude of images and the 
fact that the notion of the one unique original in cinema was utterly non-
existent; the entire mode of film production was based on multiplication. Cine-
ma’s chief values lay not in the object that was produced, the print of the film, 
but on the narrative, the ideas communicated, the reality presented or reinter-
preted.  
Deleuze begins with the movement-images. It is through these images, he 
argues, we connect with, experience, and make sense of the world.300 Move-
ment-images thus rest on their documentary-like foundation. What a move-
ment-image accomplishes is a way to describe reality, even if the image itself is 
staged and/or edited. Deleuze understands the movement-image as a continu-
ous depiction of movement where time is represented chronologically, namely 
where time is represented as human beings are used to understanding it, creat-
ing a documentary-like sensation, a sensation that reality is being “represented”. 
Deleuze also describes movement-images as composites of two sides. Its two 
sides relate on the one hand to the object in question that is being portrayed 
and on the other to the whole,301 that is, a linear and chronological representa-
tion of time passing. In the movement-image Deleuze appreciates editing and 
montage as that “which constitutes the whole, and thus gives us the image of 
time” and it is that which creates reality-like images.302  
With movement-images the camera functions as the human eye, even if it is 
mechanical. When a human being perceives and understands impressions 
around him/her in real life, even if the information is fragmented, the brain 
conducts an ‘editing process’ of its own, it organises and categorises the per-
ceived images into our consciousness so that we ultimately understand them 
linearly. The movement-image likewise links notions initially perceived (Frame 
1: the close up of the shooting gun, Frame 2: wide shot of the falling body) to 
each other (The human brain concludes: the person was shot and killed by the 
gun). The mind connects it to other images from memory and organises them 
so that we can make sense of them, as well as it links us as human beings to the 
world around us.303 Movement-images thus function in the same way as the 
human process of thought,304 namely, their value lies in their ability to describe 
the reality and make it understandable.  
Most films were arguably based on movement-images. Or more accurately, 
most “commercial” films with a traditional linear narrative were based on 
movement-image logic. The movement-image based cinema is over-represented 
                                                
300 Dyrk, Using Deleuze, p. 119. 
301 Deleuze, Cinema 1; see also Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 33. 
302 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 33. 
303 Dyrk, Using Deleuze, pp. 135-136. 
304 Ibid. p. 137. 
 141 
in e.g. Hollywood films, but Deleuze also gave some other examples of the 
movement-image films that were of a far more experimental nature than Holly-
wood studio films, for instance Dziga Vertov’s Man With a Moving Camera. The-
se works, had social, cultural as well as commercial functions. Hollywood’s abil-
ity to act as life-style creating machinery was a perfect example of a social value. 
With its ability not only to generate value in terms of box office returns, the 
commercial cinema also generated socially and culturally significant capital. 
Even if there is a lot to be said, and a lot has indeed been said, of the kind of 
“ideology” and life styles Hollywood cinema disseminates, it need not be dis-
cussed in this context.305 What is of far greater interest for the context of this 
research project is, of course, access to all types of artworks. Cinema is particu-
larly interesting as it comes with its own public space, i.e. the cinema theatre. 
The early film could mainly be watched in cinema theatres as, bar for some 
wealthy exceptions, most people did not have projectors in their private homes. 
Film could thus only be watched in a public setting. That entailed various acts 
of communication, both inside and outside the cinematic framework. There was 
a social aspect involved in going to the cinema also a collective appreciation of 
the work when watching it with others, which added additional values and func-
tions to the cinematic experience. Film was one of the main modern artistic ex-
pressions that attempted to create an “experience” outside the work itself for 
the viewer, and was thus moving away from traditional rhetoric based notions 
and ‘objecthood’. The drive-in cinema for instance became a social institution 
rather than a place where film was, or is, watched. There, the watching of the 
film becomes more often than not a secondary activity. 
The fact that cinema (both the making of it and the watching of it) is over-
whelmingly a collective process, both created and disseminated by the means of 
machines indicates that film represents a branch of semiotic/network based art. 
It also allows us to clearly see how the commercial, social and cultural capital 
forms exist side by side, and how works can require public spaces in order to be 
viewed and experienced. Although, as we shall see in chapter 5, public spaces in 
the digital era are not necessarily always public in the physical sense, meaning 
open to everyone to physically enter into.  
As cinema developed, the approach to film making changed and the visual 
languages of classic cinema also challenged. The movement-image based film 
was no longer a satisfactory means of expression. In terms of time-images, in con-
trast to movement-images, Deleuze finds that a clear split between the linear 
object/whole that could be found in movement-images was not likewise 
achievable for time-images. When it came to time-image based cinema it was 
not possible to succinctly define it as merely something that corresponded to or 
attempted to describe reality. That meant that the time-image based cinema 
could not as straightforwardly be deconstructed or analysed, Deleuze notes, as it 
                                                
305 But do see Slavoj Zizek, The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema, (film), (2006).  
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presents the past, the present and the future, all at once. Deleuze stresses e.g. 
Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane (1941) as an example of a time-image work where 
the ideas of time and memory were intermingled through various “regions, strata, 
and sheets: each region with its own characteristics, its ‘tones’, its ‘aspects’, its 
‘singularities’, its ‘shining points’ and its ‘dominant’ themes.”306 All these indi-
vidual regions appear as both separated and simultaneous, and all of them cre-
ate the artistic value of these works.  
The new way of making cinema might have been a symptom of the psycho-
logical turmoil and the internal malaises people were going through post WWII, 
brought on by the occurrences of the first half of the twentieth century. The 
modes of expression were therefore changing which meant that the earlier line-
ar and chronologically coherent movement-images did no longer adequately 
manage to satisfy, approach or depict the post-war reality that was being experi-
enced as much more dire, complex, shattered and thus not equally linear as it 
had been understood before the wars. As such, it was much more problematic 
to deal with in art theory. The time-images thus took over from where the 
movement images ended. 
The time-image, Deleuze writes, “always gives us access to that Proustian 
dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommen-
surable with the one they have in space.”307 The time-image was not so much 
depicting reality as it was creating and imagining a new reality - it was constructing 
a fourth dimension! Such abstract themes and the deconstruction of traditional 
subject matters, as I shall develop further below, could only be expressed 
through certain types of modern and postmodern artworks.308  
Evidently Deleuze distinguishes classic cinema from modern cinema when 
he makes a distinction between movement-images and time-images. For him 
the violence and the uprooting that had occurred during WWII meant that time 
had been distorted and that it no longer could fit within the traditional (move-
ment-image) linear narratives. For instance, fragmented memory had for a long 
time already been explored elsewhere in literature by e.g. Proust and Duras309 
and Deleuze stresses here how the same tendency is addressed in the image-
based arts such as cinema and what that means. Alain Resnais’ Last Year in Mari-
enbad (1961) is held up as an example of a time-image based film. Time-image 
                                                
306 [original emphasis], Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 96. 
307 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 38. 
308 Theodor Adorno had also been writing about the phenomenon of modern art: “[...] while 
the concept of subject matter remains a concern in art, in its immediacy, as a theme that can 
be lifted over from external reality and worked upon, it has, since Kandinsky, Proust, and 
Joyce, incontrovertibly declined.” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 149. 
309 As well as all the other authors being published by Edition Minuite publishing house. See 
also Deleuze, Proust and Signs. 
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cinema accordingly utilises film and its possibilities not in order to depict reality 
but rather to create or imagine alternative realities.  
The value in cinema thus lay, not in the commercial capital only, or the or-
namental, romantic or pretty objects being created, but rather in the ideas, or 
perhaps more accurately imaginations, of a new world. The modern artwork 
communicated from an empty place, a crisis, where the world had to be re-
invented, re-imagined, re-built and where all idealistic notions of society had 
been destroyed. What appeared to have been central and most valuable for the-
se works was the study of time itself, artists were attempting to understand what 
time was, and whether it was at all possible to live life forwards at a time when 
people were waking up to a devastated post war reality: 
 
It is here the reversal is produced: movement is no longer simply aberrant, 
aberration is now valid in itself and designates time as its direct cause. ‘Time 
is out of joint’: it is off the hinges assigned to it by the behaviour in the 
world, but also the movements of world. It is no longer time that depends 
on movement: it is aberrant movement that depends on time.310 
 
In this passage Deleuze aptly summarises the entire essence of the time-image, 
and what separates it from the movement-image. In a somewhat sombre tone, 
no doubt affected and coloured by the memory of the occurrences that had tak-
en place in the world after WWII, he explains why there was a need for an alto-
gether different visual language,311 a new understanding of time and how it 
could be portrayed. In order to describe how artists were dealing with a post 
war reality by the means of camera image Deleuze wrote that they were moving 
away from American ‘over-objective conception’, the Hollywood narration that 
we saw above, to an ‘automatic subjectivity’ that is a subjectivity that was not 
human but automatic, connected to something a-human such as a machine. At 
this particular juncture, when moving away from objecthood is discussed, it is 
here where Stapleton’s semiotic/network based works and Lippard’s demateri-
alised works can be connected to Deleuzian cinema theory. They all 
acknowledge art as moving away from objecthood towards being dematerialised 
and desubjectivised, requiring participation and an active audience, or as we saw 
above, prosumers. The value of the cinema is thus no longer only commercial or 
social (as going to the cinema theatre or the drive-in). It is no longer simply de-
picting reality. Instead, it is portraying amnesia, hallucination, madness, night-
mares, dreams,312 memory and so on. It was addressing that which was unuttera-
                                                
310 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 39. 
311 “Language” in this context refers to the wider French term langage that Deleuze applies 
which focuses on all utterances, also the non-verbal ones, rather than the narrower langue that 
refers to the language system itself, see Deleuze, Cinema 2, p 28. 
312 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 53. 
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ble: that which no-one could put into words. The main significances and values 
were now the ones embodied in the ability to provide the tools that help people 
cope with the reality of transitional times. The therapeutic significance that the 
camera image can have was of course interesting from a public access point of 
view and it shows why access to cinema was necessary.  
By adopting Deleuze’s cinema theory, juxtaposed with Stapleton’s and Lip-
pard’s writings, we can demystify and extrapolate all the different capital values 
(commercial, social, cultural and perhaps even therapeutic) and the knowledge en-
capsulated in art, and then go on to discuss why such values ought to be made 
accessible to the public, even outside the commercial sphere. That artworks are 
valuable in terms of knowledge potential is obvious, however, as we already 
have seen, the fact that the medium of film does not have the same attributes as 
traditional art resulted in the above mentioned debate, namely, was the camera 
image to be considered as art at all, and if so, what functions did it have? 
Deleuze’s writings on cinema, both movement and time-images help us not on-
ly to identify many additional functions of cinema and images, and to under-
stand the medium of film, but it can also serve as a theoretical tool in conduct-
ing a critique of law. Using Deleuze’s argumentation aids in illustrating how law 
only focuses on that which is tangible in art, inside the legal sphere art is com-
modified and packaged as entertainment which is mainly commercially valuable. 
But how film and all its additional social and cultural capitals ought to be treat-
ed and whether law, especially in the information society, should address all the 
other functions that are not commercial in nature remain to be discussed.  
Current positive law can result in the rather awkward situation where the 
more commercial value a work has, the more tangible and object-like it can 
(pretend to) be, the more it will be apt to fit inside the legal sphere as a cultural 
commodity and intellectual property. In such a case, access to the ideas and the 
knowledge potential in artworks are not being treated as (equally) valuable as 
the commercial potential. In terms of modern artworks, movement-image based 
cinema for instance has historically lent itself more easily to fit within a com-
mercial paradigm even though it is a collective art form. Commercial cinema is 
adaptable to law as it uses traditional legal and economical tools (e.g. contracts, 
but also in the way it is marketed and exploited). It can be commodified even 
though it is not directly envisioned as art within intellectual property sphere. 
But, the same is not always true of e.g. the time-image based cinema. Not only 
does the time-image based cinema not have a chronological, traditional narra-
tive and expression that can be packaged for the market, it is also far more 
complex to define, as anything, let alone a commodity.  
However, what the time-image based cinema lacks in commercial potential 
when compared to its movement-image counterpart it more than makes up for 
in social and cultural capital. As the commercial potential of it is smaller, the ac-
cess to such works shrinks too. And ironically, as Deleuze very well points out: 
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“This is the old curse which undermines the cinema: time is money.”313 And it 
is evident, the more money (economic capital) a work generates the more it can 
be fitted inside the construction of private and commercial law such as copy-
right law, and there a wider access to the commercial works will be enabled by 
the marketing and distribution structures, while the less commercial works will 
more often than not be pushed back by the same legal and market structures in-
to the oblivion. 
 
3.5.2 PLATEAU: ACCESS 2.0 
With the digital advancement and with an augmenting number of distribution 
platforms that are comparatively inexpensive to build and uphold, all camera 
based artistic works can nowadays be accessed in entirely new platforms and 
more easily than before through e.g. VOD,314 pay-per-view and DTO315 (as well 
as through various illegal platforms). The reliance on objecthood and expensive 
marketing and distribution structures in order to exploit works and make them 
accessible is not equally pronounced in the digital era. Still, the point that is 
made here is that when such dematerialised works (e.g. films), or access modes 
(e.g. legal or illegal digital platforms), are indefinable in one way or another, as 
the definitions may be connected to earlier paradigms, and if the work does not 
have a clear strong commercial potential, it can be rendered week in terms of 
access, regardless of any at the time available digital possibilities. The selection 
of works that can be accessed is still very much conducted by the market and is 
prevalent in terms of what generally can be accessed even in the digital era. Dig-
ital alternatives could be used (more) productively in terms of accessing art-
works more widely, provided, of course that the digital alternative is not fully 
commodified too.  
In law, the digital alternatives are in principle approached as a threat, a mode 
for potential illegal dissemination of copyrighted works. That assumption re-
mains to be subverted. Such an assumption also locks in the social and cultural 
capital of the artworks, which are still to be understood and genuinely given a 
value. The artistic content needs to, at least initially, be separated partly from its 
economical value and partly from the platforms (carriers) through which it is ac-
cessed, so that it is possible to determine what requires further (legal) attention 
and why in terms of access. 
When enclosures of products and traditional packaging, marketing and dis-
tribution processes are discussed, it has to be kept in mind that they are to a 
certain extent connected to the industrial paradigm, and adapted for commercial 
exploitation that looked differently than the one that is happening in the digital 
                                                
313 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 75. 
314 Video on Demand. 
315 Download to Own (or Permanent Electronic Licence). 
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sphere. These are the paradigm shifts that need to be acknowledged. The con-
sumer attitudes are vastly different from what they were in the industrial econ-
omy. The audiences require and are used to open access, but the legal frame-
work remains rather unfamiliar with openness as opposed to enclosure. Today 
enclosures are seen as unnecessary obstacles to access. Further still, even the 
most sophisticated technical fences raised in order to restrict access are often 
eventually circumvented. That means that modes of exploitation and access 
have been challenged in the digital knowledge society. Law has to follow and 
acknowledge this change. 
The digital space itself can be problematic in relation to law; in reality it is a 
complex bundle of digital elements that we refer to with the unifying umbrella 
term “the digital space”. It comprises of both carriers (platforms) and content 
(ideas/knowledge). For the purpose of access enabled within a cultural com-
mons the digital content will always be far more interesting to study than the 
platform through which the content is distributed, accessed, communicated and 
shared, be it through lawful channels or by way of infringement. Even if, the 
separation between content and carrier is not as straightforward always, which 
will be discussed further below.  
  
3.5.3 PLATEAU: ORIGINALITY AND FIXATION 
One of the reasons the dogmatic reasoning behind copyright law as we know it 
is problematic is that in most copyright legislations a work of art will subsist 
copyright if it is deemed to be somehow fixed316 and the ontology of art in copy-
right law is, as we have seen, often grounded in, a rhetoric based notion of 
works, that is, works are assumed to be invention/original, created by the hand 
of an author/genius. The two basic prerequisites of copyright that the work has 
to be an original and that it has to be somehow fixed, that is not an idea but an 
expression of an idea, will be used to further indicate how copyright law very 
much rests on the notions of rhetoric based art317, and as such it experiences 
semiotic/network based artworks as problematic.  
The idea of originality that is required in copyright law is complex. It could 
be understood either as a “quality requirement”, i.e. the work is an original in 
that that it is not a “copy” or created from an “infringing activity”. Originality 
can also be understood as a synonym for “unique”, something that has a “per-
sonal touch” of the artist and that is created as a result of his individual labour 
                                                
316 i.e. that is not an idea but an expression of an idea. Swedish law does not have a direct fixa-
tion requirement, instead Swedish law distinguishes idea from expression at the point of crea-
tion (“verkets tillkomst”) – the creation in turn can have various stages – sketches, models, 
drafts etc. in all of which copyright naturally subsists. Mogens Koktvegaard and Marianne Lev-
in, Immaterialrätt, Norstedts Juridik, (2006) p. 66. 
317 Stapleton, Art, Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Economy, chapter 1.  
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(physical as well as spiritual). In Swedish law for instance, the requirement for 
originality seems to be inferring the latter, namely that the work is created by 
the author himself as an expression of his individuality318 or as “the result of in-
dividual spiritual activity”319.  Such reasoning is true in continental law too most 
notably in French law where the notion of the artist’s sprit and the artist’s 
“soul” are perhaps strongest in European legislation. Which is also evident lin-
guistically from the French expression for copyright “droit d’auteur” – author’s 
right, as opposed to, of course, “copyright” – the right to copy/the right in the 
copy. Anglo-Saxon law in turn focuses instead on the activity of copying, which 
is something vastly different from, and not necessarily equally tied to, a rights-
creating individual artist. Nonetheless, the reliance on originality remains, in one 
way or another entrenched in law. But how does that affect works that inher-
ently multiply in the digital sphere, or that are created in participation and with-
in a network, rather than by one author’s individual spiritual activity? “Fixation” 
is another complex matter in intellectual property law. An expression is 
achieved when an idea takes a tangible form or when an idea is somehow execut-
ed and fixed.320 The focus on objecthood and tangibility is apparent, “ideas” are 
excluded from copyright law – a work subsist copyright only when it has pro-
gressed from the stage of idea to a fixed, tangible expression. 
Bearing in mind everything that has been addressed so far, if artworks as 
knowledge sources are being disseminated, it becomes evident that there is a 
difference between access to the platform (both legal and illegal) and access to 
the content (but can access to ideas and knowledge ever truly be said to be ille-
gal?). In copyright law, in order for it to be able to understand and handle a de-
materialised artwork in the digital realm, the focus has to be placed on the plat-
forms and the way they are constructed and how they enable distribution,321 and 
not, as Deleuze would have it, how ideas are linked, grouped and interconnect-
ed to make up artworks that express, imagine or create something. In order to 
successfully claim copyright infringement when artworks are disseminated digi-
tally there has been a concentration on the modes of access, focusing on the 
smallest digital components (e.g. bit torrents) in order to find the required “fixa-
tion” and “tangibility”. That can be treacherous, as that which is that is being 
                                                
318 See e.g. Koktvegaard/Levin, Immaterialrätt p. 75. 
319 [my translation], Olsson, Copyright,, p. 66 “resultatet av en individuell andlig verksamhet”. 
320 See e.g. Olsson, Copyright, p. 84, the protection of expressions of ideas rather than ideas 
themselves stems from the Berne Copyright Convention, see e.g. David I. Bainbridge, Intellec-
tual Property, (6th ed), Pearson, Longman, (2007), p. 46. 
321 The difference between eBay, Google and Pirate Bay can be addressed here. While they 
may seem very different when the E Commerce directive (2000/31/EC) for instance attempts 
to define the digital spaces, the three become confused, and it can be very difficult to discern 
why the one is different from the other when adopting a strict legal reading of the directive’s 
structures. 
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expressed322 is then ignored, as are the social and cultural capitals being dissem-
inated, and knowledge being communicated and shared.   
The increasingly stronger enforcement legislations have lead to more enclo-
sures and more restricted access. Copyright protection encloses works through 
the exclusive right, and thus, access to works can only happen in commercial 
and private spheres. There is social and there is cultural capital, which are at the 
same time also being territorialised, grounded, enclosed. The social and cultural 
capital encapsulated in works will remain locked inside an old paradigm that 
cannot understand them, because there are no paths other than the industrial 
one that enables dissemination of artworks. These broader values and other 
capital forms on the other hand, have to do with who we are and how we un-
derstand ourselves, our communities, our time and the collective and individual 
memories to which we are subject. Understood in such a way, the additional 
need for a commons where (lawful) access, communication and sharing of 
knowledge can happen outside the industrial paradigm is obvious.  
 
3.5.4 PLATEAU: ART AS BEING  
How could law imagine a cultural commons as a potential sphere for access, 
communication and sharing of knowledge in artworks? The French philosopher 
Jean-Luc Nancy wrote that “[t]here is no meaning if the meaning is not shared, 
and not because there would be an ultimate or first signification that all beings 
have in common, but because meaning is itself the sharing of Being.”323 Law has to 
be responsive to the developments, the changes from material to dematerialised, 
from analogue to digital, and it has to genuinely understand the growing digital 
sphere as an asset rather than a threat. Discussing cultural commons within the 
framework of law can be the first step. 
In Deleuze’s cinema writing two basic concepts are the idea that everything 
can be an “image” and that time is not necessarily linear or chronological but 
has a paradoxical form where  “past, present and future all co-exist and only ex-
ist in every immeasurable instant of the present.”324  
The images, the ideas, the information, the knowledge that we gain constant-
ly at a hyper speed in the digital spheres, as well as those images that we en-
counter and have been exposed and subject to in the past are integral to who we 
are. They need to be read and understood so that we can place them in a con-
                                                
322 This has e.g. been the case when platform providers such as Napster, Grokster and indeed 
Pirate Bay have been sued for contributory infringement, when the original infringers have not 
been traceable. In constructing contributory infringement cases, the courts have focused on 
the platform itself and the way it is structured in order to locate the infringing activities. 
323 Jean Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, (trans.) R. D. Richardson & A. E. O’Byrne, (ed.) W. 
Hamacher & D. E. Wellbery, Stanford University Press, (2000) p. 2. 
324 Dyrk, Uzing Deleuze, p. 61. 
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text and grasp their real social, cultural as well as commercial values and struc-
tures. For that to happen we need the cultural commons and an unfettered ac-
cess to works that is not solely based in the economic capital. The notion of 
time-images for instance that Deleuze discussed and the passing of time is thus 
an example of how certain traits in art, which are very valuable socially and cul-
turally, often remain unaddressed by e.g. copyright law as they are too abstract, 
not material enough and, dare I say, not sufficiently commercial in the sense of 
economic capital. Copyright law, at least the way it stands today, requires a rei-
fied, tangible object-based artwork that potentially has an economical value, and 
everything else has to be treated as a little less significant, as it does not con-
form to the given legal framework. Yes, it is true that there is a theoretical pub-
lic interest ambit built in within copyright law’s own structure, but the deeper 
we step into the digital age, and with the strengthened enforcement rights, the 
more it becomes evident that the public interest is weakening, and that it can 
only be upheld where there is a genuine commercial potential in the underlying 
work. All of that ought to be considered when assessing the legal framework 
around access to art in a digital sphere and in the information society.   
This is the reason Deleuze’s writings on cinema were interesting here, maybe 
as a detour – in order to illustrate what it is that copyright law is currently ex-
cluding, what it is lacking and how it is creating obstacles to access. Deleuze in-
terpreted cinema as the organ for perfection of a new reality that came with in-
dustrialisation, and then after the World Wars, cinema was seen as broadening 
of vision, of being able to see further than with the naked human eye... Carnera 
conducts a similar argumentation citing the Swiss painter Paul Klee who said: 
“Art does not reproduce what is visible but makes things visible.”325 
It is this making things visible, the seeing further than the naked eye that was, 
and still is, of course, of interest, public interest as it were, and access to it is nec-
essary regardless of the works’ economical potential or its physicality or fixa-
tion. All this has, however, remained unaddressed to such an extent that it has 
so far been impossible to articulate and grasp theoretically and even less so le-
gally how the social and cultural capitals function, where the knowledge poten-
tial is, and where the spheres are in which artworks can be communicated and 
shared for purposes other than the industrial ones.  
In the digital information society there are platforms and possibilities to (in-
expensively and instantly) constantly communicate and share ideas and 
knowledge. But these possibilities are not yet the commons proper. Access to 
artworks needs to be approached slightly differently in the digital knowledge so-
ciety. So far, artworks have been approached as mainly individuality-based, tan-
gible and material. Were artworks to be approached as for instance semiotic and 
                                                
325 Alexander Carnera, Magten over livet og livet som magt, Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens, Co-
penhagen Business School, Institut for Ledelse, Politik og Filosofi, (2010), p. 290 citing 
Partsch: Klee. Taschen. Köln. (2007). 
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network based, certain ontological points of departure in modern copyright law 
would be side-stepped such as the notions of “originality” and “tangibility” that 
law relies on today. As a consequence, copyright’s exclusion of “ideas” from its 
ambit is sensible for the intents and purposes of a commercial exploitation of 
intellectual works, but in terms of the work’s social and cultural capital such ex-
clusions can be challenged. The originality, fixation and tangibility requirements 
still being upheld are obviously not always appropriate as tools with which to 
navigate through the digital sphere. 
There already exist some, still not easily definable, concepts that are very 
similar to a cultural commons, that are constantly being created and negotiated 
in the digital spheres, but they are not legal. In the realm of art the constant cre-
ation of these concepts is remarkable. Nevertheless, we still do not really know 
how they function, whether they ought to exist at all and how to use them pro-
ductively (and in accordance with law). It might be that it is a threshold over 
which we are entering in an even newer era in terms of access to artworks and 
their communication and sharing. In that case, art in the digital era can no long-
er, naturally, be described, treated and understood as merely a rhetoric based art 
form, but rather it has to be approached as an art form that is equally based on 
communication, networks, abstraction, and sharing, by its nature. It is increas-
ingly virtual, plural, dematerialised, and this is so because of the network-based, 
connected, online, digital society in which we live.  
The difficulties that copyright law experiences today have to do with precise-
ly this, that law has painted itself in a corner by not really knowing how to han-
dle the digital alternative. It thus focuses on codes and platforms and not the 
content and meanings, communication and sharing of ideas and knowledge. 
Perhaps copyright law is not the appropriate tool with which to approach a dis-
cussion on cultural commons for communication and sharing, due to its fun-
damental construction and its individual-rights-based nature? Artworks in the 
information society have had to be forcefully made tangible and object-based in 
order to be understood and grasped in copyright law. As a result of that, super-
fluous gatekeepers and fences have been created e.g. longer durations of copy-
right, compromised fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, all this in 
order to get to the fixation or to the bottom of illegal dissemination, which in 
turn has resulted in the shrinking of the public domain, and so on. This has 
been tied to the processes of the second enclosure that have been needed in or-
der to exploit the intellectual works commercially.  
Enclosure, evidently, is something else in the digital realm and the enclo-
sures that were appropriate for the industrial era are no longer applicable. The 
industrial commercial processes required various acts of enclosure. As long as 
the artwork meant for the market has to be enclosed, even in the digital sphere 
it will always have to be provisionally and artificially enclosed, it will always be 
forced to be reified, made tangible, in order to be exploited and accessed. By 
treating works only as commodified and packaged products, means that only 
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the economical value of the work will be catered for and the social and cultural 
capital forms will be, at best, left to the vague principle of public interest. How-
ever, economic as well as social and cultural capital forms are in reality depend-
ent on each other, and a number of problems that e.g. the entertainment indus-
try has encountered during the last decade, has arguably been due to the fact 
that artworks have been fenced off in a way that is not compatible with general 
attitudes of the public that is used to open-access when it comes to the digital 
spheres and digital content. That has meant that works have been taken out of 
their social contexts in order to eliminate infringing activities brought on by the 
digital possibilities.    
It is well known that artworks can at best be maladroitly and artificially en-
closed in the digital spaces. But any further and additional justification of enclo-
sures disregards the social and cultural capitals that the digital spaces and their 
contents have inherently. The trouble seems to be that contrary to the tendency 
in the technical sciences and their development that has more and more been 
incorporating the aspects of networks and sharing, law has manically maintained 
the traditional definition of what might constitute an artwork (the origi-
nal/tangible/individual based concept) as defined in copyright law, as well as 
what constitutes spaces in which these works can be accessed: physical places 
where commodity-like works are sold and otherwise commercially exploited. 
And that has been, and is, problematic on so many levels, one of them being 
that law requires that we can always point to a fixed, original work that is creat-
ed by a definable, human being, a tangible expression of an idea and that can be 
packaged, enclosed and traded with. That is so very difficult, or maybe impossi-
ble, to achieve in a digital world and with certain works, that are in fact preva-
lent nowadays such as e.g. semiotic/network based artworks. 
“What we are looking for there, like in the photographs, is not an image; it is 
an access”326 writes Nancy. The access to artworks is thus equally significant as 
the work itself in the digital era. Instead of clumsily attempting to define what 
the artwork might be in the digital world, e.g. an individual work/invention 
built up by a collection of codes that is accessed through (legal or illegal) digital 
platforms, perhaps it would be far easier to focus on the significance of the ac-
cess to knowledge via a commons that is constituted and upheld through legis-
lation? Access to the artwork including the theoretical concepts and values men-
tioned above such as the ideas, movements (whatever that may be, both literal 
movement and movement in terms of ideas) as well as time, space and memory 
contained in the works could in that case all be catered for and considered as 
valuable as the industrial, economic capital value. The challenge is, as challenges 
go, to create spaces where that is possible and can be achieved while at the same 
time upholding the structures such as copyright law that do enable the commer-
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cial exploitation of the works, something that is equally valuable. The one does 
not have to cancel out the other. 
Legal structures have predominantly been placing art inside the property 
paradigm. In the property paradigm economical reasoning (enclosure, packag-
ing) and (private) economic capital327 dominate. That means that all other func-
tions and social and cultural capital forms that an artwork has, are being side-
stepped. In the digital era omissions of such values can no longer be disregard-
ed. By not understanding the concepts imperative for artworks and their exist-
ence today in the information society there might be serious implications on ac-
cess to artworks in the future, as there is indeed in the present. That means that 
access to knowledge could be equally impaired. 
When the artwork is no longer dependant of physical, tangible, material 
forms, and as it often exists in a de-materialised form, within the realm of the 
virtual the discussion concerning the cultural commons and its place in law is 
inevitable. Even though Deleuze himself referred to the Proustian rather than 
the digital sense of the virtual when he discussed images, his writings on cinema 
can be of particular interest, especially when it comes to understanding the vari-
ous social and cultural capital forms of art and in reassessing what it is that law 
does when it seeks to categorise artworks ontologically. The industrial processes 
of enclosure must specifically be kept in mind. And even further still, Deleuze’s 
writings on images can be used in conducting a critique of certain principles of 
copyright as not being altogether modern in some of its parts in a time of the 
digital artwork that is abstract/virtual/network-based/fragmented etc. and in a 
world where artworks exist inside the continuously evolving creative communi-
ties and spaces that are based on instant communication and open access. 
A general critique of copyright is thus unavoidable as it, in the way it is cur-
rently constructed, still places artworks largely within the property paradigm, 
which is not always commensurable with the information technology paradigm 
that requires a comparatively open, easily accessible commons and spaces where 
knowledge and ideas can be communicated and shared. So now what? If intel-
lectual property laws like copyright are creating private property out of artistic 
and intellectual works and if that is seen as inappropriate what could then be an 
appropriate approach instead? Perhaps it could indeed be a commons based le-
gal concept? 
Enabling a wide access to artworks and how that could work in conjunction 
with current copyright law today is what we are discussing here. Even if current 
copyright law obviously can be and is problematic in parts when seen from an 
open-access and commons point of view, one ought to look at both its draw-
backs and benefits when assessing it and discussing additional commons-based 
structures. A commons-based structure is capable of handling the private and 
the public simultaneously. Before that can be further discussed, we shall first 
                                                
327 Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production. 
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look at obstacles to access in the next chapter, and then at the general concept 
of commons, before discussing a legal concept of the cultural commons and 
how it works with current intellectual property law. 
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4 CASE STUDIES (PART 1): ENCOUNTERS AND 
LINES OF FLIGHT 
The complexities in terms of access to art in the present day are not always ap-
parent. Finding an encounter is an act that comes prior to articulating the prob-
lem itself. The sheer creativity of jurisprudence actually always stems from en-
counters with previously unencountered problems. It is then when law truly 
comes face to face with something that it has never seen before that we are 
forced to move, develop, create. An encounter is almost a violent act. The 
French philosopher Henri Bergson wrote:  
 
The truth is that in philosophy and elsewhere it is a question of finding the 
problem and consequently of posing it, even more than of solving it. For a 
speculative problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated […] But stating 
a problem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing […] The effort of inven-
tion consists most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in 
which it will be stated. The stating and solving of the problem are here very close to 
being equivalent; the truly great problems are set forth only when they are 
solved.328  
 
In this chapter then let us embark on the journey of finding the problem.  
 
4.1 ENCOUNTER 1: THE LOST MURAL OF BRUNO SCHULZ 
This chapter begins with a story. The story is about a man, an artist, a writer, 
called Bruno Schulz and particularly it is about one of his works of art that was 
lost and then found, many, many years after his death and after its original in-
ception. By opening with the Schulz-case we begin to discern one crucial aspect 
of the problem, namely access to physical works.  
Bruno Schulz lived between 1892 and 1942. He was born in a town called 
Drohobych that during his lifetime belonged to Poland. Drohobych is today on 
Ukrainian territory. On the surface Schulz was quite an ordinary man, a man 
who made his living by teaching drawing at the local high school. In reality, he 
was extraordinarily multitalented and his passion was his own work, his writing, 
his painting, his drawing. As an author, and during his short life, he only man-
aged (as far as we know) to finish two short story collections one called Cinna-
                                                
328 [original emphasis], Henri Bergson, Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics,  (trans.) Ma-
belle L. Adison, New York: Citadel Press, (1974. [originally published in 1938]), p. 51. 
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mon Shops (that is translated into English as The Street of Crocodiles)329 and the 
other called The Sanatorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass.  
This case study is about a work that was initially one of Schulz’s lesser 
known works but which, in time, has become probably his most talked about 
and disputed pieces – a mural painted for a little boy’s nursery.  
Painted in 1942, lost for nearly sixty years, rediscovered in 2001, disputed 
over and mystified, the pieces that once made up the mural painted by Bruno 
Schulz are today scattered and divided between two countries. Some parts re-
main in Schulz’s hometown Drohobych, Ukraine, while others are in the Holo-
caust Memorial, Yad Vashem, in Israel. A work created during WWII, it em-
bodies the uncertainty of its time and it is a living testament to the horror, des-
pair and suffering that plagued the lives of ordinary people in Europe. Its sub-
ject matter is a fairy-tale, yet it is impossible to disregard the anguish and despair 
encapsulated within it. Mirroring its own time, while acting as a shared memory 
and allowing current day audiences to gain a glimpse into their collective histo-
ry, the work also reflects apparent issues of ownership, control and access to an 
artwork. The mural is probably one of the most conflict-ridden lost artworks of 
the last decades. To consider this case is, for the research conducted herein, in-
evitable, imperative. 
When WWII, erupted the lives of all people, especially people like Schulz, 
changed irrevocably. Born into a Jewish family, he would have normally needed 
to wear the Star of David on his outer garments, but thanks to his artistic skills 
he avoided this fate. Everyone who, like Schulz, was deemed to be a “necessary 
Jew” by the Gestapo evaded being branded in such a way because these skilled 
workers were needed and as a consequence they were kept away from all round-
ups and transports. As fate would have it, a Nazi officer called Felix Landau, 
who had a keen interest in the arts, took to Schulz and chose him to be his art-
ist-protégé, his own “skilled Jew”, and commissioned several works from him. 
One such commission that Landau assigned to Schulz was to paint the walls of 
his son’s nursery.  
Creating for a young boy, under what can only be described as duress and 
fear for his life, meant that Schulz had to depart from his own usual style, which 
was normally dark, mystical, and employed an extensive use of overtly sexual 
visual vocabulary. In order to stay true to himself and his storytelling he decided 
to use symbolical imagery that still could tell the stories he wanted to tell, but 
that would remain unnoticed by Landau and be appropriate for a child. This 
work kept him alive for some time, but there was an increasing sense of fear in 
him and the Drohobych Jewish community. On November 19th 1942, one of 
Landau’s rivals within the Gestapo used a commotion that erupted in the Jew-
ish ghetto and shot Schulz to death. A couple of days prior to that Landau had 
                                                
329 Bruno Schulz, The Street of Crocodiles and Other Stories - Tailors’ Dummies, (trans.) Celina Wie-
niewska, New York: Penguin Classics, (2008 [originally published in 1937]). 
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killed the same rival’s Jewish dentist. The rival, upon shooting Schulz, at least so 
the story goes, truthfully or not, retorted to Landau by saying: “You killed my 
Jew – so I killed yours”. After that day, the mural in the nursery that Schulz had 
been working on fell into oblivion. Only sixty years later, in 2001, did a German 
documentary filmmaker, Benjamin Geissler, travel to Drohobych specifically in 
order to locate the mural.330 Astonishingly enough, he managed to find it. 
When Geissler and his crew found the mural it was unquestionably a mon-
umental cultural find. However, where the work should be kept, who the right-
ful owner was and who should be able to access and control it were obviously 
questions that emerged as soon as the first traces of the mural were uncovered.  
In legal research, questions like these are not uncommon and they are con-
stantly being discussed. How do we deal legally with problems which arise when 
a significant artwork and cultural heritage is (re)discovered? These questions be-
come even more difficult when discussing works created in wartime, or under 
coercion, and where territorial belonging is contested.  
Disputes often end up in the courts of law but the law is not always 
equipped to deal with all the complex issues that arise with such cases: the deli-
cate political and diplomatic questions, the aesthetic dimensions, the matters of 
preservation and up-keep, the conflicts of interest. It very soon becomes appar-
ent that it is far from just about a balance between the private (the work as 
property) and the public (the work as cultural heritage).  
Regardless of the difficulty that these disputes concerning ownership and 
control of artworks pose to law, they are nonetheless, quite commonly settled, 
and adjudicated upon, in the courts of law. Often, the heirs or beneficiaries of 
the artwork argue that it belongs to them by blood-line or testament, and that 
they, therefore, ought to be given the status of legal owner, able to fully and un-
restrictedly control the work by any means; to keep it, sell it, destroy it, and so 
on. If deemed in such a way, the work is legally interpreted as mainly property, a 
private asset. Legal instruments, such as for instance property laws and copy-
right law, fence it off. Placed inside the private sphere, the work is in those 
types of cases made accessible only to the owner or the people that the owner 
approves of, or designates.  
The counter argument is often brought by libraries, artistic or cultural insti-
tutions, museums, or even nation states as we shall see in this chapter, who ar-
gue that these artworks must be seen as cultural heritage, owned by the people, 
and that only a public institution can adequately tend to certain works that rep-
resent an entire people collectively. In this instance, the work is interpreted as 
having a legally defined public interest that outweighs and overrides the private 
interest. The work functions as a symbol of identity for a people or a nation, 
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and it is placed inside the public sphere – made accessible to all through a state 
or a public institution such as a library or a museum.  
Some works, however, fall through the cracks of law. These works cannot 
be deemed as either mostly private or predominantly public. They simply defy 
the straightjacket imposed by various definitions such as: whether it is property 
or heritage, which territorial belonging or nationality can be ascribed to it, 
where it ought to be kept, and so on. This Schulz case, on the facts of it, was a 
perfect storm when it comes to questions like these. 
After Geissler unearthed the lost and practically forgotten mural in 2001 the 
controversy surrounding the ownership, control and access to it that ensued 
was inevitable. Five fragments of the mural, which had already been rudimen-
tarily restored by Polish conservationists, were, depending on which side of the 
story is told, either smuggled or rescued by Yad Vashem representatives and 
taken to Israel. This removal of the five pieces resulted in international ire.  
A settlement was reached in the end between the state of Ukraine and Yad 
Vashem through diplomatic (and contractual) channels allowing the pieces that 
were taken to Israel to remain in Yad Vashem on a “long term loan”331. None-
theless, it still is one of the most interesting recent examples where an artwork 
defies law and legal definitions332. For now, let us go back and retrace what ini-
tially happened to the work and then go on to analyse the legal problems and 
the lines of flight that challenge law as they arise. 
As soon as Geissler and his crew had discovered what seemed to be traces 
of the mural in the old Landau house they immediately alerted the Ukrainian au-
thorities, and Polish and Israeli art preservationists to help them with the exca-
vation. The excavations of the mural began. However, before the entire work 
had been lifted from underneath the layers of paint and wallpaper that covered 
it, some five recovered pieces that had already been somewhat restored by 
Polish conservationists, were taken away by Yad Vashem representatives.   
This removal of the restored pieces led to a dispute. The involved parties, the 
community and art experts could not agree whether this was the right thing to 
do or not. Questions such as: “Who could rightfully control this newly redis-
covered, work?” sprung up. Was it truly Yad Vashem, because Schulz was a 
Holocaust victim and because it is an institution with the means and knowledge 
to preserve the work properly? Or was it Poland, because Schulz had been a 
Polish citizen? Or was it the Ukraine, on whose territory it had been found, and 
who were at the time planning to open a Bruno Schulz museum in his 
hometown of Drohobych? 
This case illustrates some of the problems surrounding issues of access to art 
and cultural heritage. Not only was it unclear which nation had the strongest 
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332 The settlement agreement shall be more closely examined in chapter 7. 
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grounds for claiming ownership, the case was even further complicated by the 
fact that the mural also embodied knowledge and information, as Schulz had 
incorporated social commentary and criticism in the painting. He had for in-
stance painted un-Aryan features on the queen in the painting, something that 
was unheard of, even forbidden, when Schulz painted it. On one part of the 
mural a dwarf’s face appears to bear the artist’s own self-portrait and this dwarf 
can be seen at the reins of a carriage. This is very important to note, because at 
the time Nazi laws prohibited Jews from both riding in and driving carriages. 
Schulz’s mural was thus at once a timeless and unusual act of disobedience and 
social criticism, a historical document, as well as a disputed object of cultural 
heritage.  
The object of the case study is thus a mural that is a significant work of art 
for all Jewish people as it is a part of their history, while it at the same time, ap-
pears equally significant for the Polish people, especially when considering the 
fact that they are trying to deal with their pre war Jewish heritage and its past 
and present relationship with its own Jewish population. It also embodies a 
piece of European history. A traditional approach to identity is therefore prob-
lematic as at the core of this issue undoubtedly lies a question of justice and 
how law could deal with such conflicts, and whether it is possible to at all ap-
proach this case legally. In this case I ask whether law is able to confidently rule 
and designate the legitimate owner. 
Having to weigh the fact that Schulz, influenced by Judaism, its teachings 
and traditional Jewish methods of storytelling, at the same time as he was a 
Polish citizen and that he was, essentially, culturally secular, is very illustrative, 
particularly in order to reveal the plateaus of the artwork that then need to be 
fitted into the rhizomatic legal reasoning. There is an identity implication, or 
more accurately, haecceity, which shall be analysed below. This term, as was men-
tioned in chapter 2 is used instead of identity, as it focuses on the actual proper-
ties of a subject rather than imagined/assumed identity traits. As such also the 
legal subject is approached differently. Deleuze and Guattari explain haecceity: 
 
A degree, an intensity is an individual, a Haecceity, that enters into composi-
tion with other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual. […] In 
short, between substantial forms and determined subjects, between the two, 
there is not only a whole operation of demonic local transports but a natu-
ral play of haecceities, degrees, intensities, events, and accidents that com-
pose individuations totally different from those of the well-formed sub-
jects[…] However, depending on their degree of speed or the relation 
movement and rest into which they enter, they belong to a given Individual, 
which may itself be part of another Individual governed by another, more 
complex, relation, and so to an infinity. There are thus smaller and larger in-
finities, not by virtue of their number, but by virtue of composition of the 
relation into which their parts enter. Thus each individual is an infinite mul-
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tiplicity, and the whole of Nature is a multiplicity of perfectly individuated 
multiplicities.333 
 
When Deleuze described the notion of the encounter he addressed it as some-
thing that forces us to “think [t]his something is an object not of recognition 
but of a fundamental encounter”334 (rencontre335).  This is how I propose we ap-
proach the Schulz case, as an encounter, as something previously unencoun-
tered in law, and as Deleuze goes on to say such an encounter is perplexing “in 
other words it forces [us] to pose a problem.336 
The access issue is of course the one that we focus on here, namely from a 
legal perspective, how do we approach this case and access to this particular 
work after the death of the creator, but also after the death of the commission-
er, heirs, after copyrights have expired and after wartime? Schulz’s mural is ob-
viously particularly problematic and, as I shall be developing further below, 
when it comes to this specific piece of art it is unusually difficult to find any ter-
ra firma to stand on, or anything onto which to build the legal argumentation 
upon.  
 
4.1.1 LINE OF FLIGHT: IDENTITY 
The first complexity that must be analysed further is the identity of the creator. 
The mural, which was initially intended to adorn the walls of a nursery, now ap-
peared to be a work of art that had been created with the intent to wordlessly 
illuminate the story of the Drohobych Jewish community at a time during 
which it was painted, detailing the struggle of the Jewish people, expressed uti-
lising religious symbols/devices. Even though Bruno Schulz was highly influ-
enced by the Jewish religion he was still a secular man and there are many tes-
timonies that confirm that he considered himself to be, first and foremost, a 
Pole. He probably never saw the Polish people as his oppressors and his 
Polishness undoubtedly also influenced his work greatly, defined him as an art-
ist and as a person, and ultimately played a great role in his life. The problem 
concerns the fact that if the work is deemed Jewish in some way (e.g. Jewish 
                                                
333 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 279-280. 
334 Deleuze/Guattari, What is Philosophy, pp. 139-41, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 
‘The Autopoietic Fold: Critical Autopoiesis between Luhmann and Deleuze’. See also Fredrika 
Spindler, ‘Filosofin i Tänkandets Våld: Eller Coming out of the Ball Park’ in special issue: 
AILOS + GLÄNTA: DELEUZE, (2004) and Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 189. 
335 As opposed to recognition – see e.g. H. L. A. Hart. 
336 Deleuze/Guattari, What is Philosophy, p. 139-41, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘The Auto-
poietic Fold: Critical Autopoiesis between Luhmann and Deleuze’. The attempt here is to read 
the encounter as something ordinary, and not as fetishized or as an apocalyptic moment. An-
dreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Workshop presentation, Take A Walk: Law, Bodies, Space, 
Lund University (21st May 2012). 
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folk art) and in giving prominence to the one side, Jewishness, it has to be asked 
whether the other aspects of “identity”, Polishness, Europeanness, are simulta-
neously being negated, and if so whether it is at all possible for Bruno Schulz 
and his work to belong to both the Jewish and the Polish people at the same 
time while remaining in Israel and still being European? Or can it belong to 
mankind as a whole? Traditional legal approaches no doubt struggle to deal with 
this question.   
The kernel of the issue centres not only on the people the work rightfully 
belongs to, but also consequently where it should be kept and who should be 
able to access it. That too turned out to be an enigma, at least from a legal per-
spective. To answer that, one is put in the uncomfortable situation of having to 
define what Schulz was, and what he was not. Who was Bruno Schulz – a Polish 
Jew, or a Jewish Pole, or simply a European artist who was a victim of Nazism?  
The question of not only the artist’s identity but also the artist’s Heimat, thus 
becomes inescapable. In these cases it is evident that the law appears stale and 
inadequate because it seems to be presupposing certain notions of archaic 
monocultural societies and easily definable nationalities. But issues concerning 
the lack of identity, or perhaps more accurately multi-identity, are far less unu-
sual today than they were at the turn of the century. There are many artists that 
are creating in today’s multicultural, globalised world with on-going and increas-
ing disputes, migration that is constantly taking place, where national identities 
are blurred and many territorial borders still remain problematic and undefined. 
So the concept of haecceity lends itself nicely for the analysis here, and becomes 
a much more appropriate tool, that allows for a more sophisticated reading of 
what is commonly referred to as identity. 
I will argue that the reason we (the lawyers, the legal philosophers, the 
scholars, the people…) perceive Schulz’s mural as an insurmountable problem is 
because there appears to be an incongruity between the notions of what art is 
(supposed to be), who the artist is (supposed to be) and what they de facto are in 
the eyes of the law.   
The positive, dogmatic law in the guise of e.g. IP legislations has to, and in-
deed does, simplify, assume and presuppose certain concepts in order to cover a 
wide plethora of complicated and complex issues that make up the ‘reality’. In 
other words, in intellectual property law as it stands today, we find a founding 
assumption that cultural works are created under uniform and clear conditions 
and that concepts such as:  a) work of art, b) artist c) identity etc. really exist and 
can be articulated and defined definitively. These assumptions, that all of those 
concepts inherently form a unity are obviously problematic when it comes to 
the absence of such unity or in the presence of pluralism and multi-centricity in 
terms of the works of art. When the laws, national as well as international, pro-
vide little or no help towards a genuine answer to the question of how art 
should be accessed and where it should be kept, it can of course lead to con-
flicts, and it undoubtedly does.  
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Existing legislation is currently not yet of help when it comes to identifying 
and clarifying issues of ownership, preservation, and most interestingly access, 
to all works of art. It has to be acknowledged that works of art play a significant 
role in the development of societies and need to be preserved regardless of any 
remaining archaic notions in law, and regardless who the creator is, and where 
he/she might or might not belong. That this is still an issue that we struggle to 
understand is apparent with the Bruno Schulz case: 
 
Born a subject of the Austro-Hungarian empire and later a citizen of inde-
pendent Poland, Schulz found himself living briefly under Soviet occupa-
tion at the beginning of the war and was murdered because he was a Jew in 
the Third Reich [...] Remarkably, this is the story of a man who spent most 
of his life in one place.337  
 
Eerily echoing Paloff’s expression, Deleuze and Guattari describe the nomad in 
the following manner: “the nomad is on the contrary he who does not move.”338 
In Roman law, there exists a division between property that is deemed to be 
fixed land, realty, and property deemed to be chattel, personalty, movable ob-
jects, not fixed to land. This is a division that to a great extent still exists today. 
Furthermore, in Roman Law objects, as well as living beings that were not citi-
zens, strangers, were historically deemed to be chattel as they could not own land 
and were subject to a landowner’s protection. As a consequence of such legal 
reasoning, animals, women, slaves as well as Jews339 were legally treated as chat-
tel as they were, quite simply, not attached to land. Created on Polish territory 
under German occupation, that later became the Ukraine, Schulz’s work no 
longer has a land, if ever it did. If we must suppose that the work legally is 
merely chattel then it must belong to the landowner.  
Morally it is impossible to ever claim that the occupying power or the Lan-
dau family and their heirs are the legal owner. But owning something is not the 
same as belonging to someone? So to whom does Schulz’s mural belong? Is it re-
ally as simple as saying that Schulz’s work belongs to the Jewish people exclu-
sively and that by such reasoning Yad Vashem, in Israel, is the only legitimate 
representative of all Jews? Or the Ukraine, Schulz’s hometown, and the work’s 
original place of creation? Can it be argued that the work, on the contrary, 
ought to be passed down by copyright or inheritance laws and thus maybe it be-
                                                
337 Benjamin Paloff, Who Owns Bruno Schulz? Poland stumbles over its Jewish past, Boston Review, 
(December 2004/January 2005). Available at: http://bostonreview.net/BR29.6/paloff.html. 
Last accessed 20 April 2010. 
338 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 420. 
339 See e.g. David Menahem Shohet, The Jewish Court in the Middle Ages: Studies in Jewish Jurispru-
dence According to the Talmud, Geonic and Medieval German Responsa, New York: Commanday-Roth 
Co., (1931). 
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longs to Schulz’s nephew, his only surviving heir? And how about Poland and 
the Polish people, what legal interest, if any, do they have in the mural, since 
Schulz was a Polish citizen? If deemed to belong to any of the abovementioned 
peoples, states, institutions or private persons the access issue is directly and se-
verely affected – it is for this reason that the issue of “belonging” must be dis-
cussed in order to understand its access implications. Belonging is a much more 
interesting concept than ownership here, one that contains the issues of identi-
ty, haecceity, as well as the nomadic aspects that also influence this discussion. 
What we are left with is a work not tied to (a) land, it has immense know-
ledge and cultural heritage potential and it is still surrounded by intense and on-
going discussions regarding its belonging, and how to define its legal status. To 
determine the legal status of such a work and to appoint a legitimate owner, 
given the circumstances in which the work is created and the fate it has had 
since it was found, is legally a task that can only be described as a nightmare.  
But are we not, once again, looking at it all wrong, and not posing the ques-
tion correctly? Are we not posing the question in reverse, already presupposing 
a given answer? The fact that the work cannot be defined, the fact that the artist 
does not have a clear belonging, the fact that this work cannot simply be seen as 
a financial asset, or movable property that can physically be fenced off and kept 
in a single, more or less closed-off environment, all that ought not to be seen as 
problems but rather as an immense potential.  
These issues are also in line with the discussions on the topic of internation-
al conventions that regulate works of traditional cultural heritage, intangible cul-
tural heritage and folklore. Cultural artefacts have been discussed widely in re-
cent years.340 They are generally excluded from copyright and so too under 
Ukrainian Copyright Law (Section 10(b)). This means that works of art that are 
deemed ‘heritage’ or ‘folklore’ are considered almost as above or beyond the 
monopoly of copyright and the personal moral rights. Cultural heritage, as we 
saw in chapter 1, is usually described in physical terms i.e. the cultural heritage 
definition is broken down into “monuments,” “groups of buildings”, and 
“sites”. Schulz’s mural does not (directly) fall within this definition. The other 
types of works that UNESCO also acknowledges as cultural heritage is intangi-
ble cultural heritage that is defined in the following manner: 
 
The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, ex-
pressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts 
                                                
340 See e.g. Eva Hemmungs-Wirtén, No Trespassing: Authorship, Intellectual Property Rights, and the 
Boundaries of Globalization (Studies in Book and Print Culture), University of Toronto Press (2004), 
Fiona Macmillan, ‘Commodification and Cultural Ownership’, in Copyright and Free Speech: Com-
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Macmillan. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. (2007), see also Merima Bruncevic, 
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and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in 
some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This in-
tangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is con-
stantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environ-
ment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them 
with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural 
diversity and human creativity.”341 
 
Schulz’s mural does not (directly) fall within this definition either. 
 
Finally, folklore has been defined by UNESCO as: 
 
Folklore (or traditional and popular culture) is the totality of tradition-based 
creations of a cultural community, expressed by a group or individuals and 
recognized as reflecting the expectations of a community in so far as they 
reflect its cultural and social identity; its standards and values are transmit-
ted orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms are, among others, lan-
guage, literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, handi-
crafts, architecture and other arts.342 
 
Schulz’s mural does not (directly!) fall within this definition, either. There seem 
to be no rules that cover the conflict brought about by this artwork. 
The problem in this case is that neither the concepts of cultural heritage, in-
tangible cultural heritage nor folk art were wide enough to provide tangible an-
swers for the Schulz mural because it could not be deemed as anything other than 
maybe a tangible object as any other. Even the principles of copyright, while the 
work was still in term, particularly moral rights, were difficult to apply on this 
artwork, as we shall see below. 
However, even though the mural does not directly fall under any heritage or 
folk art definitions it is still worth lingering there for a moment for the sake of 
argument. In Roman law, for instance, we find the concept of res communae—
things that cannot be owned and are open to everybody by their sheer nature.343 
This concept is reminiscent of what we today consider as folk art. Folk art indi-
cates works of art that collectively belong to a group, works that depict the his-
tory and culture of the people they stem from, something that is worth protect-
                                                
341 1970 UNESCO Convention For The Safeguarding Of The Intangible Cultural Heritage, I 
General Provisions, Art 2. 
342 UNESCO 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folk-
lore. 
343 These Roman law concepts shall be revisited in chapter 7. 
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ing both in the short and the long term, independent of the copyright aspect 
and its commercial uses. 
Schulz created a work of art in order to beg silently for change and, if he had 
asked for change more vociferously, it would inevitably have meant an instant 
end to his life. How can such issues be captured in law as they are, at the core, 
issues concerning human suffering and justice? How can the ownership, or in-
deed belonging, of a work of art that is influenced by Judaism as well as Polish 
culture and that was created under Nazi occupation, on occupied territory, be 
reconciled in law today? 
 
4.1.2 LINE OF FLIGHT: FRAGMENTED AND AURA OF THE WORK 
Schulz’s mural can be approached as crime scene evidence, i.e. a work that is an 
evidence of an historical occurrence, that is deserted and made for the purpose 
of establishing evidence. It challenges the viewer. Albeit rather unusual as crime 
scene evidence, it serves as a crucial testimony of the events that took place at 
that particular time in history. Much like ordinary crime scene evidence, it re-
veals stories that might initially not seem accessible or understandable. Howev-
er, these stories can gradually be elicited through careful analysis and once un-
derstood they provide detailed accounts of the victim, offender and the circum-
stances in which the crime was committed.  
Adorno, as we saw above, focused on artworks like this one, deemed to 
have some kind of social or cultural function. He argued that authentic art em-
bodies the ability to free itself from the restraints and fetters of its own time. 
Although difficult to define, Adorno maintained that the authentic work of art 
is essential in a democratic rule since it remains autonomous in an otherwise 
administrated society and as such provides indispensible insights into the totali-
ty of the society from which it stems.344 He privileged therefore these artworks 
as particularly important, and claimed that they were often overlooked sources 
of social knowledge and social commentary.345 This line of flight assists in un-
derstanding Schulz’s mural, it is not just a pretty painting, it is also a document. 
Could it be said that, by virtue of being knowledge-based and socially signifi-
cant, such works attain a higher ‘dignity’? In that case, there must be a higher 
public interest in it than in other works of art. Contrary to mass culture, if we 
are to follow Adorno’s reasoning, the general public needs to have access to such 
works because they incorporate certain democracy aspects, such as freedom of 
information and freedom of speech.  
                                                
344 Benjamin, ‘Work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction’, in Illuminations, p. 93. 
345 See e.g. Douglas Kellner, ‘T.W. Adorno and the dialectics of mass culture’ in Adorno: A crit-
ical reader, (ed.) Nigel C. Gibson and Andrew Rubin. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (2001). 
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The approach to Bruno Schulz’s mural thus folds346 in on itself—its outer 
contours are defined by its original context, that is as an artwork with a number 
of ‘authentic’ qualities, which was created for a nursery that belonged to the son 
of a Nazi officer. But on the inside it equally must be acknowledged as a dis-
torted, fragmented piece of art that is divided between two countries and whose 
belonging is disputed and unclear.  
Studying the mural from a public interest perspective, access to this work 
becomes further complicated: the work has been destroyed, fragmented and it 
cannot be viewed in (any) one place in its entirety, it is thus constantly also ex-
hibited elsewhere, always away from its ‘original’ context, away from itself. 
What happens to such works of art when they are taken out of their original 
context, fragmented, broken, taken elsewhere? Does the work of art lose its 
knowledge value, or potential, and become reified; does it lose its authentic 
qualities all together? And how can law handle a fragmented work? Walter Ben-
jamin writes: 
 
We know that the earliest art works originated in the service of a ritual—
first the magical, then the religious kind. It is significant that the existence 
of the work of art with reference to its aura is never entirely separated from 
its ritual function. In other words, the unique value of the ‘authentic’ work 
of art has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use values. The ritual-
istic basis, however remote, is still recognisable as secularised ritual even in 
the most profane forms of the cult of beauty.347  
 
We can thus add a new line of flight to this piece, namely the concept of the 
‘aura’ of the artwork that Walter Benjamin discussed, i.e. the sense of venera-
tion and admiration experienced when confronted by a piece of art through the 
ritual function of an exhibition. For Benjamin, the location and the origin of the 
work of art play a significant role for the sensation of the aura, and that is of 
course interesting here. The implication for the authentic aspects in the work of 
art and its ‘aura’ when taken out of such context is a question where opinions 
differed within the Frankfurt School itself.  
Adorno/Horkheimer saw the aura as an inherent aspect of a work’s authen-
ticity; the powerful aura of an authentic work of art, they claimed, violently 
grabs hold of the spectator and demands of him not only contemplation but al-
so praxis.348 Benjamin, on the other hand, stressed the potential not in the aura 
                                                
346 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘The Autopoietic Fold: Critical Autopoiesis between Luh-
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itself but rather in the act of destroying and shattering it, and thus freeing the 
work of art from the magic and ritual aspects of it, revealing the authentic quali-
ties through brutal and violent acts such as copying or fragmentation. Benjamin 
wrote that this could also be done through mechanical reproduction (and per-
haps, it could be argued, even digital) reproduction. In doing so, shattering the 
aura in one way or another can be a creative act that unleashes the potentiality 
locked inside the work as both the ‘context’ and ‘uniqueness’ of the work be-
come radically questioned and, Benjamin claimed, not only is the dissemination 
of the work to the wider public facilitated, thus democratising access to it, but 
the act of copying and fragmentation itself also reveals additional layers of 
meaning and significance trapped within the artwork. 
In the case of Bruno Schulz this is particularly relevant in relation to the is-
sue of whether the five pieces, by being taken to Yad Vashem, were rendered 
‘soulless’ and ‘inauthentic’, whether they became reified, or, on the contrary, 
whether the act itself shattered the aura of the work and freed it from the bur-
dens of its past, its original location, and unleashed its true potential, emancipat-
ing it from its given and perhaps vastly constraining context. This is significant 
for the legal study of the access to the work, particularly from a public interest 
perspective. It can be argued that by taking the mural to Yad Vashem the mural 
attained another, or maybe its ultimate, potential in that it can be studied inde-
pendently of its original context, it is placed in a new setting, in a new (Old) 
land, it can be viewed by larger numbers of people, be properly preserved and 
can also be understood as relevant from additional aspects. Arguing in such a 
way means that Yad Vashem, after all, might have had some legitimate claims of 
the mural. So the question is not what is Bruno Schulz’s work, it is rather what func-
tion does it perform, in its present fragmented state… 
However, Yad Vashem is not the sole claim that exists on the mural. The 
multiple claims (from other countries, as well as heirs that I do not study here) 
further add to the concept of this particular encounter, what we are witnessing 
is the fact that law, or what we assume law to be, is being attacked with various 
encounters at once, that cannot be handled easily or fully dealt with or even un-
derstood by the dogmatic legal methods and tools available. Law is here, quite 
simply, running out of rules. 
 
4.1.3 LINE OF FLIGHT: (COLLECTIVE?) MORAL RIGHTS 
As access to authentic works of art such as this one must be seen as significant, 
the problems with current law and issues concerning control and (legal) protec-
tion and access to these works of art must be presented at this point. In 
Schulz’s case, the inherent dichotomy in works of art is illustrated— i.e. the so-
cial significance of art vis-à-vis the proprietary structure that is facilitated by IP 
law. This renders the ownership and access issues particularly interesting in cas-
es where works of art, which are important for reasons other than commercial 
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ones, are in question. It is an issue that requires weighing up and balancing the 
interests and intentions of the original creator, rights owner, potential subse-
quent owners, as well as the public interest in an accessible and unfettered cul-
tural heritage and, with that, a healthy and growing cultural commons. 
To search for answers within positive law itself by solely utilising traditional 
dogmatic legal methods proved instantly unhelpful in this case. The work was 
created in the course of employment or under commission. The first problem 
that confronts the lawyer is in which jurisdiction and in which legislation to 
search for solutions. Polish law from the 1940s? Current Ukrainian law? Inter-
national law?  
In modern Ukrainian law similar issues are generally handled on a national 
level. Much like most other European legislations, Ukrainian Law on Copy-
rights and Related Rights stipulates in Article 16.2 that works of art created dur-
ing employment or by commission are to be vested in the employer. Interest-
ingly though, Ukrainian law, unlike most other European IP legislation, goes 
further in its protection of the creator and also protects moral rights of the author 
in the course of employment. Let me return to that in a moment. 
In a press statement Yad Vashem issued the following statement after the 
removal of the five pieces from Ukraine to Israel: 
 
Unfortunately it is a fact that from the around 3.5 million Jews who lived in 
Poland before the Shoah, today there are only a few thousand Jewish inhab-
itants. Despite the fact that today most of the Holocaust survivors live in 
Israel, the remnants of the vibrant Jewish life and the suffering both of the 
victims and the survivors are scattered all over Europe. Therefore Yad 
Vashem has the moral right to the remnants of those fragments sketched by 
Bruno Schulz.349  
 
The term “moral right” catches legal attention particularly in the way it was used 
in the press statement by Yad Vashem. From an IP law perspective this is an in-
teresting choice of words, as the legal concept “moral right” is not (directly) ap-
plicable here. Moral right, as a legal concept, was intentionally separated from 
the proprietary aspect of copyright law and is considered as fundamentally dif-
ferent from the general copyright. Moral right is considered to be non-
commercial, serving to protect certain ‘softer’ aspects of the artistic creation. It 
is closely linked to the author, for example through the right of integrity. In 
contrast to proprietary copyright, moral rights were created in order to protect 
the personality and reputation of the creators themselves.350 Moral rights are 
not only non-assignable but they also generally die with the author; to be exact, the 
                                                
349 [my emphasis], Yad Vashem’s press statement from 2001. Available at: http://www.ji-
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350 See also Merima Bruncevic, ‘Cultural Property Rights’. 
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right cannot be inherited post mortem auctoris. Simply put, moral rights protect 
the sides of the work of art that are part of the creator’s self, his ‘soul’, and are 
as such inalienable from him/her.  The author in the Ukrainian Copyright Act is 
today narrowly defined as ‘an individual who created a work by his creative ef-
fort’.351 
Attempting to determine the ownership and the right of access to a work of 
art after the death of the author, the employer, particularly when the nationality 
or belonging of the author is being disputed, as well as the fact that the work 
had been created under undue circumstances, is almost impossible to do. The 
strongly protected non-proprietary, inalienable moral right in Ukrainian legisla-
tion brings forth an interesting argument that is not only relevant in this case, 
but that also serves to illustrate a variety of other lines of flight that flee intellec-
tual property legislation, particularly when it comes to dealing with works of art 
such as this one, internationally, culturally and historically significant works that 
fall outside the traditional margins of copyright law. 
In the Schulz case, for example, moral rights are claimed post mortem not 
by the creator himself, obviously, but rather by an institution decades after his 
death when both the copyright and moral rights have expired. The grounds for 
claiming moral rights appear as non-legal but were they irrelevant and otiose? If 
claims seem to fall outside positive (dogmatic) laws as we know them or when 
the traditional legal method cannot provide a solution it appears precisely then 
as though law has run out of rules. 
Contrastingly, by way of example, a similar case appeared in front of the In-
dian courts in 1995. A renowned sculptor by the name Amar Nath Sehgal was 
commissioned in 1959 by the Indian government to create an artistic piece for a 
significant and central part of a government building in the capital of India. Mr 
Sehgal’s work resulted in a 40-feet high mural representing Indian customs, dai-
ly life, celebrations, clothing etc. The work won acclaim not only in India but 
also across the world because of its delicate depiction of Indian culture and, ul-
timately, became a cultural landmark. 
In the 1970s the building that had housed the work was due for renovation 
and in 1979 builders not properly trained to handle artistic works, dismantled 
and took the mural off the walls and put it into storage.352 Mr Sehgal brought a 
lawsuit against the Indian government for violation of his moral rights on the 
grounds that the dismemberment of the homogeneous blend of the pieces of 
each tile in the mosaic constituted an act of mutilation; that the action was prej-
udicial to the artist’s honour and reputation; obliteration of the artist’s name on 
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WIPO Magazine. (April 2007) Available at: 
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the work, etc.353 Mr Sehgal won his claim and all the rights in his work reverted 
to him, but the damage his mural had suffered and the loss to Indian cultural 
heritage, it was argued, could unfortunately not be rectified. 
The difference between the Indian case and the case of Schulz is of course 
that Schulz was not alive at the time when the mutilation, dismemberment, and 
destruction of his work took place and was thus unable to bring an action him-
self. Nor were there, more importantly, any questions of belonging/nationality 
present in the Sehgal case. One could also discuss further whether the Sehgal 
work can be deemed to have ‘authentic’ qualities: while it was highly important 
for Indian society, it could be argued that it lacks the additional knowledge in 
order to be elevated to the status of ‘authentic’ and that it served a more ‘deco-
rative’ function. Nevertheless, the Indian example contrastingly illustrates how 
difficult the case of Bruno Schulz is to approach legally, and it is useful in 
demonstrating the complicated issues concerning works of art that come into 
existence during the course of undue or conflicting circumstances e.g. works 
created in wartime. 
Interestingly enough, had Bruno Schulz been alive today he might have been 
able to bring an action for breach of moral rights due to the mutilation, frag-
mentation and destruction of his work. Dissimilarly, the Sehgal work illustrates 
a work that fits the folk art definition (as well as falling within the ambit of both 
copyright and moral right). The Schulz mural, therefore, simply falls through 
the legal cracks. As a result, it is rendered vulnerable and left unprotected as it is 
problematic (or undesirable?) to deal with it in law. 
Yad Vashem as an institution was created in order to honour the people 
who lost their lives in the WWII and to preserve the memory of the victims, so 
that the Holocaust would never be forgotten. Could it be argued then, that by 
virtue of being able to protect and preserve the works of the victims of the 
Shoah, certain rights ought directly to be extended to, for example, Yad 
Vashem or similar institutions, where there are grave circumstances present at 
the time of the creation, such as exploitation, incarceration, coercion or worse 
still—genocide? What would such a solution mean for the principle of public 
interest in works such as Schulz’s mural? Copyright law, and the concept of 
moral rights, evade these particular questions. However, in circumstances like 
these, they cannot be escaped— particularly in light of the international conven-
tions surrounding cultural heritage, for example, the Convention on the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Own-
ership of Cultural Property 1970. 
Intellectual property law regulates the sphere of the private domain. There-
fore, it has to be asked, in view of all of the above, whether it should be at all 
possible to ‘own’ works of art such as Schulz’s mural, i.e. in the traditional sense 
of private, individual ownership. Ought, for example, a notion such as force 
                                                
353 Kalra. 
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majeure be incorporated into law when it comes to ownership, control and ac-
cess to works of art that have been created under difficult circumstances and 
that, through disputing the ownership, the work itself runs the risk of destruc-
tion or peril, something that undoubtedly is a collective loss. Moral rights, ex-
tended or otherwise, are probably not the appropriate tool to make provisions 
for this problematic but they do reveal and draw attention to the stiffness and 
inadequacy of law in these situations. The question of ownership might there-
fore not be interesting at all, as determining who can have access to the work is 
far more acute. The question of ownership and access are of course tightly 
linked, but they differ from one another. 
We have already seen how Schulz’s mural does not fit into any legal concept 
neatly, neither the copyright concepts nor heritage concepts, demonstrating that 
works of art that are not covered by IP legislation or by folk art conventions in 
international law could be in danger by, in one way or another, being excluded 
from all existing legal protection. 
 
4.1.4 LINE OF FLIGHT: DIGITAL REPRODUCTION OF THE WORK, A MOV-
ABLE PIECE, NOT MERELY CHATTEL 
The case of Bruno Schulz’s mural does not even end there and it keeps chal-
lenging many of the most fundamental legal principles, some of which date all 
the way back to Roman law. On top of everything that we have seen so far, if 
we then place the study in the context of Benjamin Geissler’s mobile installation 
The Picture Chamber of Bruno Schulz – The final work of a genius additional issues 
emerge. There, Geissler recreates the mural virtually in an installation that takes 
the work into the 21st century. The installation can be described as follows:354 
The viewer enters into a constructed chamber created as a true-to-scale re-
construction of the Landau nursery in which the mural was originally painted. 
There are images being projected on the four walls, and the images change con-
tinuously, they do not only show the mural. All the phases – from the moment 
of discovery to the various moments of destruction of the wall, to the moment 
of reconstruction with all the known fragments – drift past, slowly fading in and 
out, accompanied by music composed exclusively for the installation. Ten visual 
presentation boards in A1 clip-on picture frames for multi-lingual texts allow 
the viewer to learn more about Bruno Schulz, Drohobych, the origin of the mu-
ral, the virtual reconstruction, the meaning of the fragments and the significant 
influence of Schulz as a source of inspiration to artists all over the world. Out-
                                                
354 The presentation of the installation here is mainly taken from the exhibition catalogue for 
Die Bilderkammer des Bruno Schulz – das letzte Werk eines Genies – Mobile Installation von Benjamin 
Geissler, Umweltbibliothek, Grosshennersdorf, (2012). The installation has been created and is 
described in the catalogue by Benjamin Geissler. 
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side the installation there are films being shown that were inspired by Schulz 
work, lectures on Schulz etc. 
That Schulz’s work challenges territoriality355 is obvious and this is wonder-
fully captured in Geissler’s installation. As a nomadic, travelling, movable, digit-
ised space that reconstructs the mural and places the original into a present day 
context, the installation is a subversive act of defiance in its own right. It deterri-
torialises the mural even further and functions as a genuine alternative that chal-
lenges the dichotomies inside/outside, here/there, movable/immovable, mate-
rial/immaterial, all of which are often taken for granted as well as perpetuated 
in the traditional concept of law. The installation constitutes an iterant space 
where the mural can be experienced in a simulated, yet true-to-scale environ-
ment. It enables access to the work while it evades and challenges the provi-
sional settlement that has been reached between the Ukraine and Yad Vashem 
concerning the ownership and control aspects. This is achieved by Geissler’s 
clever usage of digital media technology. The work is simulated, projected onto 
walls of the mobile chamber inside the travelling installation that can take the 
work around the world while remaining physically in Yad Vashem and the 
Ukraine. 
The installation reconstructs the room where it was originally painted and as 
it does so it also re-imagines it, moves it, and opens up a portal through time 
for the audience to enter into the world of Bruno Schulz and his work – a truly 
modern approach in terms of exhibiting works of art in the 21st century and in 
the information society.  
The installation by Geissler elevates Schulz’s mural onto an additional plat-
eau, it connects it to other rhizomes such as the dematerialised digital art of the 
21st century, and adds a new dimension to its significance. Geissler adds post-
post-industrial, aspects to it. From the physical work as it once was in the 
Ukraine, to the broken, dispersed and fragmentised work of the beginning of 
the 21st century, the technology of our time has allowed us to, with some imagi-
nation, now have it digitally recreated and simulated, in a mobile environment. 
It is like picking up the broken pieces of the work and reassembling them when 
entering the installation. It is as if taking the pure essence of the mural and free-
ing it from all burdens of physical bodily fixation, definitions and territories. 
Legally this is a very interesting discussion concerning access with the added 
complexity of a digitised derivative work. How to provide adequate legal pro-
tection while still encouraging creations of this kind and similar spaces where 
works of art can be accessed virtually and where also a creative communication 
and sharing of art can take place is the interesting issue here. Incontestably, the-
se spaces challenge traditional legal reasoning and the binary logic: the work 
                                                
355 For a more detailed study of the Bruno Schulz case with a full legal analysis see: Merima 
Bruncevic, ‘The Lost Mural of Bruno Schulz, A Critical Legal Perspective on Control, Access 
to and Ownership of Art’, in Law and Critique, 2011, 22:79-96. 
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clearly does not have to only be either a private asset or public heritage, not 
have to be deemed as either fixed land or mobile chattel, or something that ei-
ther belongs to a people or does not, something that has to be either here or 
there.  
As we are experiencing new conditions, new needs, new demands, new types 
of works, the legal sphere has to become more flexible and allow for various 
combinations that transcend the simplified pairs or opposites that mark the le-
gal binary logic.356 A space like Geissler’s mobile installation is a room but not 
realty; it is movable but it is not chattel. With The Picture Chamber it is evident 
that we are experiencing two generations of artworks, Schulz’s physical mural, 
and Geissler’s digital, virtual, mobile installation where both the artworks and 
the artists have been dematerialised. Legally, however, it may still be difficult to 
fully make a distinction between the two. Yet, if law is approached in a dogmat-
ic manner, both works can only be treated as objects, movable property: chattel 
– invented by an individual human being. This happens because certain underly-
ing assumption in law that are becoming clearer, for instance, a work must be 
assumed to be whole, created by a definable ‘genius’, and as such it must be able 
to be connected to a legal subject, at least as an object, as chattel. Current legal 
structures envision artworks as chattel categorised under the subsections of  
copyright, heritage or folk art law. If the artwork in question then has e.g. a cre-
ator with an unidentifiable identity, or another form of multiple belonging, both 
in terms of ownership as well as the broader belonging in terms of heritage, or 
if it is a question of creation that concerns transmission of knowledge across 
generations, or if the work is fully or partially dematerialised, it becomes prob-
lematic for law.357 
 
4.1.5 LINE OF FLIGHT: THROUGH TIME AND SPACE, JOURNEYS TO THE 
UNKNOWN 
Benjamin Geissler’s installation provides an open space where much wider ac-
cess to the original work is enabled. As such, it is a new and certainly radical ap-
proach to exhibiting art. It defies the prevailing ideas, in law and elsewhere, that 
a work of art always has to be created by one singular, definable individual, that 
creation of art is a linear process with a beginning and an end. Open spaces 
where access to artworks is enabled such as Geissler’s installation can today be 
equally significant as the original work of art itself. Such more or less temporary 
places for events, encounters, communications and conversations subvert the 
restraints, difficulties and fences, being – often unnecessarily – erected by law. 
                                                
356 See e.g. Gustafsson, Dissens. 
357 Closer analysis of the legal assumptions, particularly in IP law, will be conducted in chapter 
6.  
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This installation by Benjamin Geissler serves as a perfect example of such a 
space.  
Law must be responsive to these aspects of art and start treating communi-
cation and sharing of artworks that happen in open spaces as a potential rather 
than as a threat to underlying property rights. This can only be done by moving 
away from the established, restricting binary legal logics, where a work is either 
made openly accessible or closed off, either falls under copyright law or cultural 
heritage, and so forth. It involves looking at the law and seeing its potential to 
be more flexible and complex, where the one does not have to be the other’s 
opposite, where two legal phenomena can temporarily stop being opposites and 
instead become interlinked with a potential to create something new or re-
imagine something old.  
The fate of Bruno Schulz’s mural is a chilling, sobering story with a strong 
native subject matter, but in it “native” is simultaneously challenged as it trans-
cends all definitions of the word. The mural recounts a story of a violently de-
humanising force that seized Europe in its grip; it is a voice from beyond the 
grave, reminding all of us about the darkness of our shared history. It is about 
the struggle of people. Current law, understood in a traditional way, seems to be 
able to read this work only partially or in its most simplified, reified, form. But 
the work cannot be understood partially, particularly not in the light of what 
happened to it. Geissler’s installation contributes with yet another piece towards 
understanding the work in its entirety.  
Bruno Schulz’s mural has become a symbol. Currently it cannot be legally 
classified or defined, and legally it seems not to be possible to determine with 
full certainty to whom it belongs the most and by the same token, who ought to 
control it and have access to it. It is a work of art that is defiant in all senses of 
the term – it even resists the constraints of space and time. The work is at the 
same time private as it is public, it is historical and contemporary, it is affirma-
tive in its fragility, it stays put in one place while travelling the world; but most 
importantly, it presents a powerful, almost Messianic, imagination of a world that 
is yet to come. The work is continuous, it is a journey, a truly movable piece, and it 
proves once and for all that it does not fit a common legal definition of cultural 
heritage and that it is, without a doubt, much more than merely chattel...  
That the mural of Bruno Schulz is an encounter in a Deleuzian sense is quite 
clear. The instances surrounding the inception, discovery and exhibition of the 
work all bring into question certain fundamental legal concepts such as the legal 
subject, jurisdiction in a globalised world, as well as the legal territoriality. It also 
brings into question other, less fundamental, but here interesting legal concepts 
such as cultural heritage, moral rights, the scope of copyright, etc. The fact that 
Bruno Schulz was born and lived in a contested territory colours and contami-
nates the entire access discussion further and affects all of the legal concepts, 
where it appears that law has run out of rules – that is – law has been confront-
ed with something that can be explained as a Deleuzian encounter.  
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4.2 ENCOUNTER 2: DARFURNICA 
The Bruno Schulz case study introduced the difficulties that increasingly appear 
in terms of access to physical artworks, about locating the artwork, preserving it 
and other issues regarding its whereabouts, storage and control. It culminated in 
Benjamin Geissler’s creation of a derivative work, a work in which Geissler in-
corporated the already existing work (Schulz’s mural) into a new original work 
(Geissler’s mobile installation) while at the same time shifting format (Geissler 
used digitalised photographic images and did not use actual pieces of the mural 
nor any replicas). This second case study focuses on a similar type of activity, 
namely the creation of a derivative work as a means of commenting on a cur-
rent issue. This second case study focuses on access to inspiration. 
The study examines the Danish artist Nadia Plesner’s so-called Darfurnica 
case. It concerns one of Plesner’s illustrations on t-shirts and posters that she 
sold for the benefit of the organisations dedicated to helping the victims of the 
conflict in Darfur. Her illustration was displayed on her website, 
www.nadiaplesener.com.358 Plesener had within the illustration incorporated an 
image of the Louis Vuitton (LV) Audra bag. Her work depicts a small, emaciat-
ed black child with a Chihuahua dog and an LV bag in his hands. It is part of 
Plesener’s Simple Living series, aimed at raising awareness about poverty, famine 
and the dire circumstances of African children. The work, from 2008, makes a 
reference to Paris Hilton, famous for her penchant for Louis Vuitton bags, 
small Chihuahua dogs and her reality series, named “The Simple Life”. The art-
ist herself commented on the work by explaining: 
 
Since doing nothing but wearing designer bags and small ugly dogs appar-
ently is enough to get you on a magazine cover, maybe it is worth a try for 
people who actually deserve and need attention. If you can’t beat them, join 
them! This was why I chose to mix the cruel reality with showbiz elements 
in my drawing ‘Simple Living’.359 
 
Louis Vuitton opposed the use of their intellectual property (copyright, trade-
mark and design right) as well as the association that Plesner’s work was making 
to their bag. They applied for an injunction against Plesner’s T-shirt sales on the 
basis of their Community Registered Trademark.360 After having sent a cease-
and-desist letter to her, the company requested from the French Court, the Tri-
                                                
358 Lucie Guilbault, The Netherlands: ‘Darfurnica, Miffy and the right to parody!’ in 3 (2011) 
JIPITEC 236, para 1. 
359 Quote taken from an unofficial translation of the Plesner judgement from May 4th, 2011, 
fully reprinted in Guilbault. Guilbault writes that the translation was made by attorney Kenne-
dy Van der Laan, working for the firm that represented Nadia Plesener. The quote is on p. 3 
of the translation of the judgement, and on p. 241 of the article. 
360 Ibid. para 2.   
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bunal de Grande Instance in Paris on 25 March 2008 to issue an injunction. The 
Paris court imposed an (ex parte) injunction and awarded damages of a symbol-
ic 1 Euro with an additional threat of a 5,000 Euro fine for each day of non-
compliance with the injunction.361 Nadia Plesner removed the t-shirts from her 
website and stopped selling them.  
However, Plesener did not stop using the Louis Vuitton brand altogether. 
She later created a large painting modelled after Picasso’s Guernica, again featur-
ing the illustration of the child with the Louis Vuitton bag. She called the paint-
ing Darfurica. Louis Vuitton once again made another ex parte application re-
garding the use of their brand in the painting Darfurnica. This application was 
however rejected by the court in Hague.362 It is these two court cases that we 
shall turn our attention to in this section. Let us begin with the latest one, the 
Dutch ruling. 
Both Louis Vuitton and Plesener chose to base their argumentation and rely 
upon certain fundamental (human) rights set out in the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Plesener claimed a defence under freedom of expression 
(Article 10 of the Preamble363). Louis Vuitton invoked Article 1 of the first Pro-
tocol relating to protection of property.364 Regarding the claim for protection of 
intellectual property under the protection of human rights, the Court wrote: 
                                                
361 Rosie Burbidge, ‘Louis Vuitton Attempts to Ban Darfurnica’, at Art and Artifice: A weblog 
dedicated to everything concerning art and the law, (24th March 2011). Available at: 
http://aandalawblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/louis-vuitton-attempts-to-ban-dafurnica.html.  
Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
362 Nadia Plesner Joensen v. Louis Vuitton, Dutch Civil Court, The Hague, 389526/KG ZA 11-
294. The full minutes in Dutch from the hearing and the decision is available on line:   
http://www.mediareport.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/kvdl-727526-v1-
vonnis_d_d__4_mei_2011.pdf. Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
363 The unofficial translation referenced in Guilbault. See p. 7 of the translation of judgement, 
and on p. 245 of the Guilbault article.  
ARTICLE 10 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the li-
censing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be sub-
ject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of in-
formation received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judi-
ciary. 
364 ARTICLE 1 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
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That the concept ‘property’ in the last mentioned provision should also in-
clude the rights of intellectual property has been confirmed by the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights in the Anheuser / Busch decision […] and, more-
over, has not been disputed by Plesner.365  
 
Plesener’s claim that her work falls under the freedom of expression provision 
prevailed this time and was a successful defence in the Hague court. The court 
wrote that given the circumstances, the artist’s interest to continue to be able to 
express her artistic opinion outweighed the interest of Louis Vuitton in the 
peaceful enjoyment of their possession.366 
This case is particularly interesting and serves as an encounter, in the Deleu-
zian sense, for several reasons, the chief reason being that while the freedom of 
artistic expression did prevail in the second court ruling, the binary opposites: 
freedom of expression and freedom of property were very clearly pitted against 
one another. A reading of this ruling through Deleuzian theory demonstrates 
the problems concerning the assumption that intellectual property can always 
be equated to property, something that even the Dutch court almost invites us 
to question, when they write that the concept ‘property’ includes the rights of 
intellectual property, and that this fact had not been disputed by Plesner.367 
What if Plesner had disputed the fact?  
What happens when a brand like Louis Vuitton is associated with the con-
flict in Sudan and the Darfur situation? What happens with the underlying Pi-
casso piece, why has that not been addressed anywhere? Plesener has claimed 
that she used the LV brand as an “eye catcher” in order to generate discussion. 
Was that why LV chose not to appeal? What would have happened to their 
goodwill if they had? But before I address the Darfurnica case in more detail I 
need to provide a background concerning derivative works, collages and free-
dom of speech in such cases. 
 
4.2.1 LINE OF FLIGHT: DERIVATIVE WORKS 
The issue of collage368 or the assemblage of various artworks into a new, deriva-
tive, one is particularly interesting to analyse here.369 Before we go back to ana-
                                                                                                                                   
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
365 [my emphasis], The unofficial translation referenced in Guilbault. See p. 7 of the transla-
tion of judgement, and on p. 245 of the Guilbault article. 
366 Ibid. para 4.6. 
367 Guilbault, p. 7 of the translation of judgement, and on p. 245 of the Guilbault article. 
368 See Bruncevic ‘Cultural Property Rights’. 
369 Ibid. 
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lyse the Plesener case and her derivative work let us first look at another type of 
derivate works namely digital music samplings370 and mash-ups371. These types 
of works founded on incorporation and re-usage of already existing copyrighted 
material into derivative ones are particularly popular in the DJ culture and are 
often based on either sampling or mixing of works or musical genres. Here we 
shall look at the so-called Grey Tuesday that took place in February 2004. On that 
day, the music industry was exposed to the up to that date largest case involving 
unauthorised sampling.  
A New York/Atlanta DJ Brian Burton, otherwise known as DJ Danger 
Mouse, had sampled Jay Z’s Black Album372 with The Beatles’ White Album. 
His derivate work was created by using the mash-up and sampling techniques 
and it was named Grey Album. The Grey Album, audacious in its execution as it 
was, generated an enormous interest in music circles and the recording industry; 
journalists and fans started referring to the rumoured tracks on the album (that 
everybody was yet to hear) as revolutionary and ground braking.  
Just days before the album’s release DJ Danger Mouse was served with a 
cease-and-desist letter from the remaining members of The Beatles and their 
record company EMI. The group and EMI who are extremely restrictive with 
regards to licensing of The Beatles’ content declined to enter into a settlement 
agreement with Danger Mouse. A settlement would have enabled the Grey Al-
bum to be released as if clearance had been obtained beforehand. This was not 
granted to Danger Mouse. 
Regardless of the culturally valuable music that was so representative of the 
zeitgeist, regardless of the potential public interest in the album, or any other ar-
gument to that effect, all of it was trivial for the exclusive rights owners of the 
master. This case is illustrative because it demonstrated an instance where copy-
right was used as a gatekeeper373 or formed an obstacle, acted as censorship374 im-
                                                
370 Taking small parts, loops or hooks from one song and incorporating it into another, see 
e.g. Tyron McKenna, ‘Where Digital Music Technology and Law Collide - Contemporary Is-
sues of Digital Sampling, Appropriation and Copyright Law’, in Journal of Information Law and 
Technology, (JILT), 2000 (1). 
371 Sampling usually means playing two songs or part of songs at the same time, altered to fit 
in one another; mash-up means that two musical works are not at all altered rather merely 
played in such a way that they within each other, when played simultaneously. 
372 This album had been released with the intention for DJs to use as they saw fit as it only 
consisted of a-capella rap. 
373 See e.g. Fiona Macmillan, ‘What Might Hans Christian Andersen Say About Copyright’, in 
(ed.) Helle Porsdam, Copyright and Other Fairytales, Edward Eldgar, (2006). 
374 More on copyright and censorship see e.g. Martin Cloonan, Banned!: Censorship of Popular 
music in Britain: 1967-92, Arena, (1996), and Guy Osborne and Steve Greenfield, ‘Copyright 
Law and Power in the Music Industry’, in (ed.) Simon Frith, Music and Copyright, 2nd ed. Edin-
burgh University Press, (2004). 
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posed by the owners, an act of prohibition able to deter certain derivative crea-
tive works from reaching the public. 
For this reason, and due to several other similar cases375, clearances for the 
use of other works for sampling, mash-up or collage purposes became increas-
ingly difficult to obtain and generally resulted in expensive legal negotiations 
that artists, beatmakers and DJs still have to go through in order to be granted 
the use of various different sounds necessary for their music making. Providing 
that they can afford such costly negotiations and procedures, if not, they do not 
get to argue their cause.  
Even if it for a second seemed as though the digital alternative and the in-
ternet had placed many aspects of art making on its head and challenged many 
contemporary structures through which artworks had to pass in order to reach 
their audiences, the DJ Danger Mouse case showed just how complicated access 
to inspiration can be. Everybody could not always have access to anything - 
there were limitations. Tougher legislations were not lagging either, and with the 
Digital Millennium Act and PIPA, ACTA, SOPA, IPRED376, and all other ac-
ronyms of laws that govern and will govern the digital sphere in the future, the 
world wild web simply was no more. The much-quoted Naomi Klein passage377 
can once again be presented, even if it was written more than a decade ago, 
however its words ring ever more ominously as time goes by: 
 
When Beck, a major-label artist, makes an album parked with hundred of 
samples, Warner Music clears the rights to each and every piece of the au-
dio collage and the work is lauded for capturing the media-saturated, multi-
referenced sounds of our age. But when independent artists do the same 
thing, trying to cut and paste together art from their branded lives and make 
good on some of the info-age hype about DIY culture, it’s criminalized—
defined as theft, not art.378 
 
Naomi Klein’s book was written more than a decade ago, but from a legal point 
of view we still have not come much further. Arguably, the art that ever really 
reaches the broadest global audiences, in the analogue and in the digital spheres 
                                                
375 Other famous mash-ups that have had trouble gaining clearance are: Rob Kerr’s A Stroke of 
Genie-us (The Strokes Hard To Explain and Christina Aguilera’s Genie in a Bottle) – it was never 
cleared and never released. DJ Erol Alkan’s Can’t Get Blue Monday Out of My Head (New Or-
der’s Blue Monday and Kylie Minogue’s Can’t Get You Out of My Head) released as an authorised 
B-side only after Kylie Minogue herself liked it and performed it on the Brit Awards. That per-
formance persuaded the record label to authorise the sample. 
376 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights (also known as “(IPR) Enforcement Directive” 
or “IPRED”). 
377 Bruncevic, ‘Cultural Property Rights’. 
378 Naomi Klein, No Logo, Flamingo, (2000), p.179. 
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still is, as it has always been, the one with a strong financial backing in the guise 
of a record label, a film studio, a gallery or an art collector, somebody that has 
the means to commodify the work, market it and make it sellable. Those are the 
people that are ultimately allowed to create and speak, and on the others law 
seems to be imposing invisible gag orders.379 
Plesner’s case is in many ways different from these music cases, not just be-
cause her work is a different artistic genre and does not concern the use of al-
ready existing sounds, but already existing designs. The Dutch court did allow 
her to speak, even though she at the time was young and not widely established 
as an artist. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, these cases can be 
treated as almost exactly the same. The main reason being, that even though the 
outcomes were different, the dichotomy private intellectual property as opposed 
to public freedom of speech were pitted against one another in the legal reason-
ing as each other’s opposites. 
 
4.2.2 LINE OF FLIGHT: POSSESSION AND EXPRESSION 
In section 4.3. of the Dutch adjudication in the Plesner case the Court notes: 
 
Since the case concerns fundamental rights that are on an equal footing but con-
flicting, according to established case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, a fair balance should be sought between the general interest and the 
interests of the parties involved.380  
 
While the Court clearly puts the two fundamental rights on equal footing they 
add in their reasoning that the two are conflicting. It is of course undesirable as 
per this type of dogmatic reasoning that some parts of law should conflict with 
others, because that arguably creates incoherence, which in turn is equally unde-
sirable. Thus, the only way to deal with this conflict of rights is to pit the two 
rights in question against one another so that they in the end have to form an 
oppositional pairing. This is the “oppositional identity”381 of law, which Andre-
as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos refers to, that allows law as a system to main-
tain its internal boundaries. Such oppositional identity constantly requires com-
promises and balancing acts like the one in the Plesner case between e.g. the no-
tion of property as opposed to the notion of freedom of expression. 
                                                
379 As opposed to the other more visible gag orders put on e.g. media that span from celebrity 
transgressions such as infidelity or dealings with prostitutes, to more serious matters of na-
tional security. 
380 [my emphasis], The unofficial translation referenced in Guilbault. See p. 7 of the transla-
tion of judgement, and on p. 245 of the Guilbault article.  
381 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘The Autopoietic Fold: Critical Autopoiesis between Luh-
mann and Deleuze’. 
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The additional aspect here is the clear assumption that intellectual property 
without any reservation always falls inside the property provisions. In Anheuser 
v. Busch382, cited by the Dutch court, the European Court of Justice did indeed 
address the question whether a trademark constitutes a “possession” within the 
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 ECHR. Writing that “while intellectual 
property as such incontestably enjoyed the protection”383 of the ECHR provision, 
in the particular circumstances of the case at hand it was deemed that it did not 
constitute a possession. The circumstances of that cited case involved the beer 
giant, Budweiser, the respondent, who relied on an application for a trademark 
it wanted to have protected, not on a de facto registered trademark. The Europe-
an Court of Human Rights thus concluded in their ruling that: “while it was 
clear that a trademark constituted a ‘possession’ within the meaning of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1, this was so only after registration of the trademark […].”384 
The courts were thus compelled to construct a reasoning that was able to 
measure degrees of possession, as the concept of trademark, something intangi-
ble, does not lend itself to straight forward traditional framework of a ‘posses-
sion’.385 That does not mean that a trademark is not a possession, it only means 
that such a way of defining and approaching possessions will always create a 
conflict between various differing (human) rights. Possession will be seen as 
something that is and must be enclosable, exclusive, private, and expression as its 
opposite, namely something that is open, non-exclusive, public. This reasoning 
also assumes that the two rights will always be comparable and commensurable 
in a conflict or a dispute. I shall return to a closer study of the intellectual prop-
erty construct in chapter 6 below and the notion of possession as put forward 
in intellectual property law, but already here the following question may be war-
ranted, are possessions and expressions really commensurable? Can we ever re-
ally measure what is possessed against that which is expressed and the freedom 
to speak? Yet, that is exactly what is being done here, a comparison that might 
be impossible, but nonetheless, courts of law are making it. 
The idea of difference, of acknowledging the existence of difference and how 
that is represented in law is interesting to address here. Due to the generality 
and universality of the rules that dogmatic law requires by nature, the concept 
of particular differences in law is thus only “an empty form of difference”386 in 
Deleuze’s words. What that means is that while it might seem as though every 
situation can be subsumed within the universal web of law, in reality, in order 
                                                
382 European Court of Human Rights 11 October 2005, IER 2007/46. 
383 [my emphasis], The unofficial translation referenced in Guilbault. See p. 16 of the transla-
tion of judgement, and on p. 254 of the Guilbault article.  
384 Ibid. p. 17 of the translation of judgement, and on p. 255 of the Guilbault article. 
385 i.e. a traditional notion of possession of a tangible object. 
386 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 2. 
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for that to happen the situation at hand has to firstly be applied to the rule that 
can be generalised. It means that every form of expression must be 
a) assumed to be comparable and commensurable with any other 
form of expression, and 
b) that expressions that incorporate other already existing intellectual 
property rights; that are derivative works, will always conflict with 
the prior original work as a possession.  
The particular case at hand, Plesner’s case, has to thus be summarised under the 
‘abstract universalities’ of law, namely, the concepts of freedom of expression 
and freedom of property. What cannot enter law, however, are certain aspects 
of this particular case. It is precisely here we encounter the border. These are 
the boundaries of law, the ones that separate the relevant legal facts, that fall in-
side the law, from the irrelevant, non-legal, facts that must be expelled or exter-
nalised. Thus we are left with almost a platitude, that we are talking about, as 
the Dutch court phrased it is: ‘fundamental rights that are on an equal footing 
but conflicting’.387 What does that mean? Such a statement presupposes that the 
concepts of expression and possession can be comparable and commensurable 
every time and that they can be repeated in a general manner each time.  
Following this reasoning, a number of aspects fall outside the legal concepts 
(here freedom of expression, or indeed also possession) and cannot even be im-
agined. That was arguably why the two courts (Parisian and Dutch) ruled differ-
ently on more or less the same issue. Questions like the abovementioned: 
“What happens when a brand like Louis Vuitton is associated with the conflict 
in Sudan and the Darfur situation?”, “What happens with the underlying Picas-
so piece?”, “Why did LV chose not to appeal?”, “What would have happened to 
their goodwill if they had?”, have all been excluded. The way the two courts of 
law defined the concept freedom of speech and what they conceived as falling 
inside it, differed in the two cases and thus resulted in two different rulings. In 
order to rule in the case, they both had to eliminate certain aspects, which they 
individually deemed to fall outside the concepts of freedom of speech and pos-
session, and assume by the same token that other aspects fall inside the concept. 
Thus the court begins with the ontological, Platonian in nature, questions, 
namely: What is freedom of speech? and What is a possession?388 These are the ques-
tions that set the dialectic in motion389 claims Deleuze, but it does not stop 
there. He continues: 
 
                                                
387 The unofficial translation referenced in Lucie Guilbault. See p. 16 of the translation of 
judgement, and on p. 254 of the Guilbault article.  
388 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 188 aa. 
389 Ibid. p. 188. 
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The question ‘What is X?’ gives way to other questions, otherwise powerful 
and efficacious, otherwise imperative: ‘How much, how and in what cases?’ 
The question ‘What is X’ animates only so called aporetic dialogues – in 
other words, those in which the very form of the question gives rise to a 
contradiction and leads to nihilism […]390 
 
These types of questions stem from taking Socratic irony too seriously, Deleuze 
claims, which has meant “the dialectic ceased to be the science of problems and 
ultimately become confused with the simple movement of the negative, and of 
contradiction”.391 Deleuze thus proposes that in order to exit the permanent 
state of contradictions the questions must be posed differently and focused not merely 
on the general, but instead on what he refers to as the singularities of a prob-
lem, the particulars. These are the coordinates suggested by the questions 
‘Who…?’, ‘How…?’, ‘Where…?’, and ‘When…?’. These questions form the 
conditions of actuality of a problem.392 It is this very line that law in its dogmat-
ic essence has to toe, between that which is general and the particulars of every 
case. The general is that which law can predict and envision, and the particular 
is that which actually has occurred in the case at hand. Sometimes, what has ac-
tually occurred cannot be thought of, or fitted in law, before it has actually hap-
pened. This is the point of a Deleuzian encounter. 
This brings us to the second Deleuzian concept that he connects to differ-
ence namely, repetition. Commonly, difference would impede repetition, as that 
which differs from something previous cannot and is not repeated per se, it is 
something new. Deleuze, however, claims that difference inhabits repetition.393 
Central to the concept of repetition for Deleuze is that it is subject to time, it is 
also subject to the law of the identical and to a previous model of time, i.e. “to 
repeat a sentence means, traditionally, to say the same thing twice, at different 
moments. These different moments must be themselves equal and unbiased, as 
if time were a flat, featureless expanse”.394 
The arguments I have presented here are neither a critique of the adjudica-
tion in that Plesner was not allowed to speak, nor that the legal sphere was not 
able to provide a solution to the case. In fact, the type of encounter that this 
case study is meant to show is perhaps the one that is closest to Deleuze’s idea 
of encounter, namely the encounter with the process of ‘simplification’ that 
forces the legal practitioner into the trap of opposites, which locks the reason-
ing into contradictions. It also demonstrates the inherent differences (in the 
                                                
390 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 188 aa. 
391 Ibid. p. 188. 
392 McMahon ‘Difference and Repetition’, in (ed.) Stivale, Gilles Deleuze, Key Concepts, p. 46 
393 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 76. 
394 Jon Roffe, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/deleuze/. Last 
accessed 17th March 2014. 
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Deleuzian sense) that exist in the concepts such ‘possession’ or ‘property’ or 
‘expression’. These simplification processes, and generalisations, also act as ob-
stacles to access. 
This is particularly clear here, when we read the Dutch adjudication carefully 
or when we compare the reasoning conducted in the two court rulings with 
each other. In both, the same conditions, the same case, could both constitute 
and not constitute possession and expression. The same circumstances once 
constituted an infringement of intellectual property and were once held to be 
democratic freedom of speech. In a binary system property and freedom of 
speech conflict and are at odds with one another, and same circumstances result 
in two different rulings. In a binary based system that constitutes a contradic-
tion. In the Deleuzian universe that constitutes an encounter with the border. 
This is where we find the potential and creativity of law and legal reasoning. For 
Deleuze, thought occurs here, at the ‘edges’ of a system as the principle of its 
initiation and revolution: thought occurs not ‘naturally’, but when it is forced to 
think. We could say, putting it in another way, that whereas the image of LAW 
as re-presentation assigns a passive or speculative role to the LAWYER as spec-
tator, for Deleuze the LAWYER is an actor, with all that this implies of being at 
the juncture of an event and being engaged in a drama.395  
 
4.3 ENCOUNTER 3: DEAD POETS 
This third case study concerns the control exercised by the death estates over 
cultural works and access to artworks post mortem auctoris (pma), and how such con-
trol functions as an encounter. A particularly interesting circumstance is what 
happens to original documents and/or previously unpublished works that are 
bequeathed to various categories of heirs of the author. Should someone be re-
sponsible for ascertaining that these artworks are preserved and that they indeed 
reach the public? This type of encounter exemplifies clashes of legal rules and 
principles that create obstacles to access, but happens pma.  
In the present case study, heirs to prominent literary figures have declined 
access to works left behind such as letters, drafts and even entire, previously 
unpublished works. This case study concerns the documents left behind by 
Franz Kafka and James Joyce. Taking into consideration art. 27 Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (UDHR) and placing it in light of the question of ac-
cess to artworks and the trans-generational transmission of knowledge this case 
study discusses how access to artworks pma functions in conjunction with the 
definition of art. 27 UDHR. Since the two authors studied here play a particu-
                                                
395 [original emphasis, quote modified], McMahon ‘Difference and Repetition’, in (ed.) Stivale, 
Gilles Deleuze, Key Concepts, p. 46. Where I have written LAW she writes ’thought’ and where I 
write LAWYER she writes ’thinker’. 
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larly important role in literary history, their works can also be connected to the 
wider implications of art. 27 UDHR. 
 
4.3.1 AWAY-FROM-HERE 
Franz Kafka wrote once in a diary entry: 
 
I have not shown the faintest firmness of resolve in the conduct of my life. 
It was as if I, like everyone else, had been given a point from which to pro-
long the radius of a circle, and had then, like everyone else, to describe my 
perfect circle round this point. Instead, I was forever starting my radius on-
ly constantly to be forced at once to break it off. (Examples: piano, violin, 
languages, Germanics, anti-Zionism, Zionism, Hebrew, gardening, carpen-
tering, writing, marriage attempts, an apartment of my own.)396 
 
The two cases at hand concern access to works by two authors that, as Kafka 
notes above, were constantly starting new radiuses and breaking them off. Par-
ticularly by their trans-nationality, by their non-belonging in the languages in 
which they chose to write, the two authors created works that challenged liter-
ary canons and shaped global literature and Western modernism. Both of the 
authors’ works have also been commented upon by Deleuze and Guattari, 
which makes them also specially fitting within the theoretical framework of this 
project. Deleuze and Guattari argue for instance that Kafka’s entire body of 
work was to be considered as a rhizome because it had “no privileged point of 
entry, no direct chef d’oeuvre, no extra-literary texts and no intrinsic hierarchy of 
fragments and completed works”.397 Deleuze and Guattari argued that as such, 
as a rhizome, all Kafka’s diaries, letters, short stories, novels, etc. played an 
equally pivotal role for his writing machine. I shall not engage in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s readings of Kafka’s works here more than to connect it with the 
claim that this is an author that writes in a trans-language, as a trans-identity. Ad-
dressing Kafka’s writings as “minor literature”, a term that they coined to de-
note a literature that deterritorialises a language, that is political and that has a 
collective value, Deleuze and Guattari claim that it engages in a linguistic dis-
possession. Kafka was writing in German at the same time as he was challeng-
ing German, deterritorialising it, inventing it, enriching it “artificially, to inflate it 
with all the resources of symbolism, oneirism, esoteric meaning, hidden signifi-
ers”.398 Yiddish was never absent from his writing either, even though it is a 
language that is only spoken, a language in continuous flux, according to 
                                                
396 Diary entry from 1922, quote taken from Judith Butler, ‘Who Owns Kafka’, in London Re-
view of Books, Vol. 33 No.5, 3 (March 2011). 
397 [original emphasis], Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 107. 
398 Deleuze/Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, p. 34.  
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Deleuze and Guattari.399  On this particular subject Judith Butler has also com-
ments, writing: 
 
We find in Kafka’s correspondence with his lover Felice Bauer, who was 
from Berlin, that she is constantly correcting his German, suggesting that 
he is not fully at home in this second language. And his later lover, Milena 
Jesenská, who was also the translator of his works into Czech, is constantly 
teaching him Czech phrases he neither knows how to spell nor to pro-
nounce, suggesting that Czech, too, is also something of a second language. 
In 1911, he is going to the Yiddish theatre and understanding what is said, 
but Yiddish is not a language he encounters very often in his family or his 
daily life; it remains an import from the east that is compelling and strange. 
So is there a first language here? And can it be argued that even the formal 
German in which Kafka writes – what Arendt called ‘purest’ German – 
bears the signs of someone entering the language from its outside? This was 
the argument in Deleuze and Guattari’s essay ‘Kafka: Toward a Minor Lit-
erature’.400 
 
** 
 
Deleuze and Guattari approached James Joyce’s work in a similar fashion, 
namely as an exercise in challenging a language, in this instance the English lan-
guage. In their view, Joyce was assaulting the English language with Irishness, 
deterritorialising it, making it move. In one of the first pages of A Thousand Plat-
eaus Deleuze and Guattari address Joyce’s writing as  “words, accurately de-
scribed as having ‘multiple roots’, shatter the linear unity of the word, even of language, 
only to posit a cyclic unity of the sentence, text or knowledge.”401  
Deleuze and Guattari did not devote as much attention to Joyce as they did 
to Kafka, but they often return to Joyce in A Thousand Plateaus. At one point 
they even reference Joyce’s letters, as examples of how people are segmented.402 
Joyce, it can be understood, was an author that was segmented, and one of his 
segments were his letters. Interestingly, it is access to his letters that will be 
studied here. Deleuze and Guattari write, “[w]e are segmented in a circular fash-
ion, in ever larger circles, ever wider disks or coronas, like Joyce’s ‘letter’: my af-
fairs, my neighbourhood’s affairs, my city’s, the world’s…”403 
                                                
399 Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 118-119. 
400 Judith Butler, ‘Who Owns Kafka’. 
401 [my emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 6. 
402 Ibid. p. 230. 
403 Ibid. p. 230. 
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So are Joyce’s private letters to be considered as his other works, as his art-
works? For Deleuze and Guattari this is obviously the case. They are part of 
Joyce’s segments, the larger circles, the rings on the water-surface, part of his 
artistic rhizome. As mentioned, I will not further dwell on Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s analysis of these two authors and their oeuvres. Instead let us look at two 
brief summaries of the two cases at hand before we analyse the various lines of 
flight that together produce an encounter.  
 
4.3.1.1 THE KAFKA CASE 
The case of Franz Kafka’s manuscripts, unlike Schulz’s mural, resulted in court 
action. The dispute concerning Schulz’s mural has (so far) not ended up in 
court. But the case of the Kafka manuscripts differs on other key points as well. 
In October 2012, a judge ruled that a collection of documents that Franz 
Kafka had left behind and just before his death given to his friend and publisher 
Max Brod, should be handed over to Israel’s National Library from the private 
hands of the family of Esther Hoffe. Hoffe, now deceased, who in her lifetime 
had been a friend and secretary of Brod’s. Brod in his turn had left Kafka’s 
documents to her. Her estate, controlled by her two daughters, was in the pos-
session of the documents.  
Max Brod had kept all Kafka’s documents, manuscripts, letters, drafts etc. 
after Kafka’s death and he had taken them along when he fled from Prague to 
Palestine in 1939. After Kafka’s death in 1924 Brod decided to publish a post-
humous edition of Kafka’s novels. The Trial came out in 1925, followed by The 
Castle, that came out in 1926 and Amerika, in 1927. This edition was published 
notwithstanding the letter that Kafka had written to Brod before his death. The 
publishing of these works took place even though Kafka had asked for the con-
tents of his documents to be destroyed after his death. A letter had been found 
in Kafka’s desk with the following directions to Brod: “My last request: Every-
thing I leave behind me… in the way of diaries, manuscripts, letters (my own 
and others’), sketches and so on, to be burned unread.”404 
Brod continued to publish and exploit Kafka’s work posthumously. As a 
matter of fact, it is thanks to Brod that most of Kafka’s works ever were pub-
lished and made public. The contents of the Kafka documents that had been 
left to Brod and kept in a suitcase thus became the subject of a very drawn out 
legal battle, that was adjudicated upon in October 2012, but that is at the time 
of the writing this dissertation still being appealed. The facts of the case were 
the following: 
                                                
404 Kafka case – this translation from Hebrew has been taken from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
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While Brod was still alive (already in 1952) he had written a “gift-letter” to 
Esther Hoffe. In that letter, he had pronounced that he was giving a large num-
ber of Kafka’s documents outright to her to keep, take care of and guard. Two-
thirds of the documents left by Kafka had already ended up in Oxford’s Bodlei-
an Library, and the remainder that had been kept by Brod himself were there-
with signed over to Hoffe, his secretary, friend and presumed lover. Esther 
Hoffe, sold off part of the contents, and left the remainder to her daughters 
when she died 101 years old in 2007. The Hoffe daughters argued in court that 
the collection, which has since been kept in safes in Tel Aviv and Zürich, was a 
private gift from Brod and as such their own private possession, bequeathed to 
them by their mother, the rightful owner.  
Having refused all access, scholarly or otherwise, to the collection through-
out her life, and after only selling the official original manuscript of The Trial to 
the German Literature Archive in Marbach, a legal action was brought against 
Ester Hoffe’s estate by, among others, the National Library of Israel, contesting 
Brod’s gift-letter where the collection had been handed over to Esther Hoffe, 
awakening thus the public interest in the contents of the collection. The library 
contended the Hoffe estate’s argument that Brod had left the Kafka manu-
scripts to Hoffe as an executor. The library claimed instead that Brod had left the 
documents to her as a beneficiary, which means that, after Hoffe’s death, the pa-
pers would have to be reverted to the Brod estate. Brod’s official will states that 
all his literary estate be left “with the library of the Hebrew University of Jerusa-
lem, the Municipal Library in Tel Aviv or another public archive in Israel or 
abroad.”405 The Municipal Library in Tel Aviv renounced its claim to the estate, 
making the Hebrew University Library — today, the National Library of Israel 
— the only claimant specifically named by Brod.406 The gift-letter from 1952 
challenged the National Library’s claim. The Hoffe sisters were able to show 
and present to the court a two-page photocopy of this letter. The National Li-
brary, then in turn, “produced a photocopy of a four-page version of the letter, 
of which the two missing middle pages appear to clarify the limitations of 
Brod’s gift. When the court ordered a forensic examination, the sisters were un-
able to produce the original letter.”407 
The court chose not to accept the Hoffe sister’s argumentation, and it was 
ruled that the collection of the documents should be handed over to the Na-
tional Library of Israel.  
There are several issues that are particularly interesting with this case within 
the framework of my study. I will return to the actual court decision in chapter 
7, but before I do that I shall be stressing some very interesting lines of flight 
that this case has given rise to: 
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• the fact that even though Kafka had been born in Prague, he was 
deemed to be part of Israel’s national heritage. This challenges the 
concept of the author as a coherent unity with a singular belong-
ing. It also challenges the notion of the national, local, religious 
and cultural communities as described in art. 27 UDHR. Here, the 
belonging of the author and his works, form a line of flight and in 
itself it challenges the notion of community, belonging and per-
sonal unity. Both art. 27 UDHR and intellectual property law pre-
suppose these to be definable and unified in order to be applica-
ble.  
 
• the fact that there was an express wish of the author that his 
works be destroyed after his death. This deals with among others 
the concept of privacy and moral right in one’s intellectual work 
that is addressed in section 2 of art. 27 UDHR as well as in intel-
lectual property law. But how does this comply with public good 
argument? Can a work or a body of work ever reach such a stat-
ure that can outweigh the last wish of the original author and 
his/her moral rights?  
Both of these are continuations on some of the issues that were addressed 
above in the Schulz case, but the difference here is partly that they resulted in a 
court decision, and partly that there was an estate that controlled and owned the 
work, and as such it also controlled the access issue more directly.  
 
4.3.1.2 THE JOYCE CASE 
Carol Shloss, the professor writing a book on James Joyce’s daughter Lucia 
wrote: 
 
The history of modernism is especially prone to […] constructed silences, 
its dead zones managed and manipulated by the practices of active literary 
estates.408 
 
The Joyce case is about James Joyce, his daughter Lucia, his letters that de-
scribed their relationship, her writings, and a professor’s struggle to get access 
to these documents for the purposes of research of what would eventually be-
                                                
408 Carol Loeb Shloss, ‘Privacy and the Misuse of Copyright, the Case of Shloss v. The Estate 
of James Joyce’, in Modernism & Copyright, (ed.) Paul K. Saint-Amour, Oxford University Press 
(2011), p. 243. 
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come the book Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake.409 The book describes Lucia 
Joyce’s dancing, but it is also contains facts concerning the dramatic and crea-
tive relationship between father and daughter, and the many complexities of 
their life such as the issue of her mental illness.  
The documents that eventually became part of the dispute between profes-
sor Carol Shloss and the Joyce Estate, represented by Joyce’s grandson Stephen 
Joyce, were mainly letters. Up until then, not much was known about Joyce’s 
daughter who had inspired him greatly. Nobody had explored her story in de-
tail. Neither had it been studied how Joyce’s observations of her made their way 
into his writings, particularly into Finnegan’s Wake. Shloss writes: 
  
This is a story that was not supposed to be told. […] Like Lucia herself, the 
evidence of what happened to her seemed to some people to be shameful 
or dangerous. It was something better left under lock and key, erased from 
records, and expunged from memory.410  
 
There had been many restrictions on quotations that were imposed on scholars; 
the alleged destructions of Lucia Joyce’s writings411 as well as the extreme de-
mands in terms of approval of quotes and clearance for use of those and other 
Joyce materials.412 One of those restrictions concerned the edition of the book 
Letters of James Joyce by Richard Ellman. Ellman, who is Joyce’s biographer, had 
come across certain letters Joyce had written to his partner Nora Barnacle. 
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Joyce’s letters, as is widely known today, were extremely sexually explicit, and 
only meant to be read by Nora. Stephen Joyce condemned the publication of 
the letters as they were “[i]ntimate very personal private letters, which were 
never meant for the public eye, have been sold, pirated, and published. I con-
demn and deplore this intolerable shameless invasion of privacy as would my 
grandparents, were they standing beside me here today.”413  
The Joyce estate is well known for their onerous demands in terms of access 
to the Joyce documents under their control. The estate often places conditions 
on access e.g. conditions regarding approval of content and/or editing. These 
conditions are also frequently placed on academic scholarly work and research, 
something that potentially is contrary to some permitted acts and statutory de-
fences to copyright infringement (or exclusions from infringement, depending 
on the jurisdiction) such as public interest, education and research. This was 
brought forth in the dispute between Shloss and the Joyce estate. 
Relying on many primary sources, Shloss' work focuses on the life of Lucia 
Joyce, her unacknowledged artistic talent, her tragic life spent mostly in mental 
institutions, and the unrecognised influence she exerted over her father’s work. 
Upon learning of Shloss’ scholarship, the Joyce Estate — controlled by Joyce’s 
grandson Stephen James Joyce — denied her permission to quote from any of 
the materials the Joyce Estate controlled and repeatedly threatened her with a 
copyright infringement suit.414 
Eventually, Stephen Joyce and the Joyce Estate entered into a settlement 
agreement enforceable by the court that allowed Shloss to publish her material 
electronically as well as to publish a printed supplement to her book Lucia Joyce: 
To Dance in the Wake.415 I will return specifically to the litigation process between 
Carol Shloss and the Joyce Estate in chapter 7. Here, as with the Kafka case the 
lines of flight this case gave rise to are being studied, particularly privacy rights 
that were challenged by the notion of public interest and scholarly research.   
 
4.3.2 LINE OF FLIGHT: DEAD AUTHORS AND ART 27 UDHR 
The right of everyone to take part in and enjoy the benefits of scientific and cul-
tural knowledge has been recognised in the human rights setting and through 
human rights instruments such as mainly art. 27 UDHR, as well as art. 15 of the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)416. 
This section discusses the two paradoxes or conflicts that these regulations give 
rise to: 
1) Between intellectual property legislation, particularly the rules 
stemming from the TRIPS agreement and art. 27 UDHR. This 
has to do with cultural works that have been deemed to have a 
very significant role in the production and transmission of 
knowledge. As such it creates tension between commercial IP 
rights and heritage-based human rights. This conflict can poten-
tially affect access to such works.  
 
2) Between section 1 and section 2 of art. 27 UDHR, namely, the 
individual right to the intellectual creation and the public’s right to 
participate in the cultural life and “share in scientific advancement 
and its benefits”417. This concerns the internal tension within art. 
27 UDHR itself, between public and private provisions that figure 
in the two sections of the same article.  
Art. 27 UDHR has been formulated in the following manner: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the commu-
nity, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.418  
 
Here in this chapter art. 27 UDHR is being discussed with reference to docu-
ments held by literary estates. The literary estates control some of the most 
highly valued (economic, social and cultural capital, in Bourdieu’s words) literary 
works and other content and documents left behind by the creators. The estates 
control both access as well as dissemination of the works.  
Under copyright provisions the heirs and estates are usually granted the priv-
ilege of 70 years pma to control the intellectual property in the works. Thereaf-
ter, other strategies can be – and are indeed – often utilised in order to control 
(further) dissemination and access. When the UN promulgated the UDHR with 
                                                
416 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948) [henceforward UDHR]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/6312 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (en-
tered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [henceforward ICESCR]. See also generally Aurora Plomer, ‘The 
Human Rights Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science’ in Hu-
man Rights Quarterly, Volume 35, Number 1, February 2013, pp. 143-175.  
417 Art. 27 s(2) UDHR. 
418 [my emphasis throughout] 
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art. 27 granting every individual the universal human right to participate in the 
cultural life of the community and to enjoy the arts, they probably did not en-
visage the question of access to unpublished works of dead authors.  
The encounter aspect here is the following: By addressing participation in 
and enjoyment of culture, the UN “introduced the idea that culture was an as-
pect of human rights, although it did not elucidate the specific relationship be-
tween individuals, communities, and nations, and did not clarify how conflicts 
among these three entities could or should be resolved”419. Here, problems in 
terms of access have arisen as a consequence of restricted access to documents 
by the estates that hold valuable literary works and furthermore the implications 
of preservation, archiving420 and assemblage of the documents for access to lit-
erary works.    
I will first address the reason why the issue of deceased authors and literary 
estates is pertinent for the encounter in question and for this research. The two 
authors whose works are discussed here are not only interesting because of their 
literary importance or the fact that access to their work resulted in legal dis-
putes, but also because there were certain identity matters that are particularly 
interesting for this type of study and the notions of community that are pre-
sented within the legal realm. This needs to be connected with how these two 
authors who wrote in-between languages and cultures, and how juxtaposing 
their works with access to cultural heritage or indigenous art and transmission 
of knowledge becomes particularly interesting for this study. In Volume II of 
this study, this encounter and its lines of flight will be connected to the concept 
of haecceity discussed above in chapter 2 as well as the concept of the cultural 
commons. 
The conflict that exists between human rights and intellectual property 
rights, as well as within human right provision itself, between individual and 
public based rights, are well known, established and acknowledged in research. 
The UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights has for instance addressed the 
constitution of economic, social and cultural rights and their potential clash 
with TRIPS, stating that “actual or potential conflict exists between the imple-
mentation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights, in particular the rights to self-determination, food, housing, 
work, health and education, and in relation to transfers of technology to devel-
oping countries.”421 
                                                
419 Helaine Silverman & D. Fairchild Ruggles, Cultural Heritage and Human Rights, Springer, 
(2007), p. 4. 
420 For further discussion see Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: a Freudian Impression, (trans.) Eric 
Prenowitz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1996). 
421 Intellectual Property and Human Rights, adopted 16 Aug. 2001, Res. 2001/21, U.N. 
OHCHR, Sub-Commission on Human Rights, 26th meeting, p- 11 (2001), see also Plomer, p. 
147.  
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This is a very common approach where these types of discussion are often 
carried within the framework of health and food, leaving access to artistic and 
cultural works slightly in the shadows. But how do art. 27 UDHR, TRIPS and 
these discussions work in conjunction with access to cultural works left behind 
by authors now deceased? Is there a theoretical difference between a living and 
a dead artist, if the work is still within the term of copyright, or not? 
The first section of art. 27 UDHR is usually approached as a right of indige-
nous people to have access to their cultural works and their traditional 
knowledge.422 Looking back at the drafting of this particular article it can be 
noted that the main proponents for the provision were some South American 
countries, with vast indigenous communities on their territories.423 While indig-
enous culture and knowledge had traditionally been open and part of the public 
domain, it was also open for appropriation by private interests, and the 
knowledge that it encompasses could e.g. be patented, or included in new works 
that subsist copyright. This meant that enclosures were constructed around 
what had previously been (perceived as) works and cultural expression open 
and available to everyone, that the indigenous community could no longer take 
part in and were in many ways excluded from it. While acknowledging indige-
nous knowledge as something worth protecting a paradox was created. It seems 
to be generally considered that “when indigenous culture is analyzed from a 
human rights perspective, intellectual property rules are seen as one of the 
problems facing indigenous communities and - only perhaps - as part of a solu-
tion to those problems.”424 
In order to acknowledge the importance of the indigenous culture it was 
brought into the realm of art. 27 UDHR. Then, in section 2 it grants a provision 
of individual ownership and protection of these works. But how is indigenous 
knowledge really to be defined and addressed in the post-colonial era? In a 
globalised society, where we are increasingly moving away from “defining” 
people according to race and nationality, does the notion of indigenous 
knowledge change? How do we treat works created trans-nationally, by people 
that defy national and local definitions, that do not fit in within any of these 
large structures constructed on a supra-national level? Some aspects of this dis-
cussion were already introduced above in the Bruno Schulz case, and others are 
emerging from the Kafka and Joyce cases here. 
 
                                                
422 See also Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and Principles and Guide-
lines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People.  
423 See generally Plomer. 
424 Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Conflict or Coexistence’, p. 54. 
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4.3.3 LINE OF FLIGHT: DEBRIS 
The Kafka and Joyce estates both have in common the fact that they are guard-
ing and controlling access to some of the most sought-after literary works. 
Could a legal type of access be discussed or established as stemming from the 
public interest in all these works in view of art. 27 UDHR in particular, and if 
so, could it be argued that the public has a legal claim to the access to these 
works? How can conservation and preservation of these works function with a 
potential (unrestricted) legal access to these works?  
The main issue that lies behind the demanding and the very restricted terms 
of access to documents left behind, in the case of the Joyce estate, seems to be 
family issues, tragedies, illnesses and private problems, which the estate has an 
interest in keeping private. But to what extent can that happen without seriously 
endangering the principles of public interest in access to knowledge and partici-
pation in culture? Many of the documents in question here are letters, and they 
might have an even wider knowledge potential than only artistic value. Even 
though the literary value that they embody is enormous, these can also be ap-
proached as historical records that document both the time in which they were 
written, a mental illness, as well as the development of two artistic minds and a 
novel that would come to define Western literary modernism.  
The Kafka case concerns the problem with the reclusiveness of the author 
and how works that the creator expressly did not wish to publish ought to be 
treated after his death. The issue whether these documents at all fall within the 
ambit of art. 27 UDHR is interesting. Even if the National Library of Israel did 
not expressly rely on art. 27 UDHR in their reasoning, they certainly framed 
their (winning) argumentation in that vein when they contested the Hoffe es-
tate’s possession of the documents. Brod, in his will, never meant for these 
documents of tremendous value for Jewish and Western culture, heritage, histo-
ry and people, to be kept locked in a safe and to be published and exploited as 
two private persons saw fit. The intention of his gift-letter was only meant to 
last the life of Esther Hoffe, provide her with security, and after that the con-
tents were intended to befall a public institution, for all people to access. Two 
thirds of the Kafka documents had already ended up in the UK, so was it not 
only fair that the rest be stored in a public library in Israel? 
Even if we were to assume that these works could be such heritage within 
the scope of art. 27 UDHR, and even if the act of accessing them could be 
framed as taking part in culture or access to traditional knowledge in the sense 
that art. 27 UDHR puts forward, do we really and truly have the right to force-
fully access works when the author (a) explicitly expressed a wish not to ever 
have them published and (b) is no longer around to say no with regards to pri-
vacy or moral grounds? Clearly, in both of these cases, it is not as simple as hav-
ing to weigh the rights holders and their heirs’ privacy against the public interest 
in the works left behind. 
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Furthermore, the estates do not only keep the works private and away from 
the probing, critical – albeit sometimes even hysterical – public eye. When 
something is released and published with the estates’ authorisation, there are of-
ten requirements and conditions attached in exchange to granting access, not 
only in terms of price but also in terms of content, edits and changes, all of 
which are valid and pertinent issues that have to be acknowledged and taken in-
to consideration when discussing the public interest in access to these works.  
All these various alterations and restrictions, not only deconstruct and re-
construct (parts of) the original (as well as derivative) works, they also, frequent-
ly give rise to, in the best case scenarios double meanings unintended by the 
original author, and in worst case scenarios, indubitably lead to changed or im-
posed meanings in the works. It of course warrants the query as to when the 
private protection of e.g. a family’s good name or an author’s dying wish start to 
interfere with the public interest in prominent literary works and access to and 
trans-generational transmission of knowledge.  
One of the most interesting aspects of these cases is that while they encom-
pass many features of cultural heritage, they are not (expressly) necessarily 
deemed as such – how could they be? And even if they were to be deemed as 
heritage it is problematic for these particular works discussed here because of 
their nomadic nature, both in terms of the lives the authors lived as well as in the 
way they wrote. On a principal legal level when it comes to art. 27 UDHR it is 
imperative that it be discussed who is responsible for the safekeeping of cultural 
heritage, particularly the heritage that is trans-national, trans-communal, trans-
generational… On a more specific level for this study, the interesting aspect is 
what role the estate, as the right owner, can have vis-à-vis enabling access to 
these works.  
A literary estate’s status as a legal subject adds further dimensions, lines of 
flight and plateaus to the already shattered legal status of authors like Joyce or 
Kafka. The fact that their works were scattered and shattered to begin with, and 
that they are difficult to place in any given traditional national or local cultural 
heritage paradigm makes access to these works intriguing theoretically. How do 
we enable legal access to something that is impossible to catch, to define? These 
are the debris of works that from the outset were broken, before anyone even 
attempted to assemble them and frame them into rights, right subjects, com-
munities, identities, etc. 
 
4.3.4 LINE OF FLIGHT: RECLUSES AND PRIVACY 
The flip side of the discourse concerning access to these works is the difficulty 
in establishing a stance in terms works that have come into existence as private 
expressions of intimate thoughts, created sometimes during (self-imposed) re-
clusiveness of the author, or for the eyes of only one specific person, and to 
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what extent this ought to be kept in mind and respected after the author has 
passed away.  
Can public access ever outweigh and override individual privacy in these in-
stances? In Kafka’s case for instance, as we saw above, had not his friend, pub-
lisher and literary executor Max Brod disregarded – perhaps disrespectfully so – 
Kafka’s dying wish to destroy his manuscripts and documents after his death, 
the world would have been bereft of most of Kafka’s work that had not been 
published during Kafka’s life. The world would have been poorer for it in terms 
of knowledge.  
In the Joyce case, his letters, as well as the writings of Lucia Joyce, were in 
many ways private expressions of wishes and desires, not meant for the public 
eye. While these documents add insight into the mind and reasoning of one of 
the most important modernist writers, there seems to be an imperceptible line 
where the search for scientific knowledge can easily turn into exploitation, sen-
sualisation, gossip. In an era of sensationalist journalism, where such infor-
mation can be a priced commodity, the notions of privacy are being brought 
within the realm of commercial exploitation. These types of matters have been 
addressed in legal journals ever since the turn of the 19th century. Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote for instance in Harvard Law Review already 
in 1890 that “[g]ossip is no longer the resource of idle and of the vicious, but 
has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To sat-
isfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the 
columns of the daily papers.”425 
These cases repeatedly bring us back to the question: when does a literary 
work achieve such stature that it has to be seen as having broken away from the 
ambit of the private sphere’s and entered the realm of e.g. cultural heritage or 
the public domain that everybody in the words of art. 27 UDHR ought to have 
access to? Can this happen before the 70 years after the death of the author 
have passed as in the Joyce case?426 And what happens when even after 70 years 
pma, the physical copies and contents are still being kept in secret, private, 
vaults, where all access is prohibited, even when copyright has long since ex-
pired from the underlying works? And who is responsible whether or not doc-
uments like these ought to be saved, published and kept for posterity, like in the 
Kafka case? Or burned and destroyed, like in the James and Lucia Joyce’s case? 
The commercial aspect too must be kept in mind. Admittedly, some of these 
estates, as in the Kafka case, appeared to have been holding out for the highest 
bidder in their admitted possessiveness.427 When that is the case, it can be dis-
                                                
425 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, in Harvard Law Review 4 
(1890): 193. 
426 Joyce’s copyright expired in January 2011 while the Shloss litigation was still on going. 
427 Although Esther Hoffe and her family always maintained that there was no financial but 
rather moral obligation in having the works under their protection, see e.g. Christoph Schult, 
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cussed what the implications of bidding wars and high price tags might be with 
regards to the preservation and access to these and other similar literary works 
that lie in the hands of estates, particularly in a democratic society that has an 
interest in safeguarding the free flow of knowledge and information dissemina-
tion in general – and again, in the words of art. 27 UDHR – the right of every-
body to participate in the cultural life of the community and enjoy the arts, in 
particular? 
 
4.3.5 LINE OF FLIGHT: MEMORY-MAKING AND PRODUCTION OF HISTO-
RY 
Generally, when art. 27 UDHR is discussed the focus often lies on cultural her-
itage from indigenous people or on preservation of ethnically and/or politically 
significant cultural items (e.g. from minorities).  
In their insightful essay, Helen Silverman and D. Fairchild Ruggles428 discuss 
the selective and exclusory processes that exist in the use and identification of 
cultural items in order to e.g. (re)construct the past. They particularly study the 
complexities connected to the issues when archaeological finds are purposely 
left unacknowledged when they do not correspond with certain (political or 
commercial) ideals or notions of communities. These and similar activities are 
referred to in their article as “production of history” 429. Production of history is 
exemplified with for instance the acts of colonial powers hiding or altering in-
digenous cultural artefacts in Africa and the Americas in order to construct co-
lonial legitimacy. Silverman and Ruggles’ essay strengthens the argument that 
abuses or alterations done to cultural works can have significant impacts not 
only on the future but also on the past. 430 The interesting argument is that their 
discussion can be taken one step further and placed within the realm of this 
case study. 
Possessing the power to distil information, alter and in the end produce his-
tory and memories is a powerful tool and an act that understandably can have 
severe implications on the understandings of the past, the present and naturally 
of the future. It can be a direct exercise of power. But what do such actions lead 
to in the short run, and result in, in the long run? Drawn to its extreme – if the 
actions are enabled within an unregulated, or legally confused sphere – we 
might end up in a situation where, to rephrase a famous ancient Russian prov-
                                                                                                                                   
‘The Trial, Fight for Kafka’s Papers Winds through Israeli Courts’, in Spiegel, (28th September 
2009). Available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,651859,00.html. Last accessed 17th March 
2014. 
428 Silverman & Ruggles, Cultural Heritage and Human Rights. 
429 Ibid.  
430 Silverman & Ruggles, Cultural Heritage and Human Rights. p. 11. 
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erb, nothing becomes as unpredictable as the past.431 That is arguably the reason why 
access to culture was incorporated in the human rights realm in the first place.  
Evidently, it is not sufficient and satisfactory to merely focus on the war 
torn territories, indigenous cultures and minority art when discussing the practi-
cal uses of art. 27. This case study, and the lines of flight that it gives rise to, ini-
tiates the particular discussion as to the peculiar opposition between privacy and 
access, and between IPRs and human rights. Additionally the dimension of the 
production of history is added when we are discussing not only the literary 
works but also other documents that belonged to the authors, such as letters, 
but documents that cannot be attributed to any one particular cultural herit-
age.432  
 
4.3.6 LINE OF FLIGHT: BEYOND THE CLASHES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
IP RIGHTS 
Three opposing dogmatic legal principles are thus pitted against one another, 
firstly, the principle of privacy, secondly, the principle of private property and trade, 
here mainly regulated in TRIPS, as well as alluded to in section 2 of art. 27 
UDHR, which both have to be upheld and justified in a domain where, thirdly, 
universal human rights, such as art. 27 section 1, must also be respected and taken 
into account.  
The problem of course being that the circumstance of unpublished works 
from dead authors is not entirely simple to deal with, primarily because when 
we think of art. 27 UDHR and human rights, an unrestricted access to sealed 
safes and old unpublished documents is perhaps the last thing we associate with 
it. The international regulation that deals with culture and cultural heritage does 
not end with the scope of art. 27 UDHR, it is far more extensive. Keeping in 
mind e.g. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) as well as vari-
ous other conventions such as WIPO’s The Protection of Traditional 
                                                
431 The original Russian proverb reads: “The future is certain, only the past is in doubt”, taken 
from Faith Wigzell, Reading Russian Fortunes, Print Culture, Gender and Divination in Russia from 
1765, Cambridge University Press, (1998).  
432 Note that UNESCO now also safeguards historical documents. Apart from world heritage 
and intangible heritage they now also focus on the so-called “documentary heritage” deemed 
to have universal value through Memory of the World Register. As with tangible heritage and in-
tangible heritage sites, this register also lists and preserves documents of universal value. The 
register can be accessed at:  
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/flagship-project-
activities/memory-of-the-world/register/. Last accessed 17th March 2014.  
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Knowledge, Draft Objectives and Principles433 it becomes instantly apparent 
that the issue of what counts and does not count as cultural heritage, and how 
the custodianship of it ought to be governed and regulated in law, is far easier 
posed than answered. 
What falls within the definition of cultural heritage and how is it defined in 
law? Should a line be drawn somewhere? Could a single poem be defined as 
heritage? And how about a letter? Or a note? Or a scribble in the margins?434 
Following a rhizomatic reasoning the answer is all of them. 
The issue with definitions, the ontological question that this study is ada-
mantly attempting to reach beyond and steer clear of, is logically, that while a 
clear definition is helpful in the commonplace practice and practical application 
of law, they are at the same time exclusory and act as boundaries. A definition is 
a fence raised up so as to distinguish one fact from another, one property from 
the other, someone’s access from another’s privacy, and arguably someone’s 
heritage from someone else’s (dis)inheritance. Defining someone’s heritage 
means at same time disinheriting someone else or indeed entire groups of peo-
ple that are not defined as beneficiaries. 
Both European and international law focus strongly on individual private 
ownership and the fruits stemming from creative labour435, which is framed as a 
property right, that can be inherited after the death of the author. This means 
that the said fruits of labour do not only benefit the creator by the act of regula-
tion, the law equally names the family of the creator as the beneficiaries of such 
work and such heritage.  
Without questioning the rationale for the possibility of inheritance of intel-
lectual property assets, it perhaps warrants widening the discussion slightly. 
Namely asking whether such inheritance rights ought to only apply to the, by 
the law named, natural family (or others, by the will of the creator, named, ben-
eficiaries and executioners)? Or, whether such regulation always ought to only 
be in the private hands, or be exempt from further legal limitations? If we break 
down the problem in order to have a legal claim on access to works a public in-
terest/knowledge interest needs to be construed in order to justify the circum-
                                                
433 For a very clear and comprehensive overview over the international framework in the area 
see e.g. Tushiyuki Kono, ‘Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
Unresolved Issues and Unanswered Questions’, in (ed.) Kono, Intangible Cultural Heritage and 
Intellectual Property, Intersentia, (2009). 
434 Matilda Arvidsson, Conference paper, Marginalanteckningar, Rätt & Kultur, School of Busi-
ness, Economics and Law, Gothenburg University, (8-9 April 2010) 
435 For a superb description of immaterial labour in the consumer society see Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy In the Age of Empire, New York: The Penguin 
Express, (2004) pp. 180-188. 
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vention of, firstly, copyright infringement claims and, secondly, other regula-
tions such as e.g. breach of confidence or breach of privacy claims.436  
In the cases of Kafka and Joyce human rights such as the one stipulated in 
art. 27 UDHR can be seen to be in constant discordance with other human 
rights such as e.g. the rights that recognise personal privacy or the enjoyment of 
possessions.437 This discordance is brought on by certain dogmatic principles 
that the binary reasoning gives rise to and that cannot be fully upheld here as 
the one does not necessarily exclude the other. At the same time, art. 27 UDHR 
also appears to be in a discordance with itself, namely section one with section 
two.  
All these discordances in law and in legal argumentation, paradoxes, ten-
sions, opposites, or clashes of interests, are common in all legal areas and are 
not particularly human rights-centric, or IP-rights-specific, and this case study is 
intentionally highlighting them in order to then analyse them within the Deleu-
zian rhizomatic theory, utilising encounters and lines of flight as tool for the 
analysis. In these cases the traditional legal approach to problems requires a bal-
ance of interests, which is almost always impossible to strike. An encounter 
based approach on the other had clearly illustrates the limit of traditional rules, 
where they run out of possibilities, and the need for a wider discussion with re-
gards to functions and effects of current legal concepts and their relevance from 
a human rights perspective, as well as their influence on access to culture and 
art.   
What comes out of this encounter particularly, is the need, and analytical 
tools to reassess the notion of (cultural) community as well as the need for fur-
ther discussion of legal concepts that are constellation- or cluster based that al-
low for both the private and the public, both access and privacy… 
 
4.4 ENCOUNTER 4: ORPHAN WORKS 
The last case study differs slightly from the three first. While the first two stud-
ies analyse very particular cases and use their very particularity as an encounter, 
the third looks at two cases and treats them as one and uses the pma as an en-
counter, this last case study analyses one general legal concept namely orphan 
works as an encounter and then looks at some cases in particular in order to il-
lustrate the orphan work concept. This is done in order to conduct a different 
type of discussion, to demonstrate certain issues with legal concepts and how 
these legal constructs can constitute an encounter. This case study discusses 
abandoned and forgotten artworks and access through libraries and digitisation. 
                                                
436 In UK law, see e.g. Hyde Park Residences Ltd v Yelland [2000] RPC 604. 
437 Richard Arnold QC, ‘The Protection of confidential information in the human rights era: 
two aspects’, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2007, VOL. 2, No.9. 
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4.4.1 ORPHAN WORKS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
The EU Directive 2012/28/EU defines orphan works in the following manner: 
 
works and other subject-matter which are protected by copyright or related 
rights and for which no rightholder is identified or for which the righthold-
er, even if identified, is not located — so-called orphan works438  
 
Outside the EU, the US copyright office defines orphan works similarly: 
 
works that remain subject to copyright law but whose owners cannot be 
identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the work in a 
manner that requires permission of the copyright owner.439 
 
The framework of the concept of orphan works as it is currently constructed in 
law deals with abandoned or neglected intellectual property that is still, techni-
cally, within the duration of copyright. This is a very intriguing legal construct 
as, when analysed in more detail, it allows us to also understand (the problems 
with) other constructs within copyright law such as for instance “the author”.  
Let us look more closely at the EU directive that deals with orphan works in 
order to firstly understand the concept better. The EU Directive has been cho-
sen to represent the European legal framework concerning orphan works in 
general, and on principle level it is very similar to e.g. the US definition.  
Here a type of work is analysed, a work that is still within copyright, but 
where the author (or authors) cannot be identified or located. The first defini-
tion and concept quoted above from the EU Directive, which is provided in the 
preamble of the directive, is then developed further in Article 2: 
 
A work or a phonogram shall be considered an orphan work if none of the 
rightholders in that work or phonogram is identified or, even if one or 
more of them is identified, none is located despite a diligent search for the 
rightholders having been carried out and recorded in accordance with Arti-
cle 3.440  
 
Article 3 states in more detail how this ‘diligent search for the rightsholders’ 
ought to be conducted, since no works may be deemed to be an orphan work 
                                                
438 Directive 2012/28/EU, preamble (3). The directive must be implemented in national legis-
lations by 29th October 2014. In Swedish law, a proposal has been put forward on 2nd October 
2013, see Herrelösa verk i kulturarvsinstitutionernas samlingar, Ds 2013:63.  
439 Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Report On Orphan Works 15 (2006). Avail-
able at: http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. Last accessed 17th March 2014.  
440 [my emphasis] 
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unless such a search has been carried out. The Directive directly designates441 
(in Art. 1) particular institutions such as libraries and museums to be responsi-
ble for these types of searches. There is also a direct reference to the public in-
terest that governs the spirit of the Directive.  
This Directive concerns certain uses made of orphan works by publicly ac-
cessible libraries, educational establishments and museums, as well as by ar-
chives, film or audio heritage institutions and public-service broadcasting organ-
isations, established in the Member States, in order to achieve aims related to 
their public-interest missions.442 
The public interest is for instance mentioned in Article 6 where the permit-
ted uses of orphan works are described. Article 6.2 is particularly interesting to 
look at: 
 
The organisations referred to in Article 1(1) shall use an orphan work in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of this Article only in order to achieve aims re-
lated to their public-interest missions, in particular the preservation of, the res-
toration of, and the provision of cultural and educational access to, works and 
phonograms contained in their collection. The organisations may generate rev-
enues in the course of such uses, for the exclusive purpose of covering their 
costs of digitising orphan works and making them available to the public.443  
 
The particularly interesting aspects for this project are the above emphasised: 
a) public interest mission, and 
b) access, and 
c) revenue, and 
d) available to public 
An incisive study of the composition of these four aspects in one and the same 
legal act will show that this is in fact a rather progressive legal construct. As will 
be demonstrated in more detail below in chapter 6, the way intellectual property 
legislation is generally structured, is that it does not necessarily envision both 
revenue and public access together bur rather either revenue or access. As a mat-
ter of fact, in copyright law, these two are almost seen as each other’s opposites 
as the first one focuses on the individual rights owner and his/her rights while 
the other one takes a utilitarian approach: per the classic utilitarian maxim ‘the 
greatest amount of good for the greatest number’ of people. In such a case 
then, the needs of the single rights owner may and can be put aside.  
                                                
441 But does not define further. More detailed definitions and restrictions have to be provided 
in the national legislations, see e.g. Ds 2013:63, p. 31.  
442 Article 1.1. of the Directive. 
443 [my emphases throughout], Article 6.2 of the Directive. 
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So what does it mean and what implications does it have that all of these 
four aspects have been placed in the one and the same legal act or even within 
the construction of a legal concept? I shall be arguing, that this is an example of 
where constellation- or cluster based legal concept are increasingly required and 
which expressly reveal the legal potential to cater for these types of concepts, 
but before I do that, let us first study the concept of orphan works closer. 
 
4.4.2 THE RAISON D´ÊTRE OF THE CONCEPT ORPHAN WORKS 
The concept of orphan works aims to allow good-faith users of copyrighted 
content to move forward in cases where they wish to license the use of a work 
but cannot locate the copyright owner after having conducted a diligent search. 
The term appears to first have come into use during the 1990s in the US to des-
ignate “neglected film footage that was at serious risk of loss due to degradation 
in the physical medium over time. In the film preservation context, the 
term ‘orphan’ applied to films whose copyright owners could not be located but 
it also encompassed films with other characteristics.”444  
Lydia Pallas Loren writes that the 1993 report on film preservation issued by 
the Librarian of Congress used the term “orphan” in describing the category of 
films that were in need of preservation: 
 
If there is a single division that separates most of the preservation issues 
discussed in this report, it is between two categories of films: those that have evi-
dent market value and owners able to exploit that value; and the other films, 
often labelled “orphans,” that lack either clear copyright holders or commercial poten-
tial to pay for their continued preservation. In practice, the former are pri-
marily features from major Hollywood studios; the latter—numerically the 
majority—include newsreels and documentaries, avant-garde and independent produc-
tions, silent films where copyright has expired, even certain Hollywood sound 
films from now defunct studios.445  
 
The report being referred to by Loren is Librarian Of Congress, Film Preservation 
1993: A Study Of The Current State Of American Film Preservation.446 In this instance 
the term orphan is used for the first time, but its meaning is slightly different 
than what would later become the legal concept of “orphan works”. The films 
labelled orphans in this study refer to works that: 
 
                                                
444 Lydia Pallas Loren, ‘Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage 
Works’ in Berkeley Technology Law Journal [Vol. 27:1431], p. 1438. 
445 [my emphases throughout], Pallas Loren, ‘Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Ap-
proach to Hostage Works’, pp. 1438-1439.  
446 Available at http://www.loc.gov/film/study.html. Last accessed 17th March 2014. 
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• lack clear copyright holders, or 
• lack commercial potential, where 
• copyright has expired. 
 
For a work to be deemed an orphan it had to thus either lack clear copyright 
holders or lack commercial potential, together with the fact that copyright has ex-
pired. The study claims that these works make up the numerical majority of 
films examined, mostly newsreels and documentaries, avant-garde and inde-
pendent productions, silent films, while the other category, the minority, is 
made up of feature films from major Hollywood studios. Already here we can 
see that the term orphan is not being used to designate the same types of works 
that it would later on come to encompass when it became a bona fide legal con-
cept. For instance both b (lack of commercial potential) and c (expired copy-
right) are not required when we talk about orphan works as a legal concept. 
Orphan works is a comparatively new concept, and it did not garner further 
scholarly attention before the 2000s.447 Why did this concept then evolve from 
in principle designating films that were out of copyright (often unfinished frag-
ments that were not even completed) to encompass any and all works where a 
copyright owner could not be located after a diligent search? What a diligent 
search will come to mean in the digital information age, can only be mentioned 
here in passing, specifically if it is a question of (sometimes a small part of) a 
digital code that is being circulated virtually. 
The orphan works concept today is thus envisioned to be a cluster concept 
that has a built-in public interest remit, there to enable access to the works that oth-
erwise would have remained locked in libraries, and if these works are then used 
successfully and/or incorporated into derivate works that subsequently generate 
profit, that there is no problem with that per the new EU directive and the legal 
concept of orphan works. As a construct it aims to both further the interests of 
the public and of the individual owners (even if they are unknown). 
Getting access to works that exist in libraries but that cannot be made public 
due to the fact that rights holders may not be known is sometimes much more 
complicated that it might seem. Even if, as we shall see below, the libraries at-
tempt to categorise or digitise these works, they are not able to do so under cur-
rent copyright laws. It involves assessing risk liability in every single case as 
copying and (digitally) disseminating a work naturally requires the rights owner’s 
consent: 
 
The problem is pervasive. Our study recounts the challenges that publish-
ers, film makers, museums, libraries, universities, and private citizens, 
                                                
447 Pallas Loren, ‘Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works’, p. 
1431. 
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among others, have had in managing risk and liability when a copyright 
owner cannot be identified or located. In testimony before the Senate, a 
filmmaker spoke of the historically significant images that are removed 
from documentaries and never reach the public because ownership cannot 
be determined. In testimony before the House, the U.S. Holocaust Museum 
spoke of the millions of pages of archival documents, photographs, oral 
histories, and reels of film that it and other museums cannot publish or dig-
itize.448  
 
These types of works are historical documents, newsreels, archival documents 
etc. and that they embody knowledge and knowledge potential is evident. But, 
even creating the concept of orphan works has not been enough in guarantee-
ing access to these types of works. 
 
4.4.3 LINE OF FLIGHT: ORPHANED? THE PLAY WITH METAPHORS 
In the article ‘Abandoning The Orphans: An Open Access Approach To Hos-
tage Works’ Lydia Pallas Loren examines and questions the use of the word or-
phan to designate these particular works that are still within copyright, but where 
the rights owner is unknown and/or cannot be located.  She writes “that it re-
lies on the metaphor of the romantic author, the works he creates are his chil-
dren, born of his labor and genius.”449 As such the romantic author is the one 
who is meant to control, and protect, his children.450  The question is whether 
this is an apt metaphor. To invoke a notion of a human being who has aban-
doned his/her children. I shall return to the discussion of parent-child meta-
phor in chapter 6 below.  
Here, as Pallas Loren suggests, it might be worth connecting the concept to 
something else. She suggest for instance abandoned, neglected or derelict prop-
erty451 claiming that if the connection to abandoned or neglected property is 
used instead, it can then be argued that these works have value that is being 
wasted by the absentee owner. She claims further that, “[i]n the area of tangible 
property, the common law developed a variety of doctrines designed to minimize 
the waste that results from abandoned or neglected property.”452  
Pallas Loren’s mistrust of the use of this particular metaphor ‘orphan’ can be 
juxtaposed with Stefan Larsson’s Metaphors and Norms, Understanding Copyright in a 
                                                
448 http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/OWLegislation/. Last accessed 17th March 2014.  
449 Pallas Loren, ‘Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works’, p. 
1435. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Pallas Loren, ‘Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works’, p. 
1439. 
452 [original emphasis], Ibid. p. 1439. 
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Digital Society453 where he explores how metaphors can have serious impact on 
how we live our lives, as well as how metaphors function within the legal 
sphere. He writes: 
 
The problem, however, is that metaphors can be both informative and de-
ceptive. They can be borrowed from a context where they function well, 
only to be used in another context where they deceive and distort. The 
metaphors reveal the concepts behind them, the mental structures that 
form, for instance, debates on legal solutions and shapes. By looking at the 
linguistic labels (the metaphors) one can determine how phenomena are 
conceptualised in a given context.454  
 
Pallas Loren has provided an interesting comment on orphan works where she 
has managed to demonstrate the deceptive nature of the ‘orphan’ metaphor ap-
plied to these works. The word orphan implies that there exists a ‘parent’, a sin-
gle creator, who in turn can be tied to the romantic notion of the author, which 
is often not the case with the orphan works as we saw above, as many of these 
works are in fact joint works, news reels etc.  
Assuming that it is appropriate to link intangible works such as orphan 
works to concepts from the realm of tangible property opens up to a host of 
new alternatives. Pallas Loren subsequently goes on to apply other concepts 
from the tangible realm and see whether they may fit instead, including treating 
these works as abandoned property455, neglected property, adverse possession, 
and prescriptive easements, concluding, that what these works ought to be re-
ferred to is hostage works:  
When viewed as a “hostage work problem” it becomes clear that these 
works do not need foster parents or protection against inappropriate exploita-
tion—the end result of an orphan metaphor. Nor do these works need new 
owners—the end result of a metaphor of abandoned or neglected property. 
What these works need are ‘special forces’ that can free them from the constraints 
placed on them by the combination of the regulatory effects of copyright and 
the lack of a locatable owner who can grant permission to avoid the conse-
quences of the regulation.456  
                                                
453 Stefan Larsson, Metaphors and Norms, Understanding Copyright in a Digital Society, Board Book, 
(2011). 
454 Ibid. p. 193. 
455 For further discussion on orphan works as abandonware see e.g. Dennis W. K. Khong, 
‘Orphan Works, Abandonware and the Missing Market’, in 15 International Journal of Law & In-
formation Technology, 54 (2007). 
456 [my emphasis], Pallas Loren, ‘Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to 
Hostage Works’, p. 1452-1453.  
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The ‘special forces’ proposed by Pallas Loren is an interesting point of entry 
to the various issues of orphan works. Before we continue to discuss the or-
phan works metaphor, the de facto orphan works concept in law, and how it 
works, let us look at two recent cases, the first one involves directly millions of 
orphan works, and the second does not directly involve an orphan work but it 
illustrates the metaphor problematic.  
 
4.4.4 LINE OF FLIGHT: GOOGLE BOOKS AND HATHITRUST 
Lately, the issues of orphan works came under scrutiny when the Google Books 
project attempted and planned the very ambitious project to scan every book ever 
published.457 When the project began its digitalising process458, it transpired that 
many of the authors of the works that had within the project initially been 
dubbed (potential) orphan works by the American organization HathiTrust 
Digital Library459 were in reality not unknown and the authors could rather easi-
ly be located.460 A diligent search had therefore not been conducted before 
dubbing the works (potential) orphan works. 
The infrastructure of the digital book revealed many a legal problem, but 
one of the more prominent ones turned out to be how a vast digitisation of 
works would correspond with the orphan works and how orphan works ought 
to be handled in such cases. Kelu L. Sullivan writes: 
 
Books historically have been defined as sets “of written, printed, or blank 
sheets bound together into a volume,” and while theoretically the value of 
the book is not the cost of the paper, but the content of the words, that 
maxim has never before been tested in any rigorous sense. The e-book 
model marks a sea of changes for print media, as the content of an e-book 
exists separately from any physical form. Free from the tangibility-constraints that 
both benefited and hindered paper books, e-books strain copyright laws’ 
ability to accommodate this new media and the conventions it entails. Simi-
lar to many advances in technology that decrease the costs of reproduction 
                                                
457 James Grimmelmann, ‘Orphan Wars’, in Educause Review Online, (23rd January 2012). Avail-
able at: http://www.educause.edu/ero/article/orphan-wars. Last accessed 18th March 2014. 
458 That led to a large class action suit brought on by the American Author’s Guild. The suit 
was not about orphaned works per se, and it is too detailed and lengthy to be discussed here. 
However, it was claimed there that orphan works in particular cannot be made public (not 
even excerpts) without the express consents by the authors and/or copyright owners. 
459 http://www.hathitrust.org/. Last accessed 18th March 2014.  
460 Interestingly, a book by the quite well renowned American author Walter Lippmann 
called The Communist World and Ours was on these lists. The author’s estate could easily be 
tracked down. 
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and distribution of intangible works, the development of e-books require a 
reassessment of the proper legal protection for creators.461  
 
When Google Books in 2004 began the digitalisation project, which entailed 
scanning millions of books, including some deemed to be (potential) orphan 
works, American Author’s Guild brought a class action against Google for cop-
yright infringement.462 By copying and digitising, still-in-copyright books, it was 
claimed that Google was committing large-scale copyright infringement. A set-
tlement agreement was reached between the parties, which was first approved 
by the Southern district Court of New York in 2009, but then rejected in in 
March 2011.463 The court argued that the settlement agreement was going too 
far and resulted, particularly when it came to orphan works, in “the involuntary 
transfer of copyrights […] as copyrighted works would be licensed without the 
owners’ consent.”464 Google defended their action as fair use, claiming that any 
author that did not want to be part of the scheme could easily opt out.465 
However, given the fact that the rights owners for orphan works are in fact 
missing or unknown, Google would not only obtain un indirect transfer of cop-
yright, they could also carve out a loophole for using orphan works and no oth-
er person or entity would thereafter be able to use these works. This would be 
the case due to the fact that the original rights owners could not be identified or 
located, and with the act of digitisation Google would obtain rights in the digital 
copies that would befall them. Had the settlement agreement been granted by 
the court it would have also given Google the right to use these digitised orphan 
works and provide Google with a constructive monopoly over the market for 
orphan works.466 Google’s fair use defence was difficult and complicated to up-
hold, to say the least, for this and several other reasons. Three particular actions 
were held up: 
 
• Scans: a whole copy of each book would go into its digital database;  
                                                
461 [my emphasis], Kelu L. Sullivan, ‘Orphan Works At The Dawn Of Digitization’, in 18 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 1 2011-2012, p. 2-3. 
462 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
463 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d. at 671. 
464 Authors Guild, p. 673. 
465 Steven Hetcher, ‘The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make the World’s Collection of 
Books Searchable’, in 13 Michigan Telecommunication & Technology Law Review, 1, 65-66 (2006). 
466 See e.g. Randal C. Picker, ‘The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works 
Monopoly?’ in 10 University of Chicago Law & Economy Online Working Paper, No. 462, 2009 and 
Robert Darnton, ‘Google and the Future of Books’, New York Review of Books, 12th Febru-
ary 2009. Available at: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/google-the-future-of-books/. Last 
accessed 18th March 2014.  
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• Copies: snippets from the its digitized copies of books would be dis-
played online; and  
• Provides: access to these works to libraries participating in the Google 
Library467 
 
Each of these, technically, goes beyond the fair use exception provided in the 
US copyright law. The commercial nature of Google and its project further 
complicated the matter. To the question whether Google can be seen as library 
in the context of orphan works as a legal concept was not addressed, and in my 
view, even if it had been addressed, the commercial nature of Google would 
have hindered Google to be added to the named institutions in e.g. the EU di-
rective. The merit of this reasoning shall not be discussed here. 
This case is only being presented topographically and as an overview here, in 
order, not to study it in particular, but rather to provide a case-based framework 
for the general orphan works discussion. Irrefutably, it could be concluded, that 
while US copyright law and the interests of actual and potential authors pre-
vented the Google Books project to expand to the extent Google had envi-
sioned, it also meant that the orphan works at hand remained locked up in li-
braries where they were, and still are, waiting for their proper owners to claim 
them, and where they are still being held away from the public and the public’s 
access to them.  
 
4.4.5 LINE OF FLIGHT: THE LOST MURAL OF BANKSY 
Another case that shall be discussed briefly is not a case that concerns orphan 
works per se. At least the issue of orphan works has never been brought forward, 
even though it is about a work that was abandoned by its creator, and where the 
creator cannot be identified or directly located. Street art can be defined in the 
following manner: 
 
Street art is art, specifically visual art, developed in public spaces — that is, 
‘in the streets’ — though the term usually refers to unsanctioned art, as op-
posed to government sponsored initiatives. The term can include traditional 
graffiti artwork, sculpture, stencil graffiti, sticker art, wheatpasting and street 
poster art, video projection, art intervention, guerrilla art, and street installa-
tions. [...] Some people consider street art a crime; others consider it a form 
of art. It is a borderline issue. Street artists may be charged with vandalism, 
malicious mischief, intentional destruction of property, criminal trespass, or 
antisocial behavior and there different legal restrictions depending on 
                                                
467 Alessandra Glorioso, ‘Google Books: An Orphan Works Solution Note’ in 38 Hofstra Law 
Review 971 (2009-2010), p. 983. 
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whether it’s private or public property [sic]. In some cities, it is unlawful for 
landowners to allow any graffiti on their property if it’s visible from any 
other public or private property. A 2012 research paper from Hacettepe 
University tried to define street art as a type of crime, then examined it us-
ing criminological perspective with criminological and deviance theories, in 
order to understand and explain it better using an example.468 
 
This case looks at street art per this maybe not-so-scientific, but pertinent, Wik-
ipedia definition, and a particular work of art that was made by arguably one of 
our times most well known British street artists that goes under the pseudonym 
Banksy469, whose high-quality street art has for more than a decade divided crit-
ics, the general public and the public authorities as to how it ought to be treated 
and branded. On the one hand, his work generates million dollar sales, and has 
been sold to Hollywood stars such as Brad Pitt, on the other hand it is (or more 
accurately used to be) considered as vandalism of property, graffiti, a criminal act 
and his work used to be taken down by the city councils around the world, and 
most notably in London where he supposedly lives.  
From a tongue-in-cheek street art commentator, a vigilante of social issues, 
which he discusses with the backdrop of public places and the urban spaces as 
his canvas, he has risen to international fame, and has had both films and books 
devoted to him and his work.470 With an army of representatives that communi-
cate with the artworld and press on his behalf, his identity remains equally an 
enigma today, as it was the first time his work appeared in the streets of Bristol 
in the 1990s. Today, far from removing his work from properties, the lucky 
property owners often choose to put protective frames over the works so as to 
                                                
468 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Street_art, see also Susan C. Haedicke, Contemporary Street 
Arts in Europe: Aesthetics and Politics, Pallgrave, Macmillan, (2012). 
469 See generally in his own words: 
Banksy, Banging Your Head Against a Brick Wall (2001) ISBN 978-0-9541704-0-0 
Banksy, Existencilism (2002) ISBN 978-0-9541704-1-7 
Banksy, Cut It Out (2004) ISBN 978-0-9544960-0-5 
Banksy, Wall and Piece (2005) ISBN 978-1-84413-786-2 
Banksy, Pictures of Walls (2005) ISBN 978-0-9551946-0-3 
Banksy, You Are an Acceptable Level of Threat (2012) ISBN 978-1908211088 
Random House published Wall and Piece in 2005.  
Books about his work, authored by others: 
Ulrich Blanché, Something to s(pr)ay: Der Street Artivist Banksy. Eine kunstwissenschaftliche Unter-
suchung, Techtum Verlag (2010). Martin Bull, Banksy Locations and Tours: A Collection of Graffiti 
Locations and Photographs in London, PM Press (2010), Will Elsworth-Jones, Banksy: The Man be-
hind the Wall, Aurum Press (2012), Paul Gough (ed.), Banksy: The Bristol Legacy, Redcliffe Press 
(2012), Steve Wright, Banksy’s Bristol: Home Sweet Home, Tangent Books (2007). 
470 The most recent one is Williams Ellsworth-Jones, Banksy, where the author explores 
Banksy’s rise to fame. 
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protect them and their value. A Banksy work on a property can today signifi-
cantly increase the value of a property. 
In 2011 a mural entitled Slave Labour that Banksy had done in the area Turn-
pike Lane in London was chopped off from the building onto which it was 
painted and disappeared. Some time later, the chopped-off piece of the wall 
showed up at a small auction house in Miami called Fine Art Auctions Miami. 
Whether the painting had in fact been stolen and how the provenance of this 
artwork needed to be treated by the auction house, naturally, caused a number 
of problems.  
The auction house claimed that the artwork had not been stolen. For how 
does one steal a piece of a building, how does illegal art get stolen? A private 
collector had consigned the piece of the wall with the stencilled work to the 
auction house, and the auction house claimed further that they were very careful 
as to the provenance of the works that they subsequently put on sale. However, 
at the last minute, after vociferous protests from the UK, it was pulled from the 
auction (having previously given the work an estimated price tag of €700 000). 
Haringey Council, where the work had originally been created, claimed that it 
belonged to their community.  However, as the work was less than 50 years old, 
it was not subject to export control of cultural works, and the British Art Coun-
cil could not retrieve it in that way.  Banksy and the company that handles the 
sales of his works, the aptly named Pest Control, never commented on this issue. 
Banksy had abandoned the work. He could not care less if it was on the wall in 
Haringey or chopped-off and sold to a private owner through a gallery. At least 
that was what the lack of public response communicated. If anything the act of 
chopping-off was a comment on ownership of art in its own right. 
The work was pulled from sale and returned to its “owner”, i.e. the private 
collector who had approached the auction house in the first place and put it up 
for sale. Haringey Council, and its community, could not have it back. It re-
mains locked up with an anonymous private collector, held away from the pub-
lic. 
 
4.4.6 LINE OF FLIGHT: ORPHANED ANTIQUITIES 
In a discussion concerning who owns street art,471 the online blog Itsartlaw 
claimed that as with antiquities at the turn of the century, that gained real atten-
tion when it became clear that they could have financial value, street art too 
gained mainstream acknowledgement when it became clear that it could have 
financial value. It went from potentially cultural and sometimes also social capi-
tal, to becoming actual economical capital per Bourdieu. Something, that previ-
ously had been considered to be litter, old derelict objects, criminal damage, etc. 
                                                
471 http://www.itsartlaw.com/2013/03/part-i-who-owns-street-art.html. Last accessed 18th 
March 2014.  
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precipitously gained real, economical value. Will Ellsworth-Jones notes in the 
very first sentence in the introduction of Banksy, The Man Behind the Wall, that 
this “is the outlaw who has been dragged reluctantly, but relentlessly, ever closer 
to the art establishment.”472 As an artist, Banksy keeps mocking the establish-
ment, playing with the exception of what art is, what it is expected to be, who 
the artist is and how s/he is supposed to present him/herself, how art should 
be marketed and accessed.  
Let us be reminded then how orphan works as a legal concept was defined 
in the EU directive Art. 2: “a work where the rightholder cannot be identified 
or, even if he is identified, he cannot be located despite a diligent search”. How 
do we deal with an graffiti artist that has become mainstream, very much part of 
the art establishment, albeit reluctantly, a Robin Hood473 of the arts who does 
not want to be identified, and who is intentionally in hiding. He makes public art, 
available to everyone to behold, but he also sells his work to the highest bidder. 
He despises capitalism, writes Elsworth-Jones, yet he seems to be a capitalist 
himself – although a reluctant one.474  
Furthermore, once the economical value of the work has been established, it 
shifts from public (open to everybody in the public space) to private (framed, 
bought/sold, excluded from the public realm). This transition may seem imper-
ceptible but within the framework of the orphan work concept it is very perti-
nent. Within the context of art. 6 of the EU directive in that orphan works may 
be used in order to achieve public-interest missions and preservation or restora-
tion of works. The directive further states that certain cultural organisations 
may not only facilitate access to these works but also generate revenue in the 
course of such uses in order to cover the costs of digitising the works and mak-
ing them available. If there is a public interest in London, or in Turnpike Lane, 
for the work that overrides the one of the private collector and if there is a need 
to return the work to the building onto which it was originally painted in order 
to preserve or restore it, then there may an argument in the orphan works con-
cept that Haringey Council may have overseen. Furthermore, whether this is a 
movable work, chattel or part of a building, land, can only be asked in passing 
here. A similar discussion was also evident from the Schulz case above. 
This case is precisely an encounter because the orphan work principle has 
not been devised with street art in mind, and street art in turn, is normally not 
seen as something that necessarily has a public interest mission or potential fi-
nancial value as economic capital. If we then return to the first case of this 
chapter, namely the Bruno Schulz case, where we towards the end saw Benja-
min Geissler’s digital, true-to-scale, reproduction of the Schulz mural, it certain-
ly opens up undeniable possibilities. The interesting issue to stress here is to 
                                                
472 Ellsworth-Jones, Banksy.  
473 Some claim that before he became Banksy, the artist called himself Robin Banks. 
474 Ellis-Jones, Banksy, p. 16. 
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demonstrate that orphan works are not necessarily only abandoned music, old 
films and newsreels. The wording of the directive may be open to a wider read-
ing, but currently, it only poses as an encounter, in that works of art such as this 
one are neither cultural heritage (as it is less than 50 years old) nor a true orphan 
work, they can neither be made accessible through digitisation or libraries nor 
are they works that anybody seems to want to claim as their own.  
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--- INTERMEZZO 
 
Approaching the theory of the rhizome is not the simplest of all endeavours. As 
we have seen so far the Deleuzeoguattarian concept of the rhizome is presented 
in the introduction chapter of A Thousand Plateaus. It is often stated, that a text 
is seen before it is read. So far I have approached the concept of the rhizome the 
other way around. I have read it, before I looked at it, before I studied it visual-
ly. Before we go on to Volume II, let us once again remind ourselves what a 
rhizomatic reading of jurisprudence can be. To do that, after we have read the 
rhizomatic theory in this first volume, we now need to look at Deleuze and 
Guattari’s introduction to the rhizome. 
A bizarre looking image of jumbled, creased, notes on a graphically repre-
sented musical score sheet open up their introductory chapter, not words. 
Looking more closely at the image it can be discerned that this is XIV piano piece 
for David Tudor written by the avant-garde composer Sylvano Bussotti. However, 
it does not look like a normal musical score, it rather looks as if someone has 
taken the notes written on a music sheet, stretched them all out, broken them, 
jumbled them and then haphazardly thrown the mess back on the paper. The 
image almost looks three-dimensional. Like that, it also appears to be a graphic 
representation of an instrument and not a carefully composed, meticulous mu-
sical score: it does not have anything in common with a neat musical note sheet 
one is used to seeing – it looks like an anti-composition. So can this image that 
opens A Thousand Plateaus divulge the secret of what the rhizome theory really is 
all about? 
 
Plateau: Was the theory somehow created to comment on Sylvano Bussotti and composers and 
artists like him?  
 
Bussotti is one of Italy’s most well known composers. He was born in a cos-
mopolitan Florentine family in 1931. He is a classically trained violinist, and was 
a student and later also the lover of Heinz-Klaus Metzger who in turn was one 
of Theodor Adorno’s most brilliant music students. The connection between 
Deleuze and Adorno is thus augmented. 
 
Plateau: Is the rhizome theory a philosophical homage, a connection between Deleuze and the 
Frankfurt School?  
 
Bussotti was for a time the artistic director of La Fenice, the opera house in Ven-
ice. A post from which he officially resigned at the Venice Biennale in 1991 by 
bringing a prostitute and a pornographic star to deliver the keynote address, one 
that he himself was supposed to give. This was done as a protest against the 
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corruption that he felt reigned within the art world. That Bussotti mixed “high-
brow” and “lowbrow” art in his music and adopted it as part of his own public 
persona, and that he challenged the traditional cultural industry, as well as 
Adorno’s definitions of it, is apparent.  
 
Plateau: Can the text be connected to La Fenice? 
 
La Fenice, the ill-fated, Venetian opera house, that burned down to the ground 
twice, first in 1836 and then once again in 1996.475 Eerily, its own name, la fenice, 
the Italian word for the mythological bird the phoenix that famously burns down 
and rises out of its own ashes, echoes the faith the opera house was to have, 
over and over again. La Fenice represents classical as well as Italian art; it is a 
monumental symbol of Venice, but it also simultaneously represents tragedy, vio-
lence and perhaps even corruption. 
 
Plateau: Is it a text about Venice then? 
 
A sinking city. One of the most mystical and mythical places in Europe and 
perhaps in the world. A city like no other, on water, it has canals instead of 
streets, it has secret alleys, hidden houses and it is filled with artistic heritage and 
treasure. In Venice, nothing is what it appears to be on the (water) surface. On 
the contrary there are subterranean undercurrents that carry the city on its 
shoulders.  It is a city that is not built upwards but sideways, and not on soil but 
on water. It is a city that is not situated on a firm ground, but that flows on water. 
A city confined to the rules and strengths of the sea and not of land. A city de-
pendant of the fickle mood shifts of tides as it alternates between ebbs and 
flows.  
 
Plateau: “The average rise and fall of the tide is about three feet”, wrote Ruskin in The 
Stones of Venice but “it is enough to cause continual movement in the waters”.  
 
A connected city – but a city dependent on fluent, moving, temperamental wa-
ter that in turn is connected by slow canals and not by hard roads or fast trans-
portation. A city that is difficult, if not impossible, to fully represent on a map, 
as it is constantly moving and changing. 
 
                                                
475 For a brilliant account of the 1996 fire, La Fenice, and of the residents of Venice, see: John 
Berendt, The City of Falling Angels, The Penguin Press, (2005). 
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Plateau: How can then this concept of the rhizome, most importantly, be fruitful for legal re-
search and jurisprudence?  
 
The first volume of this research project has read jurisprudence in this very 
manner, moving from plateau to plateau, exploring the connectivity and possi-
bility of various plateaus of law, art, and obstacles to access. The project has re-
frained from reading jurisprudence and art as a tree, a structure, but rather as a 
rhizome made up of fluent plateaus. The legal machine, and positive law or 
dogmatic legal reasoning have served as a counter current – one that grounds 
and territorialises the rhizomatic law.  
Whenever legal concepts are territorialised or, attempted to be territorialised, 
sooner or later lines of flight will occur, lines of flight that flee the striated terri-
tory, force it to move. I have studied the lines of flight that emerged from the 
obstacles to access in chapter 4 that closed Volume I. The lines of flight studied 
there are not only instances of territorial law but they also reveal the potential 
rhizomatics in jurisprudence and law. Before we can arrive at further legal po-
tential we shall now move onto Volume II. 
Volume II mirrors Volume I but then additional aspects are added on. Chap-
ter 5 mirrors chapter 2. It is also a theoretical chapter, but it does not study rhi-
zomatic jurisprudence it studies de/reterritorialising law. It studies the concept 
of the commons within rhizomatic jurisprudence. Chapter 6 mirrors chapter 3. 
It too deals with the artwork, but the artwork is now placed inside a territorial, 
striated intellectual property law that attempts to ground it, territorialise it. The 
territorial intellectual property law gives rise to its own deterritorialising move-
ments, that will be followed. Chapter 7 mirrors chapter 4. It returns to the case 
studies, but there the cases do not serve as encounters that produce lines of 
flight, instead, we study how the cases have been at least partially or sometimes 
wholly solved, reterritorialised, and these attempts serve as (re)territorialising 
aspects that striate and ground the concept of the commons.  
This approach mirrors the Deleuzeoguattarian approach. It moves between 
plateaus, evolving from the rhizomatic jurisprudence to de/re/territorialising 
law… 
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VOLUME II 
 
 
THE PERFORMATIVITY OF THE COMMONS 
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PART 3 
 
 
THE COMMON 
 
“Smooth space is a field without conduits or channels. A field, a heterogeneous 
smooth space, is wedded to a very particular type of multiplicity: nonmetric, 
acentrered, rhizomatic multiplicities that occupy space without ‘counting’ it and 
can ‘be explored only by legwork’”  
 
– Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
  
 224 
  
 225 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
PROPERTY, SPACE AND COMMONS: FROM ROMAN LAW TO THE BEING-IN-
COMMON  
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5 PROPERTY, SPACE AND COMMONS: FROM 
ROMAN LAW TO THE BEING-IN-COMMON 
 
It has so far already been established that the focus of this research project lies 
in access to art by way of a legal concept of the cultural commons. In order to 
arrive there we have had to explore, in Volume I, obstacles to access created by 
the existing jurisprudential and legal concepts (chapter 2), existing conceptions 
of art (chapter 3). These obstacles were analysed through case studies presented 
as encounters in (chapter 4). In chapters 2 and 3 it was discussed how certain 
jurisprudential and legal concepts, in the way they are currently constructed and 
envisioned, can create obstacles to access, e.g. the construct of the intellectual 
property right. But also other types of legal constructs were shown to stifle ac-
cess as well as the conception of the concept of the commons in jurisprudence. 
One such example is, for instance, the individual rights construction in itself – 
that requires a notion of the private, individual, enclosed, etc. So what can the 
concept of the cultural commons in law bring forth in this discussion? The case 
study chapter above presented obstacles to access, at the same time it also 
demonstrated certain potential in jurisprudence and law that emerged from the 
said obstacles. 
This research project is, as has been established, attempting to reach beyond 
the ontological questions. This ambition extends equally to the concept of the 
commons. Therefore, the concept must be presented in a rhizomatic manner. It 
is in this instance pertinent to begin with the definition provided by Garrett 
Hardin in his famous 1968 essay ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ – where a notion 
of the commons was constructed with the underlying idea of the human being 
as a homo oeconomicus – a rational, self-interested individual, where the ideals of 
individualism and private ownership were put forward as ideological assump-
tions. After that, we shall look at the definition provided by Nobel laureate in 
economy, Ellinor Ostrom whose theory of the commons began as a critique of 
Hardin. In her study of some existing (natural) commons she manages to em-
pirically show that the assumptions made by Hardin were inaccurate and that 
commons as a resource can in fact be thriving even without the private owner-
ship right. Discussing issues such as commons-based and intergenerational 
management of resources, Ostrom adds further dimensions to the notion of the 
commons. A notion of the commons will be discussed as the one presented in 
the Bailey, Farrell and Mattei study,476 and particularly within the context of the 
Rodotá Commission in the review of the Italian Civil Code. Finally, the concept 
of the commons will be brought into the digital knowledge society. Using main-
ly Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s approach to the commons, the concept 
will then be divided into natural commons (with finite resources) and artifi-
                                                
476 Bailey, Farrell & Mattei (eds.), Protecting Future Generations Through Commons. 
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cial/human commons (with, potentially, infinite resources). The artificial com-
mons is connected to the wider A2K project and for the purposes of this par-
ticular study artworks are studied as knowledge sources. The study has up until 
this point provided a legal philosophical critique of current jurisprudential and 
legal constructions and their functions, as well as their possibilities. At the same 
time, it has also pointed out the legal potential in conceiving of, constructing 
and dealing with constellation- or cluster concepts such as the commons. From 
this chapter on we thus move on from a critical to a constructive part of the 
study, to the clinic,477, namely creating a jurisprudential approach to the legal 
concept of the commons, and more precisely the cultural commons.  
A certain critique of the existing commons definitions will also be presented. 
The definition provided by Hardin for instance, it will be argued, focuses too 
heavily on the economical individual and on nature-based commons. Ostrom’s 
(and Ostrom and Hess’) approach to the commons can also be criticised within 
the context of this study as it is in a way too open and can be destructive to un-
derlying ownership rights, as well as it particularly focuses on the ownership is-
sue, and envisions the commons as a communal resource which is owned and 
managed in common. The definition presented in the Bailey, Farrell and Mattei 
study478 presents the commons within the property law paradigm, which shall 
also be discussed. The rhizomatic approach to the commons, as it has become 
apparent, attempts to find a way beyond all these types of either/or definitions 
and argues for an “and… and”479 approach, creating connections between all of 
them. Taking into account that the concept of the commons is from the begin-
ning an economical concept, one that can have certain ‘tragedy’ inscribed in its 
very nature, it will then be linked through rhizomatic theory to various legal 
concepts.  
Therefore, discussing the commons inadvertently means that property, 
forms of ownership and property rights must be mentioned and placed within 
the access context of this analysis. Ultimately the discussion about the com-
mons is also a question about what is owned in private, public and/or what is 
managed in common.  
Studies of the commons are habitually also framed as issues that concern the 
public spaces and what can be openly accessed in the public sphere for citizens. 
This chapter will in its second part study the commons within the context of 
the public spaces and in its third part arrive at the commons paradigm as pro-
posed here, within the rhizomatic context of this research project. 
 
                                                
477 See Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, (trans.) Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. 
Greco, London, Verso (1998). 
478 Bailey, Farrell & Mattei (eds.), Protecting Future Generations Through Commons. 
479 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 27. 
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5.1 PROPERTY AND COMMONS 
In the book Common as Air, Lewis Hyde writes that “[h]ow we imagine property 
is how we imagine ourselves.”480 This chapter begins precisely there i.e. the im-
agination of property and how such conceptions affect how we imagine the 
commons.  
There are a number approaches to property and property rights that have 
been applied historically in jurisprudence as well as in property law. Since this 
project utilises Hardt and Negri’s concept of the commons, I have chosen to 
follow their particular description and division of property. That is not to say 
that property or property rights are a focus of this work, on the contrary, in or-
der to arrive at the concept of the cultural commons, and the wider theoretical 
concept the commons, it is imperative to present a succinct theoretical frame-
work and how Hardt and Negri arrive at their commons concept.  
In his search to define the commons Michael Hardt arrives at it by simulta-
neously analysing the dominant forms of property throughout history. Hardt 
begins with immovable property (land, agriculture, rural economy) the historically 
dominant form of property of agricultural societies, and moves on to movable 
property that dominated the industrial society (chattel, commodity, industrial 
production), and eventually arrives at what he refers to as immaterial property that 
he claims dominates today’s digital information society (intellectual and biopo-
litical production). Hardt481 divides property in three categories: 
 
• Property in the agricultural society: Immovable property (land); 
• Property in the industrial society: Material movable property (chattel); 
and 
• Property in the digital knowledge society: Immaterial property (intellec-
tual and biopolitical resources) 
 
I shall be using this trinity, following Hardt, in order to initiate the discussions 
regarding the commons. I also want to examine and give more prominence to, 
that which Hardt only mentions in passing namely the fact that a dominant legal 
field simultaneously strengthens and enables the existence of the said dominant 
property, enabling its dominant position. 
While this is a historically chronological overview, because it is how Hardt 
presents it, and also because there is a didactic benefit in presenting the domi-
nant properties and laws chronologically and to follow the changes in legal rea-
soning throughout time, it is applied only briefly in order to present Hardt’s ar-
gument.  
                                                
480 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 26. 
481 Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’. 
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When the commons is discussed Hardt claims that there are usually one of two, 
quite different, concepts that are being referred to:   
1) Either the NATURAL COMMONS that comprises of goods 
such as land, water, air;  
 
2) Or the HUMAN COMMONS that comprises of language, 
knowledges, ideas, images, as well as, affects in this second, man-
made, category482.  
 
The notion of the commons, it could be claimed, is a sphere or a space, physical 
as well as virtual, that somehow affects people and their quality of life, a space 
that we as human beings share, and need to share, in order to function and lead 
a good life. As it has already been argued in chapter 1 above, access to resources 
and access to knowledge within the context of the A2K movement are both 
firmly associated with the commons. Equitable access to resources and 
knowledge thus allows human beings to not only survive but to also have a 
                                                
482 Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’. Hardt, in his Marxist analysis, is not the only one 
to make such claims that as the society develops so do the forms of property. See also Law-
rence C. Becker, ‘Review: Too Much Property The Right to Private Property. by Jeremy Wal-
dron; A Theory of Property. by Stephen A. Munzer’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, XXI (1992) 
196-206 and Sukhninder Panesar ‘Theories of Private Property’ in Modern Property Law, Denning 
Law Journal, 15 Denning Law Journal (2000). Since Hardt and Negri’s writings are used 
throughout this chapter, I am here focusing on Hardt’s analysis for the sake of consistence. 
There have been other definitions of the commons, one of the more prominent ones is the 
one introduced by Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom which they describe as a complex bun-
dle of rights that include access rights, extraction rights, management rights, exclusion rights 
and alienation rights see e.g. (eds.) Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Knowledge 
as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, MIT Press, (2007), see also Hyde, Common as Air, p. 28. I 
will return to Hess/Ostrom below. Here I have chosen to concentrate on Hardt and Negri’s 
definition because the clear distinction between natural and artificial commons, which is very 
appropriate for the purpose of this particular project. Lewis Hyde also defines the commons 
in a very interesting way as: 
The Right to Use (Action, the right to act) 
The commoner who acts on that right (Person) 
The land where the right is exercised (Physical Place)  
The notion of the right to act in Hyde is very appealing, and that a commons is a kind of prop-
erty in which more than one person has a right of action, and he then adds complexity to it 
and asserts that commons is not just that but a social regime for managing a collective re-
source. Hyde, Common as Air, pp. 40-44. I shall be returning to Hyde’s writings, even though I 
am tempted to problematise his notion of the “person” and “physical place” as well as “prop-
erty”, which I shall refer from doing further than for instance in the case of Bruno Schulz. 
There, I problemise the notion of a unified “person” or “legal subject”, as well as the “physical 
place”. Hyde himself is of course aware of this, and he only begins in the agrarian commons to 
later on continue to explore art and ideas. Other than the very interesting action right, my view 
is that also Hyde’s approach to the commons is very similar to Hardt and Negri’s. 
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quality of life. Such an Aristotelian notion, i.e. the ability to live a good life, a life 
of dignity, forms the backdrop of this chapter.483  
 
5.1.1 IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AND LAND LAW 
The significance of immovable property in Europe and European legislation 
dates all the way back to Roman law. Ever since, there exists a powerful divi-
sion in law, a seemingly insurmountable jurisprudential divide. 
Only free men were able to own land in Roman law. As was already hinted 
in the Bruno Schulz case above, according to those legal principles human be-
ings who were not free male citizens, much like objects, were deemed to be 
chattel because they were not able to own land, and legally they were seen as at-
tached to the land of the landowner. They had to be subject to a landowner’s 
protection in order to be granted the status of a legal subject.484  
Immobile property is characterised by the paradigm of agricultural and rural 
society where the economy relies on the land and its natural resources. The im-
mobile property is a static form of property, which is based on (Occidental, if 
we are to briefly interject with Deleuze and Guattari) notions of cultivation and 
exploitation of land and the wealth that stems from it. Immobile-property-
dependent economies are therefore often referred to as agrarian economies and 
the rural paradigm around which the entire society is structured dominates.  
If the phenomenon is studied historically, it can be discerned that the land-
owners generated profit from the agrarian exploitation of land and by renting 
estates to tenants.485 The production of wealth is thus organised by relying on 
income structures stemming from the exploitation of land, and tending the land 
with manual labour. More often than not, manual labour meant labour provided 
by slaves, who were, once again, deemed to be chattel, attached to land as any 
other tool, machine or object. Generally, it is the access to these kinds of pro-
portions of manual labour based on slavery that underpins the entire expansion 
and the context of the Roman Empire as well as Roman law. 
This is explained by the so-called “occupational theory”486 something, which 
was initially developed in legal doctrine by Hugo Grotius487 and then by Samuel 
                                                
483 For further comment on Aristotle and the notion of the commons see Anna Di Robilant, 
‘Property and deliberation: a new type of common ownership’ in (eds.) Bailey, Farrell and 
Mattei, Protecting Future Generations Through Commons, pp. 74 aa. 
484 On the legal subject see chapter 2 above, section Luftmensch. 
485 Dennis P. Kehoe, Law and the Rural Economy in the Roman Empire, The University of Michi-
gan Press, Ann Arbor, (2007). 
486 Although the occupational theory can be developed further and is very interesting particu-
larly in terms of indigenous people’s rights to land, it will not be further developed here. But 
see e.g. Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal Review 408 in which the 
High Court of Australia recognised the communal native title of the Meriam people to land on 
Murray Island.  
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Pufendorf488. It presupposes a quasi-religious notion of land initially owned in 
common and then given to man ‘on loan’ by the will of God. Blackstone com-
ments on it in the following manner:  
 
[t]he earth… and all things therein, are the general property of mankind, 
exclusive of other beings, from the immediate gift of the Creator... all was 
in common among them, and that every one took from the public stock to 
his own use such things as his immediate necessities required.489  
 
Thus, as per the occupational theory, the individual who is the first to occupy a 
part of the common (land), or who occupies territory and people (enslaves oth-
ers, making them unfree), will always be seen as the rightful owner of that 
which has been passed on from God to man.490 By the act of enclosure man 
creates ownership of land and chattel attached to it. One additional principle 
can also be discerned, namely that of the invested labour.491 Of course this can be 
framed within the Lockean understanding of property and labour, and it is a di-
version that will be elaborated upon in 5.1.2 below. 
The paradigm of immobile property is based on exploitation of land and is 
dependent on rent, instead of one-off “profit” or “growth”. Hardt concludes 
his analysis of immobile property by summarising that in the rural paradigm the 
person who is the investor in such an economy will always be external to the 
production and the organisation of production forces and labour. The focus lies 
on extracting the value from land and its resources that are already there, by na-
ture. This logic is based on “primitive accumulation”, namely occupation by en-
closure or labour, as opposed to extraction of value from and organisation of 
labour that later dominated the industrial paradigm.  
The dominant legal field that regulated, and still regulates, this occupational 
form of ownership and that closer attention ought to be paid to is land law. Here 
we shall look at the general principles of land law in the paradigm of the West-
ern legal systems in order to discern legal principles of interest in terms of the 
                                                                                                                                   
487 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2. Ch.2, 1,4-5, (trans.) Kelsey, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, (1925 [originally published in 1625]). 
488 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (1703). Available at: 
https://archive.org/details/oflawofnaturenat00pufe. Last accessed 20th March 2014.  
489 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. II. para 1, 4 vols., 
Oxford University Press, 1765-9; rep. University of Chicago Press, (1979), quoted in Panesar 
‘Theories of Private Property’, p. 116. 
490 This is of course classical property theory, that we can see also in e.g. John Locke, Two 
Treatises On Government (1690) Book II;. In common law see the principal case Pierson v. Post 
3 Caines. R.175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1805) that appears to distinguish two principles of occupation, 
the act of enclosure and invested labour.  
491 See. e.g. Pierson v Post 3 Caines. 
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commons, particularly principles such as the rights of passage, wayleaves492, as 
well as, conversely, trespassing.493 Other interesting legal principles to comment 
upon from an immovable property and land law paradigms are tenancy, ease-
ments, servitudes and the like, all of which could be beneficial to bear in mind 
when discussing the cultural commons and immaterial property below. I will al-
so consider the different forms of exclusions and enclosures of certain spaces 
by e.g. fencing, whereby parts of the land that were initially held in common be-
come owned by the act of occupation and can thus only be privately accessible 
(e.g. by a right of way). That it is possible to find indispensable knowledge in 
land law, and the realm of the natural commons, and their general principles 
that spill over from the natural commons into the artificial commons will, if it is 
not already so, become obvious. 
I want to keep making these connections using Deleuze and Guattari’s rhi-
zomatic theory and nomadic method, following the discussions carried out 
above in Volume I. Establishing all these various connections will carry the dis-
cussion forward, onto other plateaus, and show that what we are really discuss-
ing when we are studying the cultural commons, might not be as foreign for the 
legal sphere as it might initially seem, particularly if we are making connections 
between various relevant concepts. The idea of the commons is in fact not that 
new and unexplored as a legal phenomenon, as it may have been assumed, it is 
just a matter of acknowledging its potentiality. Even if it is, primarily, a medieval 
principal, the discussion really ought to begin in Roman land law, and continue 
all the way to the present day and the digital knowledge society in searching for 
the many legal justifications for a cultural commons. 
I also want to discuss the passage of time and the evolution of the property 
forms that are consecutively enabled by law. Therefore, the natural commons 
must be where we begin in order to, firstly, show the already existing legal logic 
that stems from land law, and also where I draw inspiration from, in terms of 
how to later distinguish the artificial commons that might be more difficult to 
broach.   
In his analysis of property forms and the commons Hardt is obviously con-
ducting a Marxist reading of property. In accordance with Marx he concedes 
that the dominance of immobile forms of property stretched from the Roman 
Empire and did not really end until the mid nineteenth century494 when the 
dominant form shifted after the industrial revolution to the industrially pro-
duced mobile property took place.  
 
                                                
492 Cf. the concept of “allemansrätten” in Swedish law, see also the Swedish Supreme Court de-
cision NJA 1996 s. 495 and Swedish statutory law 2 kap. 18 § 3 st Regeringsformen, 7 kap. 1 § 
Miljöbalken. 
493 Cf. Wirtén, No Trespassing. 
494 Hardt, ‘Commons in communism’, p. 347. 
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5.1.1.1 RIGHT OF WAY AND RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS 
Before arriving at the movable property and the commodities paradigm of the 
industrialisation let us consider the legal reasoning behind the creation of cer-
tain conditions for ownership of land so that the natural commons can be ca-
tered for. Particularly the principles of way rights and easements ought to be 
stressed where access to the commons is enabled without, for that sake, (seri-
ously) denting the underlying ownership of land and demonstrate how there al-
ready are existing legal tools developed for this more complex, and not at all bi-
nary, logic.  
Legally, it has never been a problem to limit the property rights in land when 
it comes to various rights of passage and rights of way. Quite the contrary, it 
has been argued, historically even in our day, that it is a sensible, logical, incon-
venience on the part of the owner, one that does not diminish his enjoyment of 
his land or the economical worth therein. This is common(s) sense, if we are all 
to enjoy the good life we must be accustomed to resources that are held in 
common, to be able to build roads, enjoy nature, fresh air, and so forth, inter-
ests that have always been premiered in law, while nonetheless managing to up-
hold the strength of the underlying ownership of land. Professor Eric T. 
Freyfogle even phrased it as such that the public access to nature must be seen 
as the underlying primary right, or as the de facto state of nature, while the pri-
vate ownership of land must be seen as an encroachment on such a primary 
state.495 The private right is thus understood as a social construction put in 
place to regulate the already given openness and to delimit the already existing 
state of nature that is open to all, and not the other way around.496 
Some argue that these way-right or easement interests are so called ‘soft val-
ues’ that are incorporated to balance the ‘hard’ property right. These are values 
that mainly promote public health and recreation.497 The aim here is to show 
that while this might be true to a certain extent, these are not the only values 
that can be generated with a commons-based legislation. I will attempt to 
demonstrate, that there are some certainly ‘hard’ economical benefits that can 
be achieved with a commons solution if the focus is placed on the commons 
and access to the private property is granted, as opposed to creating shared, 
communitarian or even self-governed ownership of property. This was particu-
larly apparent when the right of way was established in order to e.g. build mo-
torways on private property. Strengthening the public infrastructure and build-
ing motorways generated an increase of wealth both on a social level as well as 
                                                
495 The Common Core of European Private Law, Annual Meeting in Torino, Italy, November 
2013. 
496 Professor Eric T. Freyfogle in his keynote address, The Common Core of European Pri-
vate Law, Annual meeting in Torino, Italy, November 2013. 
497 See e.g. Åsa Åslund, Allemansrätten och Marknyttjande, Studier av ett Rättsinstitut, (PhD thesis), 
Lindköping University, Sweden, (2008), p 22. 
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on the individual, private level. I will attempt to transport (pun intended) this 
type of reasoning that lies behind the principle of the rights of way to land 
when discussing the rights of access to artworks in the artificial commons. The 
discussion will conclude in the amount of inconvenience that can be deemed to 
be the appropriate scope of inconvenience that granting such access might entail, and 
the legal ability in creating and upholding it.  
The access-based analysis is not necessarily one of creating usufructs498; in-
stead it will be a discussion concerning exclusions, enclosures, stints and the 
span of privileges that come with an exclusivity rights structure.  
 
5.1.2 MOVABLE PROPERTY AND PROPERTY LAW 
It was not until the industrial revolution, Hardt claims, that a paradigm shift was 
possible and the dominance of immobile property shifted to a new form of 
property: mobile property. The industrial production strengthened the econom-
ical as well as legal significance of chattel, so that it could be exploited in a new 
way. Naturally, it also meant that the feudal structures slowly merged into bour-
geois structures and the monetary institutions obtained a strengthened symboli-
cal significance. With the new organisation of industrial labour everything could 
be calculated in monetary terms, even time.  
While the immobile property paradigm had been permeated with the no-
tions of parochialism and stasis499 (a “sedentary form of possession” in Deleu-
zian terms500), ownership of movable property constituted a new form of 
movement, one that also generated a new type of wealth, based on commerce 
(“nomadic form of possession” in Deleuzian terms501). The profit-incentive in 
the new paradigm was no longer necessarily tied to extracting as much wealth as 
possible from the immobile land, but rather extracting wealth from labour and 
investing it into mobile commodities. Though we saw above that occupational 
theory can be used to explain the ownership of land, when we move into the 
industrial paradigm, the theory of labour becomes more pertinent.  
John Locke502 and the ideas that had coloured the revolutions before indus-
trialism sought to argue that there was a natural connection between objects, 
the labour people invested in appropriating them, and ownership. Thus, Han-
nah Arendt writes:  
                                                
498 A legal concept that stems from common law and means something similar to a right of 
enjoyment that enables a holder to derive profit or benefit from property that either is titled to 
another person or which is held in concurrent estate, as long as the property is not damaged or 
destroyed.  
499 Hardt, ‘Common in Communism’, p. 347. 
500 See chapter 7. 
501 See chapter 7. 
502 John Locke, Two Treatises On Government (1690) Book II. 
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Locke, in order to save labour from its manifest disgrace of producing only 
‘things of short duration’ had to introduce money – a ‘lasting thing which 
men keep without spoiling – a kind of deus ex machina without which the la-
bouring body, in its obedience to the life process, could never have become 
the origin of anything so permanent and lasting as property, because there 
are no ‘durable things’ to be kept to survive the activity of labouring pro-
cess.503  
 
Here, ownership becomes linked to labour through money and a natural law 
idea, an idea of a right to private property that human beings have as a result of 
the sheer fact of being human.  However, the only distinction between owning 
land and owning things was that when it comes to the second type, appropria-
tion does not necessarily happen by the act of occupation but instead by invest-
ing labour into objects that were initially held in common and then entering into 
commerce with them.504  
Following the Lockean understanding that if labour is the only way through 
which we can appropriate things that are not fixed to land, it becomes clear that 
man cannot appropriate objects endlessly, since there are limitations due to 
scarcities in nature. That which exists on Earth is what can be appropriated and 
shared. The notions of scarcity and with that also exclusivity of things are two 
guiding principles of the industrial production. However, the significance of 
money acquires a new role, there were no similar scarcity limitations on money 
as there had been for natural goods, money could, in theory, be produced end-
lessly.  
Physical labour therefore became the chief amenity being traded with during 
the industrial era. As the large-scale industry eventually replaced agriculture as 
the hegemonic form of economic production, Hardt explains,505 it once and for 
all prevailed over the rural economy as the dominant form of production. It 
meant that the new form of production now over-spilled and coloured the older 
form of production. Agriculture had to become more like industry in order to 
still generate wealth, it had to become industrialised in order to still derive profit 
and it also had to adhere to and adopt to the “regimes of mechanisation” that 
marked the industrial paradigm such as discipline, work rhythms, working 
days/hours, other industrial temporalities such as leisure/holiday times, and so 
forth.506 
                                                
503 [original emphasis], Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd Ed, The University of Chica-
go Press, (1998, [originally published in 1958]), p. 102. 
504 Locke, Two Treatises On Government, Second Treatise of Government Ch. 5. para.26. 
505 Hardt, ‘Common in Communism’, p. 348 
506 Ibid. 
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The tendency that is interesting is this very colouring that occurs when one 
form of production overtakes another, forcing the old paradigm to adopt cer-
tain traits previously unnatural to it. However, what Hardt does not expressly 
claim, but that is equally fascinating is that the opposite might also be corre-
spondingly intriguing to study. It is interesting to query whether, in a transition-
al period, as the new form of production and a new dominant form of property 
is emerging, the new form is initially organising itself in a similar fashion to the 
old paradigm, by pretending, or assuming to be, more like the previous produc-
tion form than it is in actuality. For instance, the early industry depended on 
natural resources such as mining and forests that thither had been subject to the 
agricultural economy. As one dominant form of production gradually morphs 
into another, lines become blurred and become impossible to draw as to where 
the one production form ends and the other begins. It can be observed that 
such paradigm shifts also produce hybrid forms of production, that are some-
where in between, it can either be that the new form colours the old, or that some 
traits of the old linger and remain embedded in the new.    
While Hardt and Negri are following a Marxist logic in their description of 
the development of property, they are also using some Deleuzian concepts. 
Deleuze’s understanding of space can then be connected to this. Deleuze and 
Guattari divide space between smooth space (unterritorialised, free, space) and 
striated space (territorialised, ordered, governed, space): 
 
[…] the sea is the smooth space par excellence, and at the same time the 
first one to be confronted by the demands of a more strict striation. The 
problem does not arise in proximity to the land. In contrast, it is during 
deep sea navigation that the striation of the sea occurs. The maritime space 
is striated through two inventions, one astronomical and the other geo-
graphical: the bearing, obtained through a set of calculations based on the ex-
act observation of the stars and the sun; and the map, which intertwines the 
meridians and parallels, longitudes and latitudes, plotting known and un-
known regions onto a grid. […] It is as if the sea had been, not only the ar-
chetype of the smooth space, but also the first of these spaces to undergo a 
gradual striation, gridding it in one place, then another, on one side and 
then on another. The commercial cities have participated in this striation, 
and were often innovators, but only nation-states could bring it to comple-
tion, raise it to the global level of a ‘politics of science’. A dimensionality is 
increasingly established and subordinates directionality, or superimposes it-
self on it. […] It is without doubt for this reason that the sea, the archetype 
of the smooth space, has also been the archetype of all the striations of 
smooth space: the striation of the desert; the striation of air space; the stria-
tion of the stratosphere. […] It was at sea that smooth space was first sub-
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jugated and one found a model for the laying-out and the imposition of 
striated space, a model that has since been used elsewhere.507  
 
The smooth and striated spaces shall be further discussed in chapter 7, but it 
can already be stated here that with an unexpected occurrence, through a line of 
flight, something happens in the transition between two property paradigms. A 
deterritorialising act (here e.g. industrial revolution) takes flight into the new, 
unregulated, smooth space (previously unknown economic form of production), 
but through acts of reterritorialisation (the industrialisation of agriculture and 
the agricultural dependence of the industry) the line of flight is then moved 
back into the striated space and once again territorialised, at least for the time 
being.  
Let us then shift the focus back to law. We are beginning to see the practical 
potential of the Deleuzeoguattarian theory as well as the tendencies, the lines of 
flight, that are appearing more clearly. Thus, the dominant legal fields of the in-
dustrial society provide further insights.  
The property law evolved away from focusing mainly on land ownership 
and placed larger importance on personalty (in common law) or mova-
bles/movable property (in civil law). The industry was creating commodities 
and it was no longer just about the question of who owns the land, or who 
owns the industrial production but indeed who owns that which is industrially 
produced and then sold on to consumers. Various sales of goods acts started to 
emerge at this time, and the exploitation of chattel became underpinned by a 
strengthened significance of the free, unfettered contract, which became an in-
creasingly significant legal instrument. It is through entering into contracts that 
labour could be exploited and it was the very legal instrument through which 
employers and employees could agree upon the terms, and ownership, of la-
bour. It is the same instrument that facilitated commercial exploitation of chat-
tel as consumer products. 
 
5.1.3 IMMATERIAL PROPERTY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
We are still not quite sure which dominant form of property might be the domi-
nant today or which type of ownership has succeeded the industrial paradigm. 
Maybe they are several. However, many argue that it might be the finance or in-
formation based property paradigms. Hardt, together with Negri, concurs with 
this claim, but refers to it instead as immaterial and biopolitical property production. 
Among other things, they point to the fact that fewer people work in factories, 
that the labour market is more global, and that the type of goods being sold are 
                                                
507 [original emphasis throughout], Leif Dahlberg. ‘Pirates, Partisans and Politico-Judicial 
Space’, in Law & Literature, Vol. 23, Issue 2, pp. 262-281, and Deleuze/Guattari, Thousand Plat-
eaus, pp. 529-530. 
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increasingly less industrial and more immaterial. The new type of goods that 
currently seem to dominate, and that arguably might have dominated for quite 
some decades now, are based on “knowledge, code, language, social relation-
ships, affects, and the like”.508   
This is not a controversial statement, quite the contrary, this seems to be the 
point that everybody more or less seem to be able to agree upon that at least 
there is “a tendency for immaterial or biopolitical production to emerge in the 
hegemonic position, which industry used to hold.”509 Defining immaterial and 
biopolitical products could be a research project in its own right, and the point 
here is not to engage in such an analysis. The products that are studied here, i.e. 
artworks, are unquestionably one example of immaterial products and the legal 
rights connected to them are within the sphere of the intellectual and intangible. 
I shall continue using the approach to artworks that has been presented in 
chapter 3, and treat artworks as immaterial products in the sense how Hardt 
and Negri use the term.  
The traits that the immaterial products do have, and that Hardt also points 
to, is that they are based on ideas, images, information. These products can be pri-
vatised, materialised and certainly also controlled by the institute of property. 
Conducting the same form of analysis that I undertook above, it is also here 
apparent that the “over spilling” or “colouring” of the two dominant forms of 
ownership and the creation of a hybrid form in the breaking point between two 
paradigms takes place. While it is possible to privatise, materialise and control 
certain aspects of the immaterial products, it is not as simple or straightforward 
as it was to privatise the industrial commodity products. The same actors are 
still present in more or less the same guises as when they emerged during the 
industrial paradigm: the large scale factory, the labourer, the consumer…  How-
ever, there are some other actors that are unaccounted for in this round-up of 
the usual suspects that cannot be fitted as easily in the old paradigm, the inven-
tors, the artists, the hackers, the bloggers, the occupants, the public, the pi-
rates…  
Therefore a conflict with this form of property and the problem keep grow-
ing and multiplying, creating a grid-lock whose only solution seems to be to fine 
or even incarcerate consumers when they step over or challenge the boundaries 
of immaterial product based property and the laws that fence it off and enclose 
it. The difficulty in safeguarding, enforcing and policing the ownership rights 
tied to immaterial products is evident. In analysing this tendency closely we can 
once again, not only see that the industrial paradigm is colouring the immateri-
al/biopolitical production paradigm, but that also the reverse is happening, 
namely that even “traditional” industrial production is now forced to adopt 
                                                
508 Hardt, ‘Common in Communism’, p. 349. 
509 Ibid. See also Manuel Castellas, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd Ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 
(2000). 
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some of the emerging paradigm traits such as informationalisation, dependence 
on knowledge/code, and also incorporation of aspects such as affects, experi-
ence and care. The notion of “experience”510 is treated as an additional trait to 
tangible as well as intangible products, regardless of them being a car, a TV, a 
cup of coffee, a holiday, an event or any form of entertainment.  
 
5.2 SPACE 
As Hannah Arendt has shown, in early Greece and Rome only those who 
loved an active, public life were thought to have entered their full humanity. 
Private life was where the demands of necessity were met, especially biolog-
ical necessity. In private we are born and die, get fed and get clothed, and 
are nursed from sickness into health. Public life arises from this ground – 
the life of art, philosophy, and politics, all those activities proper to social 
beings and impossible for the solitary.511 
 
5.2.1 PUBLIC SPHERES: HABERMAS 
In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer discussed the differ-
ence in terms of communication between a radio and a telephone512 - the first a 
one-sided monologue-type of communication and the other a two-sided (at 
least) dialogue-type of communication. When Habermas wrote about the public 
sphere and the public spaces he must have taken his first steps somewhere in 
this very analogy513, namely, for communication to happen in more or less open 
public space at least the smallest component is required, a dialogue between two 
people will always be necessary. Communication is the bedrock of society in his 
democratic theory.  
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas traces the consti-
tution and the development of various versions of public spheres. He begins 
with the Greek polis and its agora, a public space peopled by propertied, educat-
ed, free men that could take part in learned exchanges of ideas with each other. 
He ends up in the Western European media age where advertising and journal-
                                                
510 On the notion of experience see e.g. Slavoj Zizek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, London, 
Verso, (2009): “[W]e primarily buy commodities neither on account of their utility nor as sta-
tus symbols; we buy them to get the experience provided by them, we consume them in order to 
render our lives pleasurable and meaningful” [my emphasis], p. 52. 
511 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 183. 
512 Adorno/Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 122. 
513 Although it is well known that neither Adorno nor Horkheimer supervised Habermas doc-
toral thesis, where he first discussed the public sphere. They did not find it to be sufficiently 
critical and as a result Habermas had to submit his thesis to Wolfgang Abendroth in Marburg 
instead, see e.g. ed. Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Mass. ; London : 
MIT Press, (1992) p. 4. 
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ism frame the public spaces in a wider sense and where debates on larger scale 
take place. Habermas’ writings on media in particular, such as film, television 
and radio understood as public spaces are thus most relevant here. He shows 
that what is seen as monologue and what is seen as dialogue is far more difficult 
to define in the media age than it has been historically.  
The underlying principle of Habermas’ study of the public sphere was firstly 
to demonstrate that often when the concept of public is being addressed; it is in 
fact the bourgeois public, very much dominated by bourgeois values and imper-
atives that is being referred to. His study sought to counterbalance such tenden-
cies by introducing a wider notion of the public sphere that could be placed 
within the paradigm of the Marxist theory. Habermas did not focus on the gov-
erned subject that was overwhelmed by the administrated mass culture that 
Adorno and Horkheimer had been writing about (and painting black when 
looking back at the rise of fascism), but rather on “an account of intersubjective 
communicative processes and their emancipatory potential”.514 Habermas was 
arguing that public discourse, what he would later refer to as communicative ac-
tion,515 was equally relevant in the coordination of human life as were the state 
powers and the market economies.516 
Habermas was also fascinated by how the private individuals integrated and 
acted within the public spheres. In The Public Sphere and Encyclopaedia Article from 
1964 Habermas wrote that the public “is the realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to 
all citizens”.517 The public sphere is formed, he continues, when private individ-
uals assemble to form a public body. That means that the communication that 
happens within the public sphere will always be connected to some of the fun-
damental rights, such as the right of assembly, right of information, freedom of 
speech and so forth. Habermas did not equate the public, meaning the state 
governed [Öffentlichkeit], with public in his sense, which is generated by individu-
als that communicate inside the public sphere. The public sphere that Haber-
mas addressed is not an institution as such but a space for communication.  
In order to guarantee the existence of the public sphere there were norms 
and modes of behaviour that had to be ensured, he argued, such as:  
 
 
 
 
                                                
514 Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 5 
515 Habermas, The Theory of the Commuicative Action. 
516 Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 6 
517 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere and Encyclopedia Article’, in New German Critique, 
No. 3, pp. 49-55, (trans.) Sara and Frank Lennox, (1974 [originally published in 1964]), pp. 
220-226. 
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• General accessibility to it 
• Elimination of all privileges in terms of access and participation, and 
• Discovery of general norms and legitimisations that govern it518  
 
Were we to follow this Habermasian logic legally, it would mean that there are 
certain inherent inequalities built in within the notion of the public sphere.  
Those ought to be addressed legally, for instance by enabling wider participa-
tion in order to guarantee democratic accessibility to the public sphere in which 
ideas can be communicated and opinions formed without any restrictions or 
obstacles to the accessibility.  
Habermas examined two types of social models in which the public sphere 
exists: the liberal model of the public sphere and the public sphere in the social welfare state 
mass democracy. The first model stems from the eighteenth century, which is the 
time around which, Habermas argues, the first liberal public sphere administrat-
ed by law with a demonstrable political function was constituted.519 With an in-
creasing importance of the commodity exchange, constitution based states had 
been emerging where new national constitutional laws were guaranteeing certain 
individual rights. The precondition for this, Habermas continued, was the devel-
oping market that tended to be increasingly liberalised with a necessity for pri-
vate people to be left to their own practices, free from state intervention, to in-
dependently act as legal subjects. In that sense there was a growing private 
sphere that came to be governed by the commercial trading laws. Laws were be-
ing adapted for the market. That also meant that social relations assumed “the 
form of exchange relationships”.520 Legal transactions were contract-based and 
the growing body of private law encouraged this. Within the liberal paradigm, it 
was largely assumed, and this would come to linger for a long time, that the 
contracting parties were equal and that they were acting with equal competenc-
es. Law enabled this type of activity.521 
The liberal market-based sphere had traits that were both private (in that it 
was governed by private law) and public (in that it happened outside the tradi-
tional private sphere, oikos) and it rested on a foundation of fundamental rights 
and civil liberties. States could not meddle in the private affairs of people. Ha-
bermas clarified this by stating that “the codifications guaranteed the institu-
tions of private property and, in connection with it, the basic freedoms of con-
tract, trade, and inheritance”522 remained free from state influences and inter-
ference. Those concepts of contract, trade and, indeed, inheritance are very in-
                                                
518 [my emphasis] Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere and Encyclopedia Article’, p. 50. 
519 See e.g. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 73. 
520 Ibid. p. 74 
521 Ibid. p. 75.  
522 Ibid. 
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teresting for the purposes of this research project as we can see how the proper-
ty paradigm grows over the course of history at the same time as it colonises 
certain aspects of the public spaces or even life in general, the colonisation of 
the lifeworld in Habermas’ terminology.523  
While the commercial private sphere was on the rise, the public sphere did 
not disappear – it merely changed forms and moved into comparatively closed 
off spaces e.g. salons, but also to less hierarchical realms such as coffee hous-
es,524 town squares and other similar places. The ability to discuss and com-
municate with each other arguably also elevated the quality of the artworks that 
were exposed to public discussions and public commentary.  
The new society brought with it a new form of public sphere,525 but interest-
ingly, the public sphere could increasingly be found physically indoors as op-
posed to the Greek and Roman forum-based public spaces that were outside in 
the open. Side by side, as trading grew, followed by commercial competition 
and commercial conflicts, the trading sphere moved outdoors while it at the 
same time required a private legal framework in order to function. The public 
spaces now existed indoors but still promoted an open communication and 
sharing of ideas, opinions and knowledge while the private spheres existed out-
side in the squares and markets but promoted closed off individuality, confiden-
tiality, secrecy and so on.  
As the nation states were changing in form, driven by the transformation 
from the Liberal State into the Social-Welfare State that many European nations 
were experiencing, so too did the public spaces get assigned with a new role in 
the new society. As the mode of state governance and constitutions were chang-
ing so did, yet again, the private and public spaces as well as law and the legal 
rights that constituted them: 
 
The injunction-like character of liberal rights corresponded to the following 
ideas: these rights protected from state interference and encroachment 
those areas that in principle were the preserve of private people acting in 
accord with the general rules of the legal system.526  
 
That means that these were negative rights that ensured a minimal protection of 
the individual from any intrusion from the state. With time, positive social 
                                                
523 Habermas, The Theory of the Commuicative Action. 
524 See e.g. Merima Bruncevic & Philip Linné, ‘A Taste of Law and Coffee – From Macro-
cosm to Microcosm’, in Non Liquet: The Westminster Online Working Papers Series, Law and the 
Senses Series: The Taste Issue, 2013, 11-30. 
525 Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 7. 
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rights527 developed with a notion of a different type of state, one that was active 
and nurturing – and that meant that the bourgeois (owner of goods) became 
citoyen528 or homme529 (a human being among other human beings). 
Again, contrary to Adorno/Horkheimer, when Habermas discussed culture 
dissemination in the public spheres of both the Liberal and in the Welfare mod-
el he did not paint an equally bleak picture of it like Adorno/Horkheimer who 
depicted it as part of the fully administrated culture industry, arguing that cul-
ture was more often than not only utilised in order to control and discipline 
people. Even though Habermas too recognises that culture can be an intricate 
and powerful aspect of the public sphere, he rather concentrates on the spaces 
in which it exists: salons, the media and various cultural institutions through 
which art as knowledge can be disseminated, thus also stressing the positive poten-
tial of art and culture. Habermas acknowledges that there are inequalities built in 
within these structures too, and what constitutes a cultural public space has to 
be continuously revisited as time goes by. Culture and the cultural artefacts can 
be, but are not necessarily always, commodified and consequently the spheres in 
which they exist and can be accessed need to be multiplied in order follow the 
lines of flight of culture that occur through time. 
Even though Adorno had scorned The Structural Transformation already when 
it was first published, the critics of Habermas have still maintained that the last 
part of the book is nevertheless largely dependent on Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
concept of the culture industry. Whether or not this is due criticism need not be 
discussed at this point, as we know that the culture industry concept itself has 
also been vastly criticised (as briefly mentioned above as e.g. elitist, exaggerating 
the manipulative powers and controls of this industry and so on530). Habermas 
does use the phrase “refeudalisation”531 when he analyses the mixture of adver-
tising and mass culture “[b]ecause private enterprises evoke in their customers 
the idea that in their consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, 
the state has to ‘address’ its citizens like consumers.”532 That probably indicates 
that even if he does not use Adorno and Horkheimer’s cultural industry con-
cept per se, his understanding of the entertainment and culture industry was, if 
nothing else, similar or comparable to the one of his two predecessors.  
                                                
527 Although, as Gustafsson asks, is not the concept “social right” a paradox or an anomaly in 
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Habermas’ theory is useful here because of its flexible understanding of 
what constitutes the public. Even if, in times of the digital knowledge society, 
‘public’ may not be an equally appropriate term as commons, the study of the 
commons must at least also consider the notion of the public space and map 
out the various models and transformations of the concept of what has histori-
cally constituted the public and how it has changed so that it can correspond to 
a more complex concept of the commons today. 
Each era has its own type of public sphere, and conversely, to tie it with the 
first section of this chapter, each era produces new types of ownership rights, as 
for instance Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite clearly have shown: 
 
 
 
Era Emergent Property Right 
Primordial/Ancient Patriarchal. Men over women and chil-
dren 
Feudalism Lord over land and vassals 
Centralized State King over taxes 
Imperialism Major powers over colonies, slaves 
Industrial Capitalism Capitalists over labour and surplus value 
Finance Capitalism  Bankers and investors over securities, 
bonds derivatives, interest 
Information feudalism Infogopolies, biogopolies over ab-
stract objects 
533 
What is particularly interesting is that Drahos and Braithwaite show that there is 
a type of feudalism that reappears in the information age and the digital 
knowledge society. This can be connected with Habermas’ assertion that even 
in the welfare state model there is a refeudalisation of the public sphere that oc-
curs, or reterritorialisation of the smooth spaces in the terms of Deleuze and 
Guattari. 
This particular meeting point of ownership structures and public sphere 
structures leads inevitably to the commons. 
 
5.3 THE COMMONS 
Having followed and distinguished the particularities of private ownership and 
public spaces we now must consider the commons in more detail. There are a 
number of scholars that have addressed the issue of the commons from various 
                                                
533 Entire table taken from Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite Information Feudalism, Who 
Owns Knowledge, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, (2002), p. 199. 
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perspectives534, but as already mentioned I shall be using Hardt and Negri’s def-
inition535 and approach to the commons, namely: 
 
By “the common” we mean, first of all, the common wealth of the material 
world – the air, the water, the fruits of the soil, and all nature’s bounty – 
which in classic European political texts is often claimed to be the inher-
itance of the humanity as a whole, to be shared together. We consider the 
common also and more significantly those results of social production, […] 
such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects and so forth. 
This notion of the common does not position humanity separate from na-
ture, as either its exploiter or its custodian, but focuses rather on the prac-
tices of interaction, care, and cohabitation, in a common world, promoting 
the beneficial and limiting the detrimental forms of the common.536  
 
The distinction between what is one’s own, private, (idios) and what is held in 
common (koine) can be linked to the other pair private (oikos) and public (polis). 
In the oikos, the private sphere of the home, we exist as private people. In the 
polis, the public sphere, we exist as citizens. Our rights, duties and responsibili-
ties are different depending on in which sphere we happen to be. As an ironic 
twist of the etymological fate the Greek word for private, idios, also gave rise to 
the modern word ‘idiot’ as the act of dwelling in the private sphere was consid-
ered to be idiotic.537 Deleuze and Guattari also addressed this private Idiot in 
What Is Philosophy. They write in the chapter “Conceptual Personae” the follow-
ing: 
 
[I]t is the Idiot who says ‘I’ and sets up the cogito but who also has the sub-
jective presuppositions or lays the plane. The idiot is the private thinker, 
[…] the private thinker forms a concept with innate forces that everyone 
                                                
534 For the two most significant, in my view, in terms of natural commons, see Elinor Ostrom, 
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press 
(1991 [edition from 2011]), and Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ in Journal of 
Natural Re-sources Policy Research, 1:3, 243-253 (2009, [originally published in 1968]). In terms of 
cultural commons see e.g. Carol Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions 
Of Public Property In The Information Age’, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas. 
535 And while I do use a defined concept here I am in full accordance with Ugo Mattei’s claim 
that “You don’t define bene comune [commons], you fight for them!” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aAi4wwirTYU (2:04-2:07). See also Saki Bailey ‘The ar-
chitecture of commons legal institutions for future generations’, in (eds.) Bailey, Farrell and 
Mattei, Protecting Future Generations Through Commons, p. 112. 
536 [my emphasis], Hardt/Negri, Commonwealth, p. viii. 
537 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 38. See also Hyde, Common as Air, p. 183. 
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possesses on their own account by right (‘I think’). The idiot is a conceptual 
persona.538 
  
Using the rhizomatic approach that was introduced in Volume I further con-
nections will be established between the public and the private, challenging var-
ious binary pairs it gives rise to, here for instance I am consciously linking two 
sets of pairs to show how they form a plateau in order to define the commons, 
and it could be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
This is a simple construct, but it can instantly be made more complex. We can 
add lines of flight to this plateau, using e.g. some of Hannah Arendt’s writings 
in The Human Condition: 
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Hannah Arendt herself recognises that that which is in the common interest is 
not necessarily referable only to the public or the private. She writes: 
 
The medieval concept of the ‘common good’, far from indicating the exist-
ence of the political realm, recognizes only that private individuals have in-
terests in common, material and spiritual, and that they can retain their pri-
vacy and attend to their own interest. What distinguishes this essentially 
Christian attitude towards politics from the modern reality is not so much 
the recognition of a ‘common good’ as the exclusivity of the private sphere 
and the absence of that curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public 
significance what we call ‘society’.539 
 
It is this hybrid realm that commons covers. She makes a clear distinction be-
tween the private and the public, but infers that the common good requires both 
(and not either/or). Thus, we thus keep breaking with binary thinking and con-
tinue to build upon what we shall see below in Hardt and Negri in terms of the 
singularities that make up the common, and thus it cannot be stressed enough 
that the private is not destroyed for the benefit of the common.  
Elsewhere, in a footnote Arendt criticises the French historian Fustel de 
Coulanges for stating in his book Ancient City that the fact that in Greek cities, 
citizens were obliged by law to share their harvest and consume it in common, 
whilst each of them had the absolute uncontested property of his soil, was a 
“singular contradiction”. But is it, though? It is only a singular contradiction if a 
binary based logic is assumed. Arendt concludes her note by indeed writing “it 
is no contradiction, because these two types of property had nothing in com-
mon in ancient understanding”.540  
What is being proposed here is to continue with such understandings of 
property, where it is understood that there are various different types of proper-
ty. And just because somebody somehow once owns them, it does not mean 
that all types of property are commensurable or that they contradict other types 
of access and sharing of it. On the contrary, some types of property can be in-
commensurable, and by comparing them we make such claims that laws, like the 
ancient Greek ones, or for that matter current fundamental rights as in the Dar-
furnica case above, are (on equal footing but) contradictory. That is why the 
overview above in this chapter began with various types of ownership, went 
through public spaces and now the aim is to diversify the concepts of both 
ownership and public space with a discussion of the commons. 
Before we go on then, we can look at a summarising chart in which the dif-
ference between the natural and the artificial commons is schematically present-
                                                
539 [my emphases throughout], Arendt, The Human Condition.  
540 Ibid. p. 30. 
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ed. What was claimed at the beginning of this chapter as the difference between 
the two types of commons is that the natural commons comprises of natural re-
sources such as land, water, air, and that the human or artificial commons com-
prises of language, knowledge, ideas, images, affects. The first one is natural, the 
second one is man-made, artificial. 
 
Type of  
commons 
Natural Artificial 
Definition The Earth and resources 
associated to it 
That which results from hu-
man labour/ 
knowledge/ 
creativity 
Comprises of… Land, forest, water, air, mi-
nerals… 
 
For instance:  
Diamonds, Oil, Lithium, 
Water 
Ideas, language, knowledge, 
affects 
 
For instance: 
Art, software, medicine, but 
also indigenous knowledge, 
genes 
Type of  
dispossession 
 
Theft 
 
Piracy 
 
Profit Type Sale-based 
 
Real Economy -  
Proximity 
Rent-based 
 
Finance Economy - Distance 
Ownership  Object 
 
Exclusive possession 
 
Scarcity 
Right/ 
Privilege 
 
Exclusive right 
 
Can be shared 
 
No scarcity 
Type of  
Appropriation 
Primitive Accumulation 
Accumulation by Dis-
possession 
 
Capturing something that 
exists 
Appropriation of 
subjectivity/ 
 
Social relations 
 
Creating something new 
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Most current discussions concerning the commons, the way it is defined, con-
stituted, governed and developed begin with a reading of Garrett Hardin’s fa-
mous essay The Tragedy of the Commons541 in which he begins by envisioning a 
pasture, where animals graze, that is open to all shepherds. Such an open pas-
ture eventually prompts the egotistic shepherds to overpopulate it and overuse 
it, Hardin argues. These egoistic shepherds will be driven by the unlimited ac-
cess to the pasture that will benefit them. This will lead to overgrazing of the 
pasture, which in turn will result in the destruction of an otherwise fertile land. 
Hardin thus concludes in a much-quoted passage: 
 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him 
to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest 
in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all.542 
 
Hardin was not the only one to analyse the commons in such a way and stress 
the tragedy aspect that may be inherent to it. In Elinor Ostrom’s Governing the 
Commons543 she lists various other similar statements, among them Aristotle, 
who wrote, more than two thousand years before Hardin: 
 
What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon 
it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common inter-
est.544 
 
And Thomas Hobbes too, wrote: 
 
Men (in the state of nature) seek their own good and end up fighting one 
another.545 
 
Clearly, what Hardin and before him Locke and Hobbes, and perhaps even Ar-
istotle, are referring to is the natural commons. As we saw in the table above, 
the various ownership forms of the natural resources are ultimately limited by 
scarcity. There is scarcity in nature, and there is no scarcity, as such, in the arti-
ficial commons, culture and artworks. 
                                                
541 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. 
542 Ibid. p. 246. 
543 Ostrom, Governing the Commons. 
544 Ibid p. 2. 
545 Ibid.  
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5.3.1 THE NATURAL COMMONS 
When Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economy in 2009 for 
“her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”546 the com-
mons as a viable economical concept was fully launched into the mainstream. 
Even though the concept of the commons has medieval roots it was not until 
1968 when Hardin had written ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ that the concept 
was re-introduced as an alternative for “economic governance”, albeit as a non 
desirable one in Hardin’s essay. Hardin only presented it in its “tragic” guise. As 
an ecologist, interested in controlling human population growth, Hardin was in-
tent on discussing what will happen when humans destroy all their resources.547 
Lewis Hyde writes: 
 
Population, as Malthus said, naturally tends to grow ‘geometrically’, or, as 
we would now say, exponentially. In a finite world this means that the per 
capita share of the world’s goods must steadily decrease. Is ours a finite 
world? A fair defence can be put forward for the view that the world is in-
finite; or that we do not know that it is not. But, in terms of the practical 
problems that we must face in the next few generations with the foreseeable 
technology, it is clear that we will greatly increase human misery if we do 
not, during the immediate future, assume that the world available to the ter-
restrial human population is finite. ‘Space’ is no escape.548 
 
Hardin links in this way overpopulation and the fact the goods of the Earth will 
decrease as its population rises. His essay illustrates this particularly by focusing 
the analysis on fisheries. There, Hardin argues, a common resource can exist 
only insofar as the number of “commoners”, i.e. number of people who exploit 
the commons, is limited. Then, and only then, can the common property be a 
beneficial resource. However, if the number increases, or becomes unlimited, 
then the common will crumble, he argues – mainly due to overexploitation. Har-
din presented this theory as a “social dilemma”, if a natural resource, such as 
e.g. fisheries is subject to a commons, it will eventually become overexploited 
and destroyed through extensive usage. 
But, as Lewis Hyde argues, the type of commons presented in Hardin’s essay 
is an “unmanaged common pool resource”.549 In fact, even the medieval com-
mons were of stinted nature, namely, there were limitations in place in terms of 
use. In economical theory, Elinor Ostrom was one of the first scholars to show 
                                                
546 http://www.riksbank.se/en/Press-and-published/Notices/2009/Economics-prize-2009/. 
Last accessed 18th March 2014. 
547 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 34. 
548 [my emphasis] Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, p. 244. 
549 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 35. 
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that a commons does not necessarily have to lead to a tragedy.550 Far from be-
ing a place of “no law” she argues that the commons could function without 
the individual private right or state intervention.551 She discusses in particular 
already existing examples such as pastures in a Swiss village, Turkish fisheries 
and access to irrigation water in Valencian huertas.552 
Ostrom was one of the first economical theorists to challenge the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ when it comes to the commons and provide a solution as to how the 
commons may be governed and managed as an institution. She makes a distinc-
tion between common property and common-pool resources. Common property, 
she argues, is a legal regime that governs jointly owned legal set of rights. 
Common-pool resources, on the other hand, are shared resource systems, eco-
nomic goods, independent of property rights.553 More specifically she explains 
the common-pool resources to be: 
 
A common-pool resource, such as a lake or ocean, an irrigation system, a 
fishing ground, a forest, or the atmosphere, is a natural or man-made re-
source from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource 
is provided, and one person’s consumption of resource units makes those 
units unavailable to others554 
 
Ostrom begins her influential book Governing the Commons555 by presenting the 
common approaches to the commons: as a tragedy, as a prisoner’s dilemma, as 
a collective action, or as “Leviathan”/”privatisation”. These approaches are of-
ten presented “as the only way” she argues – i.e. solutions to the commons 
which may be tragic, but that are the least of all evils. Ostrom then claims fur-
ther that first of all, attempting to claim any one approach to the commons as 
the ‘only’ approach is the first mistake that is made: 
 
The ‘only way’ to solve a commons dilemma is by doing X. Underlying 
such a claim is the belief that X is necessary and sufficient to solve the 
                                                
550 See generally, Ostrom, Governing the Commons. 
551 See e.g. Ugo Mattei, ‘Future Generations now! A commons-based analysis’ in (eds.) Bailey, 
Farrell and Mattei, Protecting Future Generations Through Commons, p.20.  
552 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, pp. 62-63. See also Filippo Valguarnera, ‘Commons: fram-
tid eller rättsligt kätteri?’. 
553 Hess/Ostrom. (eds.) Understanding Knowledge as a Commons, p. 5. 
554 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Coping With Tragedies Of The Commons’, in Annual Review of Political Sci-
ence, (1999). 2:493-535, p. 497.  
555 Ostrom, Governing the Commons. 
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commons dilemma. […] If one recommendation is correct, the other can-
not be. Contradictions cannot both be right.556 
 
She presents a “fifth” approach to the commons. One of the most interesting 
aspects of her study, that are relevant for this research project, is partly the 
above quoted critique of the notion of “one” solution, and partly the fact that 
she advocates various mixtures between public and private rights when it comes 
to common property resources. She also makes a number of findings in terms 
of governing the commons as an institution in Governing the Commons that I shall 
only mention here, albeit briefly: 
1) Clearly defined boundaries should be in place – i.e. individuals 
have the right to withdraw resources from the common pool of 
resources,557 
 
2) Rules in use to be matched to local needs and conditions – i.e. 
appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or 
quantity of resource units to be related to local conditions and 
provisions requiring labour, materials, and/or money,558 
 
3) Collective choice arrangements – i.e. individuals affected by the 
operational rule to participate in the modification of the same 
rules559 and the right of the community members to devise their 
own rules must be respected by external authorities,560 
 
4) Monitoring – of e.g. member’s behaviour,561 
 
5) A graduated system of sanctions must be available,562 
 
6) A low cost conflict-resolution mechanism provided for communi-
ty members,563 and 
 
7) Nested enterprises – i.e. appropriation, provision, monitoring, en-
forcement, conflict resolution, and governance are organised in 
multiple levels of nested enterprises.564 
                                                
556 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, pp. 13-14 
557 Ibid. p. 91 
558 Ibid. p. 92 
559 Ibid. p. 93 
560 Ibid. 
561 Ibid. p. 94, see also Hess/Ostrom, Understanding Knowledge as a Commons, p. 7. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
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Her particular findings in Governing the Commons are partly created bearing the 
natural commons paradigm in mind, partly within economical theory, which 
make them difficult to apply in more detail on this legal research project. How-
ever, I will return to some of them in chapter 7 and further discuss how this re-
search project fuses her findings with the artwork as a resource and access to art 
in the cultural commons. 
 
5.3.2 THE ARTIFICIAL COMMONS 
The main components or resources that make up the artistic commons differ 
from the ones of the natural commons mentioned above. Artistic expressions 
and aesthetic ideas565 make up the artificial, man-made, commons. Hyde ex-
plains: 
 
John Locke assumed that ‘every man’ acquired property through the ‘labour 
of his body, and the work of his hands.’ Whatever a man removes out of 
the state of nature’ and ‘mixe[s] his labour with’ becomes his to own. Fair 
enough, perhaps, but how are we to translate such notions into the cultural 
realms, where there is no ‘state of nature’, where all materials already come 
from the hands and minds of others.566 
 
There is a scarcity that exists in terms of ‘regular’ commodities such as cars, 
timber, oil etc. At some point the resources needed to produce such commodi-
ties will be exhausted. This is the old Lockean adage567 that still colours our re-
lationship to things. There are only so many cars that can be made before we 
run out of rubber, steal, or before there is no more room on Earth for cars. 
This gives rise to the exclusivity principle; the individual who owns a thing is 
the exclusive owner. I drive my car, and as a consequence you cannot drive it at 
the same time. For cars, it is foremost a question of biophysical exclusivity, a 
car cannot be at two places at the same time. The same goes for food, as in the 
example that Hardt and Negri provide, if I consume an apple it ceases to exist, 
                                                                                                                                   
564 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, pp. 94 aa. see also Hess/Ostrom, Understanding Knowledge as 
a Commons, p. 7. 
565 In law there is a fixation requirement for an artistic expression to constitute a work. But 
how can we possibly ‘see’ a beat or John Cage’s 4:33 that consists of 4 minutes and 33 seconds 
of silence? The idea and the expression can no longer be divided in this way, as we shall see 
from the discussion below. 
566 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 119. 
567 Locke, Two Treatises On Government (1690) Book II. 
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nobody else can eat it after me.568 For artworks, interestingly, we have created a 
similar type of exclusivity through copyright. 
The notions of scarcity and with that exclusivity of things has spilled over 
on art. In What is Literature569, Sartre wrote that an artistic creation, like a novel, 
is not completed until it has been communicated to others through reading, or 
connected to other machines in the words of Deleuze and Guattari. Therefore 
enclosures and the exclusivity principle are basically foreign for art, as exclusion 
ultimately renders the works void, unable to be communicated. Hess/Ostrom 
write in the Introduction to Understanding Knowledge as Commons: 
 
Most types of knowledge have, on the other hand, traditionally been rela-
tively nonsubtractive. In fact the more people who share useful knowledge, 
the greater the common good.570 
 
Hyde puts it in yet another way, by quoting Benjamin Franklin’s explanation as 
to why he refused to apply for a patent on his wood stove: 
 
If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea… do I thereby come to 
own the sea…?571 
 
Production in our time is obviously completely different from the old industrial 
production even when production of art is discussed. In fact most goods today, 
not only artworks, are based on knowledge, aesthetics, code, language, social re-
lationships, affects, communication, sharing, and so on.572 None of those are 
scarce. Even where the artwork itself has a material aspect, it is also brimming 
with knowledge and ideas that need to be communicated and shared. As focus 
has been placed on the material within the industrial paradigm, one must not 
forget the immaterial in the digital paradigm. Therefore, approaching this imma-
terial aspect of production and the immaterial goods is an endless task. Art-
works can be wholly or partly material (like a painting, or a pickled shark in a 
tank), but they do not have to be (music, films, performance, dance). Suffice it 
to say here that artworks are an example of immaterial products as they are first 
and foremost based on ideas, skills and knowledge, but furthermore, and most 
importantly, they require communication and interaction in order to be fully 
                                                
568 Hess and Ostrom refer to it as subtractive resource, i.e. one person’s uses reduce the bene-
fits of another person, Hess/Ostrom in the Introduction to Understanding Knowledge as Commons, 
p. 5. 
569 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature, (trans.) Bernard Frechtman, London : Rutledge, (2001 
[originally published in 1949]), p. 58. 
570 Hess/Ostrom in Introduction to Understanding Knowledge as Commons, p 5. 
571 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 120. 
572 Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’, p. 349. 
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appreciated and for them to reach their full potential and value. Although it has 
been made possible to privatise, materialise and control immaterial products as 
if they were commodities through e.g. copyright, it is now apparent that in the 
digital knowledge society it is no longer as simple or straightforward, as it had 
been with the industrial commodity, to commodify. Though scarcity and exclu-
sivity have reigned over the object-based industrial commodities, it cannot be 
the case with the immaterial products. At least not to the same extent. 
One step towards ceasing to treat artworks as if they were either like nature 
or like other commodities is to admit that copyright, as a legal concept driven 
by the cultural industry and the commercial sphere of entertainment, is prob-
lematic as a legal construct in terms of the commons, but the next, and the far 
more difficult step, is to think of alternatives.  How do we cater for a wider ac-
cess and sharing of all types of works without destroying the commercial worth 
and the possibility of exploitation? While the public has a claim on access and 
diversity, the artists (or other rights owners) in return arguably have a legitimate 
claim on some kind of reward for their work, ingenuity, creativity and even fi-
nancial investment, for having created products that add on to our common 
pool of knowledge.  
In order to continue to explore the cultural commons further let us first 
look at the current binary scheme that makes up the principles governing the 
commons. Hyde claims that they are either based on public recognition or pri-
vate reward: 
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PUBLIC RECOGNITION PRIVATE REWARD 
Principles governing status and re-
ward in academy IP system 
Quality of scholarship Reward 
Teaching Privilege-based 
Service to the institution  Near-term 
Reputation system Gain 
System of virtue Financial reward 
Altruism Egotism 
    
FREEDOM TO… FREEDOM FROM… 
POSITIVE LIBERTY NEGATIVE LIBERTY 
Liberty to communicate Must always be limited 
Belongs to communities Belongs to individuals 
Commonwealth Private wealth 
573 
The recognition/reward schism is exactly the way through which we can build 
on the idea of the commons. In the commons reward and recognition do not 
have to compete, as the reward will be tied to the ownership and recognition to 
the access to the works. 
 
5.4 COMMON NOT  PUBLIC 
The common, as is becoming quite apparent, goes beyond the private-public di-
chotomy. Hardt and Negri have made another important observation in the dif-
ferentiation between the “common” and the “public”, a distinction that is fit-
ting in the context of cultural commons and access to art. Whereas the term 
“community” (or indeed  “public”), they write, is often used to denote a “moral 
unity that stands above the population” the “common” on the other hand does 
not refer to traditional notions of either the community or the public; it is based 
on the communication among singularities and emerges through the collaborative 
social processes of production.574 
                                                
573 Table is based on Hyde, Common as Air, pp. 135-161. 
574 All the quotations in this paragraph: Hardt & Negri, Multitude, p. 204. Whether the com-
mons as a legal construction ought to be subsumed under property law is for instance dis-
cussed by the (eds.) Bailey, Farrell and Mattei study. Mattei for instance insists, “that, in order 
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Communication and sharing instead of community is thus the main value of the 
commons. It is this very notion that allows us to continue Habermas’ discussion 
regarding public spaces and communicative action, but with another type of fo-
cus on communication. 
Hardt and Negri write in Commonwealth that the concept of ‘private’, used in 
opposition to ‘public’, tends to often lump together all types of ‘possessions’. 
Therefore, they continue, the term ‘public’ bears a connotation to hierarchical 
control as opposed to what is horizontally managed (n.b. not owned!) in com-
mon. For instance we manage our clean air in the natural commons, and we 
transfer through generations that which makes up parts of the artificial com-
mons such as nursery rhymes, fairy tales, fables and other cultural heritage.575  
Hardt and Negri propose an ‘alternative legal strategy and framework’ alto-
gether, claiming that in order to understand the complexities of the conception 
of privacy and the private as well as that which is shared and managed in com-
mon, one has to argue for additional commons-based solutions, particularly in 
the knowledge society. Whereas the concept of ‘public’ tends to amalgamate all 
the various intellectual and cultural expressions into some kind of public unity, 
the common in their view on the other hand focuses also on the alterity, differ-
ence and singularities (each person’s difference, each different entity) that exist 
inside the public and that participate in the commons.576 In that case, the pri-
vate has to be upheld too, at the same time as the necessary collective commu-
nication, communicative action and access and sharing are enabled. This means 
that the binary opposite public-private becomes redundant, as the two are part 
of the one and the same thing – the commons.  
Hyde, for instance, gives the example of voting to illustrate this unique pub-
lic and private alliance that the commons produces. The right to vote, he claims, 
is a right we have as private people, but that we exercise together, in order to 
manage democracy in common. He writes:  
 
If you want a viable democracy, you cannot sell your vote. If you want a 
lively cultural commons, you can’t allow corporate media to enclose the 
private domain. If you and your neighbours own land over and aquifer, 
none of you should be allowed to sink a well and sell the water to some 
thirsty distant metropolis. Each of these is a constraint on some but at the 
same time each of these is the foundation of others: the freedom to live in a 
democracy, to partake in cultural inheritance, to enjoy a constant flow of 
potable water. Inalienability of this sort will frustrate the formation of pri-
                                                                                                                                   
to recuperate all the potential legal wealth stemming from a transgenerational approach, it is 
first necessary to get rid of the individual-centred scheme imbedded in our law of property.” 
575 Mattei, ‘Future Generations now! A commons-based analysis’ in (eds.) Bailey, Farrell and 
Mattei, Protecting Future Generations Through Commons, p. 12. 
576 Hardt/Negri, Commonwealth, pp. 203-204. 
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vate, choosing, subjective selves, but at the same time make possible the 
formation of the civic, extended, or common self. They allow a way of be-
ing.577 
 
It is this formation of constraints of freedoms that at the same time mark the 
foundations of other freedoms in order to form a common self, a way of being 
together. Following that, a genuine and sound diversity of the cultural com-
mons is beneficial because it generates democratic societies. The commons ex-
ists through a mixture of private geniuses and the sharing, communication and 
inspiration that stem from the historically and publically available578 knowledge 
and encouragement to learn. The two, private and public, as well as singular and 
plural, communicate and that can only be achieved by safeguarding the communi-
cation by basing communication itself in the commons.  
The singularities are the building blocks in the edifice of the cultural com-
mons, and as such they cannot be ignored or destroyed either. That is why the 
notion of the common is far more appropriate than the public, or communitari-
an, as it does not demolish the individual-private subject (artist, artwork or in-
deed enterprise), nor does it impose a notion of the community. It still enables 
the network and plurality based activities to progress and continue. This is a true 
rhizomatic reasoning, forming alliances rather than opposites. For that reason, commons-
based concepts could also safeguard copyright as a legal tool. Individuality that 
copyright promotes is seen as an integral part of the commons and does not 
dissolve in favour of an often potentially paternalistic and homogenous “pub-
lic” or “community” – it just enables communication and sharing through a 
comparatively open access.  
This can be described further by Bourdieu’s three levels of legitimacy of art, i.e. 
the basic principles as to why, according to Bourdieu, art is at all created. These 
legitimacies can be helpful here in better understanding the commons from 
Hardt and Negri’s perspective. Bourdieu divides the legitimacy of art in the fol-
lowing manner: 
1) The recognition granted to the artist by other artists – the artwork is 
created for its own sake: art for art’s sake 
2) The second legitimacy corresponds with bourgeois taste – Bourdieu 
lists various institutions such as salons, public state-guaranteed 
tribunals such as Academies representing the “taste of the domi-
nant” class, and the artworks created for and inside such institu-
tions; and finally 
                                                
577 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 168. 
578 Even if, arguably, the width of the public domain and what constitutes it, is shrinking with 
new claims on rights through e.g. digitisation, translation, adaptation etc. 
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3) The last principle of legitimacy is, according to Bourdieu, that of 
the “popular” taste, i.e. artworks created for and chosen by ordinary 
customers and mass audiences.579 
Bourdieu’s three levels illustrate the reason why the concept of public (second 
principle) is just one part of the commons where art is accessed and shared. Ar-
guably, the bourgeois and the popular may not always be two separate entities 
in the digital spheres, within the information society. Without dwelling too 
much on the details of Bourdieu’s complex analysis here, I use his legitimacy 
principles in order to build on this discussion and stress the significant differ-
ences between the public and the common. Whereas the public generally can be 
and is placed in something that resembles Bourdieu’s second legitimacy princi-
ple, i.e. artworks created for institutions, governed top down, state/publically 
funded, and often politically driven, the common on the other hand rests on the 
basis that artworks exist within (at least) all three of Bourdieu’s legitimacies, and 
many more hybrid instances, simultaneously. If we look at it as rhizomes, it be-
comes clear how an artwork is able to be both commercial and have social sig-
nificances within all the Bourdieuian categories.  
The commons is thus based on the idea of sharing and communicating, and 
therefore the value of the commons is to cater for artworks so that they can 
move and exist unrestrictedly between all the legitimacy categories and com-
municate upwards or downwards without the restrictions from unnecessary 
gatekeepers. The commons has to be managed horizontally, which means, it can 
inherently function inside the digital network based realm, as it very much re-
sembles the structure of e.g. bit torrents or peer-to-peer based software.   
 
5.5 THE BEING-IN-COMMON(S) NOT COMMUNITY 
One of the more significant problems with the concept of the public is that it 
presupposes a homogeneous or at least an, at any given point, definable com-
munity. In chapter 4 we saw several instances where this was impossible to 
achieve, or at least where such community assumptions proved to be problem-
atic. The French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s writings on community are il-
lustrative and form a continuation of Habermas and Hardt/Negri, and his writ-
ings also assist in placing these theories in the global digital knowledge society 
and its information, access and communication based discourses.   
Nancy has a vast philosophical body of work that I shall not be commenting 
further on here. I will only briefly mention The Inoperative Community580, and Being 
                                                
579 Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production. 
580 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community, (trans.) P. Connor, (ed.) C. Fynsk, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, (1991). 
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Singular Plural581, where he deals with the question of what constitutes a com-
munity or a “We” and the components that make it up. He goes into more de-
tail than Habermas did when he addressed the open community that shares ide-
as and opinions, at the same time as the two theories can be used together when 
discussing the commons.  
In Being Singular Plural, Nancy argues that being as we understand it will al-
ways be a concept of “being-with”, which means a collectivety of  “I:s” forming 
a co-existence into a “We”. For Nancy, “being with” does not necessarily con-
stitute a traditional community or a public space in a Habermasian sense per se 
which is defined by enclosure forming an inside and an outside of an existing 
group. Nancy rather adds to Habermas by presenting various hybrids that allow 
for mutual entrances and exits into the community, without the necessity of en-
closure, at least not as we are used to defining enclosure. During Nancy’s study 
of “being with” he discusses a number of issues such as political and multicul-
tural concepts, which are of course more relevant than ever in a society like the 
one today where mixture and migration is the rule, rather than an exception. 
What constitutes a community and how it is managed is an idea that Nancy de-
voted a great deal of time to. 
Nancy at the same time provides an alternative reinterpretation or a chal-
lenge of the concept “community” as well as of the Cartesian subject. Conse-
quently, Nancy does not only present an alternative way of viewing community, 
he also provides a complimentary understanding of how the individual, the sub-
ject, the “self”, can be understood as concepts today and he develops his theory 
on the notion of singularity as opposed to individuality or subjectivity. Another 
reason for briefly referring to Nancy here is because of his rather influential 
contributions towards art and culture studies, which means that even when it 
comes to his theoretical studies of community he will never stray too far away 
from the artwork and its significance for the community.582  
This particular understanding of community that Nancy presents is very 
helpful particularly in connection with the concept of haecceitiy which was in-
troduced in Volume I. Connected, the two demonstrate how neither the indi-
vidual, nor the community in which the individual or the legal subject exists are 
some unified, static concepts, but rather concepts that are constantly in a state 
of becoming. Seen in that way, the participation and communication within the 
commons is only one aspect of the unfinished project that is the individual and 
the communities in which individuals exist.  
Nancy, in the same vein as Deleuze and Guattari, also challenges the Occi-
dental idea of community arguing against the dominant idea of imagining the 
                                                
581 Even if Nancy’s most significant work on the status of art today, Les Muses, Galilée, (2001) 
is not directly referenced here, it has been influential for this research in understanding art and 
placing it within a legal context. See also, Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural. 
582 Nancy, Les Muses. 
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community as being self-enclosed (or a tree with a singular origin, roots, and so 
on). Instead he proposes imagining a “being-together” as a project of “being-in-
common”. Nancy argues that any community which attempts to become com-
munal, in such an arborescent way of imagining a community, “loses the in of 
being-in-common” and it loses the “with or the together that defines it”.583 
Therefore, contrary to all traditional models, Nancy dismisses a number of uni-
fying ideas and “attempts to depict community as something that cannot be 
forced, but is instead a shared experience of finitude, which gives rise to an af-
firming ‘Being-with’.”584  
Nostalgia towards an archaic community is a symptom of such assumed 
community, he argues, and it generates more or less imaginary concepts of ho-
mogeneous communities that may or may not have existed. Such communities, 
if they indeed ever existed, have been replaced by a multi-pluralistic alterity.585 
Today, it is problematic to see the community as an independent unit, or a ho-
mogenous whole that has a common goal. For Nancy, community is instead the 
multi-pluralistic alterity marked by the existence of a “being-in-common”.586  
It is this state of being-in-common, which is of interest here. The being-in-
common can add to Habermas and Hardt/Negri. Nancy maintains that the be-
ing-in-common does not denote a uniformity that binds separate individuals; it 
is rather based on a “shared experience”. That means that the being-in-common 
necessitates sharing, and here it is linked with the idea of the cultural commons. 
Nancy’s community thus “requires a new conception of the individual to under-
stand this ‘sharing’ and, accordingly, for this ‘being-in-common’ to exist”.587 
The classic concept of the subject is in this theory replaced by the concept of a 
singular being and fits together in a scheme where individuality is approached as 
individuation, a project, a constant state of becoming, a haecceity. Nancy’s singu-
lar being confronts the notion of the Cartesian individual, that is a clearly defin-
able individual within the external world, where there is a definable “inside” as 
well as an “outside”, therefore Nancy experiments with terminology such as 
“being self” and “being separated”.588  
                                                
583 Catherine Kellogg, ‘Love And Communism: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Shattered Community’, in 
Law and Critique (2005) 16: 339–355, p. 29. 
584 Charles Prestidge-King, ‘A Sketch For A New Community: The Inoperative Community 
And Modern Politics’, in Cross-sections: Volume I (2005), p. 26 
585 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, pp. 9-10, Prestidge-King, ‘A Sketch For A New Commu-
nity: The Inoperative Community And Modern Politics’ p. 83. 
586 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. xxxvi., Prestidge-King, ‘A Sketch For A New Commu-
nity: The Inoperative Community And Modern Politics’ p. 87. 
587 Prestidge-King, ‘A Sketch For A New Community: The Inoperative Community And 
Modern Politics’ p. 87. 
588 Prestidge-King, ‘A Sketch For A New Community: The Inoperative Community And 
Modern Politics’, p. 87 and Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. xxxvii.  
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It is these very social interactions that constitute the plural being-in-
common, he argues. What Nancy achieves by way of the being-in-common 
construction is to radicalise the idea of equality, where he does not refer to “a 
class of belonging definable with some common properties that should distin-
guish it from others”.589 On the contrary, a community for him is based not on 
inclusion into an exclusive or enclosed group, but rather on sharing [partage] of 
the “emptiness of sense that is the being itself of the singularity together with 
the plurality, that no predicate can fill up”.590 
When applying Nancy’s writings to the concept of the commons I wish to 
be able to place artworks within his idea of being-in-common. The network that 
he creates will then be placed inside a theory of rhizomatic jurisprudence. The 
use of Nancy also enables me to develop the aspects of Adorno and Horkheim-
er’s theory that I find pertinent, for instance that the market creates a lessening 
of authentic works. Arguably that also happens in other spheres that are not the 
market, such as for instance the bourgeois public space, even if it can be a mat-
ter of different types of works that are promoted and “lessened”, while a being-
in-common, a commons, may not have these effects of exclusion. Quite the re-
verse, the commons may not only enable an alternative platform for access, it 
can also enable us to communicate as well as envision alternative conceptions 
of communities. 
  
                                                
589 Perin Matteo, ‘The Sense Of Freedom. The Surprise Of Being-In-Common’, in Law and 
Critique (2005) 16: 315–338 
590 Ibid. 331-332. 
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6 COMMONS V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW  
 
In ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’ James 
Boyle writes:  
 
The more one moves to a world in which the message, rather than the me-
dium, is the focus of conceptual and economic interest, the more central in-
tellectual property becomes. Intellectual property is the legal form of the in-
formation age.591 
 
The Latin noun plaga refers to a hunting net592 used for capturing animals. Such 
netting was called plagium. Analogically, the word has acquired a connotation to 
kidnapping of children and kidnappers where thus called plagiaries in Latin. The 
poet Marcus Valerius Martialis (40-100 AD) used to be displeased when some-
body copied his poems that he likened the copying to the abduction of children 
– his poems, he argued, were his spiritual children. This was how the word pla-
gium was used for the first time, namely to denote the act of ‘kidnapping’ intel-
lectual works. The word was introduced into the English language during the 
seventeenth century, first in use for “kidnapper” (abductor of children), but it 
later developed into plagiary used to mean “the practice of stealing the ideas or 
words of others and passing them off as one’s own”.593 Centuries later, Daniel 
Defoe commented on plagiarism as “every jod as unjust as lying with their 
Wives, and breaking-up their homes.”594 Curiously, “plagiarism” as a legal phe-
nomenon is still not very clearly defined – normally, it is used to indicate the 
more severe cases of copyright infringement, where a work is not only copied 
maliciously and in bad faith, but also where the original author is not mentioned 
or the work is being passed off as an original work of the infringer.595 
Already in 1997 James Boyle wrote that in the information age, ownership 
and control of information are the most important forms of power.596 Addi-
tionally, he claimed that this, as a statement, is now so well accepted, that it has 
                                                
591 Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’. 
592 The word net has lingered to this day: inter-net…. 
593 http://wordinfo.info/unit/3424/ip:8/il:P. Last accessed 18th March 2014. See also Kok-
tevgaard/Levin, Immaterialrätt, p. 26. 
594 See e.g. Hyde, Common as Air, p. 81-82. See also Daniel Defoe An Essay on the Regulation of 
Press, (1704). 
595 See also generally Koktvegaard/Levin, Immaterialrätt, p.26. 
596 Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’. 
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even become a cliché and that one could “get away with saying in a law review ar-
ticle without footnote support”.597 
When discussing the concept of the cultural commons with regards to intel-
lectual property law, copyright law and doctrine, these strands, i.e. plagiarism 
and control/ownership of information, will have to be interwoven. How can 
the concept of the cultural commons be envisioned without at the same time 
kidnapping the spiritual children of the creators? Furthermore how can a demo-
cratic power balance be upheld in society if ownership and control of infor-
mation is not fairly distributed? The latter, of course, is partly a theoretical ques-
tion, one that borders on Foucault’s discussion in Discipline and Punish598, an is-
sue which Deleuze too analysed. Deleuze wrote in his Postscript on the Societies of 
Control: 599 
 
In the societies of control […] what is important is no longer either a signa-
ture or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other 
hand disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much as from the 
point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical lan-
guage of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject 
it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with mass/individual pair. Individu-
als have become “dividuals” and masses, samples, data, markets or “banks”. 
[…] The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the 
man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network.600  
 
It is an insightful observation, particularly bearing in mind that it was written in 
the beginning of the 1990s. This quote is particularly interesting as Deleuze is 
pointing out that in the society of control – arguably a society that very much 
resembles the knowledge society, which is also very much code-based – we 
have moved beyond the mass/individual pairings and individuals have become 
dividuals, banks of data, containers of mass information. Certainly, a similar line 
of reasoning has been adopted here in terms of the rhizomatic artwork, that is, 
the movement that has taken place from the industrial paradigm discussed by 
Adorno/Horkheimer and the authentic-mass pairing, to the network-based digi-
tal realms as per Stapleton where the artwork evolved from an object to a con-
tainer of mass-information. As it is quite obvious, however, this particular re-
search project addresses these questions slightly differently, even different from 
                                                
597 [original emphasis], Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the 
Net?’ p. 87. 
598 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (trans.) Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books, (1991 [originally published in 1975]).  
599 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, in October, Vol. 59, Winter, (1992 
[originally published in 1990]). pp. 3-7. 
600 [original emphasis], Ibid. p. 6. 
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Deleuze’s attempt above, which was based on Foucault’s writings on the society 
of discipline. The focus of this project lies not in who the individual is (or divid-
ual for that matter) or how he can be controlled, or on the singular artist and 
what he can or cannot do,601 but on the artwork as information and knowledge 
in itself, and the potential of wider access beyond the biopolitical critique of so-
ciety. Thus, ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ of information have been substituted for 
the milder (and arguably less normatively loaded) access. Boyle, Foucault and 
Deleuze all seem to be in accordance that when it comes to the particular issue 
of control and participation in the knowledge society, access is a key term in 
terms of governance of any society that is based on code. 
This chapter begins with the digital information society, in the knowledge 
economy. Here, we find intellectual property legislation as a sophisticated legal 
construct, one that has been around for at least 600 years.602 It governs some of 
the most important aspects of our society namely knowledge, power, infor-
mation, market, and per default, economy and democracy. However, the idea 
this far into the analysis is not to chart the evolution of intellectual property or 
indeed copyright law in order to arrive at the concept of the cultural commons. 
Rather, the intent is to use the theoretical approach laid out in chapter 3 where 
the rhizomatic artwork was presented, and adding the concept of the commons 
that was introduced in the previous chapter, in order to read intellectual proper-
ty law rhizomatically, and follow its lines of flight and processes of deterritorial-
isation and movement. The purpose is not to present a critique of current intellec-
tual property law, but to follow its potentiality and connectability, specifically to-
wards the concept of cultural commons. This can mean at points having to look 
back at the legal history of intellectual property law (like it was done with the 
commons in chapter 5) but not in order to describe the evolution of intellectual 
property law, but rather to reveal the existing creative potential that is (always) 
already there within the current legal construct.  
The titles of the subsections of this chapter have been formulated as dichot-
omies in order to keep revealing the problems of binary reasoning and to follow 
the already established research method that aims to get beyond legal dichoto-
mies. 
 
 
                                                
601 For an interesting approach to copyright and communication where the artist plays a focal 
point of the discussion see generally Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture. 
602 Counting from the first Venetian privileges of the 15th century, that are commonly accept-
ed as the first forms of IP law. There are other instances of IP-like laws that date back thou-
sands of years BC also, but it is generally accepted that the Venetian privileges were the prede-
cessors to the modern IP laws. 
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6.1 STINTED COPYRIGHT V. DETERRITORIALISING CAPITALISM  
A property right appears in a natural way and does not requite either legislation 
or jurisprudence.603 
 
[S]tructural tendencies in our patterns of thinking and discourse about intel-
lectual property […] lead us generally to ‘over’ rather than ‘under’ protect, 
and that partly as a result we are currently in the midst of an intellectual 
land-grab, an unprecedented privatization of the public domain.604 
 
Once we accept that houses and ideas may be lumped together as the same 
kind of property, and that their owners have natural property rights – the 
kind that supposedly exists prior to all human law – then there is little to ar-
gue about. We are in the realm of first principles and belief, not of public 
deliberation over contending values.605 
 
The stinted copyright v. deterritorialising capitalism dichotomy may be ap-
proached in the various ways as represented by the quotations above. The first 
one, where it is argued that ownership comes prior to law, the second one, 
where it is claimed that the ownership paradigm is increasingly taking over the 
public domain, and the third one, where ownership of tangible objects is diver-
sified from ownership of immaterial works. All three aspects are nonetheless 
privy to the structures of capitalism and its evolution as well as its rhizomatic 
nature. In the digital knowledge society, Jeremy Rifkin even argues that capital-
ism has moved into a (new?) stage: hypercapitalism, i.e. capitalism has rapidly en-
tered into a new phase, namely the ‘age of access’. The age of access has meant 
shifting from ownership and control oriented models towards an increasing 
number of “paid access to inter-connected supplier–user networks”.606 There-
fore, the binary pair stinted copyright v. deterritorialising capitalism must direct-
ly be problematised, as exploitation of goods in the capitalist digital knowledge 
society, (as we also saw above in chapter 5), has shifted from exclusive owner-
ship of material things towards non-exclusive access to more or less immaterial 
things/assets/knowledge/information.  
Let us look the tendencies of capitalism in Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari. 
This is how Charles Ramond presented this very issue as he analyses the 
Deleuzeoguattarian approach to capitalism (and its schizophrenic nature): 
                                                
603 [my translation]: “Äganderätt uppstår på naturlig väg och förutsätter varken lagstiftning 
eller rättsvetenskap.” Koktvegaard/Levin, Immaterialrätt, p. 25. 
604 Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’, p. 95. 
605 Hyde, Common As Air, p. 215. 
606 Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism, Where all of Life is a Paid-
For Experience, New York: Penguin Putnam, (2001). See also Frédéric Vandenberghe, ‘Deleuzi-
an capitalism’ in Philosophy Social Criticism 2008 34: 877, p. 893. 
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This unexpected association of “capitalism”, “schizophrenia” and “revolu-
tion” shows indisputably the authors’ recognition of there being a positive 
dimension to capitalism. The point at which the authors realise that their 
position with regards to capitalism is “ambiguous” becomes quite clear from 
that which has been stressed.607  
 
Ramond directs our attention towards this unexpected association that 
Deleuze/Guattari make between capitalism and schizophrenia. They, Ramond 
claims, seem to have a position vis-à-vis capitalism that can be described as am-
biguous. In the article Deleuzian Capitalism Frédéric Vandenberghe seems to be ar-
riving at a similar conclusion: 
 
Capitalism explores and anticipates the de-territorializing lines of flight to 
capture them from without, enter into symbiosis with them, and redirect 
them from within, like a parasite, towards its own ends. Capitalism is in-
ventive; its creativity knows no limits – “it is of the viral type”.608 
 
However, Vandenberghe then continues: 
 
Needless to say that I am not claiming that Deleuze’s libertarian critique of 
capitalism was anti-critical or phoney from the start and that Deleuze is 
somehow the Giddens of the 1970s: a neo-liberal disguised as a libertarian, 
or Thatcher on LSD. What I am claiming is, rather, that capitalism has pro-
gressively integrated the critique of capitalism into its mode of functioning, with the re-
sult that capitalism appears stronger than ever, whereas the critique of capi-
talism seems rather disarmed.609  
  
Or as William E. Connolly explains it elsewhere: 
 
To put it another way, we still don’t know what capitalism can become, 
even though its density and fragility give us reason to worry about the 
worst. Deleuze pursues this issue through a multi-tiered conception of time 
                                                
607 [my translation and my emphasis], “Cette association inattendue du “capitalisme” de la 
“schizophrénie” et de la “revolution” indique incontestablement la reconnaissance par les au-
teurs d’une dimension positive du capitalisme. […] On voit bien, dans l’expression que j’ai 
soulignée, à quel point les auteurs se rendent compte que leur position vis à vis capitalisme 
peut elle-même être considérée comme ‘ambiguë’.” Charles Ramond, ‘Deleuze, Schizophrénie 
et Mondialisation’, in Capitalismes: en sortir ?, Dossier de la revue Cités, no. 41, coordinated and pre-
sented by Gilles Campagnolo, Charles Ramond and Jacques de Saint-Victor, p. 99-113., 
(2010), p. 110. 
608 Vandenberghe, ‘Deleuzian capitalism’, p. 879. 
609 [my emphasis], Ibid. 
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as becoming, with periodic forks in climate, asteroid showers, religious 
movements, new instruments of investment, technological developments, 
invasions, and state priorities, etc. engendering a capitalist assemblage in 
which we can intervene but never master. To the extent either Marx or Ha-
bermas was tempted by the mastery project, Deleuze breaks with each.610  
 
Stripped of the radical project (or is it perhaps, conversely, its most radical 
form, depending on how one chooses to read Deleuze/Guattari here) this way 
of understanding capitalism in the digital knowledge society with its access-
based knowledge production opens up a path towards a reconciliation between 
the age old division “Every Free-Man… shall have… the Honey that is found 
in his Woods”611 and “S’il existe pour un homme une véritable propriété, c’est 
sa pensée”612 on the one hand and the public interest/fair dealing principles that 
copyright must be balanced against, on the other. It is not a question of prag-
matism. It is Deleuzeoguattarian constructivism. It extends an invitation to con-
tinue to explore that which Connolly refers to as ‘an uncertain degree of plu-
ripotentiality’ of capitalism. What appears to be an intriguing idea is to visit the 
Deleuzeoguattarian approach to capitalism in order to attempt to discuss how 
the two (property and public interest) may, or must, be reconciled in the cultural 
commons. This can be done within the Deleuzian matrix, as Philip Goodchild 
argues: 
 
This image of thought is closely related to the cultural milieu of Integrated 
Global Capitalism (as Guattari prefers to call it in his later works), one of 
the most frequent operations of capital is to create temporary relations be-
tween workers and sites of production that irrevocably separate workers 
from their previous environment. Everything becomes mobile: images, 
consumer products, and people are cut off from their conditions of produc-
tion and circulate around the globe, resting in juxtaposition with others of 
entirely different origins, before attaining an ultimate egalitarian status in 
the garbage dump, old age or oblivion. Deleuze and Guattari call this kind 
of movement deterritorialization. Their thought differs from the operations 
of capital insofar as it makes deterritorialization an end in itself instead of 
merely a means for the increase of capital.613 
 
                                                
610 [my emphasis], William E. Connolly. ‘Habermas, Deleuze and Capitalism.’ in Theory & 
Event 11.4 (2008). Project MUSE. (28 Nov. 2012.).  
611 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 76. 
612 Traveaux preparatoire for French Patent Law of 1791. 
613 Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, Sage Publica-
tions, (1996), pp. 2-3. 
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The intellectual property law of today rests on the same common structural fea-
ture as capital namely that it is constructed (and understood614) as capital and 
property that can be possessed with a corresponding private rights construction 
– intellectual property rights qua individual rights, part of private law. Acquiring 
copyrights means acquiring rights as property. At least that is how current law, 
read dogmatically, envisions the exploitation of intellectual and aesthetic prod-
ucts. However, if we follow the Deleuzeoguattarian analysis of capitalism it be-
comes obvious that capitalism in itself is not as binary and as structured, or stri-
ated, as law (pretends to be). In fact: 
 
The tendency of capitalism is to substitute for fixed and limiting relation 
between men and things an abstract unit of equivalence that allows the free 
exchange, and the aleatory substitution, of everything for everything. Not 
only are equivalences established between goods in an open market, but 
bodies, actions, ideas, knowledges, fantasies, images function as commodi-
ties which can be translated into other commodities, as deterritorialised 
schizophrenic flows that escape social coding.615  
 
That means that capitalism itself does not necessarily pose the idea of property 
and the idea of public interest as each other’s opposites, because within the cap-
italist sphere they are both one and the same: commodities. In fact, also within 
the open market there is a constant connection that happens between the goods 
and, as Hardt and Negri put it, “bodies, actions, ideas, knowledges, fantasies, 
images” etc. That does not mean that capitalism is unproblematic, it just means 
that it too is far more complicated than usually described, and not necessarily ad-
verse to a concept of the commons. Capitalism functions both as a territorialising and a 
deterritorialising machine. Hence its schizophrenic nature. Hence Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s ambiguous relationship to it: 
 
The capitalist machine, however, does not simply decode flows but con-
stantly reterritorializes them through an axiomatic (i.e. a single system of in-
terrelated mathematical axioms) “of the social machine itself, which takes 
the place of the old codings and organizes all the decoded flows, including 
the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist 
system and in the service of its ends”.616 
 
The capitalist reterritorialisation of the scientific and technical code is particular-
ly interesting to study in the context of intellectual property law in the digital 
                                                
614 See Darfurnica Hague case above, see also European Court of Human Rights cases that it 
refers to. 
615 Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 100. 
616 Ibid. See also Deleuze/Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 233. 
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knowledge society. This is the second enclosure movement.617 The last decade 
has seen a fast development of enclosures of network-based, peer-to-peer based 
digital products, the existence and development of which, as well as the busi-
ness models that rest on such inventions, have been rendered quite difficult by 
the exclusory nature of the intellectual property rights. And I too could now get 
away with saying that in a legal doctoral project without footnote support.618 
Territorialising intellectual property laws thus ground the capitalist project also, 
they slow it down, delimit its possibilities and alternatives.  
The reason for this state of affairs is that the artwork as an industrial prod-
uct (intellectual-mass dichotomy per Adorno/Horkheimer) developed firstly in-
to capital (economic, social and cultural per Bourdieu) and then into a decoded, 
deterritorialised, resources and immaterial asset (semiotic, network-based as per 
Stapleton), in the digital knowledge society. Each of these ‘developments’ can 
be analysed as lines of flight in their own right that have, consecutively, deterri-
torialised the concept of the artwork from its given paradigm. All these trans-
formations are therefore understood as deterritorialising lines of flight but each 
of them also became re-territorialised by the capitalist machine as well as the le-
gal machine and placed within its restrictive ambits. One such concrete instance 
is access to music, that evolved from live public performance, to recordings in 
tangible form, via the file sharing peer-to-peer network-based access, to stream-
ing of content: 
 
• firstly music could only be enjoyed at a concert or at a live public 
performance; 
• then it became commodified into a tangible object (a long play disc):  
• then into a lighter, less cumbersome version (cassette619, then CD);  
• then it became digital (tied to a no particular carrier) and then uncon-
trollable illegal file sharing happened with e.g. Napster620, Grok-
ster621, Pirate Bay;  
• which in turn resulted in business models such as Spotify; 
• these business models are still comparatively weak, and cannot gen-
erate equal amount of growth and return as traditional sales of mate-
rial product 
                                                
617 See section 1.1. above as well as Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Con-
struction of The Public Domain’. 
618 But as I am not of the same confident nature as James Boyle, so do see e.g.: Boyle, Shiva, 
Lessig, among others, and all their quoted works here! 
619 Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios  (1984) (US). 
620 A&M Records et all v Napster Inc (2001) (US) 9th circuit (Napster Case) as well as MGM v 
Grokster, (2005) (US) 9th circuit (Grokster Case). 
621 Ibid. 
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• etc… 
 
All these instances in the (r)evolution of access to music each represent their 
own deterritorialising lines of flight that happen in society and within the capi-
talist and the legal systems. As was discussed in chapter 2 above, legal reasoning 
encounters lines of flight when it reaches a border. But, instead of borders, 
Deleuze and Guattari have proposed that we imagine the legal and the capitalist 
systems as territories. As a territory law, or indeed the market, is constantly mov-
ing and is subject to an unending change. These occurrences happen for in-
stance when a new technology is invented and introduced, and it forces certain 
legal and capitalist aspects to flee the previous territory. As Vandenberghe 
writes:  
 
The basic principle of rhizomatic sociology is that society is always en fuite, 
always leaking and fleeing, and may be understood in terms of the manner 
in which it deals with its lignes de fuite, or lines of flight.622  
 
Because of its rigid nature, traditional IP law as well as the dogmatic legal theory 
that frames it, have even more so than capitalism resisted to acknowledge this 
societal leakage, these lines of flight, and each time as they have occurred they 
have caused the traditional legal structures to become unsettled, resulting in 
disputes, litigations and additional (often rather confused) legislative acts623, 
which are not able to catch up with the fast paced development in society and 
all its leakage that the lines of flight give rise to. This in turn gives rise to a law 
that can be seen as a patchwork that constantly has to repair its cracks, that 
constantly has to be sown and pieced together so as to keep up with the rapid 
lines of flight generated both within the capitalist sphere and in society in gen-
eral, while at the same time keeping up with the restraints of its own internal 
structures.  
Capitalism has proven that it is quite able to cope with and adapt more easily 
to such changes, while law always treats natural lines of flight that occur as un-
imagined encounters that each time appear to upset the entire legal system 
anew. This leads to a “fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which 
markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information”624 or 
“[t]here is always something that flees and escapes the system, something that is 
not controllable, or at least not yet controlled”.625 
                                                
622 [original emphasis] Vandenberghe, ‘Deleuzian capitalism’, p. 878. 
623 E.g. IPRED. 
624 Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Effi-
cient Markets’, in 70 American Economy Review 393, 405 (1980). 
625 Vandenberghe, ‘Deleuzian capitalism’, p. 878. 
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These occurrences are acknowledged and to a certain extent also explained 
within the intellectual property law doctrine itself. James Boyd writes for in-
stance:  
 
An alternative method for smoothing over the tensions in the policy analy-
sis is to acknowledge the tension between efficiency and incentives, point 
out that there are some limitations imposed on intellectual property rights, 
to conclude that there are both efficiency-promoting and incentive-
promoting aspects to intellectual property law, and then to imply that an 
optimal balance has been struck. (This is rather like saying that because 
fishermen throw some fish back, we can assume over-fishing does not oc-
cur.)626 
 
In the age of digital knowledge, the so-called balance that needs to be struck is 
virtually non-existent and the public domain is being swallowed up by the ever 
increasing (rights-)claims627 stemming from the second enclosure movement 
while the free market remains burdened by illegal access to content that does 
not generate profit (at least not to the same extent as exploitation of material 
products used to be). It is a lose-lose situation that creates a gridlock where law 
holds back both the public interest and the free market.  
Before we continue, let us look at a table from James Boyle’s ‘A Politics of 
Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’ that shows this particular 
clash between the efficiency (market) and incentives (artists), between infor-
mation (public) and invention (private): 
 
  
                                                
626 Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’, p 97. 
627 Ibid. p. 113. See further: Jessica Litman, ‘Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection 
and the Public Domain’, in 11 University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, 429 (1994) 
(arguing that the protections afforded by copyright law should not allow copyright holders to 
lock up the raw materials needed to develop new works); Jessica Litman, ‘Copyright as Myth’, 
53 University of Prrr Colleges Law Review 235 (1991) (discussing the discrepancies between the 
popular perception and the reality of copyright law); Jessica Litman, ‘The Public Domain’, 39 
Emory Law Journal 965 (1990) (suggesting that the copyright system would be unworkable if 
it did not allow access to the raw material of authorship), and more recently: David Bollier, Si-
lent Theft The Private Plunder of Our Common Wealth, Rutledge (2003), James Boyle, The Public Do-
main: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind. 
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Subject matter Information Invention 
Economic Per-
spective 
Efficiency  Incentives 
Paradigmatic con-
ception of the 
problem 
Transaction Costs. 
Barriers to the free flow of 
information lead to the in-
hibition of innovation and 
inadequate circulation of 
information. 
Public Goods Problems. 
Inadequate incentives for 
future production lead to 
the inhibition of innovation 
and inadequate circulation 
of information. 
Reward (if any) 
for... 
Effort/Investment/Risk.  Originality/Transformation. 
View of the Pub-
lic Domain 
Finite resources for future 
creators. 
Infinite resources for future 
creators. 
Vision of the 
Productive Pro-
cess 
Development based on ex-
isting material. “Poetry can 
only be made out of other 
poems; novels out of other 
novels.... All of this was 
much clearer before the as-
similation of literature to 
private enterprise....” 
Creation ex nihilo. 
“Copyright is about sustain-
ing the conditions of crea-
tivity that enable an indi-
vidual to craft out of thin air 
an Appalachian Spring, a Sun 
Also Rises, a Citizen Kane." 
 
 
Normative Start-
ing Point 
Free speech/Free circula-
tion of ideas and infor-
mation. 
Property rights: the crea-
tor's “natural” right, the re-
ward for past creation, the 
incentive to produce again. 
628 
 
Arguably, current intellectual property legislation can be placed in the right-
hand column above, namely Invention. From here on let us try to examine the 
binary couplings created by this division keeping the concept of the cultural 
commons in mind and linking it with the left-hand column, namely Information.   
 
6.2 THE BALANCING ACT: LEARNING V. OWNING 
Lewis Hyde writes in Common as Air: 
 
The commercial advantage which the inventor gains is his reward, not for 
having made the invention, but for having disclosed it to the public so that when the 
                                                
628 [original emphases throughout], Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmental-
ism on the Net?’ p. 99. 
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limited period of his patent has expired, the public gains the free use of the 
new idea. “It was not the person who locked up his invention in his scru-
toire that ought to profit from such invention,” Mansfield wrote, “but he 
who brought it forth for the benefit of mankind.” […] While it may not be 
obvious at first glance, copyright can be described in similar terms, as a 
grant whose purpose is not so much to reward creators as to enrich the cul-
tural commons.629  
 
Let us consider this in light of what was discussed in chapter 3 above with re-
gards to Stapleton and how he traced the rhetoric-based art mainly to the 15th 
century Venetian Republic and its privilege system.630 During the Renaissance 
the focus shifted away from approaching the artwork itself as something divine 
and spiritual, something that was made for the spirits equally as for men, to ra-
ther seeing the artist himself and his skill and genius631 as something sublime. The 
artist had always had an elevated place, even during the Antiquity, but the im-
portance of the genius was arguably at its peak during the Renaissance, and it is 
as such that we find it in the privilege system of the Venetian Republic. In Re-
naissance Italy where a system was in place with artist guilds and artist bottegas, 
the creative labour took place in a network, but the creation was attributed sole-
ly to the master as a product of his creativity. It was in this setting that the first 
rights creations in the form of privileges began to emerge.  
At that time, what is widely believed to be one of the first patents ever to be 
recorded, was granted to Franciscus Petri, from the island of Rhodes, giving Pe-
tri and his heirs exclusive rights for fifty years to build, alter, and reconstruct a 
water mill that he had designed and erected.632 Other privileges that were given 
were for instance the five-year monopolies to conduct book printing granted to 
Giovanni di Spira (Johann von Spayr) who introduced book printing to the Ve-
netian Republic. In Sweden, the first exclusive privileges arose during the latter 
half of the 17th century, and these were usually also granted to book printers. 
The early privileges were often granted to a printer, as opposed to the author. 
The privileges awarded to book printers enabled the safeguarding of profit 
and return. The emergence of rights constructions testified to the growing im-
portance of the individual rights creating subject – be it the master artist or the 
                                                
629 [original emphasis], Hyde, Common as Air, p. 51.  
630 Stapleton, Art, Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Economy, p. 32. 
631 Bourdieu refers to the same as ‘unique creators’ in The Field of Cultural Production. 
632 Paul A. David, Conference Paper. The Evolution Of Intellectual Property Institutions And The 
Panda's Thumb, paper prepared for presentation at the Meetings of the International Economic 
Association in Moscow, (24-28 August 1992) 
Available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/economics/pdf/wo_1012_e_ch_2.pdf.  
Last accessed 18th March 2014.  
 279 
printer, or even the printing enterprise. During the Renaissance, and the reign 
of the artist as genius, another figure can be identified as featuring on the art 
scene ever more frequently, namely the art patron, the prosperous investor who 
with his wealth enables the production and completion of artworks and provides 
for the artist’s living so that he can devote all his time and effort to the creation 
of art. This development together with the emerging privilege system meant 
that art, more than ever before, became a vocational633 activity and a bona fide 
profession. In Florence, the commissions made by e.g. the Medici family634 
were one of the first signs of privatisation of art on a larger scale, and also one of 
the first steps towards collecting art.635 Thus, owning art in Renaissance Italy be-
came a symbol of a high social standing. The value of art increased gradually by 
the act of enclosure and the increase of collection of artworks for the private 
domain.  
Still, artworks created under commission were nevertheless often placed in 
comparatively public spaces such as courts, churches and cathedrals. It could be 
said that Renaissance art was still relatively open to the public. However, the is-
sue of access further changed with the advent of the canvas painting. Canvas 
paintings embodied the first lightweight “enclosable” artwork, one that in prin-
ciple could be exhibited anywhere, easily stored or moved from one place to 
another, that is to say, it had an even wider access potential and could be exhib-
ited and accessed in other places than just its place of origin.  
This is the same type of line of flight that we saw above with music, namely 
to first make the artwork tangible and then to make it movable, then lighter and 
less cumbersome, reified (and ultimately, in the knowledge society: dematerial-
ised, immaterial, digital). It also meant, conversely, that artworks could now be 
removed or taken away and without greater difficulty placed and kept away from 
the public sphere. With the light version of the artwork the access to it becomes 
a privilege, a token of social standing, a luxury. 
It should also be kept in mind that the commissioned artwork was the dom-
inant type of work during the Renaissance, due to the investments granted by 
the art patrons. The patrons also ensured that the art they invested in would be-
come the most envied and prestigious. This was achieved by ingenious market-
ing strategies e.g. by weaving myths around the artists that had been commis-
sioned, their artistic character as well as their skills and ability. These were the 
first signs of marketing connected to the exploitation of artworks. The patron-
                                                
633 In fact, one of the keynote addresses at the Critical Legal Conference 2012 delivered by 
Angus McDonald was titled “Critique as Avocation”. 
634 For further reading see e.g. Paul Strathern, The Medici: Godfathers of the Renaissance, Pimlico, 
(2005). 
635 The first person to ever be connected to patronage activities was Gaius Cilnius Maecenas 
(April 70 BC – October 8 BC), the political adviser of Octavian and patron to Virgil among 
others. His name Maecenas would come to serve as a synonym with patronage.  
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commissioners therefore played their role in raising the value of the commis-
sioned ventures by privatising art and making it exclusive, something made by 
the select few for the select few.  
Access to artworks, into which enormous amounts of investment had been 
placed, had to be limited in a new way, not like earlier by the artwork’s geo-
graphical position as we saw with art of Antiquity, but rather by the possibility 
of enclosure.636 With the increasing importance and power that the artist himself 
had gained as well as the extensive promotional machinery with the sophisticat-
ed myth-building and financial structures that came with it through patronage, it 
was possible for the patrons to secure their investment and thus a discernable 
division was created by the fact that artworks were now seen to be in the do-
main and under the control of the patrons and those who invested in it. Having 
consecutively been made less public and more private, and with the growing 
privilege systems, the artworks became subject to the new bourgeois, commer-
cial trade economy that was spreading across Europe. That meant that artworks 
were instinctively included within the burgeoning capitalist property paradigm 
and came as a result to be governed by private law. The products of culture 
were, to put it bluntly, very fashionable and highly desirable for the new trading 
classes637 not to be exploited on the market.  
From having been a privilege in the Venetian Republic, gradually a need 
arose to assert the previously imperceptible link between the social significance 
of art and its commercial significance as investment and capital. Thus, it was for 
the first time firmly established and cemented in private law with the creation of 
copyright as a legal concept in 1710 in the UK through the Statute of Anne. Be-
fore that, there had been earlier attempts to codify copyright-esque laws such as 
the abovementioned customary practices in the Venetian Republic, but the 
Statute of Anne is still seen as the first genuine copyright law even if it initially 
focused on literature only and excluded other creative endeavours.  
Driven by the printers who were suffering losses from counterfeiting activi-
ties by rivalling publishing houses the Statute of Anne’s significance lay in artic-
ulating a private rights construction in law, instead of the vague privilege hand-
ed out at the doge’s discretion in Venice. An individual right was therefore cre-
ated and it was granted, at least ab initio, to the artist and not the publisher or 
the patron who might have paid for the work. The rhetoric of early copyright 
law was that the new legal concept had been created as “An Act for the En-
couragement of Learning...”, which could be achieved “...by Vesting the Copies 
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies...”638 
                                                
636 The acts of enclosure can happen in various different ways. One example, albeit rather 
ironic and perhaps counterproductive: the framing of Banksy’s graffiti art, where frames are 
placed on his street art in order for it to be preserved. See chapter 4, above. 
637 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 28-29. 
638 Statute of Anne (1710). 
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Arguably, the means for encouragement of learning came inadvertently to be 
linked to publishers and their commercial activities and they were still ultimately 
the ones who acquired copyrights contractually from authors and thus the rights 
were indirectly, and in reality, being placed in the hands of investors and their 
interests, the only difference was that now their interests were strengthened in 
law. It means that from the outset we can detect a certain built-in paradox, a bi-
nary pairing of sorts, or even a balancing act within the law itself, namely from the 
outset there was no real distinction between the interests of the public (in the 
guise of encouragement of learning) and the private (the vesting of copies in au-
thors and purchasers) in copyright law. As a matter of fact, the legal codification 
was an interesting paradigm shift. 
New technology, first book printing, and then e.g. lithography, and even lat-
er on in history photography and film, were liberating the creation of art and 
enabling what had until then been a slow, costly and cumbersome process of 
production and dissemination of works. At the same time, it was releasing the 
line of flight that was the copy of the work, and with that also the counterfeited 
work.639 The mass production possibilities that were enabled by new technolo-
gies meant that the number of artworks increased steadily and the intellectual 
circles that consumed art also multiplied. Significant institutions sprang up: mu-
seums, concert halls, salons, and so on. In public space terms these were hybrids 
of public spaces, partly closed off externally and comparatively open (and often 
governed by democratic principles640) internally. There, art was enjoyed, bought 
and accessed under, once again, public albeit limited, stinted and externally 
fenced off conditions.  
 
The industrial revolution brought with it a surge of new knowledge: of techno-
logical, scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature. In Europe, copy-
right and other intellectual property laws now existed to some extent in the UK 
and in France.641 Sweden introduced a rather provisional first copyright law as 
part of its constitutional law in 1810: “right of ownership of writing”.642 Ger-
many was comparatively late in legislating in field of copyright due to the fact 
that it was yet to become a nation state, and did not introduce copyright law un-
til 1837. 
                                                
639 For an interesting discussion on counterfeiting in conjunction with “passing off”, see Sta-
pleton, Art, Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Economy, p. 48. 
640 Bruncevic & Linné, ‘A Taste of Law and Coffee – From Macrocosm to Microcosm’. 
641 In fact, earlier privileges were abolished in France and the new copyright law was enacted 
in 1789, during the Revolution. 
642 [my translation]: “eganderätt till skrift”, mom. 8 first paragraph in 1810 “Tryckfrihetsför-
ordning” /”The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression”, i.e. it was introduced into the 
Swedish constitutional law.  
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The German legal historian, Eckhart Höffner, conducted a research pro-
ject643 that studied what this difference in terms of when copyright laws were 
enacted in Europe and which effects it had. He also examined which conse-
quences an introduction of copyright law had for the general dissemination of 
knowledge to the public. He found that whereas the UK, at the time the leading 
and the most wealthy nation in Europe, that already had a well functioning cop-
yright law, produced around one thousand works per year, Germany, much less 
developed and still agrarian in large parts, produced more than fourteen thou-
sand books per year. This enormous volume of books comprised mostly of 
works that were of a technical nature or handbook-type but that meant that 
Germany could develop very rapidly and soon be as industrially developed as 
the UK. In the UK on the other hand the type of books that were being written 
and printed were not handbooks but rather literature, philosophy, theology and 
other vastly academic canons, targeting not the general public but more or less 
only the academics and the leisurely classes.  
Such a difference in the number of works that were being produced and dis-
seminated had to do with, Höffner argues somewhat surprisingly, the fact that 
there was no copyright law in Germany until much later. This, according to 
him, meant that the publishers, in order to out-live plagiarism, had to keep their 
prices very low, which ensured high access, which in turn meant that reading 
was not equally class-dependent in Germany as it was in the UK. Knowledge 
could thus be disseminated faster and in larger numbers. Furthermore, Höffner 
finds in his large empirical study, that the authors’ earnings too were far higher 
in Germany, without copyright law, than they were in the UK, with copyright 
law. As a finding, even though its conclusion might seem radical, it illustrates 
that a fast changing society and growing capitalism do not necessarily always 
benefit from private individual rights constructions and a tightly controlled ex-
ploitation of works that encompass knowledge potential.644 
Habermas had identified museums, concert halls and salons as the main insti-
tutions where access to art happened during the late 18th century. All of these 
institutions were naturally within a bourgeois public sphere but during the 19th 
century there was also a fast growing, corresponding, public sphere for the factory 
workers and labourers, e.g. the coffee houses.645 In the new industrial cities both 
the bourgeois and working class public spheres, were developing side by side, 
without really affecting one another. Industrialism brought with it new class dif-
ferences, new lines of flight, new encounters, that had to be categorised in new 
ways, and after all the revolutions that had taken place an increasingly literate 
                                                
643 Eckhart Höffner, Geschichte und Wesen des Urheberrechts - Band 1&2, Verlag Europäische 
Wirtschaft, (2010). 
644 Höfner, Geschichte und Wesen des Urheberrechts. 
645 Ibid. 
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working class was creating a public sphere of its own, where mass production 
was not only necessary, it was more or less imperative.646 
The conditions in which people lived and worked called for a redefining of 
the public and the private. Even private homes changed and their traditionally 
public spaces such as lounges in (bourgeois) homes were transformed into e.g. 
individual bedrooms. Urban planning also changed. Even though some of the 
traditional public spheres were changing, new ones were being created. One 
such example is the large city park. The cities were also equipped with addition-
al squares and other smaller green spaces. All these places served as a focal 
point where people could meet, chat or rest. Such physical public spheres would 
serve as entirely novel open spaces where people could communicate and share 
ideas, as they also brought forth the fashionable Romantic longing for nature 
into the city. These developments further show how public spaces and commu-
nication of ideas are linked and constantly evolve and change over time as so-
ciety changes.647 They also demonstrate how the concepts of the (enclosed) 
owning and (open) learning exist side by side.  
With industrialism the hand of the artist genius could no longer be seen as 
the one single method for creating and disseminating art, the notion of the pub-
lic sphere was in transformation too, and as there were new production possi-
bilities that could speed up creation and multiplication of works. The new needs 
as well as the new reproduction possibilities could not be ignored. This had an 
impact on access, as it was no longer the invention of the artist genius, but ra-
ther the machine,648 that was seen to be the most potent creator of art. 
We can already at this point start to draw parallels with what would come to 
take place a couple of centuries later, today, when new technology first enabled 
the creation of mechanical and then of digital artworks.  
Law still to this day, centuries later, continues to be weighed down by the in-
itial lack of clarity that we first saw in the Statute of Anne, whose principles 
spread to most other jurisdictions in Europe (and the world649). The confusion 
as to which interests copyright was meant to serve – the public encouragement 
of learning (the public sphere) or the private ownership of the investment in the 
physical production (the commercial sphere), or both, in fact still remains to be 
satisfactorily resolved. 
Mirroring the same type of argumentation that Martial had presented almost 
more than a thousand years before him, Daniel Defoe published a pamphlet 
                                                
646 Ibid. 
647 Höfner, Geschichte und Wesen des Urheberrechts. 
648 This was naturally further explored in the Futurist movement with Filippo Tommaso Ma-
rinetti as their chief ideologue, although they as a group went on to have far right, fascist, ex-
treme views.  
649 Through e.g. the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
(1886) 
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around the time of Statute of Anne trying to defend the author’s private right as 
more important than the public, learning aspect. He wrote: 
 
A Book is the Author’s Property, ‘tis the Child of his Inventions, the Brat 
of his brain; if he sells his Property, it then becomes the Right of the Pur-
chaser; if not, ‘tis as much his own, as his Wife and Children are his own.650 
 
This particularly male reading of property is obvious, and maybe even comical 
when read today (did Defoe ever intend to sell his wife and his children?). Still 
the parody of it has somehow been lost, leaving intellectual property law with 
the normative starting point that Boyle distinguishes in the right hand column 
above, Invention, namely that intellectual property rights are assumed to be the 
creator's “natural” right, the reward for past creation, the incentive to produce 
again and the vision of the creative process is assumed to be a type of creation 
ex nihilo.  
 
Copyright is about sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an in-
dividual to craft out of thin air an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen 
Kane.651  
 
This idea that creative production happens out of thin air was probably always 
forced given what we have seen so far, and it certainly gave rise to the assump-
tions on which intellectual property still depends today. But in the digital 
knowledge society, such assumptions and starting points appear out-dated and 
almost impossible to uphold, not just to the lawyer that attempts to read intel-
lectual property law critically, but to any lawyer that has to work with intellectu-
al property law today. The binary opposite learning v. owning might have been 
flawed from the outset; the two are so inseparable and simultaneous that they 
can never be parted.  
 
6.3 THE TYPE OF OWNERSHIP: PRIVILEGE V. RIGHT  
So far it is obvious that the two legislative strategies that have been employed 
have been to construct the concept either as a privilege or as a right. The two 
are obviously vastly different, and both affect access in their own particular way.  
 
                                                
650 Hyde, Common as Air, pp. 81-82. 
651 [original emphasis] Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the 
Net?’, see the table above. 
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6.3.1 PRIVILEGE  
It is probably not merely an exercise in semantics when asking whether an in-
terest in one’s creation is deemed to be a privilege or a right. I have already in 
the brief and topographic outline above been able to conclude that even as this 
concept has evolved through history, it has not always been evident how one is 
supposed to understand it or what legal status it has. Above, we saw that the 
first regulations of the interests in the intellectual creation came in the form of a 
privilege. This rights construction is a comparatively recent one and originally, 
an Anglo-Saxon, model.  
Tom W. Bell652 argues that while copyright certainly has some property-like 
attributes that privilege might be a far more correct description of what it actually 
is, and that the legal concept should in that vein be called intellectual privilege as 
opposed to intellectual property. As per such reasoning, copyright should be 
called copyprivilege, he argues further.  
Bell draws up the following figure: 
 
Property Theory Privilege Theory 
Intellectual Property Intellectual Privilege 
Copyright Copy Privilege 
Owner Holder 
 
That the figure is based on a binary understanding of what a right is, and what a 
privilege is, as well as what they do, is obvious. Bell’s use of the concept is fur-
thermore a critique of the Hohfeldian use of the term “privilege”. Bell suggests 
that Hohfeld’s use of the term mistakenly makes a connection between a privi-
lege and a liberty.653 While his may be an interesting theoretical exercise in itself I 
shall leave it at that here. However, for the sake of clarity I shall follow Bell’s 
reasoning for a moment in order to crystallise the two.   
Interestingly, and as obliquely picked up by Jessica Litman already in 1996, 
when privilege is discussed in this context, it is usually the author’s privileges 
and not the public’s privilege to information and access654 that are being re-
ferred to. She writes: 
 
Most notably, since any use of a computer to view, read, reread, hear or 
otherwise experience a work in digital form requires reproducing that work 
in a computer’s memory, and since the copyright statute gives the copyright 
                                                
652 Tom W. Bell, ‘Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege’, in 58 Syracuse Law Review. __ 
(2007). 
653 Ibid. p. 9. 
654 Jessica Litman, ‘Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age’, in 75 Oregon Law Review 
19 (1996) 
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holder exclusive control over reproductions, everybody needs to have either 
a statutory privilege or the copyright holder’s permission to view, read, reread, 
hear or otherwise experience a digital work, each time she does so.655  
 
The detailed bright lines have evolved, through accident of technological 
change, into all-inclusive categories of infringers with tiny pock-marks of 
express exemptions and privileges, and undefined and largely unacknowl-
edged free zones of people-who-are-technically-infringing-but-will-never-
get-sued, like your next-door neighbor who duplicates his wife's authorized 
copy of Windows ® rather than buying his own from the computer store. 
The brightness of the current lines is illusory.656  
 
Keeping in mind that the article was written in 1996 Litman can be forgiven for 
thinking (perhaps naively) that the phenomenon of “people-who-are-
technically-infringing-but-will-never-get-sued” was going to be everlasting. In 
the age of Digital Millennium Acts, ACTAs, IPREDs and their national peers, 
we now know that rights owners do not have any ‘pangs of consciousness’, 
when it comes to suing the private infringers, i.e. their own consumers. A very 
recent example from the film industry involves Voltage Pictures who in May 
2010 initiated a lawsuit against 5000 John Doe defendants for illegally distrib-
uting the film The Hurt Locker. Voltage Pictures then amended its original com-
plaint in April 2011 bringing the total number of defendants to around 24 500 
(24 595.2 to be exact!). By the end of 2011 more than 250 000 individuals had 
been sued for similar alleged acts.657 James DeBriyn comments on this by con-
cluding that it is “unfathomable when one considers that these lawsuits only in-
volve a micro-fraction of the intellectual property being illegally traded on the 
Internet.”658 He claims that unexpected incentives arise by suing a large number 
of consumers that have illegally downloaded a work. If all (or most) of them 
settle out of court for comparatively small sums, new revenue streams are creat-
ed for film productions the moneys can then be used towards recoupment and 
profit. So not only do “people-who-are-technically-infringing-but-will-never-
get-sued” not exist as a concept, on the contrary, these very people provide un-
expected revenue streams for content owners.659 
                                                
655 [my emphasis], Ibid. p. 21. 
656 [my emphasis], Litman, ‘Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age’, p. 42. 
657 James DeBriyn, ‘Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Liti-
gation in the Age of Statutory Damages’ in 19 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 79 (2012). 
658 Ibid. 
659 “While [statutory] damages are beyond an average defendant’s means, the purpose of each 
lawsuit is not to seek the full damages through a trial, but rather to pressure a defendant to set-
tle claims for around $3000. Had Voltage Pictures only sued the 5000 Does named in the orig-
inal complaint, and 75 percent of the defendants could be identified, were sued, and chose to 
settle for $2900, the litigation would generate $10.9 million. Reports suggest that the plaintiffs 
 287 
Thus, when privilege v ownership rights are discussed then the concept is not 
strong enough in comparison with these types of rights constructions that can 
provide the strong enforcement possibilities and incentives that can generate 
such direct and indirect revenue. And when privilege as befalling the public and 
not the author/rightsholder is discussed then it is too strong of a grant as it, con-
versely, does not allow for the abovementioned type of enforcement, as the 
ownership of property is not clean, it comes with a burden of a public privilege.  
Privilege, as such, can therefore not be understood as a clear concept. Privi-
lege to intellectual works must be first and foremost understood as a concept 
that spans over several different interests, the artist, the public, the industry, the 
state etc. Somebody must grant the privilege at the expense of someone else, as 
Lord Macaulay phrased it “[f]or the sake of the good we must submit to the 
evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose 
of securing the good.”660 Lord Macaulay clearly expressed that with the current 
copyright construction in mind; however one might attempt to structure it, 
some evil will always need to be endured. The question is whether this ‘evil’ that 
Lord Macaulay is referring to is the property and the rights construct. The fact 
that the notion of property has migrated even into the intangible realm means 
that the demarcation between a privilege and a private property based copyright 
is blurred. Discussing this very topic, the American Supreme Court wrote in 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.661 that intangible interests very well can seen to con-
stitute property (this particular case concerned ‘trade secrets’ as property): 
 
It is conceivable that [the term ‘property’ in the takings clause] was used in 
its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which 
the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may 
have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights 
inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to pos-
sess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the 
phrase has been the latter.662 
 
We saw the same type of reasoning above in e.g. the Nadia Plesner case in 
chapter 4 where the ECHR provisions concerning possessions was also interpret-
ed in a similar manner, namely, that intangible interests are unquestionably to be 
                                                                                                                                   
will receive 30 percent of the $10.9 million-$3.3 million. This creates such strong incentives to 
litigate that one may question whether an enforcement-based business model can be recon-
ciled with the purposes of copyright law”, DeBriyn, ‘Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An 
Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages’. 
660 See Wendy J. Gordon, ‘An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Con-
sistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory’ in 41 Stanford Law Review 1343 (1988-1989). 
661 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
662 Gordon, ‘An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Con-
sent, and Encouragement Theory’. 
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deemed as possessions, property. Nonetheless, the court in Hague in the second 
Plesner case ruled that the concept of right of peaceful enjoyment of one’s pos-
sessions weighed (in that particular case) less than the privilege of unrestricted 
freedom of speech. Adding the dimension of privilege to discussion carried out 
above in chapter 4, we reveal further rhizomatic connections that occur within 
this sphere. The rights concept is connected to the privilege concept, the two are 
not each other’s opposites, and they do not cancel out each other. 
 
6.3.2 RIGHT 
Chapter 5 above made a connection between the Lockean notion of acquisition 
of property and the rights-based construction in law. To recapitulate briefly, I 
presented the Lockean663 idea that there is a natural connection between object-
labour-ownership. Thus, the person who invests labour into something be-
comes the owner of the said object. Carys J. Craig makes a similar link in her 
book Copyright, Communication and Culture:664 
 
The Lockean justification for copyright rests upon the assertion that the 
original author is entitled to the exclusive right in her work, having exerted 
mental labour in its creation. The assertion depends upon the ‘root idea’ of 
Lockean theory that “people are entitled to hold, as property, whatever they 
produce by their own initiative, intelligence, and industry”.665 
 
By applying Hardt/Negri to the paradigm of immaterial property it was argued 
that while it clearly is possible to privatise and materialise also intellectual intan-
gible works within the institute of property, it is often a somewhat forced en-
deavour, especially in the knowledge economy. Yet the idea of holding as prop-
erty that which a person, or a group of persons for that matter, produces by her 
own initiative, intelligence and industry cannot be fully negated. The rights con-
struction that surrounds copyright law today, to return to the beginning of this 
chapter, is fully capable to be understood within the capitalist machine, but 
within the legal sphere it constantly creates anomalies that force the concept of 
right and the concept of privilege to compete. The problem with the “capitalist 
machine” on the other hand, is that it empowers the private interest to such an 
extent that the public interest in its turn gets negated, the public sphere shrinks, 
and so law becomes powerless to shift this balance as it cannot incorporate the 
deterritorialising lines of flight.  
                                                
663 Locke, Two Treatises On Government (1690) Book II. 
664 Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture.  
665 Ibid. p. 71. She is quoting Lawrence C. Becker Property Rights, Philosophic Foundations, Lon-
don, Rutledge, (1977). 
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In Commonwealth Hardt and Negri wrote that capitalism is becoming biopolit-
ical.666 The claim in this project goes one step further and claims that capitalism 
is becoming (or probably always was) nomadic667 in Deleuzeoguattarian terms. 
The exclusive rights construction that allows ownership of intellectual produc-
tion forms a part of such process. With a rights construction based copyright in 
law the nomadic capitalist machine has been enabled to encroach (striate and 
reterritorialise) that which we are looking for here, namely the commons. Slavoj 
Zizek develops that further, he writes that privatisation involves a violent act 
that overtakes: 
 
- the commons of culture, the immediately socialized forms of ‘cognitive’ capital, 
primarily language, our means of communication and education, but also 
the shared infrastructure of public transport, electricity, the postal system, 
and so on; 
- the commons of external nature, threatened by pollution and exploitation (from 
oil to rain forests and the natural habitat itself); 
- the commons of internal nature (the biogenetic inheritance of humanity); with 
the new biogenetic technology, the creation of a New Man in the literal 
sense of changing human nature becomes a realistic prospect.668  
 
Zizek’s take on the commons is evidently wider than the one adopted in this re-
search project, which deals with (a fraction) of his first type of commons, name-
ly the commons of culture and the artworks within it. Nonetheless, Zizek links 
the “inappropriateness of the notion of private property to […] ‘intellectual prop-
erty’”.669 What Zizek describes here is not an indication of the biopolitics of 
capitalism but a nomadology of capitalism, the new capitalism, the capitalism that 
keeps evolving rhizomatically, by itself, through and with societal lines of flight. 
In the knowledge economy capital ownership of knowledge has been enabled 
by the exclusive rights construct, particularly the intellectual property rights. In-
terestingly, Zizek’s “commons of culture” is similar to and commensurable with 
Bourdieu’s definition of capital. The cultural commons is incorporated within 
the realm of economic capitalism and privatisation; it includes cultural capital 
(e.g. language) as well as social capital (e.g. means of communication). This 
means that Zizek’s and Hardt/Negri’s readings can be nuanced with Deleuzian 
(re/de)territorialisation, through Bourdieu’s reading of capital. Reading capital-
ism as a ‘territorialising machine’ adds the schizophrenic nature to the biopoli-
tics presented by Zizek and Hardt/Negri.  
                                                
666 Hardt/Negri, Commonwealth, p. 131. 
667 See e.g. Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, plateau 1227: ‘Treatise of Nomadology – 
The War Machine’, pp. 387-467. 
668 [original emphasis], Slavoj Zizek, First as Tragedy then as Farce, p. 91 
669 [original emphasis], Ibid. 
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What this analysis then adds to all of it is that it provides an exit from the 
paradox either capital or commons. In Deleuzeoguattarian terms, through 
Bourdieu’s forms of capital and Zizek’s and Hardt/Negri’s biopolitcal approach 
to the commons of culture, we have gone a full circle. We have reached the in-
stance of capital AND commons.  
 
6.3.3 RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE  
In order to continue the discussion concerning the right and privilege balance, 
or lack thereof, I have proposed a Deleuzeoguattarian link between right and 
privilege in the cultural commons. Already above in the Boyle figure we could 
see that the right hand column Invention imagined the creator as an inventor, 
creating the work ex nihilo. In the left hand column Information Boyle distin-
guished the paradigmatic conception of the creation in the following manner: 
 
Development based on existing material. “Poetry can only be made out of 
other poems; novels out of other novels.... All of this was much clearer be-
fore the assimilation of literature to private enterprise....”670 
 
Lewis Hyde explains a similar type of conception of the creative effort, first 
providing a quote from Rimbaud, that I take the liberty to re-quote here: 
 
Right now I’m debauching myself as much as possible. Why? I want to be a 
poet, and I’m working to make myself a seer… It’s a matter of getting to the 
unknown by the derangement of all the senses… The suffering is tremen-
dous, but one must be strong, to be born a poet, and know that’s what I 
am. It’s not at all my fault. It’s wrong to say: I think. One should say: I am 
thought… 
 I is someone else. Too bad for the wood that discovers it’s a violin…!671 
 
Hyde then reads this passage as the inversion of the Cartesian “I think therefore 
I am”, and in the inversion a “non-I” is revealed. The creator here is almost like 
a vessel or in Picasso’s words, a thief, “All artists borrow; great artists steal.”672 
                                                
670 Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property; Environmentalism on the Net?’ p. 99. 
671 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 201. 
672 Ibid. p. 202. As a matter of fact, it is disputed to whom this quote really can be attributed 
and there are a number of variations of it. Some claim that T.S. Elliot said “Immature poets 
imitate; mature poets steal”; and that it was Picasso who said that “Good artists copy. Great 
artists steal.” Or it might have been Stravinsky who said “Lesser artists borrow; great artists 
steal.” For more variations see Quote Investigator:  
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/03/06/artists-steal/. Last accessed 18th March 2014.  
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Reading Hyde’s analysis in this setting means presenting Rimbaud’s and Eliot’s 
utterances as representing Boyle’s left hand column, Information. Why is that in-
teresting for this analysis? 
First of all, it is important to problematise the notion of the ex nihilo crea-
tion, which is the pervasive one in current intellectual property law that we have 
seen ever since chapter 3 above. Scholars such as Boyle and Hyde have already 
shown how this is the case. Second of all, what my study adds to this, is that the 
juxtaposition of the two models Invention and Information, the I and the non-I, as 
each other’s opposites also becomes problematic.  
As we saw in chapter 3 above, Jamie Stapleton presented two types of art-
works, the rhetoric-based and the semiotic/network-based ones. We saw also 
how the semiotic/network-based artwork is constantly excluded from the ambit 
of the individual rights based legal construct; it is the outcast, when it comes to 
modern-day intellectual property rights. The semiotic/network-based artwork 
falls more into the Information than the Invention paradigm. As a matter of fact, 
these types of artworks are precisely based on the very challenging of the Inven-
tion paradigm, with all its inherent individuality, materiality and its object-centric 
nature.  
When fusing the Invention and the Information paradigms, connected by the 
notion of the concept of the author as not (only) a unit, a legal subject, but some-
thing else. It also becomes clear how the notions of right and privilege are con-
nected. An author that does not think, but that is thought, an author that does not 
invent, but that steals, requires both private rights and access privileges in order 
to create. This very movement must be acknowledged legally. 
In the next section we shall move from the author and continue to examine 
one last binary pair, which is created from the dogmatic reasoning namely, 
namely the content, attempting to differentiate (but not separate) it from its objec-
tivity and materiality, namely its carrier. 
 
6.4 CONTENT V. CARRIER 
The discourse concerning access to art often seems to confuse two concepts: 
content and carrier. Even if the two are not always uncomplicated to differenti-
ate it could be said that the first one, the content, is that which is being expressed 
and the second one, carrier or form, refers to how that is being expressed or 
communicated, and through which channels. The dichotomy content v. carrier 
may appear to be a new one, but the dichotomy content v. form, or expression v. 
form, is certainly an ancient one.  
Already in chapter 1 above, in the delimitation section, I wrote that this pro-
ject focuses on content primarily and not on the carrier. But now when we have 
reached this far into the analysis that particular statement needs to be both fur-
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ther explained and nuanced. In his description of the first sale doctrine in US 
law Lewis Hyde describes this from another, less theoretical, angle, he writes:  
 
 ‘First sale’ is a limitation on an owner’s exclusive right such that once you 
have bought a book (or CD, or video disc, or map…) you may do almost 
anything with it that you want. You may return to it multiple times, read it 
to your child, copy bits into a journal, give it to a friend, loan it to a student, 
sell it to a stranger…. You may not print and sell copies, that is true, but all 
these other things you may do. The right of first sale creates an object specific, 
down-stream public domain; the copyright owner’s control ends at the 
point of purchase.673  
 
In a setting where the object specific, or object-centred as I call it, work of art is 
absent, both the content and the carrier get mixed up and become in a way one 
and the same, and the differentiation of expression and form thus becomes 
equally difficult, or at least it is not as obvious as it has previously been. In order 
to merge the two in a legal concept of a cultural commons we need to do this 
theoretical exercise and show how content and carrier, or expression and form, 
may be approached in a rhizomatic setting, or as Deleuze/Guattari call it, in the 
rhizosphere.  
 
6.4.1 DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT674  
In order to fully understand the content and carrier discussion we can go back 
to the initial example of music that I mapped out above in 6.1 and look at it 
closer by adding the aspect of content and carrier to it:  
                                                
673 [my emphasis], Hyde, Common as Air, p. 66. 
674 Schollin, Digital Rights Management: The New Copyright. 
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 Content Carrier Object-Centric? 
Concert / 
live public 
performance 
Preformed Live No 
Music on a 
Long Play 
Disk 
Physically in-
scribed on 
object 
Long Play Disk + Ste-
reo 
Yes 
Music on 
Cassette 
Physically in-
scribed on 
object 
Cassette + Walkman Yes 
Music on 
CD 
Physically in-
scribed on 
object 
CD + CD Player Yes 
Digital 
Download: 
peer-to-peer 
File  Downloaded Immate-
rial file + Computer 
No but can be down-
loaded on a carrier 
such as a CD 
Digital 
Download:  
Bit Torrent 
Parts of file Downloaded Immate-
rial part of file + 
Computer or portable 
devise such as mobile 
phone or tablet 
No but can be down-
loaded on a carrier 
such as a CD 
Digital 
Streaming: 
e.g. Spotify 
File  Streamed immaterial 
file + Computer or 
portable devise such as 
mobile phone or tablet 
No, cannot be down-
loaded, but portable 
 
 
In the digital knowledge society we have seen that the digital work becomes less 
and less object-centric  and becomes increasingly difficult to enclose, as well as 
to keep from being infringed upon. Kristoffer Schollin presents digital rights 
management as the ‘new copyright’ or a regime that could rescue the digital 
problems copyright has been encountering in the digital spheres.675 Schollin de-
scribes the term digital rights management in the following manner: 
 
- any technology or combination of technology for monitoring, identifying 
usage and enforcing usage terms of… 
                                                
675 Schollin, Digital Rights Management: The New Copyright. 
 294 
- intellectual assets. This includes created artistic works, catalogues and da-
tabases, know-how, business secrets, photos, etc… 
- in digital forms.676 
 
Clearly, his approach to the type of content that can be governed by digital 
rights management per this definition spans much wider than traditional ‘intel-
lectual property’. Schollin writes:  
 
This means that such things such as works in the public domain or other 
intellectual resources that cannot for some reason be protected under an in-
tellectual property are also [digital rights management’s] subject. 677 
 
In Schollin’s study digital rights management is presented as a much more flexi-
ble form that could govern that which copyright often struggles to govern (and 
enforce) in the digital sphere. We can connect this to two examples that Lewis 
Hyde provides. He describes the electronic publication of Lewis Carroll’s 1865 
book Alice in Wonderland (arguably in the public domain), with the copyright no-
tice that prohibits (using digital rights management) the copying, printing, lend-
ing of the book, but also precludes the book from being given to someone else and 
read aloud.678 Hyde’s other example is the electronic version of the U.S. Constitu-
tion (again, arguably within the public domain) offered on sale via Ama-
zon.com, which makes it impossible to readers to print it more than twice a year and di-
rectly expresses that hacking of the code (digital rights management) enforcing 
this restriction is illegal.679 To link it with the second enclosure movement: 
  
[I]ntellectual property rights have become broader (covering more kinds of 
information, deeper (giving rights holders greater power), and more punitive 
(imposing greater penalties on infringers). Supplemental measures have also 
been introduced to increase the technological control of rights holders and 
to counter the way digital technologies facilitate copying. Anticircumven-
tion laws have been introduced […]. This shift has been called a ‘second enclo-
sure movement’ […]680  
 
                                                
676 Ibid. p. 149. 
677 Ibid. 
678 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 67 
679 Ibid. 
680 [my emphases throughout], Kapczynski, ‘Access to Knowledge: A conceptual genealogy’ in 
(eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property, p. 24. 
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Therefore, and as a consequence of the second enclosure movement and as a 
construct digital rights management has been placed predominantly within the 
property paradigm. 
    
Property is here defined as the right of a single individual to be the gate-
keeper with respect to a resource and to act autocratically with respect to 
decisions about its use. This vision of property is sustained by the notion 
that only the individual owner, and not the state, community, or 
nonowners, may make decisions about the price or terms of transaction of 
that property.681 
  
Amy Kapczynski refers to this type of property and ownership as a despotic do-
minion, quoting Peter Drahos, as a type of “dominum over the abstract object of 
intellectual property [which goes a long way toward maintaining the] imperi-
um.”682 
Seen from a Deleuzeoguattarian point of view it is a construct that territori-
alises and striates the smooth space (and the potential) of the digital spheres. As 
such it can be detrimental to exploitation of works commercially in the long 
run, particularly if access to information is seen as an ingredient in the creation 
of content as opposed to approaching content as being created ex nihilo.  
Nonetheless, there is a large potential in the digital rights management con-
struct in the creation of a legal concept of cultural commons. And as it is be-
coming all the more apparent, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory provides us with 
appropriate tools to unleash this potential in a manner than transcends binary 
opposites between open and closed, market-state, even capitalism-non capital-
ism, freedom-fetter, as Jeffery Atteberry writes: 
 
Perfectly aware of the potentially duplicitous character of bourgeois free-
dom, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have described the process of capi-
tal’s development in terms of a ‘generalised decoding flows’ and a dynamic 
of ‘deterritorilization’. The current informantionalist regime and the dis-
courses attending to it – including that of the A2K movement – fit nicely 
within Deleuze and Guattari’s paradigm. The informationlist mode of pro-
duction represents a new order of decoded flows. The freeing of infor-
mation promises to restructure the relations of production, replacing verti-
                                                
681 Ibid. pp. 26-27. 
682 Ibid. p. 26. Quote taken from Peter Drahos, ‘Global Property Rights in Information: The 
story of TRIPS at the GATT’, in Prometheus 13, no 1 (1995), p. 16. 
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cally integrated structures of production within horizontally networked 
ones.683 
 
By reading principles from current intellectual property law I have been able to 
discuss how the notion of the mass/authentic artwork is impossible to maintain 
in the IP law of the knowledge society, even if, this division still exists and un-
derpins many aspects of current IP law, e.g. in the notion of author as a ‘genius 
creator’ that invents the work ex nihilo. By connecting Hardt/Negri to Zizek and 
Bourdieu it could be demonstrated how various notions of capital are in fact 
(already) part of the cultural commons, especially if the de- and reterritorialising 
nature of capitalism is taken into account. Finally, by revealing the double na-
ture of the artwork as both invention and information, and the author as both a 
creator and a borrower, we could see how Stapleton’s rhetoric-based artworks 
could be fitting for the invention paradigm while the semiotic/network-based 
artworks conversely fitted inside the information paradigm. Both of these para-
digms must be accounted for and connected in law, as well as in capitalism, if 
we purport to discuss the legal concept of the cultural commons seriously.    
                                                
683 Jeffery Atteberry, ‘Information/Knowledge in the Global Society of Control: A2K Theory 
and the Postcolonial Commons’, in (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the 
Age of Intellectual Property, p. 341. Atteberry is quoting Deleuze/Guattari in his quote, Anti-
Oedipus, p. 224. 
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PART 4 
 
 
COMMONS AND COMMUNICATION – FIXING THE SHADOWS 
 
“After all, democracy is democracy.” 
 
– Lewis Hyde 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
COMMONS IN THE DIGITAL ERA (CASE STUDY PART 2)  
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7 COMMONS IN THE DIGITAL ERA (CASE STUDY 
PART 2) 
 
We have been made so stupid that we can only understand the world as 
private or public. We have become blind to the common. – Lewis Hyde684 
 
The construction of various commons types where access to resources of dif-
ferent kinds is enabled is evidently not a particularly new phenomenon. We 
have already seen how the notion of sharing within commons-like-settings has 
existed for many a century, but it was not before the advent of the internet and 
the access and sharing that happened on-line that the notion of the cultural or 
artificial commons in particular entered into the every-day realms of discussion. 
For the last couple of decades legal research has grappled with this phenome-
non.685 How to strike a fair balance between that which is open and available 
for anyone to access and that which is private, and enclosed, without creating a 
tragedy of the commons that Garrett Hardin so appropriately warned us about al-
ready in the 1960s. 
The most noteworthy commons project and the one that I shall particularly 
pay attention to in this chapter is the one carried out under the umbrella term 
Creative Commons.686 Creative Commons will serve as an example that is typical 
of a commons project from the 21st century. Even if these projects admittedly 
differ inter se, for the intents and purposes of this analysis, and for the sake of 
clarity, I have chosen to focus on the Creative Commons, which is the largest 
and the most established one and encompasses many of the basic principles of 
the commons projects in general. 
The discussion about the Creative Commons commenced when it became 
apparent that in the digital sphere it was increasingly difficult to draw a line be-
                                                
684 Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’, p. 352. 
685 It is impossible to account for all the books, articles, conferences, work-shops and discus-
sions on this topic that have been going on in the last couple of years, here in a note. 
Throughout this project I have been referring to some of the most notable ones such as the 
books written by e.g. Lessig and Vaidhyanathan that in their turn refer to many other projects. 
But this is not solely a “critical” discussion, also within the field of more dogmatic studies as 
well as in course books, these types of discussion have not been circumvented, see e.g. Nicho-
la Lucchi, Digital Media & Intellectual Property Management of Rights and Consumer Protection in a 
Comparative Analysis, Springer, (2006), William Cornish, Intellectual Property, Oxford University 
Press (2004), not to mention the election of various “Pirate” Parties into the European Par-
liament. 
686 http://creativecommons.org/. Last accessed 20th March 2014. Other noteworthy com-
mons projects that can be mentioned in passing are Icommons, Wikimedia Commons and 
Science Commons. The last one is a project under the larger umbrella of the Creative Com-
mons. 
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tween where aesthetic inspiration stopped and where infringement of intellectu-
al property began. A similar discussion has already been presented throughout 
this analysis and it was particularly discussed in chapter 6 above. Throughout all 
these discussions it has been pointed out and argued that intellectual property 
law in many ways impedes creativity.687  Simultaneously, it has been claimed that it, 
intellectual property law, as such does not afford appropriate protection to the artist. 
References to these very much different discussions have recurred in various 
stages of this analysis. What we arrive at here are the “solutions” or “compro-
mises” that have recently been presented in the guise of various commons projects 
where attempts to make the rights of the individual creator have been made 
more flexible in order to benefit a more open access and encourage sharing of 
works. This has been done so in order to achieve a more democratic distribu-
tion of culture and knowledge. Some of these projects even offer the possibility 
for the rights owners to abandon688 all or most of their copyrights for the 
“common good”. 
This chapter adopts the same approach to the commons as was presented in 
chapter 5, but it will be further embedded in the Deleuzian/Deleuzeoguattarian 
paradigm. This will be done in order to show the contrast between the two. 
From then on, the Creative Commons, its structure and its contractual licence 
solutions will be considered, in more general terms. The focus will thereafter re-
turn to the three of the case studies presented in chapter 4 above in order to 
show other types of contractual solutions in terms of access, that are not neces-
sarily, or at all, tied to a commons project, and the implications of such solu-
tions in terms of the commons. The return to the cases will also further the 
contractual government of access to art that takes place outside of intellectual 
property law and its realm. In essence, this chapter fuses the theoretical aspect 
of this study with the discussions concerning the creative commons projects, 
which constitute the contractual commons before arriving at the final discussion 
on the legal689 concept of the cultural commons. 
                                                
687 “But the service will still be essentially one-way, and the freedom to feed back, to feed cre-
ativity to others, will be just about as constrained as it is today. These constraints are not the 
constraints of economics as it exists today—not the high costs of production or the extraordi-
narily high costs of distribution. These constraints instead will be burdens created by law—by 
intellectual property as well as other government-granted exclusive rights. The promise of 
many-to-many communication that defined the early Internet will be replaced by a reality of 
many, many ways to buy things and many, many ways to select among what is offered. What 
gets offered will be just what fits within the current model of the concentrated systems of dis-
tribution: cable television on speed, addicting a much more manageable, malleable, and sellable 
public.” writes Lawrence Lessig in Lessig, The Future Of Ideas. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copy-
rights And Copywrongs, See further Lessig, Free Culture, and Boyle, Shamans, Software, And Spleens, 
Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, Vaidhyanathan, ‘Remote Control: The Rise Of 
Electronic Cultural Policy’, in 597 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 1 (2005). 
688 See both case study concerning orphan works above and section 7.2. below. 
689 Here I propose we read ‘legal’ as ‘statutory’.  
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7.1 THE COMMONS INSIDE THE DELEUZIAN FORMS OF POSSESSION 
The concept of the commons adopted herein is not presented in the sense of 
‘the opposite of private’ or as equal to ‘public’. Lawrence Lessig commented on 
the commons in a similar manner: 
 
Commons may be rare. They may evoke tragedies. They may be hard to 
sustain. And at times, they certainly may interfere with the efficient use of 
important resources. But commons also produce something of value. They are a re-
source for decentralized innovation. They create the opportunity for individ-
uals to draw upon resources without connections, permission, or access 
granted by others. They are environments that commit themselves to being 
open. Individuals and corporations draw upon the value created by this 
openness. They transform that value into other value, which they then con-
sume privately.690 
 
What is relevant to delve deeper into at this point are the Deleuzeoguattarian 
modes of possession that can potentially handle this constellation of private and 
public together. In keeping with the Deleuzeoguattarian theory, we saw in Vol-
ume I how jurisprudence could conceive of the commons, and now it was sug-
gested that one might approach the legal concept of cultural commons by fur-
ther analysing and then applying Deleuze/Guattari, particularly their two mod-
els of possession, namely the sedentary model and the nomadic model.  
Within this study, and within the Deleuzeoguattarian theory, possession 
ought not to be equated to ‘ownership’. Rather, the modes of possession are 
used in a more flexible manner, where to possess does not necessarily mean ‘to 
own’. As Leif Dahlberg explains with reference to digital media content: 
  
[T]he concept of property is complex, and possession (possessio, occupatio, 
usucapio, or detentio), for example, does not automatically or necessarily lead 
to an exclusive and absolute ownership (dominium). Whereas in ancient 
Rome this distinction between possession and ownership generally applied 
to property in land, today it also bears on the ways in which media users 
may use the digital media content they have acquired or purchased.691  
 
It is therefore imperative to look at the Deleuzeoguattarian modes of posses-
sion in more detail as well as joining it with the discussion concerning the 
commons according to Hess and Ostrom. Hess and Ostrom presented and nu-
                                                
690 [my emphasis throughout], Lessig, Future of Ideas, p. 85 
691 [original emphasis], Dahlberg, ‘Pirates, Partisans and Politico-Judicial Space’, p. 264, see 
also Justinian, Digesta, 41.2.12.1. (Ulpian). See further Peter Birks, ‘The Roman law concept of 
dominium and the idea of absolute ownership,’ in Acta Juridica 1-37 (1985). 
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anced the type of goods that may be managed (and not necessarily owned) in 
the commons. In the grid below Hess and Ostrom show the type of goods that 
are more or less difficult to make exclusive, or to enclose, or to manage in 
common. In their analysis, the easier a good can be made exclusive the more 
difficult it will be to incorporate it within the commons. 
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692 
 
As it may already be evident, but perhaps not yet explicitly stated, the concept 
of the cultural commons in my analysis spans over all of these four types of 
goods that Hess and Ostrom present and which I have reproduced above – 
even the private, enclosable goods. That means that if the concept of the cul-
tural commons is placed inside their table, it could be illustrated in the following 
manner: 
  
                                                
692 Figure based on Hess/Ostrom, Understanding Knowledge as a Commons, p. 9. 
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COMMONS  
Toll or club goods 
 
 
Cinemas (e.g. access to 
semiotic/network 
based artworks) 
CULTURAL 
COMMONS  
Private goods 
 
 
Paintings (e.g. 
Schulz/Darfurnica 
/Banksy) 
 
 
While it may be easier to make the connection between what they call ‘public 
goods’, ‘common-pool resources’ and ‘toll or club goods’ with an idea of the 
commons and how these resources could be fitted into various commons-based 
schemes, they are not the only goods that are appropriate for access within a 
concept of the commons. I have also attempted to show that when it comes to 
cultural resources the fourth type of goods, namely private goods, or perhaps 
more accurately physical private goods, also very much have to be taken into 
consideration and placed inside the commons discourse. The examples that I 
have put forward are for instance the Schulz mural and the Darfurnica painting. 
Both are doubtlessly physical goods, at least one of them is private, but they 
both embody knowledge potential, that regardless of their corporality and phys-
icality ought to be made available for access in the commons and conversely, 
the commons needs to be available in order for the creation of these types of 
works to occur. These artworks illustrate e.g. the difficulty when it comes to 
placing the physical (private) good within a cultural commons, as it can, strictly 
speaking, only be at one place at the time. However, the fact that an artwork 
may be private, physical or easy to enclose does not mean that commons-based 
access to it should per default be ruled out. The concept of the cultural com-
mons here, it cannot be stressed strongly enough, does not only concern the dig-
ital, immaterial, or dematerialised, cultural works, it also takes physical works in-
to consideration. 
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Therefore, when it comes to artworks, tangible as well as intangible, the 
concept of the cultural commons can prove to be the answer to many a (legal) 
dilemma, provided it is not simplified or flippantly applied. The Deleuzeoguat-
tarian method that I propose has already so far opened up both the notion of 
jurisprudence and what it can and could do (chapter 2), the notion of the art-
work (chapter 3), the notion of what is framed as a problem (chapter 4), the no-
tions of property and space (chapter 5) and the notion of capitalism (chapter 6), 
and what they all can or could do – i.e. the Deleuzeoguattarian method reveals 
inherent potentialities.  
 
7.1.1 THE SEDENTARY AND NOMADIC FORMS OF POSSESSION 
Stable or territorialised relations construct that which Deleuze and Guattari re-
fer to as the sedentary model of possession in their writing. Edward Mussawir argues 
that in law the sedentary possession is based on the principle of “seisin” – 
namely possession that is not that of actively “seizing” but rather one of “being 
seated”, “set down”, “sitting down” or even “presiding”.693 The legal concept of 
seisin stems from feudal fiefdom, when the king was the one who could own 
and divide land, while the subjects had tenure in fiefs. This sedentary model 
presupposes enclosure; in order to possess for instance realty, or any other type of 
space or property certain plots of land have to be enclosed. Chattel within the 
sedentary model is, as we have seen above in for instance chapter 5, then tied to 
and belongs to the person who owns the space/land.  
Mussawir develops this further as he writes “one cannot possess without di-
viding up a field into plots as closed or exclusionary spaces.”694 The notion of 
enclosure, and fencing off, in order to possess, as we keep experiencing over 
and over again, is thus in Deleuze/Guattari connected to the sedentary type of 
possession. This model of possession is then contrasted to the second form of 
Deleuzeoguattarian model of possession, namely, the nomadic model. Contrary to 
the focus on enclosure and exclusivity (rivalrous resources in Lessig’s terminolo-
gy695) that are both tightly connected to the sedentary model, the nomadic mod-
el does not imply any such exclusion or stable territory-based possession.696 
Mussawir writes further: 
 
Under the nomadic model, however, possession implies a different kind of 
relation that cannot sustain any of these elements of establishment, exclusion and lack. 
                                                
693 Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 107. 
694 Ibid. 
695 See e.g. Lessig, Future of Ideas, p. 94. 
696 Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, pp. 107 aa. 
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Since possession does not imply division, exclusions or stable territory, one 
requires other factors altogether […]697  
 
This “lack of lack” shall be revisited further on in order to show how it adds to 
the legal concept of the commons. But for now the focus remains on the two 
models of possession.  
Mussawir, for the purpose of understanding the two Deleuzeoguattarian 
models, maps them out and presents four main characteristics of each model. 
He then uses the four characteristics in order to analyse the territorial posses-
sion of the indigenous people of Australia. Here however, I propose that a simi-
lar type of theoretical approach may be used when the legal concept of the cul-
tural commons is being discussed.  
This is how Mussawir presents the two Deleuzeoguattarian models of pos-
session: 
 
THE SEDENTARY MODEL 
1. Space is divided in order to be possessed, 
2. What you possess is always a plot/lot/portion (closed space), for 
example a house, 
3. You possess only by remaining the same person (that is, as an in-
dividual), and 
4. Possession implies exclusion and displacement. 
 
THE NOMADIC MODEL 
1. Space is possessed without being divided, 
2. What you possess is always flows/movements/intensities (open 
space), for example the ocean or the desert, 
3. You possess only by being plural (that is, as a multiplicity or a 
pack), and 
4. Possession implies population and flight.698  
 
Both the notions of law and art have been presented in the context of the sed-
entary model, but in the guise of encounters and lines of flight, inferring a no-
madic model, and the sedentary underlying assumptions have been challenged 
throughout. I shall attempt to demonstrate the versatility, usefulness, and ulti-
mately, creativity of the two models of possession that Mussawir has drawn up 
                                                
697 [my emphasis], Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 107. 
698 [my emphasis], Ibid. p. 107-108. 
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from Deleuze/Guattari. In order to apply Deleuze/Guattari such schematic 
models as the one drawn up by Mussawir can prove to be very helpful. 
 
7.2 THE RES  ISSUE 
Lawrence Lessig approaches the notion of the cultural commons as layers, an 
approach that could fit quite well within this Deleuzeoguattarian understanding 
of possession. But here the legal concept of the cultural commons has been ap-
proached as plateaus that are created out of rhizomatic jurisprudence and capi-
tal, out of the encounters and lines (of flight), that occur. Or, yet more accurate-
ly, this research approaches the commons as societal flows. This fluid approach to 
access and sharing that happens in the commons that exists in a society that is 
always leaking (en fuite) within the theory of nomadology becomes more, for the 
lack of a better word, concrete, when we can draw on everything that has been 
presented so far. 
Edward Mussawir questions what he refers to as the Deleuzian critique of 
the legal rights-construction connected to possession; something that he claims 
has almost become a knee-jerk reaction within critical legal thinking, that is – to 
criticise the individual rights-construction. He argues that is not as simple as 
dismissing rights-constructions altogether as “ideological operators of legal liber-
alism”.699 Mussawir argues that the rights-construction as such plays a pivotal 
role for e.g. certain minorities and their interests. Challenging rights-
constructions altogether might mean, according to Mussawir, pulling the rug 
out from under these minorities and their interests that have been hard 
fought.700 He is of course referring to the subject of his thesis namely the Abo-
riginal people’s land rights. But also on a theoretical level, I would like to claim, 
he is right in defending rights. In order to have commons in law, we do not 
have to do away with rights altogether, or at all.  
Mussawir’s claim, and my concurrence, may seem like a direct critique of the 
stance that Deleuze and Guattari have adopted in A Thousand Plateaus and par-
ticularly if one reads the Apparatus of Capture where they develop an extensive 
argument in linking the rights-constructions in law to capitalism and private 
property. They write: 
 
[P]rivate property in itself relates to rights, instead of the law relating it to 
the land, things, or people (this raises in particular the famous question of 
the elimination of ground rent in capitalism). A new threshold of deterritorializa-
                                                
699 Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 93. 
700 Ibid. 
 309 
tion. And when capital becomes an active right in this way, the entire histor-
ical figure of law changes.701  
 
However, Mussawir’s analysis does not, in fact, criticise Deleuze/Guattari. In-
stead he reads the nomadic theory in a very interesting way, claiming that “[f]or 
Deleuze, the idea of a ‘right’ is worthless if it does not invent a way of doing some-
thing; a way of navigating a situation.”702 Mussawir ties the rights discussion to the 
notions of possession. I have already conducted my own reading, following 
Hardt and Negri (following Deleuze and Guattari), regarding how law and the 
construction of individual rights can be connected to ownership rights (in chap-
ter 5). It has already been indicated that on a theoretical level the notion of 
rights and the notion of the commons do not have to compete. I agree with 
Mussawir that we may be able to use Deleuze and Guattari’s theory in such a 
way where we do not have to question rights altogether but instead make them 
navigate the situations of access and do something. 
Before that can be done let us see how the notions of possession are tied to 
certain legal principles of Roman law. In Mussawir’s discussion he proposes to 
tie the notion of rights to Roman law via Hegel and Savigny.703 However, for 
the purpose of this analysis that I conduct here, it is worth to instead make an-
other type of connection, not via Hegel and Savigny, but rather via Carol Rose’s 
oft-quoted article ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Pub-
lic Property In The Information Age’704 and Leif Dahlberg’s article ‘Pirates, Par-
tisans and Politico-Judicial Space’.705  
Carol Rose described, among a number of res categories, also the category 
res divinis juris in Roman law, as one interesting legal category that one might be 
interested in keeping in mind when discussing the commons. In fact, Rose pre-
sents five non-exclusive types of possessions from Roman law that she then at-
tempts to place within the information age and the knowledge society. The five 
types are presented and explained as follows by Rose: 
 
1. Res Nullius – Things belonging to no one 
[T]his first category of res nullius consists of things that are not by their na-
ture nonexclusive; they have simply not yet been appropriated by anyone. 
Fish and game animals are frequent examples in the literature, as is aban-
doned property and, interestingly and perhaps horribly, enemy property. 
With all these resources, the reduction of the ‘thing’ to exclusive property is 
                                                
701 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 500. 
702 [my emphases], Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze, p. 94 
703 Ibid. pp. 93-113 
704 Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public Property In The In-
formation Age’. 
705 Dahlberg, ‘Pirates, Partisans and Politico-Judicial Space’. 
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simply a matter of human desire, time, and effort and nonexclusive proper-
ty simply results from the lack of those qualities with respect to the thing in 
question.706 
 
2. Res Communes – Things open to all by their nature 
Res communes encapsulates what might be called the Impossibility Argument 
against private property: The character of some resources makes them in-
capable of ‘capture’ or any other act of exclusive appropriation. […] The 
usual Roman law examples of res communes resources were the oceans and 
the air mantle, since they were impossible for anyone to own.707 
 
3. Res Publicae – Things belonging to the public and open to the public by 
operation of law 
The classic examples of res publicae for Roman law were roads, harbors, 
ports, bridges, rivers that flowed year-round, and lands immediately adja-
cent thereto.708 
 
4. Res Universitatis – Property belonging to a (public) group in its corporate 
capacity 
The standard ‘owner’ for the Roman res universitatis was a municipality, and 
its belongings were such public facilities as theaters and race-courses; but 
both private and public groups could own property in common, including 
lands or other income-producing property. The chief limitation on res univer-
sitatis in Roman times was that, at least in theory, the relevant corporate 
bodies required the authorization of the state.709 
 
5. Res Divini Juris – Things that are unowned by any human being because 
they are sacred, holy or religious 
The things classed under this rubric in Roman law-temples, tombs, religious 
statuary-were considered to belong to no one because they were dedicated 
to the service of the gods, or because an offense to them was considered to 
be offensive to the gods. Such things were a class of res nullius because alt-
hough they are physically capable of appropriation, they are still unowned; 
the impediment to propertization is not natural but divine.710  
 
                                                
706 Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public Property In The In-
formation Age’, p. 92. 
707 Ibid. p. 93. 
708 Ibid p. 96. 
709 Ibid. p. 105. 
710 Ibid. pp. 108-109. 
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In the article ‘Pirates, Partisans and Politico-Judicial Space’, Leif Dahlberg also 
addresses these categories in Roman law. He writes that “[i]n Roman law, one 
finds several categories of things that cannot be owned by an individual person, 
but that instead belong to all people (res communes), to the state (res publicae), to 
the city (res universitatis), or to the gods (res sanctae, res religiosae, res sacrae).”711 
Dahlberg and Rose both present the Roman law categories slightly differently 
from one another, but nonetheless they both write about the res categories from 
Roman law as particularly interesting. Dahlberg’s last three types res sanctae, res 
religiosae, res sacrae seem to be comparable to Rose’s single term res divinis juris. 
While Rose begins with the category res nullius, this category seems to be ex-
cluded from Dahlberg’s analysis. Even though he does not refer to it in his arti-
cle, I believe that it is a pertinent concept that we must not forget. I will use it 
within the Kafka analysis below, but it is also relevant to the concept or orphan 
works that was discussed in chapter 4 above. What is, however, particularly in-
teresting with both of these discussions is that they both argue that when access 
to knowledge in the digital era is discussed, the categories of (exclusive) rights 
and (individual) possession that we have been using and become accustomed to, 
appear cumbersome and difficult, but when we widen the field to also include 
categories such as the ones from Roman law, then suddenly there appears as 
though there is a number of alternatives, a number of potentialities, that are al-
ready there that we may want to pay closer attention to.  
While Rose devotes attention to the commons and how it may be connected 
to these categories in Roman law, Dahlberg only mentions the commons direct-
ly en passant when he addresses the Napster case.712 However, Dahlberg in-
stead addresses the artistic content as something liquid713 and the sphere in which 
it exists and moves as oceans714. He also connects his discussion to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of smooth spaces. Taken together, both these articles make a 
strong case for this particular connection with the presented Roman law catego-
ries. Rose and Dahlberg connect it expressly to the (cultural) commons and the 
artistic content. These articles also provide us with an entrance into the legal 
concept of the cultural commons, which is done here by way of Mussawir and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s sedentary and nomadic models of possention, the 
smooth and striated spaces, via Roman law.  
 
                                                
711 [original emphasis], Dahlberg, ‘Pirates, Partisans and Politico-Judicial Space’, pp. 262-281. 
712 Ibid. p. 281. For more on the Napster issue see A&M Records et all v Napster Inc (2001) 
(US), see also Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning’s Napster, Crown 
Business NY, (2003) and John Alderman, Sonic Boom: Napster, P2P and the Future of Music, 
Fourth Estate London, (2002). 
713 Dahlberg, ‘Pirates, Partisans and Politico-Judicial Space’, p. 265. 
714 Ibid. See also Leif Dahlberg, ‘Pirater, Partisaner och Ekollon’, in (eds.) Jonas Andersson & 
Pelle Snickars, Efter The Pirate Bay, Mediehistoriskt Arkiv, 19, Kungliga Biblioteket, (2010), pp. 
153-172. 
 312 
7.3 COMMONS (1): INITIATIVE BASED CREATIVE COMMONS 
In recent years the contract-based alternative to copyright has proven to be 
vastly popular as an addition to the statutory intellectual property law. Licenses 
(optional, compulsory, as well as statutory) have been used in order to facilitate 
mass-utilisation where single rights clearances would be far too cumbersome 
and/or costly, for instance when it comes to background music for live broad-
casting.715 Both licence-models and business-models that are based on access to 
intellectual works are underpinned by various contract solutions where aspects of 
copyright (or other intellectual property rights) are negotiated to fit within more 
flexible (often non-exclusive) access needs of the digital knowledge society. 
As it has been previously mentioned, I have chosen to focus the analysis on 
the initiative called Creative Commons and its license and business model, 
which is a hybrid of the two, namely, it is both a licence-model and a business-
model (albeit a non-profit one, Creative Commons is formally an NGO), and it 
is widely accepted and established.  
 
7.3.1 CREATIVE COMMONS 
Driven by the Copyleft716 and Open Source movements717 from the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the Creative Commons project was 
founded by Lawrence Lessig in 2001. Taking on board some of the most re-
nowned experts in intellectual property law and cyber law, as for instance James 
Boyle, the project was born as both an alternative and a supplement to copyright 
law. Having written, criticised and commented on the restrictive nature of copy-
right law, the project, helmed by Lessig, became a hub where artistic content 
could under rather flexible terms be accessed and shared. 
The Creative Commons initiative provides various ready-made licences that 
users can sign onto and that from then on apply to their works. It provides six 
different ready-made licence types ranging from non-restrictive to more heavily 
restrictive ones. The licences are non-exclusive, which means that the rights own-
ers ultimately retain their copyright and the works are not abandoned or left in 
the public domain. This is stated in the so-called “baseline rights”: 
                                                
715 See e.g. European Convention on Transfrontier Television (2002) 
716 “Copyleft is a play on the word copyright to describe the practice of using copyright law to 
offer the right to distribute copies and modified versions of a work and requiring that the 
same rights be preserved in modified versions of the work. In other words, copyleft is a gen-
eral method for making a program (or other work) free (libre), and requiring all modified and 
extended versions of the program to be free as well. This free does not necessarily mean free 
of cost (gratis), but free as in freely available to be modified. 
Copyleft is a form of licensing and can be used to maintain copyright conditions for works 
such as computer software, documents, and art.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyleft. Last 
accessed 19th March 2014. 
717 See e.g. Open Source initiative, http://opensource.org/. Last accessed 19th March 2014. 
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Every license will help you: retain your copyright; announce that other peo-
ple’s fair use, first sale, and free expression rights are not affected by the li-
cense. Every license requires licensees to get your permission to do any of 
the things you choose to restrict; to keep any copyright notice intact on all 
copies of your work; to link to your license from copies of the work; not to 
alter the terms of the license… Every license allows licensees, provided they 
live up to your conditions, to copy the work; to distribute it; to display or 
perform it publicly; to make digital public performances of it; to shift the 
work into another format as a verbatim copy. Every license applies world-
wide; lasts for the duration of the work’s copyright; is not revocable.718 
 
The Creative Commons licences are thus six different types of worldwide, roy-
alty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual licences, that can be more or less restricted, 
depending on the wishes of the original creator, and that the creators freely can 
choose from.  
 
Looking closer at the six licence types offered by the Creative Commons one 
finds the following options: 
 
1. Attribution (CC BY) – allows others to distribute, remix, tweak, and build 
upon the work, even commercially, as long as they credit the original creation. 
According to the Creative Commons, this is the most accommodating of 
licences offered and they are recommended for maximum dissemination 
and use of licensed materials. 
  
 
2. Attribution ShareAlike (CC BY-SA) – allows others remix, tweak, and build 
upon the work even for commercial purposes, as long as they credit the original creator 
and license their new creations under the identical terms. According to Creative 
Commons, this licence is often compared to the “copyleft” free and 
open source software licences. All new works based on the original work 
will carry the same licence, so any derivatives will also allow commercial 
use. This is the licence used by Wikipedia, and is recommended for ma-
terials that would benefit from incorporating content from Wikipedia 
and similarly licensed projects. 
 
                                                
718 http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Baseline_Rights. Last accessed 19th March 2014.  
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3. Attribution No Derivatives (CC BY-ND) – allows for redistribution, com-
mercial and non-commercial, as long as it is passed along unchanged and in whole, 
with credit to the original creator. 
 
 
 
4. Attribution Non-Commercial (CC BY-NC) – allows others to remix, 
tweak, and build upon the original work non-commercially, and although their 
new works must also acknowledge the original creator and be non-
commercial, they do not have to license their derivative works on the 
same terms. 
 
 
5. Attribution Non-Commercial Share Alike (CC BY-NC-SA) – allows 
others to remix, tweak, and build upon the original work non-commercially, as long 
as they credit the original creator and license their new creations under the identical 
terms. 
 
 
6. Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives (CC BY-NC-ND) – This 
licence is the most restrictive of the six main licences, only allowing oth-
ers to download the original works and share them with others as long as they credit 
the original creator, but they cannot change them in any way or use them commercial-
ly. 
719 [the Creative Commons licence text has not been fully cop-
ied, and all emphasis are my own] 
 
Clearly, and as Maritza Schaeffer also has pointed out, the Creative Commons 
licensing regime does not propose any outrageous or revolutionary additions or 
changes to copyright law.720 It offers a ready-made licence structure, within the 
                                                
719 Creative Commons Licences, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/meet-the-
licenses. Last accessed 19th March 2014. See also generally Maritza Schaeffer, ‘Contemporary 
Issues In The Visual Art Realm: How Useful Are Creative Commons Licenses?’ in 17 Journal of 
Law & Policy, p. 360 2008-2009.  
720 Schaeffer, ‘Contemporary Issues In The Visual Art Realm: How Useful Are Creative 
Commons Licenses?’, p. 387. 
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possibilities of copyright law, that potentially cuts down costs that the users 
would have had, had they needed to draft and negotiate their own licences. It is 
a mix of the copyright regime (all rights reserved) and the open source model 
(no, or very few, rights reserved).  
The project has spread around the world and many have adopted its licens-
ing scheme. Creative Commons has hundreds of millions licences used not just 
by individual creators, but also by gigantic organisations such as Google, Flickr, 
Al Jazeera, The World Bank, Wikipedia, Whitehouse.gov, etc.721 This further 
demonstrates how the idea of the commons is nothing new, revolutionary, radi-
cal or even foreign to creators, users, the market or the law. I could even go so 
far as to say, that the digital knowledge society requires these types of solutions 
when it comes to access to knowledge. But that is a statement that has been re-
hashed both throughout this project and in the recent decades by people like 
Lawrence Lessig. What we are able to do now, however, that was not possible 
in the beginning of the 00s is both to assess where the commons project cur-
rently stands, and how we can go further and keep developing it. 
It goes without saying that the Creative Commons is a tremendously suc-
cessful and important project, one that truly (re)introduced the notion and the 
concept of the commons and demonstrated how it can fully function as an ad-
dition to copyright laws. Still, for all its popularity it has its downsides too, and 
it has equally been subject to some substantial critique.722 
 
7.3.2 THE PROBLEM WITH THE CREATIVE COMMONS 
Hyde comments that: 
 
Authors who do not wish to be owners must invent complicated schemes 
such as issuing a license to the public at large (and even that may not work: 
the law includes a ‘termination of transfer’ provision whereby rights revert 
to the creator after a certain number of years no matter what licenses or 
contracts have been signed).723 
 
The types of critique directed towards Creative Commons have varied, some of 
it claims that the Creative Commons project stifles creativity as it removes the 
                                                
721 http://creativecommons.org/who-uses-cc. Last Accessed 19th March 2014.  
722 Séverine Dusollier, ‘The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. 
Copyright’, in 29 Columbia Journal of Law and Arts, 271 (2006), Lydia Pallas Loren, ‘Building a 
Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and 
Limited Abandonment of Copyright’, in 14 George Mason Law Review 271, (2007), Niva Elkin-
Koren, ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative 
Commons’, 74 Fordham Law Review, 375, (2005).  
723 Hyde, Common as Air, p. 58. 
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incentive to create (the strong individual right, the exploitation possibility). 
Other types of critique assert that it forces the creator to give up some or all of 
his rights in order to participate in the commons project, that it is creating ‘ideo-
logical fuzziness’, some that it does not allow the creator to easily abandon all 
his rights, and so on. Maritza Schaeffer provides yet another aspect to the cri-
tique, namely, she queries whether a Creative Commons licence is truly of any 
use when it comes to tangible works and that which she calls “visual art”.724 
While the quality of critique directed towards the Creative Commons project 
has varied in recent years, this particular point that Schaeffer raises, which ques-
tions the Creative Commons licences’ applicability on tangible works is a par-
ticularly pertinent one.   
At the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out how vital it is that we not 
forget the tangible, physical work when we are discussing the commons con-
cept. This critique is in line with that assertion. Having examined the Creative 
Commons licence structure Schaeffer arrives at the following conclusion vis-à-
vis commons and tangible works: 
 
Despite the two examples in which the licenses would likely work well for 
today’s artists-works in a digital media and works created by appropriation 
artists-overall there is not a general need for the licenses in the visual art realm from 
the perspective of the artist. Creative Commons licenses tip the balance in fa-
vor of the user, rather than the artist, since it is the user who benefits from the 
work being licensed freely under the specified terms. Unless artists intend to 
benefit from spreading a message or gaining popularity specifically through use of the in-
ternet, or uses Creative Commons as a branding point, there is not an obvious 
benefit or incentive to use the licenses for their works of art.725  
 
Séverine Dusollier arrives at a similar conclusion in her article ‘The Master’s 
Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright’. She writes that 
“[i]n sum, if the interest pursued by the creator is the hope for remuneration, 
the Creative Commons scheme is not very helpful.”726 
I do not agree with the general conclusions presented in either Dusollier’s or 
Schaeffer’s article, namely that there is no obvious benefit or incentive for visual 
artists to be part of a commons project in general and the Creative Commons in 
particular, or that the creator should not hope for any remuneration, other than 
perhaps free promotion. It is safe to say that the organisations listed above as 
using Creative Commons licences such as e.g. Google nonetheless manage to 
                                                
724 She is using the definition of ‘visual art’ that provided in the US Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 
101 etseq. (1976). 
725 [my emphases throughout], Schaeffer, ‘Contemporary Issues In The Visual Art Realm: 
How Useful Are Creative Commons Licenses?’ p. 401 
726 Dusollier, ‘The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright’. 
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receive remuneration for their activities. Granted, this may not be the same 
when it comes to smaller or less established artists or companies, but the prin-
ciple that I aim to show here is that a commons project does not preclude profit 
and remuneration, as such. That is not to say that the Creative Commons scheme 
is unproblematic, it is the reason why I have devoted this section of the analysis 
to pointing out some of the problems with the Creative Commons and its cur-
rent licensing structure. I believe that what the two articles found to be particu-
larly problematic here is not the idea or concept of the commons itself but ra-
ther the way the Creative Commons as such is structured. I claim that the bene-
fits and incentives are not ‘merely’ restricted to the augmenting of knowledge 
and democracy, but that there are also many financial benefits directly connect-
ed to the commons project and that in fact go hand in hand with global capital-
ism. Also, when it comes to artists themselves, I have shown, e.g. with the Na-
dia Plesner case, how important it is for artists, even the ones working in the 
tangible mediums, to be part of the commons, in order to both be able to ex-
press themselves the way they wish to, to have access to their inspiration points, 
as well as to gain further exposure in order to generate more remuneration.  
Nadia Plesner could neither exhibit nor sell her work, because of somebody else’s 
intellectual property rights. Had the LV brand been a part of a commons struc-
ture, Plesner would have been able to sell her work, and a licence fee would 
have gone out to LV.  
The entire Creative Commons project is based on their particular underlying 
licence structure, it is thus dependant of the contract as a legal concept, in order 
to function. Dusollier writes: 
 
Relying on the private ordering scheme of property rights and licensing 
contracts, Creative Commons does not operate differently than some of the 
copyright industries that it repudiates. This reliance on private ordering 
means results from an ambiguity that is at the core of the Creative Com-
mons project and might even reinforce the rampant commodification pro-
cess that is at work in copyright today.727  
 
Similarly, Niva Elkin-Koren addressed the same issue in her article ‘What Con-
tracts Cannot Do: The Limits Of Private Ordering In Facilitating A Creative 
Commons’ where she claims in her analysis that: 
 
[R]eliance on contracts alone is risky. It entails support of strong copyrights 
and freedom of contract. It requires adjusting the law of contract, allowing 
enforcement against third parties. The legal regime that would validate Cre-
                                                
727 [my emphasis], Dusollier, ‘The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons 
v. Copyright’, p. 292. 
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ative Commons’ licenses would also enforce contracts that restrict access to 
creative works. 728 
 
This research is not within the field of contract law but a couple of general 
problems with the contract-based solutions will be mentioned below. Firstly 
though, I will examine some other contract-based solutions, taken from the case 
studies in chapter 4, that are not (directly) tied to a commons project and then 
return to the commons and contracts discussion. 
 
7.4 COMMONS (2): CONTRACT BASED CULTURAL COMMONS – GO-
ING BACK TO THE CASES 
This section returns to the cases presented in chapter 4, with the added dimen-
sion of commons and other types of contract-based solutions. This is done in 
order to look at how the issues of access that amounted to the encounters and 
lines of flight in Volume I were dealt with and how those solutions in turn af-
fect(ed) access.  
7.4.1 SCHULZ – THE LONG TERM AGREEMENT 
We have already gone through the facts concerning the Schulz case, namely, to 
remind ourselves briefly, that Yad Vashem was interested in the find that Ben-
jamin Geissler and his team had made in Drohobych, and that Yad Vashem 
representatives subsequently took five pieces of the mural to Israel. An agree-
ment was reached between the state of Ukraine and Yad Vashem that the pieces 
would be kept in Israel on a long-term loan. We know that the particulars of the 
matter differ depending on which side is consulted, but that is generally what 
took place in 2001.  
In this section,729 I aim to present not the legal shortcomings in solving this 
problem that was done in chapter 4, but instead to look at the various agreements 
that were entered into along the way, particularly the long-term agreement be-
tween the state of Ukraine and Yad Vashem. 
The first agreement (A1) that I have come across is the oral consent to re-
move the pieces of the mural given to Yad Vashem representatives by the peo-
ple in whose house the mural was found.730 According to the official infor-
                                                
728 Elkin-Koren, ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons’. 
729 Many of the facts presented here come from an analysis conducted by a Ukrainian lawyer 
and it was reported to professor Thomas Hoeren, Humbolt University, Germany. The analysis 
was then forwarded to Mr. Benjamin Geissler, who in his turn forwarded them to me. The 
analysis is from here on referred to as the Hoeren-report.  
730 I have not been able to find out whether there was any consideration given to the house 
owners for this to take place, or whether money changed hands. 
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mation provided by Yad Vashem (press release by Iris Rosenburg, 29th May 
2001) one member of their foundation (Mark Schrabermann) was responsible 
for removing the pieces of the mural and taking them to Israel. This was done, 
further, with the consent (A2) given by the City Council (Aleksej Radzievskij, 
Taras Metuk and the head of the Cultural Centre for the City of Drohobych).731 
These two (oral) agreements were then challenged by the state of Ukraine 
that asserted that regardless of the two consents that had been given, the con-
senting instances (owners of the house and the City Council respectively) did 
not have the required authority to give this type of consent on matters concerning 
cultural heritage found on Ukrainian soil. The Ukrainian Law on the Protection 
of Cultural Heritage supports this claim.732 According to 1 Art. § 1 Law on the 
Protection of Cultural Heritage (LPCH), anything excavated on Ukrainian soil 
must be deemed to be cultural heritage of the Ukraine (§1 LPCH). According to 
§§ 5 aa cultural heritage may only be removed with the consent of certain 
named bodies of authority that are the sole competent bodies that may give 
consent. The competent bodies of authority that deal with the protection of the 
cultural works are named as following: 
 
According to §5 para 1. No 25: the supreme authority of administration - in this 
case it would have been the Minister of Culture, and 
According to §6 para 1. No 16: the district authorities - in this case it would 
have been the district capital – here, Lvov.  
 
Relying on this regulation the state of Ukraine challenged the two consents that 
had been given, claiming that they lack the required authority.  
Since none of the two consents for removal had been given in due proce-
dure, it was argued that the oral agreements that were entered into were thus in-
valid and void. A person or people who are convicted of removal of pieces of 
cultural heritage from Ukrainian territory without due consent for removal 
commit the criminal offence of smuggling, according to § 201 of the Ukrainian 
Criminal Code.733 
In the aftermath of the removal of the pieces, the last and most interesting 
agreement was entered into, namely the already mentioned final long-term 
agreement (A3), between the state of Ukraine and Yad Vashem. This agreement 
acknowledges that the pieces of the mural are in fact Ukrainian cultural heritage, 
currently held on loan in Israel. The interesting legal question is whether this 
subsequent agreement that arose post facto, after the pieces had been removed 
                                                
731 Hoeren-report. Same here, I have not been able to find out whether there was any consid-
eration given to the city council of Drohobych for this to take place, or whether money 
changed hand. 
732 Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage. 
733 Ukrainian Criminal Code. 
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from Ukraine to Israel, but which was nevertheless entered into with due com-
petence, can make up for the initial lack of appropriate consent and authorisa-
tion.  
The Ukrainian Committee that signed the long-term agreement was com-
posed of the head of the civil service in matters of transfer (or migration) of the 
cultural treasures - Vladislav Kornienko, First Secretary of the Embassy of 
Ukraine in Israel and Museum Director Vladimir Ilarianov “Drohobutschuna” 
Zenovij Bervetzkuj. According to § 5 Paragraph 1 of the LPCH No. 25 these 
are indeed the competent bodies that have the authority to give permission for 
removal.  
Arguably, an agreement with relevant authority was entered into this time. 
However, it can be argued that the initial removal of the five pieces of the mural 
and their transfer to Israel could not be pardoned by this subsequent act and 
was still not covered by A3 and thus potentially remains illegal or void. Perhaps 
then, the agreement between the Ukraine and Yad Vashem only concerns the 
retention of the pieces of the mural in Israel, and not their removal and transfer out of 
the country which would in that case still remain illegal in terms of consent given with due 
competence. 
A further complication with the agreement between Yad Vashem and 
Ukraine is that it may be in conflict with the Ukrainian Constitution.734 Accord-
ing to art 9 of the Ukrainian Constitution all international agreements that are 
entered into must be in accordance with the Constitution. The agreement at 
hand (A3) may be in conflict with §53 of the Ukrainian Constitution. According 
to §53 para 5 of the Ukrainian Constitution the State guaranties the protection 
of historical and cultural heritage, ipso facto, the State must ensure that the histor-
ical and cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people, which is located outside of 
Ukraine, be returned to the Ukraine. Ukraine has thus, without compensation, 
dispensed of its cultural heritage.  
It means that as the State acts as a guarantor in terms of preservation of 
Ukrainian heritage, it is responsible for it not to be taken out of the country 
without due consent and/or if it is outside the country to be returned. When 
the Ukrainian constitution is read in that manner, it can be argued that a con-
tract that allows Ukrainian cultural heritage to remain in another country for an 
unspecified period of time, which the A3 indeed allows, due to the consecutive 
automatic renewal periods, such a provision may be in conflict with this princi-
ple of the Ukrainian Constitution that stipulates the return of cultural heritage.  
There is an exception to this particular rule and that is if entrance into these 
types of agreement has been done in pursuit of a “higher purpose”. It is very 
difficult to define what would constitute such a higher purpose here. It could be 
e.g. security and safekeeping of national heritage that cannot be done within the 
source country and that the transfer out of the country serves a higher purpose 
                                                
734 Ukrainian Constitution. 
 321 
and as such makes up for the removal of cultural heritage. The safeguarding can 
in those cases override the home territory principle. Yad Vashem does moreo-
ver acknowledge, openly, (in A3) that the five pieces of the mural are part of 
Ukrainian cultural heritage. Yad Vashem’s status as a cultural and memorial in-
stitution also means that they do have the means and knowledge to keep the 
pieces of the mural safe and provide for any and all necessary restoration and 
up-keep.735 All this could possibly mean that the higher purpose that the 
Ukrainian Constitution requires has been met. 
As we saw above, the fact that Ukrainian law deems the mural to belong to 
the cultural heritage of the Ukraine, is not at all unproblematic. We have seen 
that Poland is also asserting rights in the works left behind by Schulz, arguing 
that he ultimately was born on Polish territory, and that he was a Polish citizen 
who, significantly, wrote in Polish. This fact may also challenge the long-term 
agreement with Yad Vashem, as it is, after all, not entirely straight forward 
whose (national/religious/cultural) heritage the mural ultimately is. The fact 
that Yad Vashem acknowledges that the pieces that they hold are Ukrainian cul-
tural heritage does not necessarily have any legal bearing.  
Another problem with the A3 agreement is that it is not sufficiently defined 
particularly regarding the terms concerning the return of the mural, but also re-
garding the automatic extensions of the term and the penalties that are included 
within the agreement. All these clauses appear uncertain and not sufficiently de-
fined. This taken together means that there is a risk that the pieces will never be 
returned to the Ukraine, even after the term of the agreement has expired. In 
fact, the term of the agreement could carry on in perpetuity, since there is no 
real expiration of the term. 
  
7.4.2 THE YAD VASHEM AGREEMENT – A SEDENTARY MODEL OF POS-
SESSION? 
The uncomfortable contractual solution of the problem concerning the belong-
ing of, and more pertinently for this project access to, Bruno Schulz’ mural is 
very much a result of the sedentary approach to this work. Our traditional un-
derstandings of the laws of persons and the laws of things have not only fun-
damentally been questioned with this case, it also demonstrates the difficulty in 
                                                
735 As a matter of fact, before Geissler’s find, and before Schulz garnered new attention, there 
are claims that many of his works had already been destroyed in the Ukraine, such as for in-
stance certain oil paintings. David Goldfarb, Conference Paper. Schulz, the Pre-Raphaelites and an 
encounter with Dante, Colloque international interuniversitaire ‘Schulz lu et interprété en Europe 
Centrale : entre modernisme et modernité. Poétique, réception, regards croisés’, INALCO, 
Sorbonne, Paris, (21-23 March 2013). 
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circumventing those lock-ins created with various forms of contractual agree-
ments.  
It is therefore necessary to include the various res concepts from Roman law 
as well as Mussawir’s description of the Deleuzeoguattarian forms of possession 
in order to understand (the shortcomings) of the contracts that were entered in-
to as a way of circumventing the legal difficulty in terms of belonging and ac-
cess, and the lines of flight that this case gave rise to.  
The approach to possession and access in this case is based on a sedentary 
form of reasoning where in order to possess we have to: divide and exclude. 
Certain plots have to be assigned to certain individuals, and the individual has to 
be one and the same person or legal subject, i.e. a definable (unified) entity such 
as a nation state, or a cultural institution, or a private person. To possess within 
the sedentary model of possession the notions of exclusion and displacement 
are required. All of these are present in the case of Schulz and the agreements 
entered into along the way, particularly the final agreement that the state of 
Ukraine entered into with Yad Vashem. 
Since Schulz’ mural could not be grasped, or understood by statutory law, 
the work had to be captured, striated, territorialised and set down by a legal in-
strument that is the contract, even if it, conversely, means that the work has to 
remain constantly fragmented, divided and displaced. With the contract solution 
there was at least one agreement in terms of who would, from then on, possess 
which pieces. But did it solve the conflict or do anything constructive in terms 
of the access to this work? 
There are a number of similarities between this particular work and the Kaf-
ka files that shall be discussed below, and not merely because both of them 
ended up in Israel in the end. However, there are also certain fundamental dif-
ferences between Schulz’ mural and the Kafka files. Some of them have already 
been addressed earlier. The cases are similar in that that they both rely on and 
are made difficult by the fact that the artist’s belonging cannot be framed and 
contextualised easily, that their ‘territorial’ belonging is contested and in con-
stant flux. They differ in terms of the physical scope of the works (wall mural 
vs. a suitcase filled with documents), how they have to be kept in order to be 
preserved, the fact that there was no estate in the case of Schulz, and that there 
is, so far, no legal decision in the Schulz case, only a contract for a long-term 
loan. Here, I shall focus on that which is specific for the Schulz case and leave 
the more detailed discussion concerning belonging and territory for the Kafka 
case below, so as to avoid repetitions.  
At this point one must look in further detail the concept of res divini juris. 
Carol Rose exemplifies the concept in the following manner: 
 
It is the canon, the classics, the ancient works whose long life has contrib-
uted to their status as rare, extraordinary-and also a little wild, never quite capable 
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of complete domestication even by the most erudite pedant. And lest we forget 
that all things godlike may be accompanied by lesser gods (or even false 
ones) and their representations, we might wish to include here too the ico-
nography of modern commercial culture, the Mickeys and Minnies and 
Scarletts.736  
 
Rose is referring to the music of Bach, the Mona Lisa and the modern day Dis-
ney icons. Fair enough perhaps. And while Schulz’ mural arguably has not 
reached the status of these works (yet?), maybe it is one of those lesser or even 
false ones. And as such there are still aspects of this category from Roman law 
that challenge the sedentary contract at hand, which governs the possession of 
and access to Schulz’ mural.  
Rose also provides some potential examples from the realm of nature, and 
the natural commons as being res divini juris: 
 
[T]he great wilderness parks, deserts and seashores, with their sense of the 
sublime and the vast, may in some ways fill the role of res divini juris. Such 
places suggest to the visitor the majesty of creation, the vastness of space, 
the untamed-ness of something outside human capacity to grasp. If there is 
a role for res divini juris as tangible public property in our modern jurispru-
dence, surely this is one place where it resides.737  
 
The interesting aspect with Schulz’s mural is that it is so connected to physical 
space. It was quite literally part of a house. It is being reconstructed by Benja-
min Geissler as virtual space within a physical space, as a 360° experience that 
one enters into. Far from being an object, it is a space, one that can be ap-
proached as Deleuzeoguattarian smooth space, that has been reterritorialised by 
legal instruments.  
But can it really be pinned down, striated, territorialised? 
 
7.4.3 KAFKA – THE WILL VS. THE JUDICIAL DECISION 
In her ruling of the Kafka case, that itself perhaps was a little Kafkaesque in na-
ture, the Israeli Judge Talia Pardo-Kupelman wrote: 
 
This case complicated by passions, was argued in court for quite a long time 
across seas, lands, and times. Not every day, and most definitely not as a matter 
                                                
736 [my emphasis] Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public Prop-
erty In The Information Age’, p. 109. 
737 [original emphasis] Ibid. 
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of routine, does the opportunity befall a judge to delve into the depth of 
history as it unfolds before him in piecemeal fashion […]738  
 
Judge Pardo-Kupelman continued to assert that this trial had opened “a win-
dow into the lives, desires, frustrations and the souls of two of the greatest 
thinkers of the 20th century [Kafka and Brod].”739 The language that she chose 
in her ruling is clearly not traditional legal language, dogmatically used in adjudica-
tion. But how could she have used dogmatic language?  
When encountering a case of this type, passions, time, desire, frustration, 
concepts that are usually considered to fall outside the scope of the law, that are 
excluded and considered to be extra-legal, were at the heart of the case in front 
of judge Pardo-Kupelman. There was no way of circumventing or excluding 
them. But there was also a genuine legal question that was presented before the 
judge, namely who was to be deemed to be the rightful owner of the manu-
scripts that Kafka had left behind. 
In more precise detail the dispute between the parties (Israel National Li-
brary and the Hoffe Estate) concerned:  
• the question of the interpretation of the will of the late Max Brod 
and the identity of the heir to his literary estate and whether the 
daughters of the late Esther Hoffe, as stipulated in her will, or the 
public library as stipulated in his will, were the heirs of his estate; 
and  
• the question as to what is included in the literary estate of the de-
ceased and in particular, whether it includes the writings of Kafka. 
In this regard, the daughters of the late Esther Hoffe claimed that 
Kafka’s writings were not part of the literary estate of Max Brod 
since Brod had given Kafka’s writings as a gift to their mother 
during the course of his life. In order to support this claim, the 
daughters provided various letters in evidence. The daughters also 
claimed that Kafka’s writings were not even included in their 
mother’s estate as she gave the letters to them, her daughters, as a 
gift during her lifetime.740  
The issue was not easy, and the judge acknowledged this in her ruling:  
                                                
738 [my emphasis]. This translation of the decision was taken from  
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/israel-court-orders-kafka-
manuscripts-be-transferred-to-national-library.premium-1.469870. Last accessed 19th March 
2014.  
739 Haaretz translation.  
740 [not quoted in its entirety, my emphasis added] 
http://www.theworldlawgroup.com/index.cfm?cm=Doc&ce=details&primaryKey=53792. 
Last accessed 19th March 2014.  
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Due to the strict requirements of proof required, I do not believe that the plain-
tiffs have met the requirements… the gift was never carried out to comple-
tion… One can determine that the Kafka manuscripts, like the Brod estate, 
were not given to the plaintiffs as gifts.741 
 
The judge transformed the issue from a material legal question (who is the 
rightful owner?) into a question of burden of proof (have the sisters managed to 
show, as the burden of proof was theirs, that the gift had been issued in their 
mother’s lifetime?). Evading the legal question and after having analysed the ar-
guments and the evidence presented in the case, the judge in the end conceded 
to the position of the executor of the Max Brod estate, Advocate Ehud Sol. Her 
ruling states: 
 
Indeed, letters providing for a gift were written. However, when examining 
the conduct of Brod and the late [Esher Hoffe], a doubt arises as to wheth-
er this is a gift for delivery of the object or a gift of certain rights ... both Brod and 
the deceased [Esher Hoffe] wrote letters as to giving gifts but they reserved 
the rights of ownership to themselves... on one fact I have no doubt, that 
Brod viewed these writings as his property and treated them as an owner, also 
after he wrote the letters of gift.742  
 
It is no doubt interesting to see how the delivery of the object, i.e. the physical 
manuscripts, were separated from the immaterial aspects of the documents, 
namely the intellectual rights in the writings, as well as whether Brod designated 
Esther Hoffe as an executor of this part of his literary estate (the claim put for-
ward by her daughters) or as beneficiary during her lifetime (the claim put forward 
by National Library of Israel). However, in her ruling, the judge disregards the 
delivery of the object, the documents were clearly in the possession of the 
Hoffe family, and had obviously been handed over from Brod to Hoffe. There 
was a gift-letter, but the interpretation of it was contested. Therefore, the judge 
focused on the rights aspect in the contents, concluding that a gift of the rights 
had not been given: 
 
[T]he Kafka manuscripts, like the Brod estate, were not given to the plain-
tiffs as gifts [and] should be handed to the archive, [of, as Brod’s 1948 will 
stipulated] the library of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem or the Tel 
                                                
741 [my emphasis] Haaretz translation.  
742 [sic] [my emphases throughout],  
http://www.theworldlawgroup.com/index.cfm?cm=Doc&ce=details&primaryKey=53792. 
Last accessed 19th March 2014.  
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Aviv municipal library, or (that of) any other public institution in Israel or 
abroad.743 
 
Finally judge Pardo-Kupelman concluded the case, expressing her own sentiment 
and hope, writing “I hope that the inheritance of the late Brod will finally find its 
place according to the wishes of the deceased.”744  
 
7.4.4 GALUT – THE KAFKA DECISION AND THE NOMADIC FORMS OF 
POSSESSION  
My people, provided that I have one. – Franz Kafka 
 
There are several points in how the judge has chosen to word her ruling that 
warrants a deterritorialising, nomadic, analysis of the case at hand, particularly 
where she asserts that the manuscripts ought to be stored in any public institu-
tion in Israel or abroad. The issue of where Kafka is belonging, whether that is at 
all a relevant question, has already been touched upon elsewhere in this study. 
Judith Butler also comments on this very issue claiming that the Kafka trial 
showed how he now has become a commodity because of the various parties 
claiming that they own piece(s) of him and what he left behind. But, Butler 
claims that “Kafka does not belong to these women, but rather to the ‘public 
good’ or else to the Jewish people, where these sometimes seem to be the 
same.”745 
In order to rule on the case, as well as morally argue for where the Kafka 
documents that the Hoffe family had in their possession belonged, the legal ar-
gument became transformed into a question of ‘assets’. The Kafka files are an 
asset, not necessarily only a financial asset, economic capital in Bourdieu’s 
terms, but an asset in all the senses of the word (cultural, social, political, scien-
tific, literary, etc). The question was – who can be granted the possibility to cap-
italise on this asset?  
Butler concludes that Kafka, as an author, and not just the documents left 
behind, have become commodified and can now only be deemed to be chattel. 
“Now Kafka has himself become property, if not chattel (literally, an item of 
tangible movable or immovable property not attached to land), and the debate 
over his final destinations is taking place, ironically, in family court.”746 Any-
                                                
743 Alison Flood, ‘Huge Franz Kafka archive to be made public’ in Guardian Online (15th Octo-
ber 2012). Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/oct/15/franz-kafka-archive-
public. Last accessed 20th March 2014.  
744 [my emphasis] Haaretz translation. 
745 Butler, Who Owns Kafka. 
746 Ibid. 
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body wanting to access the documents from now on, provided that the decision 
holds up on appeal, will have to travel to Israel. Butler also discusses this com-
plicated issue: 
 
It matters that Israel comes to own the work, but also that the work is 
housed within the established territory of the state, so that anyone who 
seeks to see and study that work must cross Israel’s border and engage with 
its cultural institutions. And this is also problematic, not only because citi-
zens from several countries and non-citizens within the Occupied Territo-
ries are not allowed to cross that border, but also because many artists, per-
formers and intellectuals are currently honouring the cultural and academic 
boycott, refusing to appear in Israel unless their host institutions voice a 
strong and sustained opposition to the occupation. The Kafka trial not only 
takes place against this political backdrop, but actively intervenes in its re-
configuration: if the National Library in Jerusalem wins its case, to have ac-
cess to the unpublished and unseen materials of Franz Kafka one will have 
to defy the boycott and will have implicitly to acknowledge the Israeli state’s 
right to appropriate cultural goods whose high value is assumed to convert 
contagiously into the high value of Israel itself. Can poor Kafka shoulder 
such a burden? Can he really help the Israeli state overcome the bad press 
of the occupation?747 
 
The Butler article was written before there was a decision in the case. The Brit-
ish author Will Self presented a similar line of argument when he commented 
on the case: 
 
There’s enough of what Milan Kundera terms ‘Kafkaology’ about as it is: 
seldom has a writer been as profitlessly anatomised – and that largely as a 
function of writings other than his fiction – as Kafka. This evolution will 
surely result only in more of this: more unread and unreadable doctoral the-
ses, more bowdlerised applications of this or that critical theory to the Kaf-
ka corpus […] Brod himself was intent on canonising Kafka as a Zionist 
saint, and the Israeli state holding the papers ensures that this falsification 
will continue apace – still, it matters not, the works are out there in all their 
contrariety, sparking different and heterodox sensations as legion as their 
readers.748  
 
                                                
747 Butler, Who Owns Kafka. 
748 Will Self quoted in Flood, ‘Huge Franz Kafka archive to be made public’. 
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The discussion regarding this particular case and the posthumous legal appro-
priation of Kafka perfectly illustrates the nomadic forms of possession that the 
Deleuzeoguattarian theory describes and which I am attempting to apply here.  
However, what is more interesting and pertinent for the purpose of this sec-
tion is to fuse all these lines of flight that the Kafka case provides us with in 
terms of belonging and the difficulty concerning legal concepts and definitions 
that were discussed in chapter 4, and how they correspond with the particular 
contracts that are entered into along the way. Here, there are (at least) three of 
them, agreements that is, the final wills of Kafka, Brod, and Esther Hoffe. All 
these wills had an express aim to limit wider access possibilities. In a traditional 
way of reasoning it can be argued that none of these wills have been (fully or at 
all) respected. However, such reasoning requires and presumes that a will is a 
binding contract and that an artist must have some type of belonging in order 
for posterity to designate the rightful owner of their work, as well as the rightful 
group of people who may access it. Belonging is then defined in an exclusory 
manner i.e. Jewish, or Zionist, and the group of people becomes stinted: an Is-
raeli library, the people who are in Israel or have the possibility to be in Israel.  
The public good, in the reasoning of the Israeli court, overrides the contract. 
The public good of the Israeli people overrides the will(s) as contracts. The 
public good or else the Jewish people here seem to be the same in terms of the-
se contracts.749 If ever there were any contracts at all, that is. 
This type of reasoning, as it is apparent by now, is not how this project is 
proposing that we analyse such cases. Going back to Carol Roses’ arguments 
and the res categories presented above from Roman law, adding the nomadic 
forms of possession as well as a haecceity-based approach to the belonging of 
the author that Deleuze/Guattari have presented, adds a number of dimensions 
to legal reasoning that has not been available before. When contracts cannot do 
anything, and positive law runs out of rules, which are the legal principles that 
can be used in such cases? So for instance, maybe Kafka’s documents can be 
deemed to be res nullius? Things that belong to no one and as such are by their 
nature nonexclusive. Roman law mentions fish and game as examples of res nul-
lius. These are things that exist within the natural commons, but how about 
things that exist in the artificial commons?  
Or can the Kafka files be approached as res communes things open to all by 
their nature, like air and oceans? These are the things that are incapable of cap-
ture. We have seen how impossible it is to capture Kafka and his work. We 
have also seen how Dahlberg connected artistic content, through Roman law 
and Deleuze/Guattari to oceans and liquid matter – and ultimately, smooth 
space. When it comes to the Kafka documents there seems to be nothing that 
prevents that they be made open to all, and nonexclusive in e.g. a digitised or 
                                                
749 Judith Butler, Who Owns Kafka. 
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printed form. Nothing other than profit perhaps, as things always seem to be 
more expensive the more rare and the more exclusive and elusive they are… 
 
7.4.5 SHLOSS – THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
22nd March 2007 Stanford Law School issued a press release entitled: Stanford 
Scholar Wins Right to Publish Joyce Material in Copyright Suit Led by Stanford Law 
School’s Fair Use Project James Joyce Estate Agrees to Settle750. In it, the University an-
nounced that: 
 
Professor of English Carol Shloss [had] won the right to publish her schol-
arship on the literary work of James Joyce online and in print based on a 
settlement agreement with the Joyce Estate.751 
 
The Fair Use Project and Cyberlaw Clinic who had filed the suit on her behalf 
had assisted Shloss. Anthony Falzone, fellow at Stanford and attorney, had led 
the case and the litigation. However, Falzone was not the only lawyer acting on 
Shloss’ behalf, other prominent lawyers such as Lawrence Lessig and several 
others had also played a pivotal role in the case and provided pro bono services 
including Mark Lemley, Stanford Law professor and counsel at Keker & Van 
Nest, Robert Spoo and Bernie Burk and their colleagues at Rice Nemerovski 
Canady Falk & Rabkin, P.C.752 
                                                
750 Stanford Law School Press Statement.  
751 Stanford Law School Press Statement. 
752 Ibid. According to the press statement these are all the participating attorneys that assisted 
in the case, additional to Falzone and Lessig: 
Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, and the 
director of the Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology. He teaches intellectual 
property, computer and Internet law, patent law, and antitrust. He is of counsel to the law firm 
of Keker & Van Nest, where he litigates and counsels clients in the areas of antitrust, intellec-
tual property, and computer law. He is the author of six books and 65 articles on these and re-
lated subjects, including the two-volume treatise IP and Antitrust. 
David Olson acted as a supervising attorney while he was a resident fellow with the Center for 
Internet and Society. Olson has litigated numerous high-profile intellectual property cases in 
federal courts across the country. 
Certified law students John Polito and William Ridgway worked extensively on this case as 
part of the Cyberlaw Clinic. 
Robert Spoo, a Joyce scholar and copyright lawyer, is co-counsel for Shloss on this case. For-
merly a Professor of English and the Editor of the James Joyce Quarterly, he now practices 
law full time and has written extensively on Joyce and copyright law. Spoo is an attorney with 
the law firm of Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin, A Professional Corporation 
Bernard A. Burk, a director of Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin, A Profes-
sional Corporation, acted as co-counsel for Shloss. Burk engages in litigation and counselling 
in the media, technology, publishing, and entertainment industries and has represented a wide 
range of clients including PC World Communications, CMP, Media, various academic jour-
 330 
This victory, resulting in the right to publish her scholarship, was made pos-
sible, not by a court decision, but rather by a settlement agreement that was entered 
into between Shloss and the Joyce estate.  
Studying the settlement agreement more closely it can be discerned that the 
Joyce estate agreed not to sue Shloss for infringement of copyright and allowed 
her to publish the supplement to her book that had been the subject of the dis-
pute. This was agreed upon with the caveat that the excluded supplement could 
only be published digitally, on a website that is accessible only within the United 
States with computers with a US internet protocol address.753 The site where 
this content has been made available is: http://www.lucia-the-authors-cut.info. 
Being based outside the US I have chosen not to attempt to circumvent the set-
tlement agreement in order to view the content. 
In the settlement agreement (clause 3a) the Joyce Estate asserts that they 
remain the sole and beneficial owners of the copyrights in all of the works of 
Lucia Joyce. Further down, in clause 10 it is stipulated that the settlement 
agreement does not in any way amount to an admission of liability, rather, in 
order to avoid potential expense, uncertainty and inconvenience of litigation, 
the Joyce Estate agreed to enter into the settlement agreement.  
As we noted earlier, the Shloss case is not the only case involving scientific 
research that the Joyce Estate has initiated court proceedings against due to al-
leged copyright infringement. Shloss on the other hand, unlike others who have 
been less successful, was able to negotiate this settlement agreement. She won 
the right to publish the supplement. As we have seen this victory was (probably 
only) made possible by the impressive team of lawyers and the resources of the 
Stanford University as an institution that acted on her behalf. For Shloss as a 
scholar to gain access to her own research and be able to publish and enable public 
access to it came thus at a very high price (financially speaking, but no doubt, 
culturally, socially, and not to mention probably also emotionally and personal-
ly). It goes without saying that scholars in the same type of situations but with 
less financial and legal aid and other supporting resources at their disposal may 
not have been as lucky and not as able to have the same type of success with 
the Joyce Estate. 
The victory aspect or success of this settlement agreement can also be nu-
anced. What the Estate agreed to was in fact a very limited territory, the US, 
where this research could be published. The online possibility to subsequently 
publish something that the scholar had been forced to remove from her book, 
was thus heavily stinted, and the online access was also controlled and limited. 
This is problematic from various points of view. It can be questioned whether 
this truly was a victory for access to documents and scholarly work. It can fur-
                                                                                                                                   
nals, Lee Mendelson Film Productions, Major League Baseball Properties, Clint Eastwood, 
and Green Day. 
753 Settlement agreement, p. 2.  
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thermore also be queried if this type of access to works, held by estates to 
prominent authors that often come with a price-tag, threat of litigation, will in 
the future deter researchers from even attempting to access these types of doc-
uments for the fear and risk of not being able to use or publish their scholarly 
works and findings. 
 
7.4.6 CONTRACT BASED ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE – SEDENTARY AND 
NOMADIC MODELS PUT TOGETHER 
The notions of sedentary and nomadic forms of possession have now been 
placed in the context of this study and connected to certain concepts of Roman 
law. This last Shloss case is in a way a hybrid between the sedentary and nomad-
ic forms of possession – which is interesting, but it is also problematic in that 
that access to the documents has been severely stinted by the settlement agree-
ment. It now remains to relate this case to Carol Rose’s last two concepts of 
Roman law that might be interesting pertaining to the creation of the cultural 
commons namely, res publicae and res universitatis. 
Res publicae as a concept, referring to things that belong to the public and are 
open to the public by the operation of law, is exemplified in Rose’s article as 
roads, harbours, bridges and ports. Rose devotes meticulous attention to this 
concept and particularly connects it to space: tangible space, internet as space, 
and the general intellectual space. All of these can be approached as res publicae, 
she argues.754 The tangible space that makes up res publicae from the classic ex-
amples from Roman law were as mentioned harbours, for instance. The internet 
as res publicae borrows the same metaphors from the tangible space in terms of 
harbours, ports, (pirates!), etc. and functions in a similar manner metaphorically. 
However, it is not a space where anything goes, but it is a space that enables 
transport and communication, where there are rules, enclosures and exclusions 
applied to its architecture.  
The general intellectual space: 
  
[as] res publicae has a primarily temporal character rather than a geographic 
one. One of the most interesting features of intellectual property law is that 
over the longer run, it does turn all once-propertized intellectual achieve-
ments into res publicae.755  
 
Rose is referring to the public domain as res publicae, i.e. when the term of the 
intellectual property rights has expired the work then enters into the public do-
                                                
754 Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public Property In The In-
formation Age’, pp. 96-105. 
755 [original emphasis], Ibid. p. 104. 
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main, a space free from intellectual property fetters – where works can be ap-
propriated freely. All of the aspects of the res publicae that Rose presents are rel-
evant for the concept of the cultural commons and many of them are present in 
the Shloss case here. Interestingly, even though James Joyce’s copyright expired 
in 2011, and the work entered the public domain, the US website where the ad-
ditional edit has been published, still remains locked for the users from outside 
the US. 
The Shloss case can also be connected to the concept of res univeritatis. These 
are things managed by public institutions such as municipalities, and where both 
private and public groups could own this type of property in common. These 
owners often formed corporate bodies – and of course the concept later gave 
name to today’s “universities” - which in medieval times referred to a corporate 
body of students and teachers dedicated to education.756 Rose writes that 
“[s]uch limited common property regimes may be commons on the inside, but 
they are property on the outside, that is, vis-à-vis non-members.”757 
That both the production of Shloss work, as well as the later access to it, 
happened within and with the help of the resources of a university-setting is 
obvious. These types of private-public hybrids are of course tremendously in-
teresting for the concept of the cultural commons. Access to the work generat-
ed even within this hybrid is here being exemplified by the stipulations listed in 
the settlement agreement. 
Res universitatis regulates resources that are too cumbersome to govern and 
own individually – that is why they have to be managed in a group. Access to 
scholarly work and research results produced in universities is a wide topic of 
discussion and one that is not entirely irrelevant for the analyses conducted 
herein, however I shall not engage in a further discussion about it here, as it 
slightly falls outside the scope of this research and the issue of access to art-
works.758 Res universitatis “unlike individual intellectual property, […] focuses at-
tention, first, on encouraging the group interactions that greatly foster creativity, and 
second, on policing the boundary of behaviors that are disruptive to creative groups.”759  
We have seen with the Shloss case here that a settlement agreement can dis-
rupt such encouragement of group interactions, where the behaviour of the es-
tate and the settlement agreement also disrupted the creative groups of re-
searchers and students alike. 
 
                                                
756 Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public Property In The In-
formation Age’, p. 105. 
757 Ibid. p. 106. 
758 Do however see Caroline Pamp, Intellectual Property in Science, Stockholm : Jure Förlag, 
(2010). 
759 [my emphasis], Rose, ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators: Traditions Of Public 
Property In The Information Age’, p. 108. 
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7.5 THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONTRACT BASED SOLUTIONS 
There are certain things that the contracts cannot do, and having addressed the 
shortcoming of the contract-based solutions stemming from the cases, and hav-
ing addressed some overall shortcomings of the Creative Commons initiative, I 
shall now present a more general critique of contract-based solutions in the 
digital age. I have divided this critique in three points. The three main difficul-
ties with the contract-based access to artworks are the problems and obstacles 
created by: private ordering, bargaining power and law and politics. 
7.5.1 PRIVATE ORDERING – ENCLOSURE 2.0 
Niva Elkin-Koren refers to instances of “self-regulation voluntarily undertaken 
by private parties”760 as private ordering. She distinguishes this type of private or-
dering from public ordering. She writes: 
 
Public ordering refers to rule-making processes, which are designed by the 
State and its apparatus. Its norms reflect the outcome of collective action 
mechanisms, which are formulated and applied from the top down by pub-
lic institutions. Private ordering, by contrast, concerns bottom-up processes, 
where each party voluntarily chooses to undertake the norms that will gov-
ern its behavior. This definition captures the fundamental justifications for 
the enforcement of norms created by private ordering: their self-imposition 
by the parties is considered morally justifiable and economically efficient.761  
 
Private ordering is thus regulation of access within the realm and with the tools 
of contract law. It is obvious that the governance of copyright law is shadowed 
by a regulation that is framed by the contract law parameters. In many instanc-
es, particularly within the various commons projects, these are the very tools 
that have been used in order to regulate a wider access to creative works. Elkin-
Koren writes further: 
 
These self-help mechanisms for governing information challenge the norms 
designed through collective action (copyright) and require reconsideration 
of the type of desirable government intervention. Questions arise as to 
whether the state should enforce privately created norms when they are in-
consistent with copyright, and what is the justification for enforcing such 
terms in the first place.762 
 
                                                
760 Elkin-Koren, ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons’, p. 376, 
761 [original emphasis], Ibid. 
762 Ibid.  
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We have seen instances in the previous sections of this chapter that are exam-
ples of this very “self-help” or even self-governing mechanism, mainly within 
the setting of the Creative Commons project. Content and platform providers 
often unilaterally draft the terms of access;763 they have their own limitations, 
and do not, after all, always enable the desired type of access to creative works. 
On the contrary, the contract-based solutions create additional difficulties, as 
well as add levels to copyright not originally intended. This can for instance 
mean that with unilateral licensing structures, and/or with DRM, owners are 
enabled to build stronger fences than what would not have been possible with 
‘only’ copyright law, e.g. enclose content that is technically in the public domain 
or hinder acts that otherwise would have been permitted by copyright, due to 
for example fair dealing or fair use principles. A situation is created where “con-
tent providers can set the terms of access in the digital package that wraps the 
content, so the terms literally become part of the product”.764 
This type of private ordering does not only govern the terms and conditions 
on which we may access online based, digital, consumer products, but it also 
governs commons and open access projects, e.g. the General Public License 
(GPL) project designed by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).765 In her dis-
tinction between the public ordering and private ordering types of governance 
in terms of access, Niva Elkin-Koren argues that solutions enabled by contract, 
must be looked upon with scepticism. One of the arguments that she brings 
forth is a fundamental and legal question as to whether such licences and terms 
and conditions are at all to be considered as contracts. She shows that a number 
of court cases have indicated that these may in fact be viewed as “unilateral 
statements drafted by rightholders, [and] are often enforced even in the absence 
of assent by end-users. Courts have held online contracts enforceable based on 
very minimal evidence of assent (ProCD Inc., 86 F. 3d 1447).”766 As such: 
 
It is often suggested that these online contracts are in fact a property li-
cense, which is not a contract. It is a unilateral legal action, through which a 
property owner can exercise her rights and define the scope the authorized 
use. The binding force of a property license does not derive from exercising 
autonomous will and therefore it does not require consent by the user. The 
binding force of the licenses stems from the property rules, in this case 
copyright law.767 
                                                
763 Ibid. 
764 Elkin-Koren, ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons’, p. 376. 
765 http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Last accessed 20th March 2014.  
766 Elkin-Koren, ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons’. 
767 Ibid. 
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The critique that must be stressed in terms of the tendencies emerging from 
private ordering and certain unilateral regulations do in fact affect access to 
works, particularly within the digital sphere and within commons or open access 
projects. Within the context and the theoretical framework of this research pro-
ject, it is not, nor will it be argued, that the private ordering ought to be replaced 
with the public ordering. Rather, it will be argued that a functioning cultural 
commons within a legal setting can and must, accommodate for both.  
 
7.5.2 BARGAINING POWER (INCLUDING FINANCIAL POWER) 
As it has been stated and perhaps most clearly in the Shloss case, securing ac-
cess through a contract-based settlement can sometimes require an arsenal of 
highly skilled lawyers and undoubtedly costly legal aid. The bargaining positions 
and the financial power of a party seeking to gain access to a work must also be 
addressed. The difference in the bargaining position and power between a pro-
fessor writing an academic book with the backing of some of the world’s most 
renowned lawyers in the area, and a consumer or an internet user is obvious. 
That the two differ and may not always be on equal footing does not always 
have to pose a problem, but the underlying structural problem that can be ad-
dressed here is that there is an unbalance in terms of users depending on their 
financial power.  
A similar issue has been addressed with reference to Grey Tuesday, where it 
was shown how established musical artists, with the backing of record labels 
and with stronger financial means, were enabled to access and clear larger num-
ber of rights that they wanted to (re)use and incorporate into new derivative 
works, while lesser know or unestablished artists were not able to do the same.  
Bargaining position and bargaining power in entering various entertainment 
contracts has been addressed before768 and the process of bargaining and the 
significance of inequality of bargaining power769 must be kept in mind and ad-
dressed when it comes to contract-based solutions to access of cultural works. 
Boon, Greenfield and Osborn address bargaining power in the case of artists 
signing to a record label. They write: 
 
The majority of new artists do not have the bargaining leverage to negotiate 
individual terms within these agreements. This both encourages the use of 
standard form contracts and ensures that the terms agreed are very similar 
                                                
768 See e.g. Guy Osborn and Steve Greenfield, Contract and Control in the Entertainment industry. 
Dancing on the edge of heaven, Dartmouth Publishing, (1998), Andy Boon, Steve Greenfield and 
Guy Osborn, ‘Complete Control? Judicial and Practical Approaches to the Negotiation of 
Commercial Music Contracts’ in International Journal of the Sociology of Law 1996, 24, 89–115. 
769 Boon, Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Complete Control? Judicial and Practical Approaches to 
the Negotiation of Commercial Music Contracts’. 
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to those in the standard form. Moreover, it is reasonably easy for the major 
players to ‘keep in step’ and to effectively impose on artists those terms 
which they are likely to be offered elsewhere (Beale 1986). The globalization 
of commerce and the ability to specify the lex fori has led to the migration 
of terms across jurisdictions so that the individual companies in the major 
record producing countries have very similar agreements.770 
 
Similar line of argument may be presented as a critique to the contract-based 
solutions to access here. The majority of users do not have the bargaining lever-
age to negotiate the individual terms of licences drafted on the rightsholders’ 
unilateral discretion. The standardisation that occurs in these instances, with for 
instance Creative Commons licences, create a situation that while in theory access 
can be agreed upon contractually, in reality this can only be achieved by strong 
market actors, or users with substantial bargaining and financial power. Boon, 
Greenfield and Osborn write further: 
 
In certain kinds of business, the practice of using standard form contracts is 
both efficient and expedient. However, it is arguable that standard terms are 
inappropriate to ‘transactions’ where the commodity is individual creativity 
rather than goods.771 
 
While courts have been protecting artist/creators in terms of uneven bargaining 
power as Boon, Greenfield and Osborn show, it is worth to continue a discus-
sion concerning user/creators and their protection when it comes to standard-
ised contracts or bargaining power that concerns access to artistic works. As the 
Shloss case particularly shows, this is not only interesting to keep in mind when 
it comes to standardised contracts, but also individual contracts that are entered 
into with rightsholders. That particular case shows what type of bargaining and 
financial power is required in order to gain access to works of renowned au-
thors such as Joyce. 
 
7.5.3 LAW AND POLITICS 
The last critique that shall be particularly presented here with regards to con-
tract-based solutions is a problem that is quite apparent particularly in the 
Schulz case, as well as, in a certain sense, when it comes to the Kafka files and 
the Banksy mural. That the restitution of cultural property has always been pri-
marily an affair of the states, and of disputes between states, with each state 
claiming sovereignty or ownership over cultural property of major signifi-
                                                
770 Boon, Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Complete Control? Judicial and Practical Approaches to 
the Negotiation of Commercial Music Contracts’. 
771 Ibid. p. 102. 
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cance772 is a fact very significant to address here. While we in the former section 
saw how bargaining and financial power can affect access and who manages to 
get access to works and on what/whose terms, within the ambit of that which 
Elkin-Koren refers to as private ordering, we shall lastly look at some difficul-
ties with that which she refers to as public ordering. The public ordering is 
something that she associates with the state apparatus, as opposed to the market 
apparatus of the private ordering. She writes about governance by general rules 
that stem from the public ordering: 
 
General rules adopted by society through collective action mechanisms are 
arguably more distant from temporary interests of particular parties. Public 
rulemaking processes allow a choice to be made behind a Rawlsian ‘Veil of 
Ignorance’. That, of course, is if we momentarily put aside the deficiencies 
of governments, especially those identified by public choice theory.773 
 
Elkin-Koren places private ordering and public welfare on two opposite sides, 
but stresses the deficiencies of governments identified by public choice theory. 
The governments identified by public choice theory will lack a democratic di-
mension since the approach to political life there is the same as the economical 
life. In the Schulz case we saw for instance how traditional general rules, pro-
vided by various states, did not suffice to provide satisfactory solutions to the ac-
cess issues, leaving it up the states to negotiate on a diplomatic level how access 
to the work can happen.  
The diplomatic negotiation, particularly attached to access to works that are 
somehow deemed to be cultural heritage brings with it, not an uneven playing 
field when it comes to private bargaining power, but rather larger stakes that are 
involved in international politics and negotiations being carried out on diplo-
matic levels. The consents and agreements that happen in this sphere can end 
up in contracts that regulate the access issue, but these contracts can simultane-
ously be very problematic, as we saw with the agreement between the state of 
Ukraine and Yad Vashem.  
This type of problem can be an obstacle to access to cultural works particu-
larly if there is an international dimension to the work, where it is impossible to 
decide which public the work belongs to and which public should be allowed to ac-
cess these works. In the international relations and diplomatic settings there are 
no (real or imaginary) veils of ignorance, on the contrary, there are the states 
                                                
772 Marie Cornu and Marc-André Renold, ‘New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural 
Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution’ in International Journal of Cultural Property 
(2010) 17:1–31, p. 4. 
773 Elkin-Koren, ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons’. 
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that are very much aware of everything and negotiations are often underpinned 
by political leverage, not necessarily connected to the cultural work in question. 
Other than the cases presented here there are innumerable examples where 
cultural heritage, repatriation of cultural heritage or the whereabouts of the cul-
tural heritage have stood in the middle of international diplomatic disputes as 
well as negotiations. That those types of situations affect access is obvious, and 
equally as with bargaining power above it can also mean that the more powerful 
international players are involved they will always have a greater chance of se-
curing these works for their own benefit.  
These processes have led to that quite often, in order to reach political 
agreements in terms of access, the parties have had to frame cultural heritage 
within a property paradigm. Disputes are then settled within the diplomatic 
framework, where the cultural work is seen as something that is ‘owned’ by one 
party: 
 
Alternative means of settling conflicts of interest in the ownership of cultural 
property, which coexist with the traditional tools (such as bilateral or multi-
lateral treaties), take many forms: unilateral decisions or agreements that 
may involve various forms of intermediary (namely, mediation, conciliation, 
or arbitration). In the last few decades, these consensual arrangements have 
become increasingly popular, both in terms of form and substance, in line 
with changing sensitivities regarding the restitution of cultural property.774  
 
This means that the political angle and the political leverage is also an important 
factor in terms of access to works, and affects, doubtlessly, all contract-based 
solutions that are negotiated on an international or multinational level.  
  
                                                
774 [my emphasis throughout], Cornu and Renold, ‘New Developments in the Restitution of 
Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution’, p. 3. 
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7.6 COMMONS (3): THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF CULTURAL COMMONS 
Rip, mix, burn. After all it’s your art.775 
 
Lawrence Lessig claims that the first instinct when battling infringement of 
copyright on a large scale was to wage the so-called “copyright war” against in-
fringement. The second response was to create alterations within the digital ar-
chitectures of the network, to build DRMs and content IDs in order lock down 
distribution of culture beyond permissions granted by the rights owners. This 
second wave response came with a renewed optimism, as the first wave re-
sponse had not provided satisfactory decrease of infringement activities. To be 
able to perfectly control re-use would disenable infringing activities.  
It proved difficult, not to say impossible, to achieve perfectly controlled and 
controllable re-use. Subsequently, the digital infringing activities continued. Les-
sig argues that the only way to understand and approach access to art is to find 
the right mix between what he calls law, norms, market and architecture. Lessig 
defines law as statute, norms as rules that exist ‘outside’ the legal sphere, market 
as free liberal market, and architecture he refers to the architecture of internet – 
both technical and legal – that create and enable the online digital environment. 
I shall return to this particular mix, and these four modalities, further down in 
chapter 8. 
 
7.6.1 NOMADOLOGY: SMOOTH AND STRIATED SPACES AND THE LEGAL 
CONCEPT OF THE CULTURAL COMMONS 
Deleuze/Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus that “the nomads do not precede 
the sedentaries; rather, nomadism is a movement, a becoming that affects sed-
entaries, just as sedentization is a stoppage that settles the nomads.”776 When 
Deleuze/Guattari discuss the nomadic space they do so in connection to their 
basic principle of ‘smooth’, heterogeneous space. The nomadic space and the 
                                                
775 Modified Apple Inc.’s advertisement slogan, the word art in italics replaced the original 
“music”. The original slogan reads: “Rip, mix, burn. After all it’s your music”. See Lessig, Fu-
ture of Ideas, pp. 9-11. On Wikipedia, the slogan is described in the following manner: “’Rip. 
Mix. Burn.’ (2001) used to promote iTunes desktop CD burning capability, somewhat contro-
versial as it was seen by some as advocating piracy”. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Apple_Inc._slogans. Last accessed 20th March 2014. 
However the terms and conditions for use of this very iTunes desktop together with current 
intellectual property laws and DMR solutions make it, as Lessig wisely points out, impossible 
to in fact rip, mix or burn… He writes: “Try to ‘rip, mix, [and] burn’ Disney’s 102 Dalmatians 
and it’s your computer that will get ripped, not the content. Software, or code, protects this 
content, and Apple’s machine protects this code. It may be your music, but it’s not your film. 
Film you can rip, mix, and burn only as Hollywood allows. It controls that creativity—it, and 
the law that backs it up.” [original emphasis], Lessig, Future of Ideas, p. 11. 
776 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 475 
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nomadic forms of possession cannot simply be presented in opposition to stri-
ated space and the sedentary forms of possession. They write: 
 
[W]e must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in mix-
ture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into striated 
space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to smooth space 
[….] and the two can happen simultaneously.777 
 
It is this very continuity, the constant movement from one form to another, the 
unfinished transitions from one form to the other, that must be understood and 
it is imperative that it be kept in mind when discussing the concept of the 
commons. The concept of the (natural as well as cultural) commons can never 
be approached as a static concept, yet at points it becomes striated too. As soci-
ety develops, it too becomes subject to lines of flight, that move it, force it into 
new nomadic territories, and so on, as we have seen with e.g. the Creative 
Commons initiative. Even though it initially and most probably was a result of 
nomadic lines of flight and became a smooth space in its own right that fled the 
striated space of copyright law, it too became striated with time. 
Deleuze/Guattari claim that the distinction between the two types of spaces 
is that in the smooth space we encounter “free action” while in the striated 
space we encounter “work”. The combination between free action and work 
when it comes to the production of cultural works is particularly obvious, and 
this theoretical framework allows for both free action and work in the cultural 
commons. With the Creative Commons project in particular it can be shown 
how it both challenges and exists within the capitalist structures. This is entirely 
in line with the mixture of smooth and striated spaces that Deleuze/Guattari 
present, particularly within capitalism: 
 
world capitalism,  a new smooth space is produced in which capital reaches its 
‘absolute’ speed, based on mechanic components rather than the human 
component of labor. The multinationals fabricate a kind of deterritorialized 
smooth space in which points of occupation as well as poles of exchange 
become quite independent of the classical paths to striation. What is really 
new are always new forms of turnover.778  
 
My research has especially discussed the TRIPS agreement in the first chapter as 
the legal document that harmonises and governs the global turnover of intellec-
tual property. The current IP regime can thus very well be read within the con-
cept of “world capitalism” as Deleuze/Guattari describe it. Thus, when discuss-
                                                
777 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 524. 
778 [original emphasis], Ibid. 
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ing the concept of the cultural commons within this regime, its is imperative 
that the deterritorialising nature of capital on a global scale be kept in mind: 
  
The present day accelerated forms of the circulation of capital are making 
the distinctions between constant and variable capital, and even fixed and 
circulating capital, increasingly relative; the essential thing is instead the dis-
tinction between striated capital and smooth capital, and the way in which the 
former gives rise to the latter through complexes that cut across territories 
and states, and even the different types of States.779  
 
Accordingly we arrive, through nomadic and sedentary forms of possession, 
smooth and striated spaces, to smooth and striated capital. This particular dis-
tinction applied to current intellectual property is very pertinent as it allows us 
to see the two inherent characters that exist within the cultural work as capital 
(economic, social and cultural) – the striated capital with sedentary forms of 
possession (e.g. commodity based type of exploitation) and smooth capital with 
nomadic forms of possession (e.g. global, knowledge-based, network-based 
forms of management of IP, commons projects, open access projects etc.). 
How then can it all be connected to a legal concept of cultural commons? 
We have seen, since chapter 2, where the rhizomatic jurisprudence was pre-
sented, legal concepts within the Deleuzeoguattarian theoretical matrix gain cer-
tain potential that in turn caters for these particular movements from smooth to 
striated, from sedentary to nomadic (and vice versa). In fact, Deleuze/Guattari 
go from the section where they treat smooth and striated capital into a section 
that they call “The Aesthetic Model: Nomad Art”780. However, the nomad art 
that is referred to by them is not ‘nomadic’ – as in non-static, not-striated, fluid, 
continuous, etc. – but literarily they are referring to the art created by ancient 
people that led nomadic lifestyles. They write: 
 
On one side, Egypt had its Hyksos, Asia Minor its Hittites, China its Turco-
Mongols; and on the other, the Hebrews had their Habiru, the Germans, 
the Celts, and Romans their Goths, the Arabs their Bedouins. The nomads 
have a specificity that is too hastily reduced to its consequences, by includ-
ing them in the empires or counting them among the migrants, assimilating 
them to one or the other, denying them their own ‘will’ to art. […] Moreo-
ver, it does not have that role in the guise of a ‘will’; it only has a becoming, 
it invents a ‘becoming-artist’. 
 
                                                
779 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 543. 
780 Ibid. 
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By using the cases that were presented in chapter 4, and further elaborated up-
on here, I have on the other hand, or perhaps even further still, attempted to 
show the nomadic tendencies, i.e. not in the literal but in the theoretical sense, 
in art today. The particular becoming that I have been interested in is the very 
becoming of law, or becoming of jurisprudence. How does a concept of cultural 
commons become law? I shall return to this in the final remarks and discussion 
on the becoming of law and Law Without Organs below. But before arriving 
there I will conclude this penultimate chapter with some last remarks on the 
construction of the legal concept of the cultural commons.   
In order to that, let us first be reminded how Deleuze/Guattari end their 
own penultimate chapter, before they reach their conclusion of A Thousand Plat-
eaus, by writing: 
 
Even the most striated city gives rise to smooth spaces: to live in the city as 
a nomad, or as a cave dweller. Movements, speed and slowness, are some-
times enough to reconstruct a smooth space. Of course, smooth spaces are 
not in themselves liberatory. But the struggle is changed or displaced in 
them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new 
paces, switches adversaries. Never believe that a smooth space will suffice 
to save us.781 
 
7.6.2 THE NO-LACK 
A legal concept of the cultural commons constituted by way of Deleuzeoguat-
tarian theory and their ambiguity towards schizophrenic capitalism opens up a 
potential, an a-political alternative, a framework that can theoretically introduce 
the cultural commons into the rhizomatic jurisprudence. The legal concept of 
the cultural commons also has, in turn, an a-political nature: 
 
Almost the entire range of liberal traditions, from laissez faire to progres-
sive liberalism or social democracy, can find information based cooperation 
attractive. The left, too, can find in these practices one way out of the dead 
end that state socialism proved to be. Libertarianism, of both right-wing, 
market-oriented, and left-wing, anarchistic varieties, likewise finds attractive 
narratives to tell about cooperation in the networked commons. Adherents 
to this broad range of views can then, as a practical matter, ally with market 
actors who eschew political views altogether and who are focused on sur-
vival, innovation, and growth in an increasingly competitive global economy 
where learning and adaptation are imperative. Needless to say some of this 
                                                
781 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 551. 
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congruence is temporary and ad hoc. Some, however, represents a real 
change in conditions and intellectual alignments.782 
 
And put yet in another way in the words of Lawrence Lessig: 
 
The struggle against these changes is not the traditional struggle between 
Left and Right or between conservative and liberal. To question assump-
tions about the scope of “property” is not to question property. I am fanati-
cally pro-market, in the market’s proper sphere. I don’t doubt the important 
and valuable role played by property in most, maybe just about all, contexts. 
This is not an argument about commerce versus something else. The innova-
tion that I defend is commercial and noncommercial alike; the arguments I 
draw upon to defend it are as strongly tied to the Right as to the Left.783 
 
This can also be done from a legal side, to imagine a legal concept in this way 
that the entire ideological range can find attractive. The Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian theory has demonstrated how it is not a question of Either 
(inflexible copyright) Or (more flexible contracts and self-governance) but 
BOTH, or AND, AND… This type of reasoning as we have seen throughout 
this study is suited for such a concept as the cultural commons. Atteberry 
writes: 
 
The solution to this problem of the continued colonialist distribution of 
wealth, therefore, will not be found simply in a cultural commons, although 
a cultural commons will surely have an important role to play. When faced 
with the dynamic of deterritorialization, Deleuze and Guattari ask, could it 
be that the revolutionary path is to ‘go further still, that is, in the movement 
of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? For perhaps the flows 
are not yet deterritorialized enough’. The questions for the A2K movement 
then become what function the cultural commons serve in the globalized 
economy, and how might we accelerate the process that it promises by find-
ing ways to resist its potential neo-colonial reterritorializations?784  
 
                                                
782 Benkler, ‘The Idea of Access to Knowledge and the Information Commons: Long-Term 
Trends and Basic Elements’ in (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge in the Age of 
Intellectual Property, p. 231. 
783 [my emphasis] Lessig, Future of Ideas, p. 6. 
784 [my emphasis, quote modified], Atteberry, ‘Information/Knowledge in the Global Society 
of Control: A2K Theory and the Postcolonial Commons’, in (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, 
Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property. The quote has been modified here, the words 
“cultural” in italics have replaced Atteberry’s original “informational”. 
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The final section of this chapter finally merges the theoretical approach of this 
thesis to the A2K movement.  
Already in 2002, and soon after the adaptation of the Doha Declaration that 
resulted in TRIPS, there came an influential report from the UK Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR). Even though it was a national report, it 
had a significant impact, because the commission consisted of international 
members, also including members from developing countries, experts, repre-
sentatives from the industry and academia. This was the first time a “one size 
fits all” in terms of intellectual property rights and management of IP rights was 
called into question: 
 
[I]n terms of its content, the CIPR report captured very accurately the 
growing trend of opinion that distanced itself from both a maximalist dis-
course that promoted the absolute benefits of intellectual property and a 
discourse that was unequivocally critical of intellectual property as a matter 
of principle. It thus recognized both the benefits and costs of intellectual 
property protection, emphasizing the need to ensure that the costs do not 
outweigh the benefits […]785 
 
This project has been a theoretical exercise that has attempted to show how this 
critical approach to intellectual property still is, simultaneously and adamantly, 
able to recognise the benefits of an intellectual property protection. Particularly 
legally, the concept of cultural commons as an addition to current IP legislation 
has been discussed, but other than on a contractual or a licence-level, a full step 
has never been taken towards a full-scale commons concept in law. However, 
the movement itself, A2K, as well as the discussions in terms of reforms of cur-
rent intellectual property rights are not new.  
The time is ripe to seriously discuss a construction of a legal concept of the 
cultural commons.  
Yet, other than on policy levels, or initiative level, such as e.g. Creative 
Commons and various other initiatives that govern access to art e.g. the Andy 
Warhol Foundation,786 the issues concerning a legal framework of the cultural 
commons have so far not been discussed extensively. That being said, the policy 
                                                
785 Ahmed Abdel Latif, ‘The Emergence of the A2K Movement: Reminiscences and Reflec-
tions of a Developing Country Delegate’, in (eds.) Krikorian and Kapczynski, Access to 
Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property, p. 102. 
786 The Andy Warhol Foundation takes the following stand in terms of the works that Andy 
Warhol left behind (including the tangible paintings) that illustrates precisely these types of 
hybrid initiatives that allow for both access and revenue. The Andy Warhol Foundation’s mot-
to is: “We’re Lessig when it comes to artists and scholars [and] Disney when it comes to 
commercial use.” It means that certain interests are not on a par, and there is nothing that says 
that they cannot be treated differently in terms of access. 
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and initiative driven projects can now be evaluated and lessons from those pro-
jects can be borne in mind when discussing legal alternatives. 
This project has attempted to show the theoretical possibility and potential to successfully fuse a 
legal concept of the cultural commons with intellectual property law, as well as with the free 
market and global capitalism.  
One of the theoretical breakthroughs that the Deleuzeoguattarian theory 
provides here is that what I refer to as the “lack of lack” above. On a most 
basic level it can be read in conjunction with the unlimited nature of the intel-
lectual products, and on a theoretical level it can be connected to nomadic form 
of possession, and smooth capital. The way in which nomadic forms of posses-
sion can be grasped legally, that traditionally envisions possessions to be based 
on sedentary principles, is to understand and approach law in its rhizomatic 
guise and understand the smooth attributes of capital forms and the potentiali-
ties the rhizomatic reading of jurisprudence opens up to. This has to be done 
without falling into the trap of the regime of arborescent conjunctions, the “ei-
ther…or”, concepts that fundamentally hinder the creation of a legal concept of 
the cultural commons. 
 
On the side of the nomadic assemblages and war machines, it is a kind of 
rhizome, with its gaps, detours, subterranean passages, stems, openings, 
traits, holes, etc. On the other side, the sedentary assemblages and State ap-
paratuses effect a capture of the phylum, put the traits of expression into a 
form of code, make the holes resonate together, plug the lines of flight, 
subordinate the technological operation to the work model, impose upon 
the connections a whole regime of arboresent conjunctions.787 
 
So in order to advance and strengthen access to art and create legal pathways which facilitate that art 
can be communicated, accessed and shared, could the legal thinking formulate a conception of the com-
mons and could the concept of the cultural commons be introduced, applied and given a platform in 
law?  
Yes, as long as we adopt a Deleuzeoguattarian approach to the concept and 
way of seeing things, by plugging the endeavour of creating a legal concept of 
the cultural commons into all the plateaus of the abstract machines, by allowing 
for encounters and lines of flight, by traversing smooth and striated spaces, by 
engaging in rhizomatic jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
787 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 458. 
 346 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 347 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
CONCLUSION – FIXING THE CONCEPT OF THE CULTURAL COMMONS IN 
LAW 
  
 348 
  
 349 
8 CONCLUSION – FIXING THE CONCEPT OF 
THE CULTURAL COMMONS IN LAW 
 
In Future of Ideas Lawrence Lessig poses the question: What do we gain by keep-
ing resources free? Free in this sense does not mean without cost, but free – as 
in – not hostages. This question marks the end of a discussion that shows that 
“resources held in common, sometimes create more wealth and opportunity for 
society than those same resources held privately.”788   
Following Carol Rose’s article ‘Romans, Roads, And Romantic Creators’ 
Lessig gives examples of the types of resources that sometimes create more 
wealth when they are held in common, such as roads and town squares. While I am 
fully in accordance with Lessig and Rose that certain resources gain their value 
by their openness, I have attempted to show here that an aspect of stints, that 
can control the fluidity (fuite) of common resources, are equally significant. The 
aspect of movement and nomadology have therefore been integral when it 
came to (re)addressing law, art, capitalism and ultimately the legal concept of 
cultural commons without opening any of them up altogether, making them en-
tirely free, in all senses of the word. So Lessig’s statement above and the emphasis 
on the word sometimes must not be underestimated also when we are imagining 
new, or reintroducing old, legal concepts. Resources held in common seem to, 
indeed, sometimes, create more wealth than when they are held solely privately. 
The knowledge economy has certainly attested to such tendencies.  
I have addressed and analysed a multitude of jurisprudential conceptions and 
legal concepts in arriving at the concept of the cultural commons. 
Deleuze/Guattari write in the opening segment of What Is Philosophy that a con-
cept is like a combination [chiffre] – a multiplicity789, “[c]omponents, or what de-
fines the consistency of the concept, its endoconsistency, are distinct, heterogene-
ous, and yet not separable. The point is that each partly overlaps, has a zone of 
neighbourhood […]”.790 The rhizomatic approach that this project has suggest-
ed be adopted in jurisprudence and law, and the legal concept of the cultural 
commons, manifests the potentiality of jurisprudence and law and their genuine 
capability do deal with the multiple, complex, concepts, or constellations of con-
cepts, cluster concepts, such as the cultural commons. This final chapter opens 
up the discussion about the wider implications of this type of rhizomatic juris-
prudence, what it does and what it could do.  
 
                                                
788 [original emphasis], Lessig, Future of Ideas, p. 86. 
789 Deleuze/Guattari, What is Philosophy, p. 15. 
790 [original emphasis], Ibid. p. 19. 
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8.1 SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: VOLUME I 
In summary, this research project has attempted to address the legal and socio-
cultural problems to access to art. It has proposed the legal concept of the cul-
tural commons as a way of exiting what has appeared to be a never-ending 
schism, the struggles of the private and the public, open and closed approaches 
in law and elsewhere. Utilising the theories and methods developed by Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari the project has attempted to show how jurispru-
dence and law have the potential to reach beyond such opposites-based reason-
ing and earnestly enter into and govern the unfinished and continuous para-
digms constantly being created by the digital knowledge society in a world that 
is still in a process of globalisation.  
Volume I of the study focused in particular on the very “getting-beyond” as 
a theoretical endeavour. The research began by placing the concept of the 
commons within the A2K paradigm, divorcing it from the discussion concern-
ing ownership of art and intellectual assets. Aiming to achieve a Deleuzian ap-
proach that reaches beyond law through law as an epistemological undertaking, Vol-
ume I did not indulge in the various What is? questions, not What is Law? or 
What is art?. Instead, Volume I introduced the Deleuzeoguattarian concept of 
the rhizome as an alternative approach to (the ontology of) law and art. Refrain-
ing from approaching law (and art) as a collection of “boxes” placed inside one 
another forming a system or a body, the project instead experimented with 
Deleuzeoguattarian plateaus, that when connected with each other form a rhi-
zome. The concept of plateaus that make up the rhizomes was approached as 
more open to temporary alliances, connections, constellations – constantly un-
finished, moving, iterant, able to change and create new formations. It was ar-
gued that such an iterant/nomadic/movement-based approach is particularly 
appropriate within the global knowledge society and its market(s). 
By introducing the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian concepts and making 
them operative tools, as well as structuring the presentation and the lay out of 
this study and its findings within the same framework, Volume I then moved 
into a case study chapter. The case studies where presented as Deleuzian “en-
counters”, that is, previously unrecognised occurrences that challenge the dog-
matic legal reasoning and break with it: occurrences that force the dogmatic rea-
soning to think, as Deleuze and Guattari put it. Presenting the cases as encoun-
ters and not as “obstacles to access”, the project could at the same time also 
demonstrate a creative potential that emerges from these cases, that initially seem 
only problematic and difficult. The case study chapter presented four different 
encounters that deal with and illustrate four different access issues, namely: 
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1) Access to the physical artworks 
2) Access to inspiration  
3) Access to artworks post mortem auctoris 
4) Access through libraries and digitisation.  
The case chapter culminated in and expressed the need for a rhizomatic ap-
proach to the access issue, particularly keeping in mind the aim that purports 
that access and ownership do not have to cancel each other out. 
Conclusively, Volume I answers one part of the overall research question. I 
hope that I have managed to show that access to art and additional ways to ac-
cess, communication and sharing of creative works can be introduced and given 
a platform in law. This conclusion has been reached through studying the first 
sub-questions of the study namely through engaging in a critique of the binary 
reasoning in law and by utilising the Deleuzian encounter-focused (as opposed 
to problem-oriented) approach. The critique of binary reasoning was mainly 
conducted in chapter 2 where the rhizomatic jurisprudence was introduced. 
There, it was shown how binary opposites such as inside-outside, private-public, 
open-closed could be transcended with the use and application of this theory. 
Reading law not as a “tree” but as a horizontally spreading rhizome opened up 
the possibility to introduce legal spatiality, legal territories, and how the legal ter-
ritory is constantly spreading and making connections to new occurrences 
through lines of flight that also are constantly deterritorialising it. 
In order to show how a wider access to art can be enabled through law the 
Deleuzian method was applied. By approaching the case studies that were pre-
sented in chapter 4 as Deleuzian encounters, the problems with binary reason-
ing that often result in obstacles to access could be presented, at the same time 
as a creative potential could be extracted from each case. This opened up to ad-
ditional legal possibilities that could enable access, and freed legal reasoning 
from the binary opposites of mainly opened-closed. 
 
8.1.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: VOLUME II 
Volume II introduced the concept of the commons, first on a theoretical level 
(chapter 5), then in conjunction with intellectual property law (chapter 6), and 
finally together with contract-based commons projects and solutions (chapter 
7). The theoretical approach to the commons began in the theory of Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, who in their turn have relied on Deleuze and Guat-
tari theoretically. Utilising Hardt and Negri’s approach to understanding the 
theoretical framework of the commons, could also be connected to the rhi-
zomatic jurisprudence that was presented in Volume I, it formed an additional 
plateau. Adding on the commons and developing the two together created the 
approach to the legal concept of the cultural commons that this research has 
been after to study. For that to be done the three chapters in Volume II 
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achieved a particular purpose, namely, to bring the study closer towards the le-
gal concept of the cultural commons. 
Chapter 5 outlined the general concept of the commons by beginning in the 
ownership and property paradigm as described by Hardt and Negri, and con-
trasting the concept of commons to ownership-based models. It then went on 
to contrast the concept of the commons with various (striated) types of public 
spaces, in order to arrive at the being-in-common model, i.e. a concept of the 
commons that does not rely an underlying communitarian form of ownership 
but is rather connected to the principle of communication. This chapter also 
contrasted the concepts of the natural commons and artificial commons. While 
it was made clear that this research project was within the realm of artificial 
commons, the natural commons were nonetheless also described topographical-
ly in order to demonstrate how and why the two function differently, particular-
ly when it comes to the difference between finite and infinite resources. This 
distinction between the natural and artificial commons has been the prerequisite 
and had to be acknowledged before moving on to chapters 6 and 7.  
Volume II then moved into chapter 6 where intellectual property law was 
discussed, its constructs and connections to the market and why many intellec-
tual property concepts are problematic within a commons based setting. Analys-
ing the numerous binary opposites that underpin intellectual property law and 
the dogmatic legal reasoning connected to it, chapter 6 argued that this was the 
very core that needs to be addressed if a legal concept of the cultural commons 
is to be discussed seriously before any attempts to introduce it within the legal 
sphere are made. Chapter 6 also demonstrated the nomadic and deterritorialis-
ing aspects of the market and capitalist structures themselves, and argued that 
law also has to be able to adapt to such iterant and floating tendencies. It was 
argued that the binary opposites created by dogmatic legal reasoning in intellec-
tual property law not only stifle further development of cultural commons, but 
also potentially stifle the market and the inherent movements that it is subject 
to on a global level.  
The seventh chapter of this study carried the discussion of the cultural 
commons concept into the digital era. This chapter discussed two types of al-
ready existing commons types enabled by various contract-based solutions. 
Firstly the vast and very popular Creative Commons initiative was presented, 
and then, secondly, a number of individual agreements were also brought in 
from the case studies in chapter 4 and analysed as commons. More exactly, the 
second type of solutions were not directly named as commons solutions as such 
but in the context of chapter 7 they were addressed as commons due to the fact 
that they underpinned the discussions dependent on a communication-based 
access discourses required within a democratic society. Both of these types of 
(commons) solutions that pertain to wider access to artworks were then placed 
within the Deleuzeoguattarian theoretical matrix, and particularly the models of 
sedentary and nomadic forms of possession. After having discussed the prob-
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lems with these contract-based commons solutions, the chapter finally present-
ed the legal concept of the cultural commons. This model is based on this research pro-
ject’s particular theoretical framework and approach to law, as well as this re-
search project’s subquestions and aims.  
Volume II answers the second part of the research question, namely how a 
constructive approach to a legal concept of the cultural commons could be 
adopted and how it can enable further access to art through law. Beginning to 
conduct a rhizomatic linkage (subquestion 2) between various legal concepts, 
such as ownership-public space-commons in chapter 5 and between various bi-
nary opposites from intellectual property law such as right-privilege, invention-
information, content-carrier, the research demonstrated that the constructive 
approach to the cultural commons lies in these very exercises of linkages that 
the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian methods opened up for. The “and” in 
the rhizome theory was shown in the second Volume of this study and how it 
can subvert the “or” of the dogmatic legal reasoning. 
The penultimate chapter of this study finally arrived at the constructive dis-
cussion of the cultural commons, demonstrating that a legal concept of the cul-
tural commons is not only possible but also desirable if we are to take this con-
cept seriously and introduce it to law. Chapter 7 shows how contract-based so-
lutions hinder the communication aspect (subquestion 3) of the commons, and 
are problematic in their own right, particularly in terms of the private ordering, 
bargaining power, and the political aspects. As one of the last conclusions 
drawn in this study was that the legal concept of cultural commons does not 
enable communitarian ownership but is rather an access based democratic pos-
sibility to communicate and share knowledge.  
 
8.1.3 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The overall conclusion of this project is that a legal concept of the cultural 
commons must be developed further and be made operative. By placing it in-
side the A2K paradigm, within the research question and the three sub-
questions of this project, a theoretical framework has been added and additional 
emphasis has been placed on artworks as knowledge, which are often side-
stepped or marginalised within the A2K field. 
One of the largest arguments that has been brought forward in this study 
has been to argue that a Deleuze-inspired approach to jurisprudence may open 
up new research possibilities, in the field of access to art and cultural commons, 
but also more broadly on a jurisprudential legal philosophical level. For in-
stance, the six principles of the rhizome – that have guided the theoretical ap-
proach of this study, namely connection, heterogeneity, multiplicities, asignifying rupture, 
cartography, and decalcomania can be very instrumental in modern jurisprudence, 
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particularly in terms of global influences and the paradigms of the knowledge 
society and their impact and effect on jurisprudence and law.  
The notion of connectivity and heterogeneity has guided this entire research 
project and has been imperative for the introduction of the concept of cultural 
commons in law. The ability to establish connections between, to quote 
Deleuze/Guattari, “semiotic chains, organisations of power, and circumstances 
relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles”791 now in the end of this re-
search project acquire a more practical meaning. This research studied the semi-
otics of law in general and of intellectual property law in particular, for instance 
in the use of the term ‘orphan’ as a metaphor, or the concepts of ‘right’ and 
‘privilege’ as legal tools, the ‘romantic notion of the author’ as a symbol that 
underpins law and what they all denote in terms of who the creator of the art-
work is (or assumed to be) in law and how access happens. The project has also 
studied various organisations of power, e.g. the state governed forces such as free-
dom of speech and freedom to information, market forces and the incentives of 
profit and gain, etc. All of this was then connected to the arts, (legal) science and 
even social struggles e.g. the A2K movement that is still very much framed within 
a social struggle paradigm. In the connection of all of these heterogeneous oc-
currences the project attempted to show various ‘becomings’ i.e. creative alli-
ances that show the potential of jurisprudence and law.  
The third principle of the rhizome, multiplicities, has also played a pivotal 
role for this project. Instead of presenting law as a delimited body with an inside 
and an outside, using the Deleuzeoguattarian concept of multiplicities the pro-
ject has attempted to show that traditional structures of traditional legal reason-
ing exclude certain multiplicities that a rhizomatic jurisprudence can cater for. 
For instance, the concept of cultural commons must be connected both to legal 
principles, such as e.g. copyright, as well as to market structures that in a dog-
matic approach would fall “outside” the legal sphere. By approaching law as all-
embracing in that way, i.e. as something that is able to contain all there is to be 
contained,792 not just the market forces but even further also affects, emotions, 
multi-identities etc. as we saw for instance in the Schulz and Kafka cases, the re-
search demonstrated how the notion of multiplicities could be incorporated as a 
critique of boundaries of jurisprudence and law. In a Deleuzeoguattarian rhi-
zomatic jurisprudence, where the attempt is to reach beyond the ontological 
question of what law is, this approach is necessary and carries within it the legal 
potentiality.  
The fourth principle of the rhizome, asignifying rupture, has been used to 
show how when a rhizome is broken with a line of flight, it starts up anew else-
where. This has particularly been used in the case studies both in chapter 4 and 
chapter 7, where it was demonstrated how an encounter causes a number of 
                                                
791 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 8. 
792 Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of Law’, p. 54. 
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lines of flight that take on lives of their own, so to speak. The project has fol-
lowed their deterritorialising nature, the reterritorialising aspects that are then 
added on by the positive law and the capitalist structures, but also their poten-
tial in that new alliances are constantly being formed elsewhere within (old and 
new) lines of flight. 
Finally, the fifth and sixth principles of the rhizome have assisted in ap-
proaching the spatiality of law differently and to further discuss the cartography 
of law. Instead of mimicking reality, which is constantly changing, rendering law 
constantly lagging, the Deleuzeoguattarian theory has introduced the mapping 
approach. While these two last principles of the rhizome may not have been 
equally expressly addressed throughout the study, as have the other principles, 
they have been pivotal in addressing the deterritorialising and reterritorialising 
tendencies of law and its lines of flight. The mapping method that Deleuze and 
Guattari utilise provided the tools that show how law does not have to be de-
scribed as static, and that it can very much be adaptable to the constantly chang-
ing reality that it indeed can stand to be connected to.  
This connectivity of law has also been illustrated by presenting the case stud-
ies as encounters. It is warranted, in the end of this project, to also specifically 
address these encounters here, as there are certain conclusions that have partic-
ularly emerged from the cases.  
 
8.1.4 THE CASES-SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
The cases presented in the case-study chapter, and then further developed in 
chapter 7, have been instrumental for this research project. However, I have 
consciously limited their scope, so as not to overshadow the commons concept 
that had to be at the forefront.  
 
The Bruno Schulz case – Access to the physical artworks 
When I discussed the Schulz mural as a Deleuzian encounter I had to focus on 
extracting the most illustrative lines of flight that emanated from it. I selected 
six lines of flight as particularly interesting for this project namely identity, 
fragmented artwork, moral rights, cultural heritage/folk art, digital reproduc-
tion, and space/time. All these lines of flight challenged certain dogmatic legal 
concepts. There were a number of conclusions that arose from this case, such 
as the problem with the notion of a unified identity of the artist that underlies 
many legal concepts, which becomes very difficult to defend and uphold in the-
se types of cases. The same could also be detected in the Kafka case. A similar 
underlying assumption, namely that an artwork is always assumed to be un-
fragmentised, i.e. whole, was also emphasised, and the critique could both be 
connected to the knowledge value of the artwork through the writings of e.g. 
Walter Benjamin, but also to some intellectual property concepts as e.g. moral 
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rights. Demonstrating how the particular concept of moral rights requires a liv-
ing, definable, unified artist, the line of flight indicated a number of arguments 
in line with moral rights, but differing on some key aspects, brought forward by 
Yad Vashem as an institution on a collective level.  
The critique of the moral right as a legal concept and its inability to be en-
forced on a collective level was connected to the notions of heritage and folk 
art. These concepts in their turn required a definable community, and a work of 
art that more directly than Schulz’s mural manages to do, references the culture 
of a clearly defined community. Finally, one of the main finds and conclusions 
that emanated from the Schulz case was that even when digital technology and 
the alternatives of the information society have been introduced the problems 
in terms of access remain, even though the digital alternative opens up new 
possibilities. One of the main arguments in terms of this case was to show how 
access to physical works could still be restricted even though there were digital 
alternatives. The conclusion from this particular encounter is that Bruno 
Schulz’s mural and the access issues connected to it very much challenged 
many, not to say most, of the relevant dogmatic legal concepts, illustrating a 
number of the shortcomings of dogmatic legal reasoning and positive law that 
could be deployed and placed within the matrix of the cultural commons. The 
case also opened up a potential in law to follow these particular lines of flights 
and discuss them further.  
 
The Darfurnica case – Access to inspiration  
With the Darfurnica case the aim was to particularly illustrate access to inspira-
tion as an encounter. This case served to challenge the notion of the artwork as 
something that an artist creates ex nihilo. Instead, this case presented the artwork 
as a rhizome, based on inspiration from various other artworks, artist, other 
types of sources available in society, including other (commercial or artistic) 
creative expressions. In such cases, in order to create new artworks, artists need 
to have access to all these other artworks, brands, creative expressions, etc. In 
order to discuss access to inspiration, the encounter was framed around the le-
gal concepts of derivative work, intellectual works as possession and/or expres-
sion. 
The concept of derivative work is a concept that emanates from intellectual 
property law. When it came to the Darfurnica case the two courts of law that 
had to rule on this case, had to take into account the difference between posses-
sion and expression – more exactly between the Louis Vuitton brand as an in-
tellectual property, a possession, and Nadia Plesner’s work, as a social com-
ment, an expression, a derivative work. 
One of the main conclusions that could be drawn from this case emerged 
from the expression that the Dutch court chose in its ruling, where they uttered, 
that possession and expression were fundamental rights, on equal footing, but 
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conflicting. Being able to demonstrate this instance where within the traditional 
legal reasoning two rights can be on an equal footing but conflicting, allowed 
the project to draw the conclusion that there were shortcomings in the way we 
currently approach fundamental rights, but also a potential in the possibility of 
connecting fundamental rights with each other in various new constellations. 
Another conclusion from this case that could be drawn was that the reading of 
the Deleuzian concept difference could be of interest, where it could be shown on 
a theoretical level that even though two rights might be on an equal footing that 
does not necessarily mean that they are commensurable – nor that they ought to 
be moulded into identical types of commensurable ‘fundamental rights’ forms. 
Whenever that is done in terms of access to inspiration a conflict between pos-
session and expression will always exist and create these types of obstacles to 
access.  
This case called for an insertion of the Deleuzeoguattarian and when it 
comes to access to inspiration and derivative works. 
 
The Dead Poets case – Access to artworks post mortem auctoris 
The third case study dealt with access to works left behind by deceased authors 
but where an estate or heirs control access. The discussion was framed within 
the paradigm of art. 27 UDHR and two access cases where used, namely access 
to the works of Franz Kafka and James Joyce. More precisely, the cases focused 
on the heirs to these prominent literary figures that decline access to works left 
behind such as letters and drafts. 
Using art. 27 UDHR as the guiding legal concept, but contrasting it partly to 
certain intellectual property provisions, stemming mainly from the TRIPS 
agreement, as well as pointing to its internal double nature, one of the main 
conclusions of this case could echo the previous two, in terms of opposite 
based reasoning, trans-nationality, non-belonging and fundamental rights, that 
are on equal footing but conflicting. However, this case study as an encounter added 
two additional dimensions, namely that of privacy and what is, in heritage stud-
ies, referred to as memory making and production of history. 
The two cases that were framed as one encounter could lead to an additional 
conclusion and that was that the notions of privacy are very rarely discussed in 
terms of access, and because of that, they form an obstacle to access that may 
not be apparent. Posing the questions whether last wishes of deceased authors 
or family issues are always enough to act as a shield to access, the case study 
concludes that in conjunction with art. 27 UDHR such a practice is not evident. 
The case argued that documents that can be instrumental in collective memory 
making must be placed inside art. 27 UDHR discussions more often. A perti-
nent question emerged from this case study namely when does a literary work 
achieve such stature that it ought be seen as having broken away from the ambit 
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of the private sphere and entered the realm of e.g. cultural heritage or the public 
domain that everybody ought to have access to?  
 
The Orphan works case – Access through libraries and digitisation.  
The last encounter that I presented in chapter 4 differed from the three previ-
ous ones. I focused on one particular legal concept as an encounter namely or-
phan works. On a broader note that case study discussed abandoned and forgot-
ten artworks and access to such works through libraries and digitisation. 
In order to conduct the study orphan works as a legal concept was scruti-
nised in detail – i.e. by studying how the concept itself has been formulated in 
law it could be shown that the construction of this particular concept both 
could serve as an obstacle to access as well as it was an instance when the juris-
prudential creativity demonstrates its rhizomatic potential. By presenting four 
particularly interesting aspects of the orphan work concept: public interest mis-
sion, access, revenue, and availability to public – the rhizomatic quality could be 
shown by demonstrating how access and revenue do not have to be framed as 
opposites in law. The orphan works concept has been envisioned as a concept 
that has a built-in public interest remit – which is there to enable access to the 
works that otherwise would have remained locked up.  
Most of the orphan works exist in libraries and gaining access to them could 
be made easier, but access cannot be granted due to the fact that rights holders 
are not known and cannot grant permissions for use. This tension between the 
unknown rightsholders and public access was further developed by placing the 
discussion within the metaphor used for this particular legal concept, namely 
“orphan”. By examining whether this particular term is at all an apt metaphor 
for description of these works, and what kind of legal ‘reality’ it constructs and 
projects, it could be concluded that by naming the concept an orphan it also in-
dicated that there per such reasoning has to also be a ‘parent’. But could the 
concept have been called something else and could another term to designate 
these works be used, e.g. the much more provocative hostage work? 
Lastly, two orphan work related cases where presented, one that involves de 
facto orphan works i.e. the case of Google Books and the HathiTrust, and the 
second one that is not directly named as involving orphan works, i.e. the case of 
Banksy’s Slave Labour mural. The two cases further assisted in the discussion 
concerning access to works through libraries and digitisation that has been pre-
vented through the legal concepts that counteract orphan works, as well as how 
rhizomatically the term orphan works could be extended to also include other 
works that are not necessarily envisioned as orphan works such as graffiti. 
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8.1.5 THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
The Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian approach to jurisprudence revealed its 
rhizomatic nature and opened up to new questions, new theoretical approaches 
and new research possibilities. I will only briefly mention two potential theoreti-
cal paths that this project has particularly culminated in, and it has to do with 
two theoretical connections: Deleuze and Habermas, and, Deleuze and Luh-
mann. 
 
8.1.5.1 THE DELEUZE/HABERMAS – AXIS 
Deleuze and Guattari were wary of the idea of communication. As a matter of 
fact, already in the introduction to What is Philosophy they had voiced their dislike 
of it: 
 
Philosophy does not contemplate, reflect, or communicate, although it must 
create concepts for these actions or passions. Contemplation, reflection and 
communication are not disciplines but machines for constituting Universals 
in every discipline. The Universals of contemplation, and then reflection, 
are like two illusions through which philosophy has already passed in its 
dream of dominating other disciplines (objective idealism and subjective 
idealism). Moreover, it does no credit to philosophy for it to present itself 
as a new Athens by falling back on Universals of communication and the media 
(intersubjective idealism). Every creation is singular, and the concept as a 
specifically philosophical creation is always a singularity. The first principle 
of philosophy is that Universals explain nothing but must themselves be 
explained.793  
 
This passage serves as a severe critique of Habermas and his communicative ac-
tion and intersubjectivity. But how can a Deleuzian communication be envis-
aged without assuming the Universal of communication or without fetishizing 
the intersubjective idealism that Deleuze and Guattari refuted?  
Today, this may not be as far fetched as it appears. A Deleuzian-Habermas-
ian synthesis is, in fact, possible. If communication is given a rhizomatic func-
tion, as within the context of this project, communication in that case functions 
as the very linkage between two (or more) singularities such as for instance an 
artist and an enterprise, or a consumer and a public institution, between rights 
and open access, etc. In order to conduct such a reading of communication one 
must read Deleuze/Guattari very carefully. Their apprehension to communica-
tion seems to refer to the reification and indeed commodification of the com-
munication itself. In the introduction to What is Philosophy they write further: 
                                                
793 [my emphases throughout], Deleuze/Guattari, What is Philosophy, pp. 6-7. 
 360 
 
Finally, the most shameful moment came when computer science, market-
ing, design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communication, seized 
hold of the word concept itself and said: ‘This is our concern, we are the crea-
tive ones, we are the ideas men! […] How could philosophy, an old person, 
compete against young executives in a race for the universals of communi-
cation for determining the marketable form of the concept, Merz?794  
 
Clearly, the concept of communication is presented merely within its commer-
cialised, commodified nature. But as we have seen so far, Deleuze and Guattari 
are not that forthright in their reasoning. Even though they were sceptical to-
ward capitalism, they remained, as we have seen, ambiguous to it. The same can 
be argued about communication. Or to rephrase Connolly’s formulation once 
again “[t]o put it another way, we still don’t know what communication can be-
come, even though its density and fragility give us reason to worry about the 
worst.”795 
What does then a Deleuzian/Habermasian synthesis, albeit disjunctive, en-
tail within the realm of this project? While the concepts of the rhizome, plateaus 
and lines of flight have helped us open up jurisprudence, law, art and capitalism, 
arriving at the potential in them all to accommodate for the legal concept of the 
cultural commons, the last piece in that puzzle is the communicative aspect. 
The concept of the commons relies on the communication of knowledge; it is 
its very raison d´être. Without communication, there is no, nor can there ever be 
any, commons. 
This section connects Deleuze and Habermas that can be explored further 
in future research projects. In a way, it is a study in its own right, to connect the 
two thinkers, since they have such two vastly different approaches to philo-
sophical concepts. But, here it is presented as one of the outcomes of the 
Deleuzeoguattarian rhizomatic jurisprudence that lends itself for further re-
search in the future: 
 
The Habermas exploration of potential capitalist crises also opens a door to 
productive engagements between him and Gilles Deleuze. The two differ in their phi-
losophies of time, nature, ethics and reason. And, yes, these differences do 
make differences. But Habermas’ explorations of convoluted relays be-
tween economic rationality, motivation and legitimation processes resonate 
with the Deleuze/Guattari conception of an unstable capitalist ‘axiomatic’ 
                                                
794 [original emphasis], Deleuze/Guattari, What is Philosophy, p. 11. 
795 [quote modified, my emphasis], “To put it another way, we still don’t know what capitalism 
can become, even though its density and fragility give us reason to worry about the worst.” 
Connolly, ‘Habermas, Deleuze and Capitalism.’  
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ensconced in a larger assemblage of intercoded elements with its own 
tendencies to instability.796  
 
I have been exploring the notion of crisis from the beginning of this study; it 
gave rise to the deterritorialising forces of this study. It has also opened the 
possibility to engage in a productive connection between Habermas and 
Deleuze. In a way, the shadow of the crisis has been present throughout this en-
tire project. But how serious is this crisis? It has been accentuated on various 
levels, and particularly if a Bourdieuian approach to capital is adopted then the 
crisis multiplies affecting economic, cultural and social capitals equally. A crisis 
forces the earlier paradigms to clash with the new paradigms. The technological 
advancements also played a pivotal role in the crisis. In the end, the crisis also 
reached law, and jurisprudence. Laurent de Sutter also finds the notion of crisis 
in jurisprudence when he reads Deleuze: 
 
It is as a result of a wider development on the becoming of the contempo-
rary world and the crisis of law which characterises it, that Deleuze devel-
ops it [the second thesis]. […] In defining the society of control Deleuze 
formulates the crisis. The crisis is marked by a limitless deference, which 
is best illustrated by the special status it accords to human rights. With the 
second thesis, Deleuze proposes a way of actualising a description of the 
crisis situation at the same time as presenting the same formula as a way of 
overcoming it. And therefore, before exploring the issue of the critical fur-
ther, one must consider the clinical. 797 
 
But what is crisis? What is a legal crisis? And to think about it clinically? Andreas 
Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos describes it in the following manner: 
 
[A] legal critique begins from the current state of the law and crosses the 
boundary that distinguishes the latter from a ‘better’ state of the law. In its 
urge to cross, critique announces a crisis (a judgement, a distinction), a crisis of 
crossing (critique cannot leave itself out) as well as a crisis than can only be 
observed through this crossing.798  
                                                
796 [my emphases throughout], Ibid. 
797 [my translation] “Lorsque Deleuze la formule [la second thèse], c’est en effet au cours d’un 
développement plus large sur le devenir du monde contemporain, et sur la crise du droit qui le 
caractérise. […] C’est cette crise que Deleuze formule lorsqu’il définit la société de contrôle 
marquée par un atermoiement illimité, lequel se trouve le mieux exprimé par la faveur dont y 
jouissent les droits de l’homme. En formulant sa seconde thèse, Deleuze la pense donc 
comme une manière de réaliser une description de cette situation de crise qui soit en même 
temps une manière d’en sortir. Plutôt que poursuivre plus avant la critique, il faut passer à la 
clinique.” de Sutter, Deleuze: La pratique du droit, pp. 63-64. 
798 [my emphasis], Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Niklas Luhmann, p. 13. 
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This project has not directly addressed the concept of crisis, because the main 
object has been to focus on potentiality, rather than the impossibility, or rather, 
as Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos calls it, improbability of law. However, at this 
stage in the study, where a conclusion of sorts is necessary, the sense of crisis 
ought to be at least acknowledged. While crisis in many ways drives the societal 
ebbs and flows that I have been exploring with the help of Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s rhizome theory and lines of flight, it is as such also a creative force that creates 
previously unthought-of alliances. This project has attempted to capture the crisis as a 
creative force. 
Connolly suggests that it is precisely here that Habermas and Deleuze and 
Guattari can be connected to one another, that is, in the crisis of capitalism in 
Habermas and the instability of capitalism (economic, social as well as cultural!) 
in Deleuze and Guattari. Adding Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ reading of cri-
sis in law ties them to this particular project, it makes them communicate – it facili-
tates a reading that guides us towards a ‘better’ state of the law. Deleuze writes 
that “[i]f our law is hesitant, is itself in crisis, it’s because we are leaving one in 
order to enter into the other.”799 
There is another connection between Habermas and Deleuze namely the 
Habermasian notion of the public space, that was rhizomatically connected to 
the notion of the commons, and the being-in-common in chapter 5. These two 
connections have enabled this project to further develop the legal concept of 
the cultural commons.  
Alexandre Lefebvre also made a connection between Habermas and 
Deleuze but in a sense where Habermas (together with the likes of Hart and 
Dworkin) was approached as a predecessor to Deleuze. On the other side of 
that spectrum Lefebvre placed Bergson and Spinoza, as the thinkers who 
acknowledge and envision the creativity of law in line with Deleuze. Deleuze 
identified an “orphan line of thinkers”800 that inspired him to find his own place 
in the history of philosophy. He commented that he had found a “secret” link 
between Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson in that their phi-
losophy was in opposition to the major State philosophy.801 This secret link was 
“constituted by the critique of negativity, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of in-
teriority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation of power.”802  
The point of this study has been, on a theoretical level, to see new connec-
tions, secret links as it were, getting beyond the traditional binary divisions, in 
this case beyond positivism, dogmatism, but also, critique. Thus, Connolly 
writes “[t]o the extent either Marx or Habermas was tempted by the mastery 
                                                
799 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, p. 5. 
800 Brian Massumi, ‘Translator’s Foreword’ to A Thousand Plateaus, p. x. 
801 Ibid.  
802 Ibid., quote originally from: Deleuze, ‘I have nothing to admit’, in Semiotext(e), Anti-Oedipus 
2, 3, (trans.) Janis Foreman, Semiotext(e)(1977). p. 12. 
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project, Deleuze breaks with each.”803 Deleuze interrupts the “mastery project” 
that Marx and Habermas strived towards – i.e. a project that not only purports 
to explain why things are as they are, but that also gives a solution (e.g. classless 
society in Marxism or communicative action in Habermas). But this very inter-
ruption of the mastery projects is precisely where the creative potential lies. It 
does not mean that Habermas and Deleuze are two different thinkers on the 
opposite sides of the spectrum, it means that when the two are connected, the 
potential of law and future legal theory is revealed – opening up the possibilities 
to not only provide a postmodern critique of law but also a plethora of construc-
tivist solutions to these problems that the mastery projects from modernism have 
given rise to. This is one of the biggest advantages with the rhizomatic jurispru-
dence, as it opens up the theoretical possibility for these exercises as we have 
seen throughout this project. This connection between what has previously 
been considered to be two opposites, marks, once again, an encounter as 
“[a]ccording to Deleuze, only an unanticipated and violent encounter can stimu-
late thought past the purview of recognition and force it to think.”804 The connec-
tion between Deleuze and Habermas could be one such forceful encounter. 
 
8.1.5.2 THE DELEUZE/LUHMANN – AXIS 
It is often stated that when we are adopting a critical research approach we are 
assuming a type of prescription (a de lege ferenda approach) and when the more tra-
ditional dogmatic approaches to law are utilised then we are providing descrip-
tions of law (a de lege lata approach). In a Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian ma-
trix where we do not speak of a body of law but rather about a law without or-
gans, and the becomings of law – the two, prescription and description, are 
constantly intertwined. Through this approach we have simultaneously been 
able to trace both the production of law, poiesies – and self-generation and self-
production of law, autopoiesies, but also the challenges, encounters, deterritoriali-
sation of law, that demonstrate the potentiality of law. Deleuzian becomings 
and Luhmannian autopoietic system, ultimately, are not each other’s opposites. 
Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos writes: 
 
The term ‘system’ in Luhmann’s theory is a misnomer because it gives the 
impression of systematicity, of normative promise and unfailing consisten-
cy, of a method, itself systematic, that produces systematised units of per-
fectly formed totalizing boundaries. But this system is nothing of the sort. 
If, faithful to its etymology, the term denotes a syn (‘together’) and histanai 
(‘to set up’, ‘to stand’), a togetherness that has been set up (is this setting up 
arbitrary? And who has set it up? Itself? Without discernible origin?), a tran-
                                                
803 Connolly. ‘Habermas, Deleuze and Capitalism.’ 
804 [my emphasis] Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 72. 
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sitive infinitive that stands alone and alone it consists itself; if a system de-
notes a togetherness without content, without periechon, a compearance, an as-
semblage of sorts without promise of future form, consistent boundaries, 
identifiable characteristics or positive functions; if a system is a machine in 
the Deleuze-Guattari sense that is nothing but connections and operations 
in a constant process of what they call deterritorialization, namely the relent-
less becoming other than itself, always at another stage which engulfs and is 
engulfed by its otherness; if a system is that, that is, if a system is not, then a 
Luhmannian system is indeed a system.805  
 
Theoretically this is another connection that cannot be explored much further 
here but one where we end up in in the end of this research project. The system 
misnomer, but perhaps in reality, an assemblage, a body without organs – a law, 
a ‘system’ in the Luhmannian sense, without organs – in the Deleuzeoguattarian 
sense. Deleuze and Guattari write of BwOs as we saw in chapter 2 that “[w]e 
come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the 
organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is 
opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organ-
ism.”806 
This focus on organisation of organs in terms of the BwO enables Philop-
popoulos-Mihalopoulos to create the Deleuze-Luhmann matrix on a theoretical 
level. On a more practical level, and for the particular purposes of this project it 
means that a legal BwO is not an opposite to organs (such as for instance IP 
rights as an organ of a legal body, that is organised to form an opposite to the 
organs freedom of expression, public domain etc.) but it rather opposes their 
organisation in a manner where they are forcefully placed in a binary order. In-
stead, it becomes a matter of spatiality:    
 
The legal system is waking up to its spatiality – and this does not refer 
merely to some legal branches, such as the obvious property or environ-
mental law, but the law on the whole and in all its particular manifesta-
tions.807 
 
Which brings us back to the critique of the attempts to search for the ontology 
of law – which is impossible when law is approached as a BwO, constantly 
changing, unfinished, in an endless stage of becoming: 
 
                                                
805 [original emphases throughout], Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Niklas Luhmann, p. 8. 
806 [my emphasis] Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 175. 
807 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law’, p. 56. 
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A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. […] To become 
is not to progress or regress along a series. Above all, becoming does not 
occur in the imagination [it is] perfectly real. […] Becoming produces noth-
ing other than itself.808 
 
And, to continue on Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ line of reasoning, if a 
Luhmannian autopoietic system is that, that is, if an autopoietic system is some-
thing that produces nothing other than itself, then a Deleuzeoguattarian becoming fits 
indeed within an autopoietic system, since: 
 
“[A] line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, 
origin nor destination; to speak of the absence of an origin, to make the ab-
sence of an origin the origin, is a bad play on words. A line of becoming is 
only a middle.”809 
 
This corresponds to the groundlessness, sans-fond or Ungrund that was addressed in 
chapter 2, it also corresponds with Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ reading of 
Luhmann “[i]f there were to be a Grundnorm in the autopoietic legal system, that 
would be the paradox.”810 A line of becoming is nothing like a Grundnorm. 
Furthermore, Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos addresses the Luhmannian no-
tions of system and environment. He writes that described in a generic, contex-
tual way, an environment could be said surrounds the law without touching it. 
However, if the autopoiesis of law is to be read even more radically instead an-
other approach to the (legal) environment can be proposed: 
 
If, however, one wants to be radical about the environment, one is expected 
to plunge headlong into the vicissitudes of what this environment may be, 
how to understand it without colonizing it, how to employ its appearance 
without forcing its presence. The environment must be taken literally. By 
this I mean that no representation of the environment should be offered, 
conveniently packaged for the law to ingest, instrumentalize and use. In-
stead, the environment must be understood as a disturbance for the law, as 
a space of unsettling whispering or even stentorious arguing, of unresolved 
conflict, of intense questioning. The environment of the law is the law’s 
worst fears and, at the same time, law’s avenue of potentially becoming 
more just.811  
                                                
808 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 262. 
809 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 323. 
810 Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law’, p. 59. 
811 [my emphasis], Ibid. p. 45. 
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In many ways, this research project has attempted to reach precisely this, law’s 
worst fear, in discussing the legal concept of the cultural commons. Interrupting 
the symmetry: law inside–environment outside, as Philoppopoulos-
Mihalopoulos suggests we do, has been done by employing the Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian theory and method in order to engage in a more operative 
connection between “law” and that which is “outside”. However, the “inside” 
and the “outside” dichotomy, “law” and “society”, have been questioned from 
the start by using the connectability that the notion of the rhizome and rhi-
zomatic jurisprudence opened up for: 
 
The environment is right in the middle of the various self-assured systems. 
Deleuze and Guattari bring up precisely the space of the middle as the point 
of beginning. In so doing, they revolt against the habitual conceptualization 
of beginning that goes along the need for origin, but also concepts such as 
centre and boundary.812 
 
The Deleuzian middle connected to Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos argument of 
law’s environment as “space, bodies and structures that surround and indeed 
constitute the law”813 is a relevant outcome. Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos ap-
proach to environment and this critical understanding of Luhmannian autopoi-
esis has called for a connection with the Deleuzeoguattarian notion of Bodies 
Without Organs and then further discussion of the legal concept Law Without 
Organs: 
 
[A]utopoiesis can no longer be thought without its bodily functions. Rather 
tellingly Luhmann writes: ‘the difference between corporeality and noncor-
poreality has (at least for our present societal system) no social relevance’. 
This fits rather well with a Deleuzian definition of a body: ‘a body can be 
anything: it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or idea; it can be a 
linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity’.814 
 
Finally then, we arrive at a Law without Organs. Alexandre Lefebvre has ad-
dressed this concept on various occasions815 but never fully developed it. He 
writes for instance in the article ‘Critique of teleology in Kant and Dworkin: 
The law without organs (LwO)’ could be or might become a “a critical concept: 
                                                
812 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law’, p. 50. 
813 Ibid. p. 46. 
814 Ibid. p. 57. 
815 See e.g. Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 150 and 152, see also Lefebvre, ‘We Do Not Yet 
Know What the Law Can Do’, Lefebvre ‘A New Image of Law: Deleuze and Jurisprudence’, 
Telos 130: 103–26. (2005). 
 367 
the Law without Organs (LwO) […]. By relating the BwO’s critique of judgment 
to Dworkin (now characterized as a teleological legal theorist), I propose a con-
cept that allows Deleuze’s texts to have critical purchase on […] law and juris-
prudence. While the LwO is not positively developed in this article, it results 
from the characterization of Dworkin’s theory of adjudication as teleological 
(and evoking natural purposes) and in this way can prefigure how Deleuze can 
be used to advance a theory of law and judgment as they might be freed from 
teleology.”816 Which gives rise to the natural question, what is then law and 
judgment freed from teleology? Positivism? Legal dogmatism? No. The law 
without organs is a critical concept that fosters the rhizomatic jurisprudence as 
has been explored throughout this project, a concept that allows for the various 
becomings of law, that enables its connectivity, creativity, and activates its po-
tentialities… It is precisely when law becomes a LwO that a multidimensional, 
cluster-based, polyvalent, concept such as the cultural commons can be con-
ceived of in jurisprudence and given a platform in law.  
 
8.2 THE FUTURE OF RHIZOMATIC JURISPRUDENCE 
As we have seen, the fundamental idea in the Deleuzian philosophy is the Nie-
tzschean conception of the never-ending becomings, multiplicities, and inter-
connected forces.817 Let us briefly be reminded of Giorgio Agamben’s §10 in 
The Open where he discussed the writings of Baron Jacob von Uexküll, who in-
cidentally was the very biologist that began constructing a rhizomatic concept in 
the first place. In Uexküll’s world we find the “Rhizostoma pulmo” – the jellyfish – 
a concept that would come to inspire Deleuze/Guattari. Agamben wrote:  
 
Where classic science saw a single world that comprised within it all living 
species hierarchically ordered from the most elementary forms up to the 
higher organisms, Uexküll instead supposes an infinite variety of perceptual 
worlds that, though they are uncommunicating and reciprocally exclusive, 
are all equally perfect and linked together as if in a gigantic musical sore […] 
like two notes on the ’keyboard on which nature performs the supratem-
poral and extraspatial symphony of signification’ though it is impossible to 
say how two such heterogeneous elements could ever have been so inti-
mately connected.818 
 
                                                
816 [original emphasis] Lefebvre, ‘Critique of teleology in Kant and Dworkin: The law without 
organs (LwO)’, p. 181. 
817 Cf. Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 150. 
818 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, (trans.) Kevin Attell, Stanford University 
Press, (2002 [originally published in 1942]) pp. 40-41.  
 
 368 
Dogmatic legal reasoning has not been able to grasp such understanding of 
multiple worlds, that is, traditional legal reasoning only allows us to see the 
world it itself paints. However, there are a number of other ‘perceptual’ worlds 
that, nonetheless, can all be fully reconcilable, and communicate inter se. We 
have for instance seen the various perceptible worlds when reality is presented 
in one way in law (e.g. private and public must always be each others opposites), 
when in reality there are a number of other constellations and variations to the 
particularly ‘legal’ understanding and rendition of reality. And many other ex-
amples presented here in this research project, such as the assumptions regard-
ing unified identity of authors, the un-fragmentised artworks, the work as an in-
vention created ex nihilo, etc. 
In this project, I have provided a critique of the fact that traditional legal 
reasoning rests upon an underlying understanding of being a hierarchically or-
dered system, corporeal (‘the body of law’), a static body of coherent regulation, 
dependent on a centre, an origin, a genesis, and ultimately of a binary logic. In 
order to get beyond that, I have had to get away from the reasoning that pre-
supposes law to be “hierarchically ordered from the most elementary forms up 
to the higher”819 laws. These hierarchies create the ‘reality’ that always has to 
correspond with law, a unified, coherent, ordered reality – and everything within 
it subsumable under law. When law cannot do that, when it encounters some-
thing that it cannot easily subsume under its system, when it encounters some-
thing that it cannot understand “with a ready-made rule up its sleeve”820, it is 
precisely then when the rhizomatic jurisprudence can step in, and out of the 
impossibility create a potentiality.  
It became clear that ‘reality’, is everything but clear-cut, anything but hierar-
chical, unified, ordered. That is why we always lose an element of its complexi-
ty; it becomes much less sophisticated, when it has to be translated into ‘law’, or 
dogmatic law, dogmatic legal reasoning. With rhizomatic jurisprudence we have 
been experiencing a need to approach law differently, instead of seeing it as 
fixed, it can be seen as fluent, instead of vertical it can be inspiringly horizontal, 
it does not have to be static, it can be creatively dynamic. This project has been 
an exercise in reimagining law itself, not as a body but as an assemblage of 
norms and worlds (rhizomes, plateaus, lines of flight) that do not necessarily 
have to be pitted against one another in hostile pairs that always have to act as 
each other’s opposites in order for the system to be seen as legitimate.  
What Deleuze and Guattari argue for is the seemingly paradoxical disjunctive 
synthesis – paradoxical in the sense that disjunction divides and synthesis does 
the very opposite, it unites.821 Deleuze and Guattari discuss an affirmative, non-
restrictive, inclusive disjunction that remains disjunctive, and that still affirms 
                                                
819 Agamben, The Open, p. 40. 
820 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. 174. 
821 Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 94. 
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the disjunctive terms, without restricting one by the other or excluding the oth-
er from the one.822 On the overall level of the entire project the aim has all 
along been to get to the creative possibilities, the potential of law, and show 
how it could affirm the disjunctive terms, constantly challenging and disman-
tling the legal body, but how through those types of processes a legal concept of 
the cultural commons emerges and could exist without restricting the private 
ownership/individual rights, and vice versa, coming together ultimately in a legal 
concept of the cultural commons. 
 
8.2.1 DELEUZE AND DELEUZE/GUATTARI BY WAY OF LAW 
It has been claimed in the introductory paragraphs of this research project that 
the discussion surrounding the commons, and cultural commons in particular, 
concerns some very much still-in-progress paradigm shifts. This has become 
obvious throughout the study. The study has attempted to illustrate the three-
tiered paradigm shift, or three types of paradigm shifts, that were all mentioned 
in the first chapter. These three paradigm shifts are occurring simultaneously. 
The first concerns the commons as a construction in law, the second the intellectual 
property paradigm and its existence and function in the access-and-sharing-based 
digital knowledge society, and the third has to do with an international paradigm 
shift that concerns the global access to resources, the level of openness and plat-
forms and law that can regulate access to various types of resources.  
The rhizomatic jurisprudence adds to yet another paradigm shift, namely the 
one that has to do with the future and the exegesis of the Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian philosophy. By constructing and introducing a legal concept 
of the cultural commons and by placing certain Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguat-
tarian concepts in law and jurisprudence, the project adds to their philosophy by 
way of law and it too becomes something else.  
This project has attempted to inscribe itself in the broad discussion concern-
ing the use and application of the concepts such as the rhizome, 
re/de/territorialisation and plateaus, bodies without organs, etc. These particu-
lar concepts that essentially stem from the Deleuzeoguattarian Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia project have remained under-explored from a legal point of view. 
As such, this study placed them in an unusual setting, yet one that was in no 
way unfamiliar with Deleuze and Guattari, nor are Deleuze and Guattari, con-
versely, unfamiliar to jurisprudence and legal philosophy. This aspect of placing 
their philosophy in a new setting develops it, forces it to move.   
This study has also engaged in the on-going conversations that concerns the 
philosophies of Deleuze, and Deleuze/Guattari for instance with Lefebvre and 
Mussawir. It is through these conversations that the Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian jurisprudential concepts were developed, and as such addi-
                                                
822 Deleuze/Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 76 and 90, see also Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 94. 
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tional meanings and contexts could be added to them, such as the concept of 
rhizomatic jurisprudence or the nomadic legal method. The focus of this study 
has been rhizomatic jurisprudence. Whether that particular use of the rhizome 
adds to the understanding of the rhizome, as a philosophical concept, remains 
to be discussed, hopefully.  
What has not been addressed at all here are many of Deleuze’s earlier works 
as well as the Critical and Clinical823 project, which was his final work. Guattari’s 
works without Deleuze have not been addressed either. Because of this, the 
concepts from Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and their placement within a juris-
prudential setting, have acquired an unusual meaning as they have often been 
ostracised from the wider Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian contexts. As we 
saw in chapter 2 when using Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari and their concepts 
in jurisprudence and in legal research, it is not a question of application, but 
borrowing of the ideas, of setting them in motion “in coordination with law to-
ward the creation of new problems and new concepts.”824 The rhizomatic juris-
prudence has functioned in such a manner here, arriving at the legal concept of 
cultural commons. This research has thus borrowed the concepts and the lan-
guage of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, arguing that law and jurisprudence 
can be rhizomatic, open-ended, connectable, multi-dimensional, able to create 
and uphold constellation concepts and handle clusters of concepts. It has been 
argued that law can be (if it is not already) nomadic, deterritorialised, and able to 
float and to allow for travel. For it to happen, it calls for creativity. This bor-
rowing-of-concepts and perhaps violent (dis)placements of them in new settings 
also augments their meaning, makes the Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian phi-
losophy encounter something that it is not used to encountering, forces it to 
think. It adds additional levels and dimensions to the Deleuzian and 
Deleuzeoguattarian philosophy.  
  
The principles of the rhizomatic jurisprudence have thus been applied on a the-
oretical, jurisprudential level. As such, this study has argued that creativity is not 
problematic for law, nor is it extra-legal activism, or even accidental, as 
Lefebvre refers to it. On the contrary, creativity is very much called for in the 
spheres of jurisprudence and law. As such the point of view of this study has 
not been to approach creativity as something that comes from outside law, but 
something that is always already there. The Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian theory 
contributed to and allowed for such an approach to law and jurisprudence.  
In conclusion, Deleuzian and Deleuzeoguattarian philosophy allowed this 
author to free herself from certain shackles of traditional legal reasoning and to 
describe law not as a body but instead as an assemblage, an abstract machine, 
without organs and jurisprudence as a rhizomatic movement that exists not due 
                                                
823 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical. 
824 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, p. xi. 
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to, but through, paradigm shifts. As such it does not represent, or reproduce re-
ality, it envisions it, creates it! This creation, creation of reality, creation of itself, 
autopoiesis, remains to be explored further, beyond the humble attempts of this 
particular project. And maybe Foucault was right, perhaps, not only the century 
but also the law and jurisprudence will one day be(come) Deleuzian.825 
 
The diagramic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even 
something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type 
of reality. Thus when it constitutes points of creation or potentiality it does 
not stand outside history but is instead always prior to history.826 
– Deleuze and Guattari 
 
  !
                                                
825 Foucault wrote: “[O]ne day, perhaps, this century will be called Deleuzian.” Quote taken 
from Michel Foucault ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, in Critique 282, p. 885. Also in Michele Fou-
cault, Dits et écrits 1954-1988, Vol II. Paris: Gallimard, (2001). 
826 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousands Plateaus, p. 157. 
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EXIT. 
 
Ever since he wrote Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace827 in 1999 and as late as in 
May 2013 in his inaugural lecture828, when he was made honorary doctor at the 
Lund University, Lawrence Lessig has been addressing the four modalities that 
he asserts all need to be accounted for when we are discussing improvement 
and effects of law particularly in terms of the cultural commons, namely: law, 
norms, market, and, architecture. Lessig defines law as statutory law, norms as 
rules that exist ‘outside’ the legal sphere, market as free liberal market, and ar-
chitecture refers to the architecture of the internet – both technical and legal – 
that creates and enables the online digital environment.  
All these four modalities have in one way or another been relevant and re-
quired during the course of this research project and for the understanding of 
how current law works, and equally, where it fails. Lessig argues that without all 
of the four modalities put together current laws do not, and perhaps cannot, 
function in the knowledge society. Only by understanding the interaction and 
connections between all four can we improve law. Thus, according to Lessig, 
we need to understand all four modalities equally well, and in order to that, we 
must also, sometimes, step outside the law. 
This particular research project has been attempting even to go one step fur-
ther than that. The project has firstly challenged the notions of an inside and an 
outside of law. This distinction, it has been argued, is unnecessary, as long as 
law, whatever law is, can be connected to anything that is deemed to be both ‘in-
side’ and ‘outside’ it. When Lessig lists law, norms, market, and architecture as 
four different modalities he assumes that there exist such occurrences as a defin-
able law, norm, market, and architecture, and that they can be analysed, separat-
ed, and even found. He is probably at least partially right in claiming so, but in 
claiming that, it will also always be problematic to draw a line between the four, to 
find their limits and borders, to denote where the one ends, and conversely 
where the other begins. And it brings us back to the ontological question. Such 
reasoning will always lead us back into the traps of the treacherous binary rea-
soning, back to the world of paradoxes and hostile binary opposites, in the 
world where all four of Lessig’s modalities experience a constant stalemate. I 
have throughout this study endeavoured to show that, even if we multiply the 
binary reasoning, and make quadruple modalities, like Lessig proposes that we 
do, we will have not gone far enough in the project of going beyond the ontology 
of law, seeing the potential of law. Reasoning entirely like Lessig suggests we do, 
means that there are possibilities that will always be deemed to fall outside the 
                                                
827 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, and second edition Lessig, Code 2.0 and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace. 
828 Lawrence Lessig, Honorary Lecture, Pufendorfsalen, Lund University, 30th May 2013. 
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law, to exist in one of the three other modalities, and as such to also fall outside 
the legal reach and its possibilities. 
That being said, revealing the four different modalities as a starting point in 
the commons projects has been vital for the global commons projects that have 
been evolving since the beginning of the 21st century. Lessig himself, and the 
Creative Commons project, have been pivotal in this process, but as we have 
entered a new decade, it is warranted to ask what does Creative Commons of 
the future, look like? Can it stay as popular and manage to reinvent itself?829 
The regulators830 have been ignoring the instinct that they might have had, 
Lessig argues further, that copyright, as a legal concept, may be problematic in 
the digital age. Nonetheless, the regulators have adamantly so far refrained from 
introducing any significant additions, reforms or changes to it. The reaction of 
the regulators has thus been, Lessig claims, inappropriate. I agree with Lessig 
when he reaches that conclusion. Then, Lessig argues further that when we did 
not seize the opportunity ten years ago to legislate, with the momentum of for 
instance Creative Commons and other global and local digital commons initia-
tives, to regulate the commons in law and/or reform copyright law more radi-
cally, it might now be too late. I do not agree with this conclusion. 
To circumvent today’s stalemate, where entertainment industries within a 
capitalist paradigm are burdened with piracy and where a generation of young 
people within an open access paradigm are being branded as criminals, now is 
precisely the right time to suggest substantial additions or changes to law, as now is 
the first time we can evaluate previous commons initiatives that have been run-
ning for over ten years in various contract-based guises, and conceive of new 
ones, such as the ones with a platform in law. Lessig argues that we ought to 
have a system where professionals that create intellectual content can be compen-
sated, but where amateurs, at the same time are allowed to be inspired, to create and 
share, without being burdened by, for instance, the unnecessary regulations of 
copyright law.831 This is where the legal concept of the cultural commons fits 
right in. This project has been a theoretical exercise in precisely getting at this 
particular phenomenon. In order to envision the concept of the cultural com-
mons in law, and to do so on a theoretical level, the project has had to make an 
inventory of the various existing commons initiatives and solutions and then 
                                                
829 Even as late as in December 2013 the Creative Commons has reached out globally through 
various channels including Twitter (https://twitter.com/creativecommons) to the public and 
their supporters to donate funds in order for the project to be able to continue in 2014. This 
means that the future existence of the project, at least in its current guise, is by no means guar-
anteed.  
830 Lessig uses the word regulator, not only to denote the ‘legislator’ but a wider band of peo-
ple such as policy makers, lobbyists, other decision makers etc. – anybody involved in some-
how shaping the law, the understanding or interpretation of law, etc. 
831 Lessig, Honorary Lecture, Pufendorfsalen, Lund University, 30th May 2013. 
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place them within the theoretical framework, and ultimately tie it to the rhi-
zomatic jurisprudence.  
The conclusion of this study means, furthermore, that we cannot do away 
with copyright law. Lessig argues that the solution lies in finding the perfect bal-
ance between the four modalities: law, norms, market and architecture. I would 
like to argue that the solution lies in finding a possibility within law that connects 
it to norms, market and architecture at any given point, as well as makes it able 
to shift connections as any of the other modalities, now known or hereafter devised, 
(to use a common copyright licence language) change. This is not just seman-
tics; it is a radically different approach from what Lessig is arguing for. 
Using Deleuzeoguattarian theory throughout this project I have argued for 
how it can be possible to conceive of the concept of the cultural commons as 
connectable, and how there is no direct need to refer to an ‘outside’ of law any 
longer. I have claimed that this connectedness and connectability is not some-
thing that needs to be invented – it needs only to be discovered. When Lessig 
claims that the lessons of Code Is Law have not been learned, the notion of law 
can be challenged, as well as the claim that code is law. Not challenge it in the 
sense to say that code is not law, but challenge it within the framework of this 
research project, namely that what law is is irrelevant, as long as it can communi-
cate with everything else that affects it. Code is code, and law is, always already, 
something else. 
This is not only a semantic claim either. This is the very potential of law, that 
it is adaptable to the deterritorialising and fluid (and fleeing) tendencies of socie-
ty. We live in a connected society that constantly communicates and is depend-
ant on communication (in all its guises), and that is connected through the in-
ternet, through travels, through common interests etc. The natural and artificial 
commons form a central part in this connected society, and there, it is obvious, 
law has to accommodate for connection and communication.  
There are of course many problems with the internet and the digital alterna-
tives. We have been reading about them and studying them for over two dec-
ades now. I have attempted to present some of these problems. Lessig notes 
that with the arrival of the internet there is a lot to worry about, and digitisation 
has brought with it plenty of bad, despite much of the good it has given us. Dit-
to about the law. 
In the context of copyright both Lessig and many other scholars together 
with him have for a long time claimed that that the regulators and policy makers 
have been regulating in the last couple of decades as if the internet did not exist. 
This very stance has meant that sharing became piracy – i.e. infringement of IP 
rights. This resulted in large-scale litigations as for instance in the Napster case. 
In the short term, these legislations managed to destroy organisations such as 
Napster, but in the long term – it resulted in a multitude of Napster-like entities, 
Pirate Bay being the last prominent one.  
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When Galileo Galilei was forced to recant his belief that the Earth moves 
around the sun in front of the Inquisition, he is supposed to have followed up 
the recantation by uttering the words: Eppur si muove /And yet it moves. The same 
can be said about current policies and legislations. The internet, not only exists, 
it floats and it leaks. So, regardless of how many underlying sharing structures 
have already been recanted, taken down, and more recently, how many underly-
ing structures that enable leaks have been disabled, and regardless of how many 
law professors recant the possibilities of law – the digital knowledge society is 
here to stay.  
Which brings this project to its end. The use of Deleuzian and Deleuzeo-
guattarian theory has been utilised to describe societies and laws that are con-
stantly moving, fleeing, and leaking. This must be acknowledged theoretically in 
jurisprudence as well as practically in the everyday practices of law. Such a fun-
damental acknowledgement is something Lessing has called for on a practical 
level and this research project is calling for it on a theoretical as well as practical 
level. There will be sharing, and this tendency ought not to be fought by law. 
Lessig argues that the implications of sharing should be balanced by compensat-
ing artists differently, as sharing will happen – it is inevitable. I have throughout 
this research project argued that such compensations must be discussed further, 
but one potential step towards new compensation schemes is to seriously dis-
cuss the legal concept of the cultural commons.  
If sharing during the last twenty years happened via digital downloading (le-
gal as well as illegal) of cultural content, then the sharing of the future, it can be 
argued, now happens within the realm of up- and downloading of information. 
It is no longer just a matter that concerns cultural content, it has spread to also 
include wider types of information and knowledge that is being shared and 
where further access regulation on a legal level is no doubt called for. Sadly, this 
is where this project ends and another one can begin. It can be concluded, by 
connecting the sharing of digital content and the entire internet infrastructure to 
the liquidity of the Deleuzeoguattarian smooth spaces. Interestingly, it is pre-
cisely where we have ended up here, in the sharing of the future, which also 
provides an answer as to why the Deleuzeoguattarian theory is now more perti-
nent than it ever has been before, as we have now fully entered, quite literally, 
the fluid society… and yet, it leaks. 
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Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world, our own, we see it multiplied 
and as many original artists as there are, so many worlds are at our dispos-
al…  
— Marcel Proust 
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